IR 05000280/2025004
| ML26036A044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/2026 |
| From: | Shawn Smith NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB6 |
| To: | Carr E Dominion Energy, Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| EAF-RII-2026-0006 IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26036A044 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SURRY POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2025004 AND 05000281/2025004 AND APPARENT VIOLATION
Dear Eric S. Carr:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Surry Power Station. On January 7, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with David Wilson, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Section 71152A of the enclosed report discusses a finding with an associated apparent violation for which the NRC has not yet reached a preliminary significance determination. This finding involved the failure to provide detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions to perform turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump maintenance activities.
We intend to issue our final safety significance determination and enforcement decision, in writing, within 90 days from the date of this letter. The NRCs significance determination process (SDP) is designed to encourage an open dialogue between your staff and the NRC; however, neither the dialogue nor the written information you provide should affect the timeliness of our final determination. We ask that you promptly provide any relevant information that you would like us to consider in making our determination. We are currently evaluating the significance of this finding and will notify you in separate correspondence once we have completed our preliminary significance review. You will be given an additional opportunity to provide additional information prior to our final significance determination unless our review concludes that the finding has very low safety significance (i.e., Green).
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.
February 5, 2026 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Steven P. Smith, Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000280 and 05000281
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000280/2025004 and 05000281/2025004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-004-0031
Licensee:
Dominion Energy, Inc.
Facility:
Surry Power Station
Location:
Surry, VA
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2025, to December 31, 2025
Inspectors:
S. Bruneau, Project Engineer
S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Jung, (Acting) Senior Resident Inspector
D. Neal, Health Physicist
M. Read, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Restrepo, (Acting) Resident Inspector
D. Turpin, (Acting) Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Steven P. Smith, Chief
Projects Branch 6
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Surry Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to provide detailed maintenance procedures for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to ensure safety of the reactor Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Pending AV 05000280,05000281/2025004-01 Open EAF-RII-2026-0006
[H.1] -
Resources 71152A A self-revealed apparent violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7, Unit Operating Procedures and Programs, was identified when the licensee failed to provide detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions to perform maintenance activities, which resulted in the failure of a Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS surveillance test for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (TDAFWP).
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000280/2025-001-00 LER 2025-001-00 for Surry Power Station, Failed Relay Caused Reactor Trip 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On October 12, 2025, the unit was shut down for a planned refueling outage. The unit was placed online on December 30, 2025.
Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Spent fuel pool cooling pumps during Unit 1 refueling outage on November 20, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1 reactor containment, fire area 15, elevation 47 feet - 4 inches; elevation 18 feet - 4 inches; elevation (-) 3 feet - 6 inches; elevation (-) 27 feet - 7 inches, on November 4, 2025
- (2) Mechanical equipment room #3 and #4, fire areas 45 and 54, elevation 9 feet - 6 inches, on November 20, 2025
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The licensee completed the annual requalification operating tests required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, and the crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating tests administered on March 21, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the Unit 1 reactor shutdown and cooldown for their planned refueling outage on October 11-12, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator during a just in time training involving Unit 1 reactor startup on November 26, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 heat trace panel that supports hydrogen analyzer found not energized on August 19, 2025 (Condition Report [CR] 1298739)
- (2) Review of the Maintenance Rule periodic self-assessment covering January 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024 (Performance Improvement Report 1259332)
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 shutdown risk plan in preparation of 1R33 refueling outage on October 9, 2025
- (2) High risk plan review prior to bus '1F' undervoltage protective relay testing during
==1R33 on October 16, 2025
==
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) CR1303590, 1-FW-SOV-155C1, 'C' steam generator (SG) feedwater (FW) bypass flow solenoid operated valve, was found venting which caused 1-FW-HCV-155C, 'C' SG FW bypass flow valve, to close on October 12, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) SU-23-00146, component cooling heat exchanger temporary service water supply header and temporary canal level probe
- (2) SU-19-01006, Unit 1 pressurizer heaters, cables, controls, & electrical penetration assemblies replacement
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial) The inspectors evaluated Unit 1 refueling outage, 1R33, activities from October 12, 2025, through December 30, 2025. The inspectors completed inspection procedure 71111.20, except Section 3.01(e).
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)0-ECM-1413-02, Low Head Safety Injection Pump Maintenance, following Unit 2 low head safety injection pump motor preventative maintenance on December 8, 2025 (Work Order [WO]38204301502)
(2)1-OPT-FW-003, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2, following Unit 1 TDAFWP governor oil change on December 27, 2025 (WO38204371458)
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)1-OPT-ZZ-002, Engineered Safety Features Actuation with Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage - 1J Bus, on October 14, 2025
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)1-OPT-CT-201, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Testing (Type C Containment Testing), on November 25, 2025 (WO38204354740)
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels, identifies the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials, and assesses radiological hazards.
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:
- (1) Workers exiting containment during the unit 1 refueling outage.
- (2) Licensee surveys of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:
- (1) Unit 1 refueling outage scaffolding activities inside containment.
- (2) Preparation and removal of the reactor vessel upper internals.
(3)
'4A' seal water injection filter changeout.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas (HRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs):
- (2) Unit 1 'B' steam generator loop room (Locked HRA)
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling and securing the following radioactive materials:
- (1) Surry radwaste facility (SRF) and SRF yard.
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
- (1) Unit 0, SRF control room/radwaste processing area (including liquid radwaste reverse osmosis system)
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:
- (1) Demineralizer tank (DMT) resin, Part 61 Characterization (Sample # L108036-2)
- (2) DMT sludge Part 61 Characterization (Sample # L108036-1)
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment D2025-07 of surface contaminated objects on November 25, 2025.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) Shipment number SH-2024-031, (UN2913, SCO-II, Exclusive use)
- (2) Shipment number SH-2025-037 (UN2913, SCO-II, Exclusive use)
- (3) Shipment number SH-2025-029 (UN2913, SCO-II, Exclusive use)
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 2024, through September 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 2024, through September 2025)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 2024, through September 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 2024, through September 2025)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
- (1) April 8, 2024, through December 4, 2025 71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Unit 1 reactor trip due to Hi consequence limiting safeguards relay failure (CR1297902)
- (2) Unit 1 TDAFWP surveillance test failure (CR1280548 and 1284152)
- (3) Unit 2 TDAFWP surveillance test failure (CR1283327 and 1284970)
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program and related documents such as trend reports, licensee performance indicators, system health reports, and performance improvement and training observations for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Occupational Safety and Health Administration reportable event involving improper rigging setup that led to a worker being struck by fallen piping and licensees response on October 27, 2025 (Event Notification 57968).
- (2) The inspectors evaluated #3 emergency diesel generator actuation due to loss of offsite power to 1J emergency bus, and licensees response on November 4, 2025 (EN 58020).
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000280/2025-001-00, Failed Relay Caused Reactor Trip, ADAMS Accession No. ML25275A606. The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to provide detailed maintenance procedures for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to ensure safety of the reactor Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Pending AV 05000280,05000281/2025004-01 Open EAF-RII-2026-0006
[H.1] -
Resources 71152A A self-revealed apparent violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7, Unit Operating Procedures and Programs, was identified when the licensee failed to provide detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions to perform maintenance activities, which resulted in the failure of a Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS surveillance test for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (TDAFWP).
Description:
On January 14, 2025, Unit 1 TDAFWP started and tripped on overspeed after approximately 5 seconds while performing the quarterly TS surveillance testing. The licensee restored operability by replacing the governor.
On February 18, 2025, the Unit 2 TDAFWP also tripped on overspeed during the quarterly TS surveillance testing. The licensee restored operability by adjusting the governor compensating needle valve. The licensee determined that the most probable cause of the overspeed trip was due to the compensating needle valve on the governor not being set to its optimal position following the governor oil change activity during the Unit 2 refueling outage in November 2024. During the planned Unit 2 TDAFWP governor maintenance activity on November 8, 2024, maintenance procedure 0-MCM-1403-01 did not clearly require governor venting and compensating needle valve optimization following the governor oil change activity. Step 6.11.5 of the procedure states IF Step 6.11.3 (governor oil change) was the only Step performed and Governor change out or maintenance was not performed, then Subsection 6.12 (compensating needle valve optimization) could be marked N/A. However, the licensee stated in their level of effort evaluation that the venting of the governor is an expected practice after an oil change to remove air in the oil system per the Electric Power Research Institute guidance and the Vendor Technical Manual. The procedure also provided contradicting guidance and written instructions which resulted in a failure to perform governor venting or compensating needle valve optimization.
Following the February 2025 Unit 2 TDAFWP failure, the licensee conducted an in-depth inspection of the Unit 1 TDAFWP on March 13, 2025. The licensee determined the most probable cause of the Unit 1 TDAFWP overspeed trip was due to improper governor valve maintenance performed in May 2021. Specifically, during the scheduled Unit 1 TDAFWP maintenance activity on May 14, 2021, maintenance personnel performed a tightening of the set screw that secures the guide bushing in place per the procedure 0-MCM-1403-01, Terry Turbine Overhaul, 1-FW-T-2 and 2-FW-T-2. The procedure contains instructions to tighten set screw throughout the procedure without specific instruction or guidance on expected tightness or validation of the proper installation of the set screw. This resulted in damage to the guide bushing threads and led to slight misalignment on the valve stem. The misalignment introduced excessive friction forces in the governor valve, stem, and associated packing, degrading performance over time and ultimately causing the overspeed trip.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to provide detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions to perform TDAFWP maintenance activities. Specifically, the licensees procedure 0-MCM-1403-01 did not prevent overtightening of the set screw, which introduced excessive friction force in the governor valve, stem, and associated packing, resulting in the turbine overspeed trip during Unit 1 TDAFWP quarterly surveillance testing.
Furthermore, the failure to provide specific guidance on when to perform the governor venting and compensating needle valve optimization resulted in the turbine overspeed trip during Unit 2 TDAFWP quarterly surveillance testing.
Corrective Actions:
The licensee completed immediate corrective actions to restore the plant equipment to the expected state and revised the affected procedure to include additional details and guidance for future maintenance activities. Also, the licensee initiated a corrective action assignment to perform a level of effort evaluation of the events.
Corrective Action References: CR1280548 and 1283327
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to provide a detailed written procedure with appropriate instructions could have had an effect on the safety of the reactor and was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within licensees ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the licensee did not provide detailed written procedures for preventive maintenance operations which resulted in the failure of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TDAFWP TS surveillance tests.
Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance of the procedure contributed to TS surveillance failures of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 TDAFWPs.
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, section A, the screening question A.2 was answered YES, which directed staff to perform a Detailed Risk Evaluation (DRE). The finding could not be screened to Green and is pending an initial significance determination after completion of the DRE.
Cross-Cutting Aspect:
H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, during the maintenance activities for the Units 1 and 2 TDAFW pumps, the maintenance personnel did not have adequate proficiency to perform the task without additional procedural guidance which caused the overtightening of the set screw on the governor valve. Also, the maintenance personnel did not have adequate guidance to recognize when to perform the governor venting and compensating needle valve optimization, which caused the suboptimal compensating needle valve position.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 6.4.A.7, Unit Operating Procedures and Programs, requires, in part, Detailed written procedures with appropriate check-off lists and instructions shall be provided for the following conditions[p]reventive or corrective maintenance operations which would have an effect on the safety of the reactor.
Contrary to the above, on or before February 18, 2025, the licensee failed to provide detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions to perform preventive maintenance activities on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TDAFW pumps that could have had an effect on the safety of the reactor. Specifically, the lack of detailed maintenance procedures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TDAFW pumps caused the failure of the quarterly TS surveillance tests. On May 14, 2021, during a planned maintenance activity, overtightening of a set screw resulted in a TS surveillance testing failure on January 14, 2025, and on November 8, 2024, suboptimal compensating needle valve position of Unit 2 TDAFWP governor resulted in a TS surveillance testing failure on February 18, 2025.
Enforcement Action:
This violation is being treated as an apparent violation pending a final significance (enforcement) determination.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 7, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to David Wilson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 4, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to David Wilson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
11448-FM-081A
FLOW/VALVE OPERATING NUMBERS DIAGRAM SUEL
PIT SYSTEMS SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 1
Revision 32
Procedures
0-OP-FC-001A
Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System Alignment
Revision 7
Fire Plans
0-FS-FP-115
Mechanical Equipment Room #3 Elevation 9 feet - 6 inches
Revision 5
Fire Plans
0-FS-FP-125
Mechanical Equipment Room 4 - Elevation 9 feet - 6 inches
Revision 1
Fire Plans
1-FS-FP-134
Containment Unit 1 Elevation 47 feet - 4 inches
(subatmospheric)
Revision 1
Fire Plans
1-FS-FP-135
Containment Unit 1 Elevation 18 feet - 4 inches
(subatmospheric)
Revision 1
Fire Plans
1-FS-FP-136
Containment Unit 1 Elevation (-)3 feet - 6 inches
(subatmospheric)
Revision 1
Fire Plans
1-FS-FP-137
Containment Unit 1 Elevation (-)27 feet - 7 inches
(subatmospheric)
Revision 1
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 1303541
10/11/2025
Procedures
1-GOP-1.7
Unit Startup, RCS Heatup From Ambient to HSD
Rev 56
Procedures
1-GOP-2.7
Unit Shutdown, Power Decrease From Allowable Power to
Unit Offline for Refueling Outage
Rev 54
Procedures
1-GOP-2.8
Unit Cooldown, HSD to CSD for Refueling
Rev 47
Miscellaneous
Outage Safety
Review
25 Outage Plan Safety Review Surry Unit 1
Rev 0
Miscellaneous
Relay Testing
High risk plan action for bus '1F' undervoltage protective
relay testing.
09/29/2025
Procedures
0-EPT-1802-03
Bus 1F Undervoltage Protective Relay Testing
Rev 8
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1304635
NRC Identified: Scaffolding builder climbing will inside
containment
10/21/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
CR 1305908
NRC Identified: Scaffold builder performing activities that
could challenge LHRA boundary
11/04/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Inspection
Procedures
Access Controls for High and Very High Radiation Areas
Revision 10
Radiation
Surveys
Unit 1
Containment - All
Elevations
Dose rates during fuel movement
10/20/2025
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
25-0-2118
U1R33 - Scaffolding Activities
Revision 5
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 1308133
NRC identified potential performance deficiency related to
physical barriers as defined in 10 CFR 37
2/02/2025
Procedures
HP-1072.020
Sampling, Analyzing, and Classifying Radioactive Waste
Revision 6
Shipping Records
D2025-07
11/25/2025