IR 05000275/1995009
| ML16343A317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1995 |
| From: | Dexter T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342C980 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-95-09, 50-275-95-9, 50-323-95-09, 50-323-95-9, NUDOCS 9507130115 | |
| Download: ML16343A317 (34) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-275/95-09 50-323/95-09 Licenses:
DPR-80 DPR-82 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 P.O.
Box 770000 San Francisco, California Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
June 12-16, 1995 Inspectors:
A. D. Mcgueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst T. 0.
McKernon, Reactor Inspector Approved:
exter, Acti g ie Reactor Inspection B anch te Ins ection Summar Areas Ins ected:
Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the emergency preparedness program including changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures; emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies; organization and management control; training; internal reviews and audits; effectiveness of licensee controls; and followup on previous inspection findings.
Results:
The licensee had reviewed and properly submitted to NRC changes in the emergency response plan and emergency plan implementing procedures (Section 2.1).
Three outdated revisions of the Emergency Response Plan were found in two emergency response facilities (Section 2. 1).
The licensee had maintained a close relationship with offsite emergency response organizations (Section 2. 1).
9507i30ii5 950707 PDR ADQCK 05000275
POR
.
With the exception of one continuous air monitor past due for calibration, emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies had been maintained in a proper state of operational readiness
{Section 3. 1).
Primary and backup offsite communications systems were adequate to meet NRC requirements during and following severe natural events (Section 3.2).
~
An appropriate number of emergency response personnel had been trained and qualified.
The emergency planning organization was fully staffed with qualified personnel (Section 4. 1).
~
An Emergency Action Forum was empaneled to improve emergency preparedness at the site (Section 4.2).
~
The training organization had maintained an effective emergency response training program.
All emergency response organization personnel had been trained in accordance with applicable station procedures (Section 5.1.1).
~
A violation involving the failure to conduct fire drills was identified (Section 5.1.1).
The performance of two operating crews in implementing emergency response actions during walkthrough evaluations varied in response actions but was generally good, The crews made different protective action recommendations for the Site Area Emergency and the General Emergency (Section 5. 1.2).
~
Comprehensive quality assurance audits had been performed by qualified personnel.
The audits were of proper scope, depth, and effectiveness (Section 6.1).
A satisfactory system of controls had been maintained regarding safety issues, events, or problems which emphasizes early detection and elevation to an appropriate management level, thorough root cause analysis, and timely, effective implementation of corrective actions (Section 7. 1).
Since the last emergency preparedness inspection, five Unusual Events were declared and reported to the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer.
Timely required notifications were made to the appropriate local and state agencies and to the NRC (Section 9.2).
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
Inspection Followup Item 275/9509-01 and 323/9509-01 was opened (Section 2.1).
Violation 275/9509-02 and 323/9509-02 was opened (Section 5. 1).
-3-Weakness 275/9323-01 and 323/9323-01 was c1osed (Section 8. I).
Attachments:
~
Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
~
Attachment 2 - Emergency Preparedness Inspection Scenario Narrative Summary
DETAILS
PLANT STATUS During this inspection, both units operated at full power.
EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (82701-02.01)
The inspectors reviewed changes in the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures to verify that these changes had not decreased the effectiveness of emergency planning and that the changes had been reviewed properly and submitted to NRC.
2. 1 Discussion Since the previous inspection, one emergency response plan revision (Revision 3, Change 14)
had been implemented.
The licensee had performed a
documented review of the revision in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of emergency preparedness.
The change had been submitted to and reviewed by the NRC for acceptability.
During the inspection of the emergency response facilities (Section 3. 1 below), three out-of-date copies of the emergency response plan were identified.
Of three copies in the Control Room, two were identified as Revision 3, Change 13, and one as Revision 3, Change 14.
Of two copies at the Emergency Operations Facility, the one in the office of the recovery manager was identified as Change 13, and the one in the engineering work area was Change 14.
About a year and a half ago, the licensee began a project to delete unneeded copies of the emergency response plan by asking each holder of the more than one hundred and fifty controlled copies to identify controlled copies which could be eliminated.
This project reduced the number of controlled copies to about 27.
Two of the three copies in the Control Room were identified for deletion; however, they were not removed from the offices to which they were assigned.
These two copies were indicated as being uncontrolled and unauthorized plan copies.
The licensee took immediate action to remove the two out-of-date copies from use.
The recovery manager'
controlled copy was to be replaced with Change 14.
Revised copies of the emergency response plan are forwarded to controlled copy holders, who are responsible for replacing the out-of-date revisions with new revisions.
A signed notification of receipt and replacement is then returned by the holder to Document Services.
Document Services then annotates a list to indicate the replacement was made and disposes of the receipt.
The Emergency Response Plan (Volume 11 to the Plant Nanual) is not included in an annual audit of procedures in use, because it is not considered a procedure and is replaced completely upon revision.
On June 14, 1995, the licensee initiated action request No.
A0372081 to develop and implement corrective actions to assure future proper replacement and audit of controlled emergency response plan copies in use with a required date of August 30, 1995.
Corrective actions will be reviewed in a future emergency preparedness inspection at the site (Inspection Followup Item 275/9509-01, 323/9509-01).
The inspectors also reviewed documentation pertaining to selected Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure revisions of the 36 revisions implemented since the last routine inspection.
No degradations in emergency preparedness were identified in procedures reviewed.
The licensee maintained a close relationship with offsite agencies and coordinated changes in emergency action levels with those agencies annually or as appropriate.
The inspectors discussed with the licensee their contracts and Letters of Agreement established with support agencies and determined that they were reviewed annually and were updated as required.
2.2 Conclusion The licensee had reviewed and properly submitted to NRC changes in the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
The licensee had maintained an effective relationship with offsite radiological emergency response organizations.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, INSTRUMENTATION, AND SUPPLIES (82701-02.02)
The inspectors toured onsite and nearsite emergency response facilities and reviewed the licensee's emergency equipment inventories and maintenance to verify that facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of operational readiness.
3.1 Discussion A tour was made of each emergency response facility which included the inspection of various equipment items, instrumentation, and supplies.
Facilities inspected were the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, the Mobile Environmental Monitoring Laboratory Facility, and the Emergency Operations Facility.
The facilities were observed t'o be well maintained and ready for emergency use.
No substantive changes had occurred at any emergency response facility since the last inspection.
Random inspections were performed of radiation monitoring and respiratory equipment at each emergency response facility.
With the exception of one continuous air monitor at the Emergency Operations Facility which was about 1 week overdue for recalibration, all selected items were verified as being in calibration or had been appropriately inspected on a scheduled basis.
Equipment and supplies placed in response facilities and in emergency equipment lockers matched scheduled inventories.
Copies of the emergency plan, current implementing procedures, and current emergency telephone directories were maintained in all facilities.
Primary and backup communications in each facility were as described in the emergency plan.
3.2 Offsite Communication Ca abilities The inspectors conducted a review of the primary and/or backup offsite communication systems to determine whether the systems were adequate to meet NRC requirements during and following severe natural event t The licensee employs multiple communication means providing several redundant and variable capabilities rendering it a remote possibility that a severe natural event could disable the complete offsite communications system.
Communications to the Public:
The licensee maintained a system of 131 sirens to alert inhabitants within and near the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone.
As backup to this system, the licensee provided three local public broadcasting stations with public radio announcements for broadcast throughout the emergency planning zone and beyond.
The county sheriff's office, which was the first offsite response agency notified of an emergency event at the site and which activates the siren system if appropriate, has the capability of covering the area with patrol vehicles for personal or loudspeaker communications to the public.
Communications with the Primar Offsite Res onse A enc
The San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's dispatch station located on the ground floor of the building housing the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility was the first and primary offsite notification made by the site in an emergency event.
The county sheriff's office then makes all other notifications to local emergency response organizations and elements.
The licensee had a dedicated ringdown line to the sheriff's dispatch station as well as the Pacific Bell (PACBEL) Telephone System for routine and backup communications.
The licensee was also able to communicate with the sheriff's dispatch station by radio on the site assigned operations frequency.
In addition to the PACBEL system, the licensee had a corporate telephone system which was microwave based and was capable of communicating with and through the corporate headquarters communications system, allowing access to public long distance telephone systems throughout the United States from San Francisco.
Communications with the State of California:
The primary state agency for emergency response was the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) located in Sacramento.
The licensee maintained a dedicated ringdown line with the OES, as well as using the PACBEL system and the microwave system described above.
Communications with the NRC Head uarters 0 erations Officer:
The licensee had an NRC provided FTS (Federal Telecommunications System)
dedicated line with NRC Headquarters.
The licensee could also use the PACBEL and microwave systems for communicating with the NRC.
~
Emer enc Backu Communications:
The licensee had two additional means which could be employed as backup communications in an emergency situation.
Pacific Gas and Electric owned two units capable of direct satellite communications from the site to any other location.
One of the units was located at corporate headquarters in San Francisco and the other at a facility in San Ramon, California.
The licensee had tested and demonstrated flying one of the units to Diablo Canyon, set it up, and established communications with systems outside the plant area.
The licensee also successfully tested the use of a cellular telephone during
an earthquake drill by placing a cellular relay station on a mountain adjacent to the plant.
All site telecommunications systems were equipped with battery backup and emergency generator power.
This licensee had twice in the past year had to respond to severe natural events affecting their routine communications systems.
In both events, the county Emergency Operations Center and the licensee Emergency Operations Facility were activated and manned.
During a wildfire in August 1994, the licensee lost one of the microwave system's stations located on Black Butte to the fire.
They were still in the process of restoring that system to its full potential.
In March 1995, the site experienced severe weather wherein flooding and mudslides restricted access to the site.
That weather temporarily disabled 42 of the 131 sirens in the public warning system.
During both events, the licensee maintained required communications with offsite emergency response agencies.
3.3 Conclusions With the exception of one continuous air monitor past due for calibration; emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies had been maintained in a proper state of operational readiness'rimary and backup offsite communications systems were adequate to meet NRC requirements during and following severe natural events.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL (82701-02.03)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response organization staffing levels to determine whether sufficient personnel resources were available for emergency response.
The emergency planning organization was reviewed to ensure that an effective programmatic management system was in place.
4. 1 Discussion The inspectors reviewed the staffing of the emergency response organization and the selection process for positions.
Selections of personnel for positions in the emergency response organization were made by the various managers at the site in coordination with the emergency planning manager.
The emergency response organization was configured with several named individuals available for each position.
The licensee was currently in the process of reorganizing the emergency response organization into teams which will train, drill, and respond together.
A list of alternates trained to function in emergency response organization positions was also maintained by Emergency Planning.
Callout of the emergency response organization was by pager system and occurred upon declaration of an Alert.
The licensee is currently installing a DIALOGIC callout system which should enhance activation of the emergency response organization.
Overall responsibility for emergency response was assigned to the Director of Safety, Health and Emergency Services.
The Emergency Planning organization had two supervisors, one for onsite emergency planning and one for offsite planning and coordination.
The supervisors had a staff of about nine personnel for onsite and offsite emergency preparedness and planning
functions.
The inspectors found that the emergency planning group was staffed with an appropriate number of qualified personnel'ince the last routine inspection, the emergency planning supervisors have assumed responsibility for emergency training, along with two training personnel.
4.2 Licensee's Initiative The licensee was in the process of implementing improvements to the emergency planning program as a result of problems and actions identified in an Emergency Action Forum initiated by the licensee.
In addition to Pacific Gas and Electric Company management and staff, the forum also included two members from the San Luis Obispo County emergency planning and response staff and six members of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations ( INPO).
The forum identified and documented 52 areas for improvement of site emergency preparedness.
The forum then identified about 176 actions to solve the problems of which 59 have been completed.
The remaining actions were pending completion or had been deleted or deferred.
4.3 Conclusions The licensee had trained and qualified an appropriate number of emergency response personnel to ensure a good depth in the organization.
The emergency planning organization was fully staffed with qualified personnel.
The licensee empaneled an Emergency Action Forum to improve emergency preparedness at the site.
TRAINING (82701-02.04)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response training program and interviewed selected individuals to determine whether emergency response personnel had received the required training and complied with the requirements of the Diablo Canyon administrative procedures and the emergency plan,
CFR 50.47(b)( 15)
and
CFR Part 50, Appendix E. IV.F.
5. 1 Discussion 5. 1. 1 Trainin Pro ram The program for training and qualification of emergency responders in the emergency response organization was specified in Procedure OM10. 103.
Training consisted of two courses which included required basic training for all plant staff (General Radiological Emergency Plan Training)
and advanced, specialized training for task specific skills and knowledge in the performance of emergency response actions.
Current qualification status lists were maintained in the plant information management system data base along with the required requalification training due dates.
A sampling of individual records were reviewed and ascertained to be current.
Interviews with key emergency response organization individuals were conducted to verify that they were knowledgeable of their emergency response duties and ongoing changes being made to the emergency response program.
Additionally, the emergency preparedness training staff was implementing new initiatives such as a
self-paced annual emergency preparedness requalification training course and
reorganizing the emergency response organization to train as teams and by emergency response functions.
Through a review of records, fire protection audits, and interviews with key individuals, it was determined that some fire drills had not been conducted during 1994.
A further review of 1994 fire protection audit results indicated that a similar problem had existed in 1993.
Followup interviews indicated that during 1993 a problem with maintaining documentation of fire drill participation had occurred.
Whereas, in 1994 not only did there appear to be a problem with maintenance of fire drill participation records but also in ensuring that all members of the fire brigades participated in at least two quarterly fire drills.
The inspectors found that the licensee had concluded that the failure to maintain an accurate set of records for 1993 was a result of individual reassignments and function reorganization.
The licensee initiated corrective action through guality Evaluation g0011271 and Action Request R¹329809.
,Again in 1995, the fire protection audit determined that records of fire drill participation were not maintained such that no evidence existed to verify that fire drills were held for all shift crews in the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1994.
Inspectors'nterviews with key fire protection individuals verified that some fire drills for crews were missed in 1994.
Subsequent review of the issue by the licensee determined that the fire protection procedure requirements of Tgl.DC12 were inconsistent with the requirements of Final Safety Analyses Report, Appendix 9.5, and the Emergency Plan, Section 8. 1. 1.4.
The fire protection procedure stated that fire drills "should" be conducted quarterly, while the Emergency Plan requirement stated that all fire brigade members were "required" to participate in at least two quarterly fire drills.
The licensee initiated corrective actions in 1995 under guality Evaluation f0011663 and Action Request (AR) ¹A0367882.
Additionally, corrective actions from the 1994 Fire Protection Audit were determined to be missing or ineffective such as maintaining evaluations of the fire drills.
The documentation of fire drill participation is a requirement of Fire Protection Procedure Tgl.DC12.
This issue was another repeat finding in the 1995 fire protection audit.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had conducted fire drills during the first and second quarters of 1995 and were maintaining the appropriate records.
However, because the intended corrective actions implemented in response to the 1994 audit findings were not effective, fire drills were missed in 1994.
The inspectors considered the issue to be a weakness in the licensee's corrective action program.
The failure to conduct required fire drills is a violation of regulatory requirements,
CFR 50.54(q)
and 50.47(b)(14),
(VIO 275/9509-02; 323/9509-02).
5. 1.2 Walkthrou hs with 0 eratin Crews The inspectors conducted emergency response walkthroughs with two operating crews using the plant-specific simulator to evaluate the adequacy and retention of skills obtained from the emergency response training program.
One of three licensee developed walkthrough scenarios was reviewed and administered to the crews to determine, through demonstrated performance, whether Control Room personnel were proficient in their duties and responsibilities as emergency responders during a simulated accident scenari i-10-Attachment 2 to this inspection report contains a narrative summary of the walkthrough scenario.
The inspectors observed two operating crews using the plant-specific simulator in the dynamic mode.
The scenario consisted of a sequence of events requiring an escalation of emergency classifications, culminating in a General Emergency.
The scenario was developed to run approximately 90 minutes.
The inspectors observed the interaction of the response crews to verify that authorities and responsibilities were clearly defined and understood.
The walkthroughs also allowed the evaluation of the crews'bilities to assess and classify accident conditions, utilize abnormal and emergency operating procedures, perform dose assessments, develop protective action recommendations, and make corresponding notifications to offsite authorities.
The performance of the operating crews during the walkthrough evaluations was generally good, with some variances between the crews observed as follows:
While the operating crews both mitigated the events successfully, the second crew chose to manually trip the reactor rather than manually actuating safety injection first during the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) event.
The second crew used Emergency Operating Procedure E-l. I, "Safety Injection Termination," until they realized that pressurizer level could not be controlled effectively and that Emergency Operating Procedure E-l.2, "Post LOCA Cooldown Depressurization,"
was the more appropriate procedure to be followed as indicated by Step 8, response not obtained column of Procedure E-I. l.
The licensee stated that although both crews responded differently, they both mitigated the event.
Crew briefings for Crew I were done well.
However, Crew 2 was not as well informed.
The shift technical adviser at one point had to ask a
shift foreman as to the.current emergency classification level.
Further, the second crew shift supervisor failed to announce to the crew the declaration of the General Emergency.
The licensee acknowledged this observation and indicated that it would emphasize briefings during future training.
Both crew's shift supervisors maintained good command and control during the scenarios.
This was particularly noted on the second crew when the shift supervisor interjected himself to preclude the crew from reinitiating letdown flow.
The crews used different dose calculation programs to aid in the determination to upgrade to a General Emergency.
One crew used a
reactor engineering core damage assessment calculation,
"RB-14", while the other crew used a chemistry calculation,
"R-2, Release of Airborne Radioactive Haterial Initial Assessment."
This resulted in different Site Area Emergency and General Emergency Protective Action recommendations for both crews.
The licensee indicated that both procedures were correct,
Crew 2 took twice as long as Crew 1 to declare an Unusual Event after annunciation of high radiation alarms.
This amounted to a difference of 12 minutes between crews.
The licensee did not feel that this was a
significant problem.
~
The simulator does not have loose parts monitoring instrumentation.
During the first crew scenario, the staff had to stop the responding crew to provide input for the loose parts monitor.
Followup review by the inspectors verified that the problem was identified under Simulator Change Request SCR 91-138 and that Action Request A0372012 had been initiated to install a design change (45523) during 1995.
5.2 Conclusion The training organization has maintained an effective emergency response training program with minor procedural challenges noted, and all emergency response organization personnel had been trained in accordance with applicable station procedures.
The performance of operating crews in implementing emergency response actions during walkthrough evaluations was generally good.
In the area of fire protection, the licensee failed to effectively implement corrective actions to 1993 fire protection program deficiencies which, in part, contributed to a recurrence of similar problems in 1994 and a failure to conduct fire drills in 1994.
The inspectors concluded that the problem represented a programmatic breakdown in the emergency preparedness program in the fire protection area.
INDEPENDENT AND INTERNAL REVIEWS AND AUDITS (82701-02.05)
The inspectors met with quality assurance personnel and reviewed independent and internal audits of the emergency preparedness program performed since the last inspection to determine compliance with the requirements of
CFR 50.54(t).
6.1 Discussion The inspectors reviewed and discussed with quality assurance personnel the most recent annual audit (Audit 940221) of the emergency preparedness program which had been performed from June 20 through June 30, 1994.
Audit findings included five positive findings and two weaknesses.
Action requests were initiated for the two weaknesses to implement corrective actions.
The audit team leader and members appeared to be well qualified.
The team leader was a
certified auditor with current lead auditor recertification as set forth in the licensee's Site Quality Assurance Work Instruction SQA-26, Revision 2,
dated November 23, 1994, which incorporates certification criteria of ANSI Standard 45.2. 12, "Qualification of Quality Assurance Program Audit Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants" as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1. 146, August 1980.
The team included personnel familiar with and experienced in emergency planning, including individuals with emergency response organization experience.
The inspectors reviewed the audit plan, scope of the audit, and the audit check list.
The audit appeared to be thorough and complete.
The inspectors also discussed the 1995, audit of emergency preparedness with the
-12-audit team leader.
The audit was in June 1995 and the report was not yet in a
draft form, but the audit team leader was able to review raw notes and findings of the audit.
The audit report will be reviewed in the next routine inspection at the site.
The 1994 audit report was issued to'ppropriate levels of management to include site and corporate management.
Action requests and/or quality evaluations were issued for tracking each audit finding indicating corrective action and required dates.
6.2 Conclusion Audits of emergency preparedness had been conducted in accordance with
CFR 50.54(t).
equality assurance audits of emergency preparedness and planning had been performed by qualified personnel and were of proper scope, depth, and effectiveness.
EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE'S CONTROLS (82701-02.06)
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the licensee's controls system pertaining to safety issues, events, or problems.
The review included discussions with quality assurance and emergency preparedness staff personnel and review of procedures and documentation of problem identification, root cause analysis, management review of problem identification and solution, and corrective actions'.1 Discussion The licensee's controls system appeared satisfactory in identifying, resolving, and preventing problems in the area of emergency preparedness.
Principal tools for managing corrective actions included the action request, quality evaluation, and nonconformance report systems.
All personnel were instructed in the use of the action request and quality evaluation systems in their site general employee training.
Action requests can be entered into the site data management system by computer terminals located throughout the site or any employee can initiate an action request through his/her supervisor.
Action requests may be submitted by any employee regarding any item perceived as being a problem or safety issue.
The organizational element for managing this program was equality Assurance, which reviews new action requests on a
daily basis.
Each action request was documented, assigned to a responsible manager, assigned a suspense date, and tracked through action completion.
Action requests may be completed and closed out by the manager assigned responsibility.
equality evaluations and nonconformance reports are reviewed by equality Assurance for closure, and as appropriate, by senior management.
The Emergency Planning group also uses the action request and the quality evaluation for tracking items specific to emergency planning and preparedness.
7.2 Conclusions The licensee had maintained a satisfactory system of controls pertaining to safety issues, events, or problems which emphasizes early detection and
-13-elevation to an appropriate management level, thorough root cause analysis, and effective implementation of corrective actions.
FOLLOWUP PLANT SUPPORT (92904)
8. 1 Closed Weakness 275 9323-01 and 323 9323-01:
Technical Su ort Center Emer enc 0 erations Facilit En ineerin Su ort Exercise Weakness.
During the 1993 annual emergency exercise, one exercise weakness was identified by the NRC inspectors'ased on observations by the inspectors in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility, there was a
concern that technical support provided by the engineering staff at these centers did not appear to provide emergency management with appropriate assessments regarding the areas of core damage and probable release path.
By letter (PGKE Letter No. DCL-93-285) dated December 17, 1993, the licensee indicated actions being taken to improve performance in this functional area.
The licensee had prepared Engineers Handbooks for reference in emergency events and had trained engineering personnel in their use.
On September 22, 1994, PEP EP EN-1, titled, "Plant Accident Mitigation Diagnostic Aids and Guidelines,"
was approved and personnel had been trained in its use.
These documents appeared comprehensive and were used in an emergency response drill in June 1994 for validation of the content and to upgrade the manuals as appropriate.
Since the licensee's corrective actions had been completed, this item is closed.
ONSITE FOLLOWUP OF EVENTS AT OPERATING POWER REACTORS (93702)
Five licensee events were reviewed during this inspection wherein the licensee had declared emergency events since the last routine emergency preparedness inspection.
9. 1 Event On June 22, 1994, the licensee telephonically notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) that an Unusual Event had been declared at 2:40 a.m.
(PDT) due to a grass fire outside the protected area.
There were no equipment problems at the plant and offsite power was stable.
The licensee indicated the threat to the 500 KV lines, located 1/4 mile from the fire was small.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 5: 15 a.m.
the same date.
(HOO Event No. 27427).
9.2 Event On October 4, 1994, the licensee telephonically notified the NRC HOO at 11:59 a.m.
(EST) that an Unusual Event had been declared based on a Tsunami Warning.
The Tsunami was expected to reach the Pacific Coast at approximately 4 p.m.
(PDT)
on that date.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 3:08 p.m.
(PDT) when the Tsunami warning was canceled (HOO Event No. 27859).
9.3 Event-14-On December 20, 1994, the licensee telephonically notified the NRC HOO that an Unusual Event had been declared at 2:45 a.m.
(PST)
due to a minor earthquake being felt on site.
The earthquake triggered the site's TerraTech seismic monitor (low level), but did not trigger the high level Kinemetrics monitor, There was no evidence or reason to believe that any damage had occurred on site.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 3:49 a.m.
(PST) after licensee management concluded there was no operation concern from the earthquake (HOO Event No. 28166).
9.4 Event On February 13, 1995, the licensee telephonically notified the NRC HOO that an Unusual Event had been declared at 2: 10 p.m.
(PST)
due to an earthquake being felt on site and instrumentation on site registering the earthquake.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 2:53 p.m.
(PST)
based on review of the seismic instrumentation and walkdown of the plant with no evidence of any affect noted (HOO Event No. 28374).
9.5 Event On March 10, 1995, the licensee telephonically notified the NRC HOO that an Unusual Event had been declared at the discretion of management at 6:50 p.m.
(PST)
based on severe weather in the area.
Mud slides and flooding were restricting access to the plant.
Additionally, 42 of 131 emergency sirens were inoperable due to power outages.
The units had not been experiencing any grid difficulty and all of the emergency core cooling system and emergency diesel generators were operable.
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1 p.m.
(PST)
on March 11, 1995 (HOO Event Number 28515).
9.6 Conclusion A review of these events verified that they were appropriately classified and declared in accordance with the site emergency classification procedure.
Timely notifications were made to appropriate state and local emergency response agencies and the NRC in accordance with approved procedure ATTACHMENT 1
PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
- J. Becker, Director, Operations
- J. Bigelow, Simulator Engineer, Training
- R. Bliss, Emergency Planner
- M. Brewer, Supervisor, Procedure Services M. Carlson, Procedure Services
- P. Colbert, Senior Engineer, Engineering Services
- D. Cosgrove, Supervisor, Fire Protection
- W. Crockett, Manager, Engineering Services
- B. Ellis, Coordinator, Emergency Planning S. Ellis, Fire Protection
- T. Grebel, Director, Regulatory Support
- J. Griffen, Director, Training
- L. Hagen, Director, Safety, Health
& Emergency Services
- C. Harbor, NRC Interface, Regulatory Support
- M. Hug, Supervisor, Onsite Emergency Planning
- C. Johnson, Fire Marshall, Safety, Health
& Emergency Services D. Miklush, Manager, Operations
- J. Molden, Manager, Maintenance
- M. Morris, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- M. Persig, Coordinator, Emergency Planning
- R. Powers, Manager, Nuclear Quality Services D.
Rowe, Supervisor, Procedure Services D. Royer, Offsite Support, Emergency Planning G. Smith, Audit Team Leader, Quality Assurance D. Taggert, Director, Nuclear Safety Engineering
- E. Waage, Supervisor, Offsite/Corporate Emergency Planning
- J. Young, Director, Quality Assurance, Nuclear Quality Services
- D. Yows, Emergency Planning Consultant 1.2 NRC Personnel
- G. Johnston, Acting Resident Inspector The inspectors also held discussions with and observed the actions of other station personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
EXIT MEETING The inspectors met with the licensee's representatives and other personnel indicated in Section 1 of this Attachment on June 16, 1996, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or reviewed by, the inspection team during the inspectio ATTACHMENT 2 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY Simulation Facility:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Initial Conditions:
Events Se uence:
Both units at 100% power, MOL ( INIT 25).
A liquid discharge is initiated.
There is a release of a small amount of radioactive material (fuel flea) that was not detected during the last batch sampling.
A liquid radwaste discharge is in progress when at eight minutes into the scenario, a Hi Rad monitor alarms (RE-18)
and exceeds the isolation setpoint.
The automatic isolation fails to occur and an auxiliary operator is dispatched to manually isolate the discharge path.
The crew declares a Notice of Unusual Event based upon the potential release to the environs.
A seismic event with a magnitude of.28g occurs and is registered in the control room with the seismic alarm annunciating.
The crew should enter the earthquake casualty procedure, CPM-4.
Shortly after the seismic event occurs, a loose parts monitor alarm annunciates followed by an increase in RCS activity level.
The crew should upgrade the EAL to the Alert level.
Other alarms may annunciate during this period such as SG Blowdown Hi Rad.
At this point in the scenario, the crew may choose to perform a plant assessment and conduct an orderly shutdown of the plant.
At this point in the scenario, a
LOCA inside containment occurs which requires SI initiation.
The crew should upgrade the event to a Site Area Emergency.
The event increases fuel damage to a
40%
gap release.
Subsequent RCS sampling reports by Chemistry to the control room verify the increase in gap release.
Based upon radiation monitors readings on RE30/31 corresponding to 3% core release calculations performed by Reactor Engineering and reported to the control room indicate greater than 100% gap release as indicated by calculation RB-14.
The crew should recommend declaring an upgrade to a General Emergency.
The crew should continue in performing the actions of the EOPs to shutdown the reactor under procedure E-l.2, "Post LOCA Cooldown Depressurization."
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO EVENTS Simulation Facilit
Diablo Canyon Power Plant Specific malfunction codes and scenario timing:
Initial Conditions: Simulator Setup INIT 25 Event Time 0 min.
8 min.
28 min.
48 min.
70 min.
70 min.
Malfunction DRILL 90 xmt rms
3,4e+05,2,480,d,30 mal scil act 0.25,10,1680,d,60 mal rcs6 act,20,60,270,c,jmlsei 1,0 ser 1101 act, 1,0,240,c,jmlseil,
mal rcs3c act,500,30,2880,d,0 ramp rrmscnm,725,5, 15,c,jml rcs3(3)
ramp jrtcbst, 1,0,4200 ramp rrtcbst,le7,30,4202 ser 1101 act,1,0,0,d,5 ramp rrmscum,8.2e4,60,0 Description After SFM reports the crew has taken the watch, load session MALs, LOAs, etc.
by Drill/manually RE-18 Alarms Seismic event with increased RCS activity and Vibration and Loose Parts Monitor alarm LOCA GE rad levels NOTE: Manually enter "file epdrill" at the 70 minute point for rad levels or manually t5 above.