IR 05000247/2020002
| ML20223A284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/2020 |
| From: | Daniel Schroeder Reactor Projects Branch 2 |
| To: | Vitale A Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Schroeder D | |
| References | |
| IR 2020002 | |
| Download: ML20223A284 (17) | |
Text
August 10, 2020
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER, UNITS 2 AND 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2020002 AND 05000286/2020002
Dear Mr. Vitale:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Indian Point Energy Center, Units 2 and 3. On July 22, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, X /RA/
Signed by: Daniel L. Schroeder
Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000247 and 05000286 License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000247 and 05000286
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000247/2020002 and 05000286/2020002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0042
Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Indian Point Energy Center, Units 2 and 3
Location:
450 Broadway, Generation Support Building
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2020, to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
N. Floyd, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Haagensen, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Obadina, Acting Resident Inspector
J. Vazquez, Reactor Ops Engineer
K. Warner, Senior Health Physicist
Approved By:
Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Indian Point Energy Center, Units 2 and 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 89 percent rated thermal power as part of the planned coastdown. On April 30, 2020, Unit 2 was shutdown for defueling outage 2D24. The unit was defueled on May 12, 2020, and the Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel Letter (ADAMS Accession Number ML20133J902) was submitted.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On May 20, 2020, Unit 3 reduced power to 95 percent for main turbine stop and control valve testing. Unit 3 was returned to rated thermal power on May 20, 2020. Unit 3 remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems:
- On-site and off-site alternating current power systems at Unit 3 on June 30, 2020
- Central control room air conditioning system at Unit 3 on June 30, 2020
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment at Unit 3 to ensure they are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding on May 22, 2020.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Service water system prior to unit shutdown at Unit 2 on April 20, 2020 (2)31, 32, and 33 service water pumps due to 32 service water Zurn strainer shaft seal leakage at Unit 3 on May 29, 2020
- (3) Electric fire pump while the diesel fire pump was out of service for maintenance at Unit 3 on June 19, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Service water pump pit and service water Zurn strainer pit pre-fire plan (PFP)-264 at Unit 2 on April 20, 2020
- (2) Fuel storage building (PFP-217) at Unit 2 on April 27, 2020
- (4) Auxiliary feedwater building (PFP-367A) at Unit 3 on May 29, 2020
- (5) Containment spray pumps (PFP-306B) at Unit 3 on June 12, 2020
- (6) Fire pump house (PFP-390) at Unit 3 on June 26, 2020
- (7) Primary auxiliary building, general floor plan, 55-foot elevation (PFP-307), at Unit 3 on June 28, 2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Service water Zurn strainer pit leakage mitigation capabilities at Unit 2 on March 30, 2020
- (2) Internal flooding switchgear room, emergency diesel generators, and emergency diesel generator valve room (OpESS 2007-02) at Unit 3 on May 27, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance in the control room during the final reactor shutdown prior to defueling at Unit 2 on April 30, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the reactor coolant system cool down and transition to residual heat removal cooling at Unit 2 on May 1, 2020.
- (3) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during reactor coolant system drain down to decreased inventory (68 foot) (Yellow Risk) at Unit 2 on May 6, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification examination in the simulator at Unit 3 on June 23, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)125 volt direct current power system at Unit 3 on May 22, 2020
- (2) Weld channel and containment penetration pressurization system at Unit 3 on June 24, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated risk due to 33 emergency diesel generator maintenance at Unit 3 on April 22, 2020
- (2) Elevated risk due to replacement of valve SWN-109-2 at Unit 3 on April 27, 2020
- (3) Shutdown risk with reactor water level at reduced inventory at Unit 2 on May 6 to 8, 2020
- (4) Shutdown risk during reactor vessel head lift at Unit 2 on May 9, 2020
- (5) Shutdown risk during core offload at Unit 2 on May 11 to 12, 2020
- (6) Elevated risk due to 31 instrument air dryer out of service at Unit 3 on June 4, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)
(CR-IP3-2020-00833) 36 service water pump potentially degraded after service water header swap at Unit 3 on April 15, 2020 (2)
(CR-IP3-2020-00843) 31-32 residual heat removal low head injection lines equalizing line found empty during residual heat removal/safety injection system venting at Unit 3 on April 21, 2020 (3)
(CR-IP2-2020-01199) service water line SWN 411 ultrasonic testing (service water inlet to the 21 component cooling water heat exchanger) thickness below calculation limits required engineering evaluation at Unit 2 on May 11, 2020 (4)
(CR-IP2-2020-01233) source range detector N-31 operability during defueling at Unit 2 on May 11, 2020 (5)
(CR-IP3-2020-01087/01093) pinhole service water leak identified downstream of FCV-1167A in the common service water emergency diesel generator return line at Unit 3 on May 27, 2020 (6)
(CR-IP3-2020-01011) 34 safety injection accumulator check valve back leakage impacts residual heat removal/safety injection system venting at Unit 3 on June 3, 2020
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Unit 3 EC-86354/86341, temporary clamp installation/freeze seal and permanent weld repair for charging pump recirculation/relief line leak
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
(1)33 charging pump following internal valve replacement and recirculation line weld repair at Unit 3 on April 3, 2020 (2)31 emergency diesel generator air compressor following unloader valve replacement and lube oil filter change at Unit 3 on April 10, 2020
- (3) N-31 source range instrument following replacement of the excore detector at Unit 2 on May 4, 2020 (4)33 auxiliary boiler feedwater pump following repack of BFD-FCV-1123 (recirculation control valve) at Unit 3 on May 19, 2020
- (5) AC-723 spent fuel pool make-up isolation valve following repairs and freeze seal application at Unit 3 on June 10, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 defueling outage 2D24 activities from April 30 to May 13, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
(1)3-PT-M079B, 32 emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance test at Unit 3 on April 7, 2020 (2)3-PT-Q116B, 32 safety injection pump functional test at Unit 3 on April 8, 2020 (3)2-PC-2Y70, N-33 (N-5143) Gamma Metrics detector source range qualification surveillance test to support defueling operations at Unit 2 on May 4, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)3-PT-Q022, residual heat removal system valve stroke times inservice test at Unit 3 on April 9, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)3-PT-Q029, PCV-1229 and PCV-1230 containment isolation valves stroke test at Unit 3 on June 4,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.
- (1) The inspectors monitored pre-job briefings, radiological surveys, documentation associated with core exit thermocouple assembly (CETNA) disassembly, and the fuel transfer canal blind flange removal under RWP 2561. The inspectors observed a portion of the CETNA disassembly job remotely.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas and very high radiation areas:
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors reviewed procedures and procedure changes for adequacy of access controls.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2019, to March 31, 2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective maintenance backlog, control room deficiency tags, open operability evaluations, and operator workarounds over the past six months at Unit 3 for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Review of corrective actions to address scaffold evaluation issues discussed in NRC Non-Cited Violation 05000286/2019002-01 at Units 2 and 3
- (2) OpESS FY2007-02 analysis of flooding vulnerabilities at Unit
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues - Review of Corrective Actions to Address Scaffold Evaluation Issues 71152 In the second-quarter inspection report for 2019 (05000247 and 05000286/2019002), the inspectors documented a Green non-cited violation (05000286/2019002-01) because the licensee did not adequately develop engineering evaluations for numerous scaffolds that were in close proximity to safety-related equipment. In response to the NRCs identification of this issue, the licensee took action to reinforce established requirements for scaffolding construction and evaluation among the personnel responsible for these activities. The licensee also took action to revise the associated fleet procedure (EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding) to properly classify it as a quality-related procedure.
For the present review, the inspectors reviewed the associated corrective actions to verify proper implementation. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports (CRs) associated with scaffolding concerns over the previous 12-month period to assess effectiveness of the corrective actions. The inspectors also walked down a selection of scaffolding erected throughout the plant to verify conformance with established requirements and that evaluations were being performed adequately.
The inspectors concluded that, overall, station performance had improved with regards to adhering to scaffold control requirements. The inspectors noted that there had been no additional non-conformances with scaffold requirements associated with nuclear safety identified by either NRC inspectors or the licensee staff during the 12-month period since the previous pattern of issues had been identified.
The inspectors also noted examples of good practices that demonstrated safety-oriented thinking and decision-making. For example, in one CR from late 2019 (CR-IP3-2019-03743),a licensee staff member noticed a long-term scaffold that was located near some important-to-safety equipment associated with the station city water system. In the CR, this individual questioned whether or not periodic inspections were being performed to verify that this scaffold maintained its integrity, given that it was in an outside location and would be exposed to the elements over time. After this question was raised, the licensee performance review group, responsible for dispositioning the CR, was able to verify that inspections were indeed being performed on the scaffold in question. In this instance, the individual who generated the CR demonstrated a good questioning attitude in identifying a potential safety concern.
The inspectors did, however, note one minor performance deficiency while conducting a walk-down of scaffolding. Specifically, on May 4, 2020, while inspecting a scaffold located in the Unit 3 pipe penetration area, the inspectors identified long-term scaffolding (originally erected in 2017) that contained platforms which were not adequately secured to the rest of the scaffolding assembly. The inspectors determined that these scaffolding components had the potential to come loose during a seismic event and could thereby have the potential to impact nearby safety-related equipment (safety injection discharge piping). In accordance with the licensees scaffolding control procedure EN-MA-133, long-term scaffolding (i.e.,
scaffolding that is to be in place for more than 90 days) is required to be re-inspected every 2 years. Furthermore, this re-inspection is required to include an engineering evaluation, where warranted. The inspectors therefore concluded that the unsecured platforms should have been identified during the most recent re-inspection, and the issue should have been corrected. After the inspectors brought this issue to the attention of the licensee, the licensee documented the issue in CR-IP3-2020-00992 and took corrective actions to restrain the associated scaffold components.
Regarding the issue of unsecured scaffolding platforms, discussed above, the inspectors screened the issue in accordance with IMC 0612, Issue Screening, and determined that it was minor. Specifically, the inspectors concluded that the likelihood of any scenario in which safety-related equipment would actually be affected by the unsecured scaffolding was very low. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the issue did not adversely affect reactor safety cornerstone objectives. Because this issue constitutes a minor violation, and because the licensee implemented adequate corrective actions, it is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues - Analysis of Flooding Vulnerabilities (OpESS FY2007-02)71152 Indian Point's response to the post-Fukushima flood reanalysis established mitigating strategy assessments (MSAs) as a commitment to protect up to 17.9 feet using sandbags and tiger dams. The MSAs were proceduralized, audited, and inspected by NRC in 2015.
The licensee determined that the new revised current design basis flood levels were not bounded by the current license basis flood level of 15 feet. Subsequently, the determination was made not to require the completion of an integrated flood analysis prior to the shutdown of both units in 2021. However, the MSAs are still a regulatory commitment, were proceduralized, and were inspected to ensure they can still be implemented.
The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations.
Observation: Semiannual Trend Analysis of Corrective Maintenance Backlog, Control Room Deficiencies, Open Operability Evaluations, and Operator Workarounds 71152 The inspectors reviewed and assessed the corrective maintenance backlog, control room deficiency tags, open operability evaluations, and operator workarounds at Unit 3 for trends from January 1 to June 30, 2020. Unit 2 was permanently shutdown on April 30, 2020, and was therefore not included in this semi-annual trend analysis. The inspectors did not identify any potential adverse trends. The licensee continues to correct problems in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
Corrective maintenance backlog: The current corrective maintenance backlog is relatively small, and out of service equipment is being promptly repaired. The total maintenance backlog remains consistent compared to the past two quarters. The licensee continues to repair equipment and reduce the historic maintenance backlog from past periods. There were no corrective-critical maintenance items in the backlog.
Control room deficiencies: There are a total of three control room deficiencies. This represents a decrease of one deficiency over a 6-month period of performance. Indian Point is effectively managing the backlog of control room deficiencies. None of the control room deficiencies were safety-significant.
Open operability evaluations: As of June 30, 2020 (date of sample completion), there were two operability evaluations for equipment that is considered operable but degraded or non-conforming (OP-DNC) in the licensee corrective action program. These included:
- CR-IP3-2019-01335 - Unit 3 baffle bolt structure is degraded
- CR-IP3-2012-03262 - Unit 3 turbine building high-energy line break affects on 480 volt switchgear
None of the OP-DNC components were significant safety risks. The inspectors noted that the licensee has updated the status of previously open CRs, which significantly reduced the list of components that were categorized as having open operability determinations. The licensee now has a dedicated report for tracking open items and appeared to accurately reflect the current status of safety-related components.
Operator workarounds: There were no operator workarounds or operator burdens.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On May 7, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiological hazard assessment and exposure controls inspection results to Scott Stevens, Radiation Protection and Safety Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 22, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Anthony J. Vitale, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS
The inspectors reviewed Institute on Nuclear Power Operations reports that were issued during the inspection period.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
EN-FAP-WM-016,
Site Certification Letter for Summer Readiness
May 2020
Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergy's Response
to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to
CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of
Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force
Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
Accident Indian Point Unit No. 2, Docket No.
50-247, License No. DPR-26
Staff Assessment of Flooding Walkdown Report
Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3
Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power
Plant Accident Entergy Nuclear Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. Indian Point Nuclear Generating
Unit Nos. 2 and 3, Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286
6/18/2014
Supplement 38
Generic Environmental Impact Statement for
License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants,
Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station
Revision 5
Procedures
0-MET-402-GEN
Location of Sandbags in Flood Warning Conditions
Revision 5
0-SOP-WEATHER-001
Seasonal Weather Preparation
Revision 8
0-SOP-WEATHER-002
Severe Weather Preparations
Revision 1
3-AOP-138KV-1
Loss of Power to 6.9kV Bus5 and/or 6
Revision 9
3-AOP-Flood-1
Flooding
Revision 11
3-AOP-SWL-1
Low Service Water Bay Level
Revision 3
EN-FAP-EP-010
Severe Weather Response
Revision 7
IP-RPT-12-00036
IP2 Flooding Walkdown Submittal Report for
Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force
Recommendation 2.3: Flooding License
Amendment Request
LAR-2017-
000095, CA4
IP-SMM-OP-104
Offsite Power Continuous Monitoring and
Notification
Revision 13
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-IP2-2020-00927, CR-IP2-2020-01132
Procedures
2-COL-24.1.1
Service Water System
Revision 52
Fire Plans
General Floor Plan, Containment Building, 46-0
Elevation
Revision 10
General Floor Plan, Containment Building, 68-0
Elevation
Revision 0
General Floor Plan, Containment Building, 95-0
Elevation
Revision 0
General Floor Plan, Fuel Storage Building
Revision 12
Intake Structure, Exterior Buildings
Revision 0
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents Resulting
from Inspection
Miscellaneous
PM Change Form for Retirement of PMs
50062547-01 and 50063511-01
3/1/2017
IPS-SW DBD
Indian Point Unit 2 Design Basis Document for
Service Water System
Revision 2
Procedures
2-AOP-FLOOD-1
Flooding
Revision 12
2-COL-24.1.1
Service Water System
Revision 52
Procedures
2-E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Revision 8
2-ES-0.1
Reactor Trip Response
Revision 7
2-POP-3.1
Plant Shutdown from 45% Power
Revision 63
2-POP-3.2
Plant Recovery from Trip, Hot Standby
Revision 42
2-POP-3.3
Plant Cooldown - Hot to Cold Shutdown
Revision 84
2-POP-4.1
Operation at Cold Shutdown
Revision 9
2-POP-4.2
Operation Below 20% PRZR Level with Fuel in the
Reactor
Revision 12
2-SOP-1.2
Draining Reactor Coolant System
Revision 52
2-SOP-4.2.1
Residual Heat Removal System Operation
Revision 69
Calculations
IP-CALC-19-00057
Leak Evaluation at 21 CCW HX Service Water Inlet
Line Downstream of Valve SWN-34
Revision 2
Corrective Action
Documents
4/28/2020
Procedures
3-SOP-RW-005
Service Water System Operation
Revision 42
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-IP2-2020-01233, CR-IP3-2010-03580, CR-IP3-
2010-00805
NDE Reports
IP3-PT-20-007
Liquid Penetrant Exam of Piping Adjacent to
AC-723
6/10/2020
Operability Evaluations 00483166
Procedures
2-PC-2Y72A
Source Range Neutron Flux N-31 Channel
Calibration
Revision 9
Procedures
2-PT-V1
Source Range Analog Channel Functional Test
Revision 36
3-PT-Q026C
Charging Pump
Revision 17
Work Orders
00483166
00528976
2838142
2889688
2915828
2915831
Procedures
2-REF-002-GEN
Reactor Vessel Head Removal
Revision 7
System Component Monitoring Program,
9.5, Indian Point Unit 2 2D24 Coast
Down
Revision 16
IP-SMM-MA-120
Heavy Loads
Revision 5
Corrective Action
Documents
Procedures
2-PC-2Y70
Source Range Neutron Flux (N-5143) Channel
Calibration
Revision 10
3-PT-M079B
EDG Functional Test
Revision 60
3-PT-Q022
Residual Heat Removal System Valves
Revision 24
Work Orders
2797639
4/9/2020
2834613-04
2912995
4/9/2020
Procedures
Radiation Protection Posting
Revision 22
Special Monitoring Requirements
Revision 11
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
202521
2D24 Reactor Disassembly
Revision 0
71151
Miscellaneous
eSOMS
Unit 2 and Unit 3 Control Room Log
1/1/2019 to
2/31/2019
eSOMS
Unit 2 and Unit 3 Operator Rounds Log
4/1/2019 to
3/31/2020
ctors/operating/oversight.
html
NRC Internal Performance Indicator Web Page
4/1/2019 to
3/31/2020
ors/operating/oversight/do
cket-pi.html?docket=IP2&
quarter=2019Q4#IE01
Indian Point 2 - Quarterly Performance Indicators
Public Web Page
4/1/2019 to
3/31/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-IP2-2019-00107, CR-IP2-2019-00179, CR-IP2-
20-00630, 2019-00648, CR-IP3-2019-00749,
CR-IP3-2019-00757, CR-IP3-2019-00758, CR-IP3-
2019-01140, CR-IP3-2019-01445, CR-IP3-2019-
01531, CR-IP3-2019-01593, CR-IP3-2019-01713,
CR-IP3-2019-02250, CR-IP3-2019-03012, CR-IP3-
2019-03743, CR-IP3-2019-03757
Corrective Action
Documents Resulting
from Inspection
Miscellaneous
PR-PRHQN-2019-00243
Procedure Change Request Document for
4/10/2019
Procedures
Control of Scaffolding
Revision 19
Control of Scaffolding
Revision 20
Control of Scaffolding
Revision 21
Work Orders
2778297