IR 05000266/2011009

IR 05000266-11-009 & 05000301-11-009, on 10/18/11, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) Report

ML11298A323
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	10/25/2011
From:	Ann Marie Stone NRC/RGN-III/DRS/EB2
To:	Meyer L Point Beach
References
IR-11-009
Download: ML11298A323 (5)

Text

ber 25, 2011

SUBJECT:

ERRATA TO POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2; COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION (CDBI) REPORT 05000266/2011009; 05000301/2011009

Dear Mr. Meyer:

On October 18, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) Report 05000266/2011009; 05000301/2011009 (ML11291A094). In the inspection report, the summary of findings incorrectly annotated a cross-cutting aspect for Non-Cited Violation (NCV)05000266/2011009-03; 05000301/2011009-03. As indicated in the body of the inspection report, no cross-cutting aspect was identified for this issue. In addition, the alphanumeric identifier for the cross-cutting aspect for finding (FIN)05000266/2011009-04; 05000301/2011009-04 was incorrect. As indicated in the body of the inspection report, the correct alphanumeric is H.4.c. Please replace pages 1 and 2 of Inspection Report 05000266/2011009; 05000301/2011009 with the enclosed corrected pages.

We apologize for any inconvenience to you and your staff.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Ann Marie Stone, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License No. DPR-24; DPR-27 Enclosure: Errata to Inspection Report 05000266/2011009; 05000301/2011009 cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000266/2011009, 05000301/2011009; 8/01/2011 - 9/02/2011; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI).

The inspection was a 3-week onsite baseline inspection that focused on the design of components. The inspection was conducted by regional engineering inspectors and two consultants. Four Green finding were identified by the inspectors. Three of the findings were considered Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be (Green) or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings Cornerstone: Initiating Events

• Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving the licensees failure to meet the requirements of the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Specification. Specifically, the licensees design basis calculation failed to ensure the turbine building structural steel floor beams met the AISC specification. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

No violation of NRC requirements was identified.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset the plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green)

because the transient initiator would not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in human performance, work practice because the licensee did not ensure effective supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety was supported. Specifically, the licensee failed to have adequate oversight of design calculation and documentation for establishing structural adequacy of the turbine building structural steel beams at EL. 44-0. H.4(c) (Section 4OA5.1.b.(2))

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the licensees failure to correctly translate design basis assumptions into procedures or instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to monitor average outside air temperature which was one of the design input criteria for the temperature heat-up calculation associated with rooms which housed safety-related equipment. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

1 Enclosure

The performance deficiency was associated with Mitigating System Cornerstone and determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green)

because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources because the licensee did not ensure adequate training and qualification of personnel. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately train licensed operators to ensure adequate knowledge with respect to the interface between functionality of a non-safety system component and the impact of a failure on the operability of safety-related equipment. H.2(b). (Section 1R21.3.b.(1))

• Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to ensure a minimum AFW flow of 275 gpm as specified in the accident analysis for the Loss of Normal Feedwater event. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

The performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of design control and was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern.

Specifically, an AFW flow rate of less than 275 gpm as specified in the procedures did not ensure the pressurizer would not become water solid and cause an over-pressure condition within the Reactor Coolant System during the Loss of Normal Feedwater. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources because the licensee did not maintain design documentation in a complete and accurate manner. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain Emergency Procedures consistent with the design basis analysis for LONF. H.2(c).

(Section 1R21.6.b.(1))

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

• Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the licensees failure to ensure the Containment Spray Pipe Support 2S-249 and Containment Spray Pipe Anchor 2A-35 meet Seismic Category I requirements. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of design control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because there was no actual barrier degradation.

The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because this was a legacy design issue; and therefore, was not reflective of current

SUBJECT:

ERRATA TO POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2; COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION (CDBI) REPORT 05000266/2011009; 05000301/2011009

Dear M