IR 05000289/1975009
| ML19256D612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1975 |
| From: | Gage L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256D611 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-75-09, 50-289-75-9, NUDOCS 7910190572 | |
| Download: ML19256D612 (7) | |
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1E:I Form 12
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(Jan 75) "(Rev)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY Com!ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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. REGION I
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IE Inspection Report No:
sn 9Ro/7s-no Docket No:
sn-?no Licensee: Metropolitan Edison Company License No: DPR-50
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P. O. Box 542 Priority:
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Reading, Pennsylvania 19603 Category:
C Location: Middletown, Pennsylvania (Three Mile Island 1)
Safeguards Group:
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Type of Licensee: PWR, 871 MWe (B&W)
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S ecia1, Announced P
Type of Inspection:
A ril 15, 1975 P
Dates of Inspection:
Dates of Previous Inspection:
April 9, 1975
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Reporting Inspector:
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L. W. Gage, Reactor Inspector
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Accompanying Inspectors:
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Date Date
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Date
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Other Accompanying Personnel:
None Date Reviewed By:
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I/c) /W D E8 R. C. H nes, Senior Reactor Inspector
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Enforcement Action
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A.
Items of Noncompliance
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None B.
Deviations i7 None
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items
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Not applicable Design Changes Seismic Anchoring of AC Control-Rod-Drive-System Trip-Breaker Cabinets (Reference:
Licensee Nonroutine 30-day Report No. 74-02)
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The design of the seismic anchoring of the AC control-rod-drive-system
trip-breaker cabinets is being modified by the licensee.-
(Details,
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Paragraph 2)
Unusual Occurrences 1.
Inability to Operate the 1A Decay-Heat-Pump Suction Valve (Reference: Licensee Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0 50-289/74-33)
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The 1A decay-heat-pump suction valve, DH-VSA, from the borated-water storage tank, failed to close during a pretest valve line-up.
(Details, Paragraph 3)
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Failure of the 1C Hikh-Pressure Injection Pump to Start on an ESAS Signal (Reference: Licensee Abnormal Occurrcnce Report No. A0 50-289/75-01)
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The 1C high-pressure injection pump failed to start on an automatic
,rngineered-safety-features test signal, during a high-and low-pressure'
inj ection-logic and component-surveillance test.
(Details, Paragraph 4)
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Failure of the IB Reactor-Building Emergency-Cooling River-Water Pu=o to Start on an ESAS Signal-(Reference:
Licensee Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0 50-289/75-02)
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The 1B reactor-building emergency-cooling river-water pump failed to start on an automatic engineered-safety-features test signal, during a high-and low-pressure injection-logic and component-surveillance test.
(Details, Paragraph 4)
Other Significant findings
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Current Findings
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Acceptable Areas The corrective actions taken by the licensee with respect to the
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l equipment malfunctions experienced as listed under " Unusual Occur-E rences" above were inspected and found to be acceptable.
(Details, Paragraphs 3 and 4)
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Unresolved Item
' Seismic Anchoring of AC Control-Rod-Drive System Trip-Breaker Cabinets
The licensee has developed a procedure for modifying the seismic
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anchoring of.the AC control-rod-drive system trip-breaker cabinets.
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It is anticipated that this modification will be performed during
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the next scheduled plant shutdown.
(Details, Paragraph 2)
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Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
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Not inspected Nbnagenent Interview
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At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector held a meeting at the site with the following personnel to discuss the inspection findings:
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Metropolitan Edison Company
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Mr. ~. Herbein, Station Superintendent Mr... Sheets, Engineer, Jr., Electrical
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The following items were discussed, and the inspector's findings were
acknowledged by the licensee.
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Purpose of the Inspection
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The inspector stated that the purpose of this special, announced E5{.
inspection was to review the details and corrective action in the
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licensee's abnormal occurrence report numbers A0 50-289/74-33, j5
/75-01, and /75-02; and 30-day report number 74-02.
B.
Current Findings: Acceptable Areas
=ss The inspector stated that his review of the licensee's corrective actions, in the following areas, revealed acceptable findings:
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Inability to Operate the 1A Decay-Heat-Pumo Suction Valve (Details, Paragraph 3)
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2.
Failure of the 1C High-Pressure Injection Pump to Start on an ESAS
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Signal.
(Details, Paragraph 4)
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3.
Fa_ilure of the IB Reactor-Building Emergency-Cooling River-Water
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'Pu=p to Start on an ESAS Signal. (Details, Paragraph 4)
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~Unresolied Item:
Seismic Anchoring of AC Control-Rod-Drive-System t._.-.
Trip-Breaker Cabinets The inspector stated that the recent corrective actions of the licensee
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in preparing a procedure for modifying the design of the seismic mounting were found to be acceptable.' However, this item will remain unresolved pending a subsequent review by an NRC inspector when the licensee has completed the modification.
(Details, Paragraph 2)
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Metropolitan Edison Company Mr. C. Hartman, Unit 1 Lead Electrical Engineer J
Mr. H. Mitchell, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor Mr. E. Sheets, Engineer, Jr., Electrical 2.
_ Seismic Anchoring of AC Control-Rod-Drive-System Trip-Breaker Cabinets The inspector examined the present seismic anchoring for the AC control-rod-drive system trip-breaker cabinets.
The cabinets are in a dual or double-cabinet configuration. At present, the double cabinet is anchored i
to a steel-reinforced concrete mounting pad by four fillet welds (each
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approximately 1-inch long)--one at each corner.
The inspector determined I
that this anchoring was not in accordance with the architect-engineer's
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drawing requirement, sketch DK-1 (revision 3), titled " Welds for Equip-ment Anchorage, Seismic Class I Equipment."
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However, the design of the base of the double cabinet is such that it
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was not, vaal'ule, to follow the drawing requirement for welding the base
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to the steel imbedments in the concrete mounting pad.
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The cabinet vendor (Babcock and Wilcox) informed the licenseel
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that they had found deficiencies in the anchoring of the cabinets at other sites.
They recommended that the licensee examine the cabinet anchoring to
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determine if the following criteria were met: fillet welds between cabinet base and steel imbedments, one-inch long, every 4 inches.
The li,censee inspected the cabinet anchoring and determined that it did not meet the vendor's criteria.
The licensee then generated a report to NRC2 informing NRC of the findings of the anchoring inspection.
The licensee has prepared Work Request No. 6508, dated 1/6/75, which documents the procedure that will be followed to modify the anchoring and make it equivalent to the vendor's criteria.
This modification will be perforced during the next scheduled plant shutdown.
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This item is unresolved, pending a review by an NRC inspector when the
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licensee has co=pleted the modification.
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Letter of 10/28/74, from E. G. Ward (B & W) to R. W. Heward (GPUSCO),
titled "TMI Nuclear Station, Unit #1, CRD System, A$ $ Qed d[inet, B & W Reference NSS-5"
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2.
Nonroutine 30-day Report No. 74-02, dated 1/15/75
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3.
Inability to operate the 1A Decay-Heat-Pump Suction Valve (Reference:
Licensee Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0 50-289/74-33 The inspector reviewed the abnormal occurrence with the licensee.
The licensee indicated that, while performing a pretest valve line-up in preparation for a high-and low-pressure injectior-logic channel and component-surveillance test, the 1A decay-heat-pump suction valve (DH-V5A) from the borated-water storage tank failed to close.
The' licensee determined that the cause of the occurrence was a broken auxiliary contact in the opening motor-starter.
The licensee replaced the contact and tested the system to assure its operability. The licensee also inspected the auxiliary contact in the opening motor-starter of'the redundant system (the DH-VSB suction valve's system).
It was satisfactory, as cocumented in licensee PORC meeting minutes, No. 264, for 1/6-10/75.
The licensee indicated that this type of contact has no history of defects in their plant.
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Failure of the 1C'High-Pressure Injection Pump to Start on an ESAS Signal (Reference:
Licensee Abnormal occurrence Report No. A0 50-289/75-01)
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Failure of the 1B Reactor-Building Emergency-Cooling River-Water
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Pumo to Start on an ESAS Signal
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(heference:
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Licensee Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0 50-289/75-02)
The inspector reviewed the abnormal occurrences with the licensee.
The licensee indicated that, while performing a high-and low-pressure injection-logic and compcaent-surveillance test (a) the 1C high-pressure injection pump, and (b) the 1B reactor-building emergency-cooling river-water pump, failed to start on separate Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) signals.
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The licensee determined that the cause of the occurrences, in both instances, was loose electrical connections in the respective circuit breakers for the-two pumps. The loose connections prevented the breakers from closing, which prevented the pumps from starting. The loose connections were found on a terminal block on the front of the breakers, in the upper left corner of the lower portion of the breakers.
The breakers are manufactured by Westinghouse, and are
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identified as type 50 DH-P 350 air circuit breakers, rated at 4.16 kv.
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The licensee tightened the loose connections and tested the systems to assure their operability.
The licensee also prepared a Work Request, No. 6910, dated 1/15/75, which identified the other circuit breakers of this type in the plant and provided inspection procedures to check their attaching hardware. The licensee is presently completing the c' fort associated with this Work Request.
The inspector examined _censee records. They indicate that, of the 28 circuit breakers of this type in the plant, 21 had been inspected and.(where necessary) corrected to date.
(The licensee stated that he had contacted Westinghouse. They advised the licensee that lockwashers were not a design require-ment on the es 2nal blocks where the~1oose connections were found, and they were not inadvertently omitted.)
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