IR 05000309/1986014
| ML20197A720 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1986 |
| From: | Conklin C, Lazarus W, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197A646 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-86-14, NUDOCS 8610270378 | |
| Download: ML20197A720 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION '
Report No. 50-309/86-14 Docket No.
50-309 License No. DPR-36 Priority Category Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 Facility Name: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine Inspection Conducted:
September 22-24, 1986
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/OMM6 Inspectors:
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u W. Thomas,"T4'ain LeadeM EPy, EP&RPB, DRSS
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<Pb C. ConkKIP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS date L. Cohen, EP Specialist, EPBHQ C. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector, Maine Yankee J. Robertson, Resident Inspector, Mainediankee E. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, DRP-N!P6 Approved by:
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. Jg1(azaruU Chief, Emergency Preparedness date Section, EP&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 22-24, 1986 (Report No.
50-309/86-14)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emer5ency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on September 23, 1986. The inspection was performed by a team of six NRC Region I and headquarters personnel.
Results: No violations were identified. Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public. A deficiency was identified in one area which requires prompt attention. There is no method to include an estimate of iodine contribution to the source term in initial dose projections and subsequent protective action recommendations.
In addition, the licensee's methodology used to provide protective measures for offsite authorities does not consider the NRC guidance of focusing on the potential degradation of plant and core prior to recommending sheltering or evacuation of populations around the facility.
8610270378 861021 PDR ADOCK 05000309
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on September 24, 1986.
C. D. Frizzle, Vice President Operations G. D. Whittier, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Licensing J. M. Temple, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator J. C. Frothingham, Manager Operations Department P. L. Anderson, Maine Yankee Project Manager, YAEC T. P. Fuller, Radiation Protection Engineer, YAEC The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercise.
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Emergency Exercise The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant partial-scale exercise (limited off-site participation) was conducted on September 23, 1986 from 9:00 AM until 1:30 PM.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss objectives, scope and content of the exercise scenario.
As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain objec-tives, revise certain portions of the scenario, and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on September 22, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario.
The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
Increasing leak rate from the reactor coclant systen,;
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Charging system piping rupture;
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Release of activity to the atmosphere (leakage exceeding
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containment design leak rate);
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Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert and Site Area Emergency
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Classifications; Calculation of offsite dose consequences; and
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Recommendation of protective actions to state officials.
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The above actions caused the activation of the licensee's emergency response facilities and permitted the state (to the extent necessary to support notification and assessment activities) to exercise its emergency p an.
2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, six NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events;
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Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
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Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of pertinent plant status information; Communications /information flow, and recordkeeping;
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Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and
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consideration of protective actions;
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Provisions for in plant radiation protection; Performance of off-site and in plant radiological surveys;
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Maintenance of site security and access control;
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Performance of technical support;
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Performance of repair and corrective actions;
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Assembly and accountability of personnel; and Management of accident recovery operations.
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3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
Event classification was completed accurate'
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reasonable time from event recognition; Positive command and control of all emergency response
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facilities was demonstrated by the respective facility managers; Habitability surveys were routinely performed in all emergency
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response facilities; Status boards in the emergency response facilities were
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adequately maintained and updated in a timely manner; Emergency response facility managers conducted frequent
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briefings of their staff concerning plant conditions; and Recovery discussions were conducted by both TSC and EOF key
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players and were complete and thorough.
3.1 Open Items The NRC team identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action:
(OPEN) 50-309/86-14-01: The coordination and flow of
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information between the EOF, TSC and Control Room needs to be improved. As an example, a containment atmosphere sample was requested by the EOF, but an hour later, the TSC Manager cancelled the request as being unnecesary. The EOF did not followup on the request since the exercise terminated approximately 30 minutes later.
(OPEN) 50-309/86-14-02: The Radiological Data Evaluator and
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the Radiological Data Evaluator Aide did not consult appropriate procedures for dose assessment and projection operations. They often consulted handwritten notes and the only copy of a procedure available was uncontrolled and filled with handwritten corrections.
(OPEN) 50-309/86-14-03: The licensee should evaluate the E0P's
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as they relate to the EAL's, and should further ensure consistency with the EAL guidelines in NUREG-065.
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4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following open items were identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report 50-309/85-12).
Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise, Open Items 85-12-01 through 85-12-05 were not repeated and are closed:
(CLOSED) 50-309/85-12-01: The PA announcement of the Unusual Event
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did not include the reason for the classification and the PA announcements for the Site Area and General Emergency classifications included instructions fo personnel to take actions that had previously been implemented.
(CLOSED) 50-309/85-12-02: The Plant Shift Supervisor (PSS) was
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distracted from directing the Control Room (CR) personnel during lengthly telephone discussions with the Technical Support Center (TSC).
(CLOSED) 50-309/85-12-03: The Control Room did not request the TSC
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to calculate the leak rate when operators became occupied with cooldown.
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(CLOSED) 50-309/85-12-04: There were no PA announcements relative to who was directing the emergency response organization when the PSS was relieved.
(CLOSED) 50-309/85-12-05:
There was no PA announcements to inform
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emergency response personnel that the EOF, TSC, and the OSC were activated.
The following open items were identified during the previous exercise (Inspection Report 50-309/85-12).
Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during'the exercise, these items will remain open pending further licensee action. Clarification of these repeat findings is as follows:
(OPEN) 50-309/85-12-06: The primary dose assessment system does not
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include estimation of a source term for fodine and there is no methodology to estimate the iodine source term for different release pathways nor to estimate the effective filter efficiencies for different removal systems. This resulted in an inappropriate decision to issue potassium iodide during the exercise.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) requires in part " adequate methods,.... for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use."
Licensee methodology presently
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considers offsite consequences only as indicated by actual measurements, either by instrumentation or sample. This could result in unconservative protective measure recommendations. When asked to provide an estimated fodine contribution to the source term the licensee could not.
In addition, the licensee could not project potential protective measures based upon the conditions postulated in the exercise scenario.
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(OPEN) 50-309/85-12-07:
The OSC did not track cumulative exposure of corrective action team members.
Although a system is in place to track cumulative exposure of team members, the scenario was so limiting in length, detail and consequences, (elevated in plant radiation levels) that the NRC team members were not able to make an adequate assessment as to the adequacy of the system. This item shall remain open pending review in a subsequent inspection.
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Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on September 24, 1986, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique addressed the areas where improvements are needed. However, the licensee's critique was somewhat lacking in supporting detail. Clarification was required in several instances to ensure the licensee had actually identified, and understood the root cause to, the areas where improvement was needed.
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Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1.
The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed of the previously identified exercise items that were adequately addressed.
Further discussions were held on the status of the items that were not adequately addressed. Although there were areas identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would
adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified open items following receipt of this report. At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.