IR 05000282/1992026
| ML20128D013 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1993 |
| From: | Burgess B, Reidinger T, Salehi K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128D008 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-92-26, 50-306-92-26, NUDOCS 9302100022 | |
| Download: ML20128D013 (6) | |
Text
l
<
.
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
,
Reports No.
50-282/92026(DRS); 50-306/92026(DRS)
Docket Nos.
50-282; 50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, MN Inspection Conducted: January 11 1993 Inspectors:
/ MN Ifombiz Sag (f Date fY A N 9U Yh Timotjy'Reidinger (/
Date Approved by:
I T-
]/
[b f.'B'urgegs, Chief
/
Datd /
Operatipnal Programs Section Inspection Summary Inspection on Janualy..11 - 22. 1193 (Recorts __
' llo. 50-282/92026(DRS); No. 50-306/92026(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced, safety inspection of design changes, modifications and temporary _ alterations conducted in accordance with Inspection Module 37700.
Results:
No violations er deviationsiwere identified.
One unresolved item related to backward installation of several safety -related valves was identified.
The modifications and temporary alterations reviewed were implemented satisfactorily.
!
9302100022 930203
{DR ADOCK0500g2 t
.
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Egrsons Contacted North.ern States Power Co.tpany E. Watzl, Site General Manager M.
Sellman, Plant Menager K. Albrecht, General Superintendent of Engineering R. Cooper, Quality Assurance Engineer D.
Dugstadt, Associate Engineer J. Goldsmith, Station Black Out, Project Manager S. Hiedeman, System Engineer J. Hill, Superintendent /I&C Engineering C.
Kinney, Power Supply Quality Assurance G.
Rolfson, General Superintendent of Engineering M. Thompson, Project Engineer U.S.
Nuclear Rgaulatory_ggjmniscion B. Jorgensen, Chief, Projects Section 2A E.
Schweibinz, Senior Project Engineer All personnel listed attended the exit held on January 22, 1993.
The inspectors contacted other staff during this inspection.
2.
Desion Chances and Mggifications (37700/3711Q1 For each of the listed modification packages, the inspectors reviewed or inspected the following areas:-
Design of the modification,
10 CFR 50.59 Safety evaluation, e
l Post-modification testing,
'
s Governing procedures, o
Drawing changes, and
Plant installation.
Unless otheralse noted, the inspectors determined that the modifications reviewed were in accordance with programmatic and regulatory requirements.
Further, technical issues identified by the modification review process were appropriately addressed.
Results of the inspection identified one unresolved item concerning backward installation of several valves (see Paragraph 3).
l
i I
.
.g l
.
.
Also, some examples of lack of attention to detail were identified by the inspectors.
However, these examples were minor and had little or no safety significance.
The examples were discussed with the licensee for appropriate resolution.
a.
Modifications.
(1)
MOD 91-L-281. Reconstitutina LeDkina Pugl
,
The modification consisted of reconstituting a
fuel bundle that had a failed fuel rod.
The reconstituted fuel bundle was reinserted into the core with a natural uranium fuel rod.
(2)
MOD 91-L-300 Modify Reaqtat_ Head Vent Pining
The modification changed the reactor coolant gas vent systen (RCGVS) piping and pipe support configuration to prevent overstress conditions in the support structure.
The RCGVS piping had been reanalyzed for thermal and hydraulic load cases that were not previously considered in the design of the system.
(3)
MOD 92-L-361. Separation of Containingnt y_entilation Isolation fCVI) Control Circuit fIq13 54_LesterAs Cir_c31ts The modification removed the CVI control circuits from train A and B safeguards circuits on both units.
It also separated the safety injection
'
auxiliary relays, steam exclusion control circuits and miscellaneous relays.
During the modification process, the licensee noted differences between the'as-built condition and the contractor developed drawings.
The licensen revised the as-built drawings to reflect the installed terminal. board configurations for the modified systems.
The licensee committed to change existing drawings to accurately designate
'
other terminal board configurations that were i
either installed or did not reflect as-built terminations.
The inspectors identified that this modification package was approved for installation by the same person that developed the modification. -Although no technical or programmatic issues were identified, the practice of one individual both initiating and approving a nonsafety-related
?
l
L
_ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _
-
.
-
<
i
.
i modification does not allow for an independent review and evaluation of the design and design assumptions.
If this practice was utilized _for a safety-relatet modification, an inadequate review process would have resulted.
There were similar examples in other nonsafety-related modification packages.
This practice was discussed with the licensee at the exit meeting.
(4)
MOD 92-L-376. Removal _sf. prorsure Tans for the Ghn.raina Pumns
,
The modification removed one unused charging pump suction strasner upstream pressure tap.
The remaining charging pump's upstream pressure taps will be removed and capped-off during the next outage of sufficient duration.
Vibration restraints were also installed on the charging pumpa' discharge pressure piping tap.
The reason for the modification was that pressure tap welds on the charging suction and discharge piping were subject to fatigue cracking.
b.
Igaperary Modifications
(1)
IM:#9-L-057. Renlacina Cont 31Dm.ent Pressure
'
T13tMpitters The modification replaced Barton Model 368
}
containment pressure transmitters to Rosemount Model 1154DP6RO.
The new transmitters will be installed at the original location to maintain-separation criterion.
The reason for transmitter
replacement was the age of the old Barton units and the need for a higher accuracy transmitter.
(2)
TH-EQ-T-015. Disq9DDeption of Reactor Level 1Dd.iGation Systga,J ggpr Bellows Vent Tubing The temporary modification disconnected reactor J
level _ indication system (RVLIS) vent tubing upstream aide of the vent valves and installed a swagelock cap.
Removal of the vent tubing from the reactor level indication system was in response to tubing leaks at the vent valve to tubing interface.
(3)
TM-92-T-024, _Beactor Egotection Initiation Analoa Innut connection to Emeraency Resnonse Cqmruter_
The modification was performed to temporcrily
-
,
-bypass a bad wiring connector to the emergency A
__
_
.- _
_
.
,
,
l response computer system.
An input from the bad connector to the emergency response computer I
caused false rod insertion monitor alarms in the l
control roo.n.
The connector was replaced and the system-tested satisfactorily during the outage.
(4)
TM-92-A-243. Reolacgppnt of Letdgyn Pressure Control Valves The modification replaced letdown piping and both letdown pressure control valves.
The control valves were replaced because of poor response to automatic control signals during RCS pressure transients.
3.
Eackward Insta11ation of Safetv-Related.yAlyAg The above modification, TM-92-A-243, noted that a letdown isolation valve was installed backward.
In response to the inspectors' inquiry, the licensee identified that 17 valves in unit 2; and 9 valves in unit 3 were installed bachward in either a safety-related system or RCS pressure boundary system.
However, the licensee also indicated that they were not aware of all the instances of backward orientation of valves.
In addition, the current drawings did not reflect the Westinghouse legend that identifies the backward valve orientation.
The licensee committed to update the drawings.
The valves range in sizes from 2 (Rockwell) to 3 inches (Valan).
Applications vary from installation in safety-related systems (e.g. RTD manifold outlet isolation valves)
to nonsafety-related systems (e.g. charging pump discharge to the seal injection valves).
The inspectora reviewed the engineering evaluations for the backward installation of the valves.
Some of the licensee's evaluations for safety-related modifications did not include a fully documented engineering evaluation.
In one case, in response to the inspectocs' request, the valve manufacturer was contacted and indicated that a nonsafety-related valve backward installation had "little or no effect" on valve performance.
However, orientation of a valve could be an important consideration on overall system performance if a backward installed valve was a motor, air, or pilot-operated valve.
The licensee did not document safety-related engineering evaluations, nor were they aware of all instances of backwa_d installed valves.
This issue will remain en unresolved item pending the results of inspections of valve orientation in safety-related systems (282/92026-01 (DRS); 306/92026-01 DRS)).
E l
_ _.
.
..
.
__
-
-
. _.
,
,.
4.
Ey. stem Enoineers and Eroiect Encineerina (377.221 The inspectors interviewed system engineurs and plant staff regarding the engineers' support.
Prompt and high quality engineering support of system engineers on most technical issues was noted.
For example, a spike on a steam generator pressure transmitter was identified on the same day to be caused by radio transmission.
Operations, maintenance, and other plant staff interviesed by the inspectors considered system engineering support to te good.
However, a consistent-comment received during interviews with engineering staff noted coordination and communication-difficulties between systen and project engineers.
The inspectors did not identify any hardware, programmatic or safety-related concerns caused by an apparent lack of coordination between the two engineering groups.
The licensee had already recognized this issue and was in the process of implementing specific organizational changes to increase the communication and coordination effectiveness between system and design engineers.
The licensee had recently revised the engineering manual for the system and project engineers.
The recently implemented engineering design standards and requirements appeared to have the potential to address the lack of attention to detail examples discussed with the licensee at the end of t' *is inspection.
-
5.
Unresolved Iten Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they:are acceptable items,-violations or deviations.
Unresolved item is discussed in Paragraph 3.
6.
Exit Meeting The inspectors met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection _on January 22, 1993.
The
.
inspectors summarized the purpose, scope,_ and findings of the inspection report.
The licensee acknowledged the information and did not identify any information as proprietary.
l
- -