IR 05000280/2014002
| ML14122A227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/2014 |
| From: | Mark King NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR-14-002 | |
| Download: ML14122A227 (28) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION May 1, 2014
SUBJECT:
SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2014002, 05000281/2014002
Dear Mr. Heacock:
On March 31, 2014, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 23, 2014, with Mr. L. Lane and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
One self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspection. This finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Surry Power Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Surry Power Station.
Additionally, as we informed you in the most recent NRC integrated inspection report, cross-cutting aspects identified in the last six months of 2013 using the previous terminology were being converted in accordance with the cross-reference in Inspection Manual Chapter 0310.
Section 4OA5 of the enclosed report documents the conversion of these cross-cutting aspects which will be evaluated for cross-cutting themes and potential substantive cross-cutting issues in accordance with IMC 0305 starting with the 2014 mid-cycle assessment review. If you disagree with the cross cutting aspect assigned, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Surry Power Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael F. King, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37
Enclosure:
Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2014002, 05000281/2014002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37 Report No: 05000280/2014002, 05000281/2014002 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 5850 Hog Island Road Surry, VA 23883 Dates: January 1, 2014 through March 31, 2014 Inspectors: P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector J. Nadel, Resident Inspector K. Roche, Acting Resident Inspector A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5)
Approved by: Michael F. King, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000280/2014002, 05000281/2014002; 01/01/2014-03/31/2014; Surry Power Station, Units and 2: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and region-based inspectors. One self-revealing finding was identified which was determined to be a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. The cross-cutting aspect was determined using IMC 0310, Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 19, 2013. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. All violation of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
A self-revealing NCV of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7 was identified because 1-SW-MOV-103D, the B and C recirculation spray heat exchanger (RSHX) inlet isolation valve, motor thermal overload was improperly reset after planned maintenance and became disengaged on November 29, 2013, rendering one service water (SW) flow path of the B and C recirculation spray (RS) subsystem inoperable. The issue was documented in Surrys corrective action program (CAP) as CR 533932.
The licensees failure to include acceptance criteria for determining if a thermal overload was properly reset was a performance deficiency (PD) that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, an inadequate procedure did not have electricians verify that the trip indication flag in the thermal overload had fully cleared the viewing window or provide some other criteria for acceptance. The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the motor thermal overload was improperly reset after planned maintenance which resulted in rendering one SW flow path of the B and C RS subsystem inoperable thereby affecting the availability of the RS subsystem. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors screened the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A,
Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power dated June 19, 2012, and determined that it screened as Green because the deficiency did not affect the design or qualification of the RS system and it did not represent a loss of system safety function. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Documentation aspect of the human performance area, H.7, because the licensee did not create and maintain a complete and accurate procedure to ensure that MCC thermal overloads were properly reset. (Section 1R15)
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) throughout the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near RTP from the beginning of the inspection period until March 6, 2014 when it reduced power to 70 percent because of an instrument air line break that affected the High Pressure Feedwater Heater System. The unit returned to 100 percent later that same day.
On March 19, the unit was shut down to repair a packing leak from a pressurizer spray valve. A reactor startup was commenced on March 21, and the unit returned to 100 percent power on March 23, 2014. The unit remained at or near RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Site Specific Weather
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a site specific weather-related inspection due to anticipated adverse weather conditions, specifically extreme cold temperature, on January 8, 2014.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations for potential severe weather as well as severe weather procedure 0-OP-ZZ-021, Severe Weather Preparation, Revision 3.
The inspectors walked down site areas which included the emergency diesel generators (EDGs), emergency switchgear rooms, emergency service water pump house, alternate AC (AAC) diesel generator, and the turbine, safeguards, and auxiliary buildings.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted three equipment alignment partial walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and TS to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions.
The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.
- Unit 1 'A' and 'B' Charging (CH) Pumps while the 'C' CH pump was out of service to replace the auxiliary lube oil pump
- "A" and "B" Emergency Service Water (ESW) pumps while "C" ESW pump was out of service for maintenance
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Quarterly Fire Protection Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the five areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program, Revision 9, CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Revision 6, and CM-AA-FPA-102, Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process, Revision 5.
The reviews were performed to evaluate the fire protection program operational status and material condition and the adequacy of: 1) control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; 2) fire detection and suppression capability; 3) passive fire protection features; 4) compensatory measures established for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features; and 5) procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems so that post-fire capability to safely shutdown the plant is ensured. The inspectors reviewed the CAP to verify fire protection deficiencies were being identified and properly resolved.
- 2B Battery Room
- Unit 2 Cable Vault
- Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room
- AAC Diesel Room
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1 Room
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the internal flood protection measures and procedural controls established to address potential flooding in the Unit 2 emergency switchgear room. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the affected areas to observe and assess the condition of the installed flood dikes, floor drain backflow preventers, the sealing of holes and penetrations between flood areas, the adequacy of water tight doors, the operability of flooding alarms, and the installed sump pumps. The inspectors reviewed the CAP and verified internal flooding related problems were being identified and properly addressed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator simulator exercise given on March 25, 2014. The scenario involved a steam generator tube leak, a failed open steam generator power operated relief valve, and a steam generator tube rupture. This scenario was intended to exercise the entire operations crew and assess the ability of the operators to react correctly to multiple failures. The inspectors observed the crews performance to determine whether the crew met the scenario objectives; accomplished the critical tasks; demonstrated the ability to take timely action in a safe direction and to prioritize, interpret, and verify alarms; demonstrated proper use of alarm response, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures; demonstrated proper command and control; communicated effectively; and appropriately classified events per the emergency plan. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Resident Inspector Observation of Control Room Operations
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of licensed reactor operator activities to ensure consistency with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. For the following activities, the inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance: 1) operator compliance and use of plant procedures including technical specifications; 2) control board component manipulations; 3) use and interpretation of plant instrumentation and alarms; 4) documentation of activities; 5)management and supervision of activities; and 6) control room communications.
- Unit 1 main turbine trip test
- EDG 3 monthly performance test
- Unit 2 ramp from 73 percent to 100 percent RTP
- Unit 2 A charging pump in-service test (IST)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
For the two equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the corresponding licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and associated circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews, as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problems. Inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), station procedures ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 5, and ER-AA-MRL-100, Implementing the Maintenance Rule, Revision 6.
- Unit 1 rod control after several material failures that required rod control to be placed in manual.
- Safety-related sections of Unit 1 SW
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the five activities listed below for the following:
1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; 2) the management of risk; 3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and 4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the CAP to verify deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved.
- On January 27, Unit 1 risk when "C" SW pump was removed from service for planned maintenance, the "E" main control room (MCR) Chiller was removed from service for planned maintenance, a low level intake structure battery discharge test in progress and EDG 1 monthly performance test (PT) was in progress
- On February 18, Unit 1 and 2 risk when EDG 2 was out of service for a maintenance availability
- On March 6, Unit 2 risk during the emergent repair of instrument air header piping
- On March 19, Unit 2 risk during the emergent repair of 2-RC-PCV-2455A, the "B" PZR Spray Valve
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the five operability evaluations listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess as appropriate: 1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; 2) whether continued system operability was warranted; 3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered; 4) if compensatory measures were involved, whether the compensatory measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and 5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance.
The inspectors review included verification that operability determinations were made as specified in OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 11. The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP to verify deficiencies in operability determinations were being identified and corrected.
- CR 532478, inadequate thread engagement on 1-SW-33, 1-SW-25, 1-SW29, 1-SW37, service water to component cooling heat exchangers isolation valves.
- CR 540174, EDG 2 exhaust expansion joint bolting.
- CR 540845, "B" AFW pump motor bearing oil sample debris and elevated vibrations
- CR 533932, 1-SW-MOV-103D thermal overloads not fully engaged
- CR 539533 1B Charging Pump outboard motor bearing bubbler found empty.
b. Findings
Introduction:
A self-revealing, Green NCV of Surry TS 6.4.A.7 was identified because 1-SW-MOV-103D, the B and C RSHX inlet isolation valve, motor thermal overload was improperly reset after planned maintenance and became disengaged on November 29, 2013, rendering one SW flow path of the B and C RS subsystem inoperable.
Description:
On November 29, 2013, the shut indication for 1-SW-MOV-103D went out on the MCR bench board. The position of the valve was verified shut locally and the MOV breaker was in the on position at the MCC panel. The valve was declared inoperable and investigation by Surry personal found that the motor thermal overloads were not fully engaged, but not tripped. The thermal overloads were mechanically cycled by hand, reset, and the light returned to the shut indication on the MCR board.
Surry replaced the three heaters inside the thermal overloads to restore valve operability. Surry Unit 1 entered a 24-hour shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO) for one inoperable SW flow path to a RS subsystem. 1-SW-MOV-103D was restored to service following the replacement of the three heaters in the thermal overloads and the 24-hour LCO was exited 5.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> after the shut indication went out. The issue was documented in Surrys CAP as CR 533932.
The 1-SW-MOV-103D motor breaker had preventative maintenance conducted on it during the fall refueling outage (RFO) and was restored to service with a successful post maintenance test (PMT) on November 14, 2013. The valve was again cycled on November 18 as part of troubleshooting of the SW leak-by into the B RSHX and the valve passed another PMT on this date.
Surry procedure 0-ECM-0306-02, Motor Control Center Maintenance, Revision 54, requires, in part, for maintenance department electricians to Reset overload assembly, after thermally tripping each phase of the thermal overload. This step does not give acceptance criteria to verify that the overload is properly reset, nor does it tell the electrician to visually verify that the trip indication flag in the thermal overload has fully cleared the viewing window. The reset step is performed within the overload test subsection, whether testing is performed in the field or in the shop.
The licensee determined the most likely apparent cause was the thermal overload assembly had not been fully reset during the last periodic maintenance testing. The 0-ECM-0306-02 step that resets the thermal overload assembly does not give acceptance criteria for a closed overload that is properly reset. This procedural step is not in accordance with Dominion procedure DNAP-0503, Writers Guide for Dominion Nuclear Common Procedures, Revision 2 which states in section 3.3.5.c that If a decision point is involved, the criteria for making the decision should be included in the procedure.
Analysis:
The inspectors concluded that the failure of the licensee to include acceptance criteria for determining if a thermal overload is properly reset was a PD that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, an inadequate procedure did not have electricians verify the trip indication flag in the thermal overload had fully cleared the viewing window or did not provide some other criteria for acceptance. The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the motor thermal overload was improperly reset after planned maintenance which resulted in rendering one SW flow path of the B and C RS subsystem inoperable thereby affecting the availability of the RS subsystem.
Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone.
The inspectors screened the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, SDP for Findings at-Power dated June 19, 2012, and determined that it screened as Green because the deficiency did not affect the design or qualification of the RS system and it did not represent a loss of system safety function. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Documentation aspect of the human performance area, H.7, because the licensee did not create and maintain a complete and accurate procedure to ensure that MCC thermal overloads were properly reset.
Enforcement:
Surry TS 6.4.A.7 requires, in part, that detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions shall be provided for conditions that include: preventative maintenance operations which would have an effect on the safety of the reactor. These requirements are implemented, in part, by Dominion Procedure DNAP-0503, Writers Guide for Dominion Nuclear Common Procedures, Revision 2. Section 3.3.5.c of procedure DNAP-0503 states that If a decision point is involved, the criteria for making the decision should be included in the procedure. Contrary to the above, on April 30, 2012, the licensee did not provide appropriate instructions for procedure 0-ECM-0306-02, Electrical Corrective Maintenance, Revision 54. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide acceptance criteria for a properly reset MOV thermal overload in the procedure used to test thermal overloads. Because the licensee entered the issue into their CAP as CR 533932 and the finding is of very low safety significance (Green), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000280/2014002-01, Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Inlet Isolation Valve MOV Thermal Overload Not Properly Reset.
1R18 Plant Modifications
Temporary Modification TM-S1-14-024
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed temporary modification, TM S1-14-024, 1-RC-FC-1414 Filter Installation, that activates a 50ms filter on 1-RC-FC-1414, Channel 1 Reactor Coolant Flow Comparator, to attenuate 8 Hz noise in the reactor coolant flow detection circuitry, to verify that the modification did not affect system operability or availability as described by the TS and UFSAR. In addition, the inspectors verified that the temporary modification was in accordance with CM-AA-TDC-204, Temporary Modifications, Revision 3, and for the related work package, that adequate controls were in place, procedures and drawings were updated, and post-installation tests verified the operability of the affected systems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six post-maintenance test procedures and/or test activities for selected risk-significant mitigating systems listed below, to assess whether: 1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; 2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; 3)acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; 4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; 5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; 6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; 7) test equipment was removed following testing; and 8)equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Revision 14.
- 1-ICP-RC-T-005, Delta T/Tave Temperature Control Auctioneered Tave and Delta T, Revision 9, following module replacement
- 0-ECM-1404-02, Low Voltage Motor Maintenance, Revision 35, following Unit 1 C Charging Pump auxiliary oil pump replacement
- 2-OPT-FW-003, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2-FW-P-2 Periodic Test, Revision 51, following pump outboard bearing oil pressure adjustment
- 0-OPT-SW-009, Emergency Service Water Pump, 1-SW-P-1C, Comprehensive Test, Revision 17, following pump and motor planned maintenance
- 2-OPT-EG-009, Number 2 EDG Major Maintenance Operability Test, Revision 51, following a 4-day planned maintenance outage for EDG #2
- 2-OPT-CH-001, Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 2-CH-P-1A, Revision 52, after pump motor balancing
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Unit 2 Forced Outage Due to Packing Leak from Pressurizer Spray Valve
a. Inspection Scope
Unit 2 began a forced outage on March 19, 2014, due to a packing leak from 2-RC-PCV-2455A, A pressurizer spray valve, which continued until March 22, 2014. During the force outage period, the inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71111.20, Refueling and Outage Activities, to observe portions of the maintenance and startup activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage risk assessment and applicable TS. The inspectors also confirmed that the licensee had appropriately considered industry experience and previous site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance of defense-in-depth. The inspectors monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below.
- Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate maintenance of defense-in-depth for key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TS when taking equipment out of service
- Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing
- Decay heat removal processes to verify proper operation and that steam generators, when relied upon, were a viable means of backup cooling
- Controls over activities that could affect reactivity
- Startup and ascension to full power operation and tracking of startup prerequisites
- Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to forced outage activities
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the six surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.
In-Service Testing:
- 1-OPT-CH-002, Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 1-CH-P-1B, Revision 56 Surveillance Testing:
- 0-OSP-AAC-001, Quarterly Test of 0-AAC-DG-0M, Alternate AC Diesel Generator, Revision 43
- 1-OPT-CS-002, Containment Spray System Test, Revision 16
- 1-OPT-EG-001, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise Test, Revision 62
- 1/2 NSP-SI-001, Ultrasonic Examination of Safety Injection Piping, Revision 2
- 2-PT-8.1, Reactor Protection Logic Test (For Normal Operations), Revision 35
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill
a. Inspection Scope
On March 25, 2014, the inspectors reviewed and observed a licensee EP drill involving a steam generator tube leak, a failed open steam generator power operated relief valve, a steam generator tube rupture, fuel element failure, and an unisolable radioactive release. The inspectors assessed the licensee emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classifications, notifications, and protective actions recommendation development. The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the drill and post-drill critique performance. The inspectors verified that the drill critique identified drill performance weaknesses and entered these items into the licensees CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the six following Unit 1 and 2 PIs to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 data reported to the NRC for the period January 1, 2013 through December 31, 2013. Documents reviewed included applicable NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports, operator logs, station performance indicators, and related CRs.
- Unit 1 and 2 Unplanned Scrams
- Unit 1 and 2 Unplanned Scrams with Complications
- Unit 1 and 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Daily Reviews of Items Entered into the CAP:
a. As required by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.1. The review included issues documented outside the normal correction action program in system health reports, corrective maintenance work orders, component status reports, site monthly meeting reports, and maintenance rule assessments. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of July through December, 2013, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted.
The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest integrated quarterly assessment report. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy.
b. Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified. In general, the licensee has identified trends and has addressed the trends with their CAP. No new adverse trends were identified this period that had not already been identified by the licensee.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
Unit 2 Forced Shutdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors responded to forced shutdown of Unit 2 on March 19, 2013, due to significant packing leakage from 2-RC-PCV-2455A, A pressurizer spray valve. The reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage was below the TS limits for unidentified and identified RCS leakage. The inspectors discussed the shutdown with operations, engineering, and licensee management personnel to gain an understanding of the event and assessed follow up actions. The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken in accordance with licensee procedures, and reviewed unit and system indications to verify that actions and system responses were as expected. The inspectors will perform a detailed review of the cause of the event during a subsequent review of the licensees causal analysis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction 2515/182, Phase II - Review of the Industry Initiative to
Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed records and procedures related to the licensees program for buried piping and underground piping and tanks in accordance with Phase II of temporary instruction (TI) 2515/182, Review of the Implementation of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks, to confirm that the licensees program contained attributes consistent with Sections 3.3.A and 3.3.B of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 09-14, Guideline for the Management of Buried Piping Integrity, Revision 3, and to confirm that these attributes were scheduled and/or completed by the NEI 09-14 deadlines. The inspectors interviewed licensee staff responsible for the buried piping program and reviewed a sample of program related activities to determine if the program attributes were accomplished in a manner which reflected acceptable practices in program management.
The licensees buried piping and underground piping and tanks program was inspected in accordance with paragraph 03.02.a of the TI and it was confirmed that activities which correspond to completion dates specified in the program which have passed since the Phase I inspection was conducted have been completed. The licensees buried piping and underground piping and tanks program was inspected in accordance with paragraph 03.02.b of the TI and responses to specific questions found in http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/buried-pipe-ti-phase-2-insp-req-2011-11-16.pdf were submitted to the NRC headquarters staff. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees risk ranking process and implementation of the inspection plan using the guidance of paragraph 03.04 and 03.05 of the TI.
A review of Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) 019240, which evaluated the ground water protection program criteria being exceeded that was documented in CR 484956 was also performed. The leaks addressed in the ACE were associated with degraded storm drains. The corrective measures identified in Design Change CM-AA-DDC-201, 17, and Commercial Change SU-12-0023, currently under construction at the site, provide reasonable assurance the degraded storm drains are being repaired to prevent future leakage.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. Based upon the scope of the review described above, Phase II of TI-2515/182 was completed.
.2 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the final report for the INPO plant assessment of Surry Power Station conducted in September 2013. The inspectors evaluated this report to ensure that NRC perspectives of the licensees performance were consistent with any issues identified during this assessment. The inspectors also reviewed this report to determine whether INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC follow-up.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Cross-cutting Aspects
The table below provides a cross-reference from the 2013 and earlier findings and associated cross-cutting aspects to the new cross-cutting aspects resulting from the common language initiative. These aspects and any others identified since January 2014, will be evaluated for cross-cutting themes and potential substantive cross-cutting issues in accordance with IMC 0305 starting with the 2014 mid-cycle assessment review.
Finding Old Cross-Cutting Aspect New Cross-Cutting Aspect 05000280/20130005-02 H.3(b) H.5 05000280/20130005-03 H.4(b) H.8
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Resident Inspector
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 23, 2014, the inspection results were presented to Mr. L. Lane and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- V. Armentrout, Nuclear Engineering Programs
- L. Baker, Manager, Training
- J. Eggart, Manager, Radiation Protection & Chemistry
- B. Garber, Supervisor, Station Licensing
- A. Harrow, Manager, Organizational Effectiveness
- J. Henderson, Manager Engineering
- L. Hilbert, Manager, Outage and Planning
- E. Homer, Engineering Programs
- R. Johnson, Manager, Operations
- L. Lane, Site Vice President
- D. Lawrence, Director, Station Safety and Licensing
- C. Olsen, Director, Station Engineering
- J. Pollard, Nuclear Licensing
- R. Scanlan, Manager, Maintenance
- R. Simmons, Plant Manager
- M. Smith, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- E. Turko, Supervisor ISI/NDE
- N. Turner, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000281/2014002-01 NCV Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger Inlet Isolation Valve MOV Thermal Overload Not Properly Reset (Section 1R15)
Closed
2515/182 Phase II TI Review of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks, Phase II (Section 4OA5.1)