IR 05000295/1980001
| ML19305E032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1980 |
| From: | Kohler J, Little W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305E026 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-80-01, 50-295-80-1, 50-304-80-01, 50-304-80-1, NUDOCS 8004220175 | |
| Download: ML19305E032 (11) | |
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U U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-295/80-01; 50-304/80-01 Docket No. 50-295; 50-304
.. cense No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion site, Zion, IL Inspection Conduct d: Janua 3 through February 6, 1980 Id.
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,f Inspector:
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Approved By:
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Projects Section 1-2
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Inspection Summary Inspection on January 3 through February 6, 1980 (Report No. 50-295/80-01; 50-304/80-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of maintenance, plant opera-tions, security, review of licensee events, IE bulletin and circular re-view, surveillance, new fuel inspection, reactor power distribution limits, thermal power evaluation, axial flux determination. The inspection involv-ed 159 inspection-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified, (infraction; failure to follow procedures during shift turnover, paragraph 19).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- N. Wandke, Plant Superintendent
- C Schumann, Operating Assistant Superintendent
- L. Soth, Administrative and Support Assistant Superintendent E. Murach, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
- E. Fuerst, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
- J. Gilmore, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- J. Mariayi, Technical Staff Supervisor
- R. Ward, Senior Operating Engineer F. Lentine, Technical Staff Engineer T. Parker, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor T. Rieck, Technical Staff Engineer
P. LeBlonde, Station Nuclear Engineer
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Little, Section Chief, NRC K. Ainger, Technical Staff Engineer F. Ost, Health Physicist F. Reseck, Station Health Physicist J. Wennerholm, Engineering Assistant K. Depperschmidt, Modification Coordinator R. Turner, Shift Foreman M. Romano, Nuclear Station Operator G. Rowe, Nuclear Station Operator G. Keene, Nuclear Station Operator
- C. Schultz, Training Supervisor
- P. Kuhner, Quality Assurance
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-27-01):
(304/79-26-01)
Emergency Operating Procedure Review The licensee has determined that for the maximum break accident, there is adequate time for switchover from injection to recircula-tion before tF lo lo RWST alarm occurs.
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(Closed) Jnresolved Item 295/79-27-02):
(304/79-26-02)
Gouged Bergen-Paterson Steam Generator Snubbers.
The licensee performed an inspection and operability tests of gouged Bergen-Paterson Steam Generator Snubbers from Zion Station at Wyle Laboratory. The results of the tests determined that the gouged Unit I and Unit 2 snubbers would perform their intended safety fut.ction.
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Special surveillance monitoring of fluid levels during the next
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operating segment for Unit I and 2 is required. All 16 Unit 2 steam generator snubbers will be inspected, repaired and modified during May 1980 refueling outage.
Additionally, during general review of steam generator snubber engineering, the lock-up rates of.12 to.19 inches per minute were confirmed by Sargent-Lundy and Westinghouse to be adequate for seismic assumptions, c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-27-03):
(304/79-26-03)
Discovery of Inadequate Westinghouse Generic Rod Drop Accident.
Licensee issued a standing order regarding rod control system opera-tion:
greater than 90% power, control bank D must be greater than 215 steps withdrawn whenever the rod control system is in automatic.
d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (295/79-13-02):
(304/79-13-02)
QA Audit Performed Identifying Defeciencies in ZAP 13-52-0.
The ZAP 13-52-8 controlling the shipment of Dry Active Waste was clarified such that sufficient representative surveys are taken of radwaste shipments and documented on the control form.
3.
Monthly Operating Summary Unit 1 The unit remained in cold shutdown the entire reporting period for repair of the 1A charging pump, 1B reactor coolant pump seals, and repacking the SI 8811 A&B valves.
Unit 2 The Unit 2 forced outage which began October 26, 1979, ended on January 20, 1980. Plant operation was maintained at power levels up to 100%.
One reactor trip occurred on January 24, 1980, caused by the trip of both rod drive MG sets on overcurrent (Paragraph 24).
4.
Maintenance Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents were reviewed to ascertain that they are conducted in ac-cordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry-codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
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The following items were considered during this review:
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ing conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service;. approvals were obtained prior to initiat-ing the work; maintenance activities were accomplished using approv-ed procedures; maintenance activities were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to re-turning components or systems to an operating status; quality con-trol records were maintained for maintenance activities; and main-tenance activities were accomplished by qualified personnel.
The inspector reviewed the following completed work packages:
k'R 4830 2A Rod Drive M/G Set Replace Bearings k'R 4831 2A Rod Drive M/G Set Inspect Breakers WR 04481 1A Charging pump No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Plant Operations The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations of control room log books, shift engineer log book, equipment outage logs, special operating orders, and jumper and tagout logs for the month of January 1980. The inspector observed plant operations dur-
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ing several offshifts during the month of January.
The inspector i
also made visual observations of the routine surveillance and func-l tional tests in progress during the period. This review was con-ducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Administrative Procedures. A review of the licensee's deviation reports for the period was conducted to verify that no violations of the licensee's Technical Specifications were made. The inspector
toured areas of Unit 1 and 2 throughout the period and noted that i
the monitoring instrumentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations i
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were minimal, seismic restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equip-ment caution and hold cards agreed with control room records, plant
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housekeeping conditions / cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Physical Protection - Security Organization The inspector verified by observation that at least one full time member of the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization was onsite at all times; verified by observation that the security-4-
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organization was properly manned for all shifts; and verified by
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observation that members of the security organization were capable of performing their assigned tasks.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Physical Protection - Physical Barriers The inspector verified that certain aspects of the physical barriers and isolation zones conformed to regulatory requirements and commit-ments in the physical security plan (PSP); that gates in the protect-
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ed area were closed and locked if not attended; that doors in vital area barriers were closed and locked if not attended; and that iso-lation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Physical Protection - Access Control (Identification, Authorization, Badging, Search, and Escorting)
The inspector verified that persons and packages were identified and authorization checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA),
vehicles were properly authorized prior to entry into a PA, persons authorized in the PA were issued and displayed identification badges, and personnel in vital areas were authorized access; verified that persons, packages, and vehicles were searched in accordance with regulatory requirements, the PSP, and security procedures; verified that persons authorized escorted access were accompanied by an es-cort when within a PA or vital area; verified that vehicles author-ized escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within the PA.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Physical Protection - Communications The inspector verified by observation that communications checks were conducted satisfactorily during the security personnel work shift and that fixed and roving posts, and each member of the re-sponse team successfully communicate from their remote location.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate-5-
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corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Speci-fications.
Unit 1 79-50 79-91 79-55 79-92 79-58 79-93 79-65 79-94 No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Surveillance of Safety Related Systems / Components Required by Technical Specifications
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The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing (other than calibrations and checks) on the Unit 1 and 2 special 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> auxfeed pump test and the Unit 2 RCS leak test, and verified that testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures, that test results were in conformance with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were review-ed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during testing were properly re-viewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulle-tin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forward-ed copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite manage-ment representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
79-03 79-11 79-04 79-12 79-05 79-26 79-09 79-28 79-10 79-15 79-08 79-17 80-01-6-
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13.
IE Circular Followup
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For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applic-able to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
79-01 79-04 79-07 79-10 79-14 79-18 79-02 79-05 79-08 79-11 79-15 79-19 79-03 79-06 79-09 79-12 79-16 79-21 79-24 No items of noncompliance were identified.
14.
Receipt of New Fuel The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel; observed receipt inspections and storage of new fuel e!ements and verified it was performed in accordance with the licensee's procedures; and, followed up resolu tions of deficiencies found during new fuel inspections.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
15.
Thermal Power Evaluation The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's core thermal power evaluation for Unit 2 which were obtained on January 23, 1980, and verified the technical adequacy of the evaluations and results and that the frequency of evaluations was as prescribed by the facility's Technical Specifications.
During the evaluation, the calorimetric taken was noted by the in-spector to be reading nonconservatively with respect to the Nuclear Instrumentation Channels.
Investigation by the licensee revealed that the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> auxilary feedwater pump performance test was caus-ing the deviation.
The licensee took the approximate corrective action.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
16.
Reactor Physics a.
Axial Flux Difference Calculations The inspector reviewed the Axial Flux Difference Calculations and the Delta I trending for Unit 2.
The inspector has no fur-ther questions regarding calculations of Axial Flux Difference.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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b.
Incore/Excore Calibration
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The inspector reviewed the procedure used to calibrate the excore instrumentation to insure that the instrumentation was capable of measuring the correct axial offset and quadrant power tilt. The inspector determined the calibration was performed for Unit 2, Cycle 4 and has no further questions
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regarding the incore calibration procedure.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Core Power Distribution Limits The inspector reviewed Unit 2 Flux maps taken on September 25 1979.
The inspector noted that the maximum allowable Fq(Z) peaking factor calculated was in accordance with Technical Specifica-tions Section 3.2.2.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
17.
Licensee Identified Noncompliance Inspector's review of licensee event reports during the month noted that the licensee's management control system identfied the follow-ing items of noncompliance:
LER #
Event T/S 295/79-93 Missed radioactive analysis of 4.11-1 fire pump discharge when both units were in cold shutdown. The analysis for before and after the day missed were within Technical Specification limits.
295/79-91 One s! iftly grab sample missed for 6.6.2 the Gas Decay Tank Cubicle when monitor ORT-PR02B was out of service.
The above two events will be classified as licensee identified items of noncompliance for which no citation will be given.
18.
Damage to 1A Charging Pump On January 8, 1980, at 7:00 a.m. a Unit 1 operator started and attempted to run the 1A charging pump during a routine plant-g.
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s evolution with the suction supply valves closed. This action re-t
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sulted in significant damage to the 1A charging pump and rendered
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it inoperable.
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At the time the event occurred, Unit I was in cold shutdown. The l
loss of the pump did not result in the release of any radioactivity,
nor violate any conditions for operation since the high pressure L
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injection system is not required during cold shut down.
An investigation was made by the station's PRO Committee into the causes of the event. The investigation revealed that Unit 1 shift number 1 on January 8, 1980, left the duty area before relief shift
2 came on board so that no shift turnover between 1 and 2 took place.
In so doing, shift I did not adhere to the requirements of ZAP 10-52-3 (Shift Turnover Procedure).
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The investigation further determined that the suction valves were requested to be closed to work on a flow controller during a pre-i
vious shift, but the maintenance activity had not begun on the event date and VCT level control was being maintained by periodically
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opening and closing the suction supply valves to the charging pump.
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On the event date, shift 1 left without conducting a proper shift turnover per ZAP 10-52-3.
However, the 1A charging pump was left in the pull to lock position with suction valves closed. Shift 2 did not check the illuminated (closed) suction supply valve posi-
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tion status lights before pump operation.
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The inspector reviewed the event with respect to IE Information Notice 79-20, Rev. 1 (enclosed copy) in order to determine whether any individual license holder violated the conditions of their license.
Since the margin of plant safety was not reduced, no radioactive release resulted, no violation of an LCO occurred and no overexposure'resulted, the event is classified as a personnel error resulting from a failure to follow approved procedures.
It is the inspector's conclusion that the personnel error was not l
l limited to the control room operators on shift I and 2 on January 8,
1980, but must also include supervisory personnel on duty at the
time. The control room supervisor did not supervise the adherence to the approved Turnover Procedure since it became officially ef-fective on January 2, 1980.
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Failure to follow ZAP 10-52-3 on January 8,1980 is classified as an item of noncompliance (infraction) against Tr'hnical Specifica-i tion 6.2.A which requires adherence to approved written procedures.
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19.
NRR Lessons Learned Audit
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The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation sent an eight person team to Zion Station on January 21, 1980. The purpose of the team visit was to directly assess the station's compliance with implementation of TMI modifications needed to be in place by January 1, 1980.
The station received commendation from the team leader during the exit of January 22, 1980 on the significant progress the station had made toward meeting implementation objectives of January 1, 1980.
Several items were identified during the exit for resident inspector followup. These followup items will be performed when the team's report is finalized.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
20.
Part 21 Closeouts The inspector reviewed the following two Part 21 reports and de-termined that the licensee had taken appropriate corrective action in both cases. These two reports are closed out.
(1) Farr Company notification to Zion Station that a possible quality problem existed with charcoal media used in filters delivered to Zion.
Zion isolated the designated material in the warehouse and will send material back to manufacturer.
(2) Henry Pratt notification to Zion Station as to deficiencies with ASCO solenoid valves which were furnished as accessories to G4-Bettis Actuators mounted on Henry Pratt butterfly valves.
Zion Station has closed the valves and deenergized them.
21.
Containment Cleanliness The inspector discussed the need to maintain containment clean-liness. The licensee shares this concern and will reemphasize the need for maintaining containment cleanliness during power operations to station personnel.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
22.
Fuel Building Area Monitor An area monitor in the fuel building has been in the alarm state over an extended period of time due to the presence of radioactive material placed in the decontamination bay while awaiting shipment to a burial site.
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Although, shiftly grab samples have been taken while the monitor
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has been in the alarm condition, the grab surveillance is not meant to be a permanent replacement for an operating monitor.
This item was discussed with licensee managment. A station work request has been initiated to move the sampling location of the monitor so that it is not as sensitive to the material in the decontamination bay. Concurrently, actions are being taken by the licensee to expediously ship the radioactive material to a burial site.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
23.
Unit 2 Reactor Trip On January 24, 1980, with Unit 2 at 100% power a reactor trip occurred. The reactor trip resulted C om the overcurrent trip actuation of both 2A and 2B rod drive MG sets. All plant systems responding to the Unit 2 trip responded as designed.
Investigation into the causes of the event revealed that the 2A rod drive MG set failed when a bearing in the generator failed, howe"er, the 2A breaker did not trip immediately. The delay in the l'. breaker trip led to an overcurrent condition in 2B rod drive MG set 2A and 2B MG set subsequently tripped simultaneously, in-terrupting power to the control rods, tripping the reactor.
The breakers involved are Westinghous DB-50's with overcurrent trip devices. These breakers have been identified by Westinghouse as (also IEB 79-11) requiring adjustment for safety related appli-cations. While the rod drive MG sets are not safety related, the licensee is making the adjustments to the overcurrent trip devices or. these breakers.
Modified Westinghouse DB-50's have been installed in Unit 2 and are planned to be installed on Unit 1 prior to startup.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
24.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Par-agraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the in-spection on February 6,1980, and summarized the scope and find-
.ags of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these comments.
Attachment:
IE Information Notice No. 79-20
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IE Information Notice No. 79-20 Rev. 1 September 7, 1979
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Page 2 of 3 (3) Operation of mechanisms an.d apparatus other than controls which may
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indirectly affect the powet level or reactivity of a reactor shall l
only be accomplished with the knowledge and consent of an operator
licensed in accordance with l' art 55 (10 CFR 50.54 (j))
(4) Licensed senior operators are required to be present at the facility
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during specified conditions, and available or on call at other times
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during operation (10 CFR 50.54 (m))
(5) The NRC licensed individual shall observe all applicable rules, t
regulations and orders of the Commission, whether or not stated in
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the license (10 CFR 55.31(d))
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The above requires the NRC licensed individual to comply with the requirements pertaining to the operation of the facility and manipulation of its controls
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and to comply with radiation safety procedures implementing 10 CFR 20.
NRC policy for the resp;nsibility for safe operation of NRC licensed facilities continues to be as follows:
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(1) The facility licensee is responsible for assuring that the facility is operated within the requirements of the license, Technical Specifica-tions, rules, regulations, and Orders of the NRC and for the actions of their employees.
(2) NRC licensed individuals are responsible for taking timely and proper actions so as not to create or cause a hazard to " safe opera-tion of the facility" (i.e. actions or activities, including failure l
to take action, related to the facility which could have an adverse
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affect on the health and safety of the public, plant workers or the i
individuals).
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Enforcement Sanctions
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On December 31, 1974, the then AEC sent a letter to all facility licensees containing the criteria for determining enforcement action and the cat gories of noncompliance with AEC regulatory requirements. Those criteria and categories are applicable to NRC licensed individuals as we'l as facility
licensees.
Paragraph 55.40(b) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations prescribes that NRC issued operator licenses may be revoked, suspended or
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modified for failure to observe any terms or conditions of any rule, regulation or Order of the Commission, or any conduct determined to be a
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hazard to safe operation of the facility.
These would generally Wolve i
serious items of noncompliance where: (1) the indivionals' action clearly
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demonstrate inattention to duties or disregard for requ;eements including technical specificatons and operating procedures; (2) the NRC licensed individual fails to take a required action or takes an iiidecendent action j
that results in significant actual or potential safety consegeences; or (3) there is repetitive noncompliance with regulatory requirements.
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IE Information Notice No. 79-20 Rev. 1 September 7, 1979 Page 3 of 3
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l Examples of situations which could result in violations include:
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(1) Noti'ig a serious violation of procedural requirements and not taking corrective action.
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(3) Defeating alarms which have serious safety significance (4) Unauthorized abandoning of reactor controls
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(5) Knowingly taking actions that violate TS Limiting Conditions for
Operation
The examples listed above involve the failure of an NRC licensed individual to follow procedures and adhere to controls.
These are violations of NRC require-ments.
In the past the NRC has issued Notices of Violation, as provided for in
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10 CFR 2.201, and suspended, modified or revoked the license, as provided for in 10 CFR 55.40 (b), of NRC licensed individuals.
The issuance of civil monetary penalties, as provided for in 10 CFR 2.205 and 10 CFR 55.50, or criminal charges, as provided for in 10 CFR 55.50, have not been previously used against NRC licensed individuals but may be used if the circumstances warrant such action, j
The Commission will continue to monitor the performance of NRC licensed
individuals and will continue to take the appropriate enforcement action I
against NRC licensed individuals.
No written response to this Information Notice is required.
If you have
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questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appro-priate NRC Regional Office.
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SSINS: 6870 Accession No:
7908220108 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 f
September 7, 1979
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.IE Information Notice No. 79-20 Rev. 1 NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY - NRC LICENSED INDIVIDUALS l
Background:
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In the past, NRC licensed individuals have been cited by the NRC for failure to comply with the conditions of their licenses. These items of noncompliance can generally be characterized as serious or repeated failures to t011ow reactor operating procedures. Two recent events involving the radiation overexposure of NRC licensed individuals through their violation of utility procedures, facility Technical Specifications and the Code of Federal Regulations have raised questions about the exercise of their responsibiliti::.
The purpose of this Information Notice is two-fold:
(1) To remind the NRC licensed individuals of their responsibilities, not only in the proper operation of the facility controls, but in compliance with the facility administrative procedures, and (2) To summarize the enforcement sanctions available to the NRC for use against licensed individuals.
Description of Circumstances:
1.
Responsibilities
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Facility licensees are charged with the responsibility to design, l
construct and operate their plants in accordance with NRC requirements to assure that public health and safety are protected.
The role of
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NRC licensed individuals is no less important in the overall Regulatory l
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scheme. The NRC recognizes that timely actions by NRC licensed indivi-
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duals are an important part of safety.
Reliance on these actions is a part of the defense-in-depth concept.
Specifically, the NRC requires
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that:
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(1) Only licensed operators are permitted to manipulate the controls i
that directly affect reactivity (10 CFR 50.54 (i))
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(2) Licensed operators are required to be present at the controls at all times during the operation of the facility (10 CFR 50.54 (k))
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