IR 05000275/1995003
| ML16343A303 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1995 |
| From: | Ang W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342C918 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-95-03, 50-275-95-3, 50-323-95-03, 50-323-95-3, NUDOCS 9505050064 | |
| Download: ML16343A303 (30) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-275/95-03 50-323/95-03 Licenses:
DPR-80 DPR-82 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 P.O.
Box 770000 San Francisco, California Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
Harch 27-31, 1995 Inspector:
C. Clark, Reactor Inspector Accompanying Personnel:
A. Singh, Reactor System Engineer f
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved:
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.
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,
an upport rane V2~ $ $
ate Ins ection Summar regs Ins ected Units 1 and
Routine, announced inspection of the implementation of the licensee's fire protection program, and followup inspection of previously identified items.
Inspection Procedures 64704 and 92904 were used.
Results Units 1 and
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A noncited violation was identified concerning the failures to document a December 1994 monthly surveillance of four fire extinguishers on the maintenance record cards attached to the fire extinguishers (Section 2.3).
Due to the lack of an acceptable fire test, the ability of the Pyrocrete fire barriers to meet the required 1-hour or 3-hour rating was indeterminate (Section 2.6).
950505006+
95050'DR ADOCK 05000275
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Corrective actions for inadequate installations of silicon foam fire barrier penetration seals, currently installed without damming boards, were still being developed (Section 3.2).
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Except for the noncited violation noted above, the licensee's implementation of its fire protection program met its fire protection safety objectives.
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Licensee personnel had a good understanding and knowledge of the fire protection program.
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
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A noncited violation was identified (Section 2.3).
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Unresolved Item 50-275/93-34-03 was closed (Section 3. 1)
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LER 50-275/94-001, Revision 01, was left open (Section 3.2).
Attachments:
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Attachment I Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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Attachment 2 - List of Documents Reviewed
DETAILS
FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAN (64704)
An inspection of the licensee's fire protection program was conducted to verify that the licensee had properly implemented and maintained the fire protection program required by the operating licenses.
FIRE PROTECTION/PREVENTION PROGRAN (64704)
2. 1 Diablo Can on Fire Protection Re uirements Operating Licenses, DPR-80, November 2, 1984, for Diablo Canyon Power
.
Plant (DCPP) Unit 1, and DPR-82, August 25, 1985, for DCPP Unit 2, required, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described and/or discussed in the documents referenced for each unit indicated below:
Unit
The approved fire protection program and NRC staff's Fire Protection Evaluation in Supplements 8, 9, 13, 23, and 27 to the Diablo Canyon Safety Evaluation Report, subject to,Provisions 2.C.(5)b and 2,C.(5)c of the license.
Unit 2 - The final safety analysis report (FSAR), in Pacific Gas and Electric Company December 6,
1984, Appendix R, report and NRC staff's Fire Protection Evaluation in Supplements 8, 9, 13, 23, 27, and 31 to the Diablo Canyon Safety Evaluation Report, subject to Provisions 2.C.(4)b. and 2.C.(4)c of the license.
Section 9.5. 1 of the Diablo Canyon FSAR contains the licensee's commitments for the Diablo Canyon fire protection systems and fire protection program.
2.2 Review of Fire Protection Procedures The inspectors reviewed the licensee's approved program as defined in the FSAR for the facility.
The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program implementing procedures listed in Attachment 2.
The inspector's review of procedures determined that the procedures adequately implemented the approved fire protection program.
2.3 Plant Tour The inspectors visually inspected various areas of the DCPP Units 1 and
mechanical and electrical auxiliary buildings.
Housekeeping was well maintained in general plant areas.
Transient combustible materials noted
inside the buildings were properly controlled.
The inspectors noted the following:
~
Fire protection equipment, such as hose reels, hoses, detectors, and fire extinguishers were in good material condition.
Fire sprinkler systems and deluge stations appeared to be operable and well maintained.
Trash and poor housekeeping were observed on the roof of the auxiliary building at the 140-foot elevation.
Approximately ten large paper wipes and two pieces of plastic were observed on the roof and in the intake grills for the building ventilation system.
The inspectors informed the licensee fire protection staff.
The fire protection staff promptly requested plant housekeeping personnel to clean the area.
Except for the areas identified in an exception request to NRR, discussed in Section 2.7 of this report, the emergency lights were available and in operable condition on the safe shutdown access and egress routes.
Four of seven fire extinguishers adjacent to the Unit 1 safety injection pump room did not exhibit an initial and date on the attached maintenance record cards for the December 1994 monthly surveillance inspection.
Subsequent monthly inspections in January, February, and Harch 1995 of these four fire extinguishers were documented on the attached maintenance record cards.
Licensee Procedure STP H-69A,
"Honthly Fire Extinguisher Inspection," Revision 13A, paragraph 8. 1, required the person performing the monthly inspection of a fire extinguisher to note the inspection results on Data Sheet 69-10205 and to initial and date the maintenance record card.
A review of the completed December 1994 monthly record Data Sheet 69-10205 for these four fire extinguishers noted (1) that the extinguishers had been inspected, (2) evaluated acceptable, and (3) that the maintenance record card for each one had been initialed and dated on December 13, 1994.
The inspectors were concerned that (1) the information recorded on the applicable December 13, 1994, Data Sheet 69-10205 indicated that maintenance record cards for the four fire extinguishers had been initialed and dated, when, in fact, they had not, and (2) that three subsequent monthly inspections were performed on these four fire extinguishers and the personnel performing these inspections and initialing off on the maintenance record cards did not document a
concern that the maintenance record cards had not been initialed and dated for the month of December 1994.
The inspectors checked the four fire extinguishers and did not question the acceptability of them but did consider the problem to be one of procedure compliance.
The licensee issued Action Request A0367398 to rev>ew this finding and develop appropriate corrective actions.
The licensee also issued a
guality Evaluation f0011632 request to review this inspection finding.
The inspectors noted no other examples where a fire extinguisher maintenance record card had not been completed for the required monthly inspections.
This violation did not appear to be willful, was of minor safety significance, and was immediately addressed by the licensee.
Therefore, this was identified as a noncited violation.
2.4 Fire Protection S stem Walkdown Ins ection The inspectors performed a walkdown of the firewater supply system.
All valves inspected were in their proper position.
Firewater pumps and equipment were operable and well maintained.
The inspectors also verified that randomly selected equipment listed in Procedure OP AP-SA, "Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby,"
Revision 6, which may be required for safe shutdown during a control room fire, were accessible, well labeled, and had adequate local area emergency lighting to perform required tasks.
2.5 Fire Barriers The inspectors visually inspected various fire areas in the Units
and
electrical and mechanical auxiliary buildings to ensure that electrical and mechanical penetration seals and barriers were in place.
The inspectors also verified that fire doors and dampers were visually intact and had no apparent conditions that would preclude their functioning.
Excluding penetration seals and barriers under review by NRR and the licensee, no deficiencies were identified.
2.6 Thermo-La 330-1 Fire Barriers The inspectors discussed with the licensee actions that they had taken to resolve Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier issues generic to the industry.
Thermo-Lag 330-1 is a fire barrier material manufactured by Thermal Science Inc.
NRC issued NRC Bulletin 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Haintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free From Fire Damage,"
dated June 29, 1992, and required a response.
By letter dated July 29, 1992, the licensee provided the response to NRC Bulletin 92-01 and stated that DCPP had installed Thermo-Lag barrier systems in ll fire areas of the plant to separate cabling for Appendix R safe shutdown functions.
Subsequently, NRC issued Supplement 1 to NRC Bulletin 92-01 and expanded the scope of the bulletin.
As a result of the expansion of scope in Supplement 1,
the licensee added three additional fire areas to the fire areas previously identified in the licensee's original response to NRC Bulletin 92-01.
By letter dated February 14, 1994, the licensee informed the NRC that it had replaced Thermo-Lag with Pyrocrete and other fire barrier materials in several fire areas.
The letter also noted that the remaining Thermo-Lag credited as a
I
fire barrier in the current Appendix R safe shutdown analysis would be replaced as appropriate with other fire barrier materials/systems by December 31, 1994.
Further, by letter dated January 12, 1995, the licensee informed the NRC that the above mention actions were complete.
On Harch 15, 1995, the licensee submitted a
CFR 50.72(b)(l)(ii)(B) report that stated they had determined that material used for fire barrier construction had not been verified acceptable per Appendix R.
It was determined by the licensee that fire barriers constructed of Pyrocrete in various areas of both units had not been tested to demonstrate its acceptability as required by Appendix R.
During this inspection, the inspectors walked down the areas where the licensee had replaced the Thermo-Lag material and noted that the licensee had established roving fire watches in the appropriate areas.
The inspectors also discussed the availability of the fire tests which would qualify the Pyrocrete material.
The licensee stated that the fire tests credited were for Pyrocrete barriers installed on columns and beams.
The inspectors noted that the acceptance criteria for fire protection of structural steel members was not the same as for cables in conduits.
In order to demonstrate the acceptable performance of the Pyrocrete for fire barriers, a fire test of the installed configuration must successfully demonstrate that the integrity of the cables within the enclosure was not adversely affected.
Due to the lack of an acceptable fire test, the ability of the Pyrocrete fire barriers to meet the required 1-hour or 3-hour rating was indeterminate.
On April 14, 1995, the licensee issued LER 1-95-003-00,
"Fire Barriers Outside Design Basis Due to Inadequate Testing gualification Basis," covering the subject Pyrocrete fire barriers.
This LER noted that the root cause and corrective actions for this event had not been determined by the licensee.
The LER also stated that a supplement LER would be issued by October 16, 1995, to report the finalized root cause and corrective actions.
NRC will review the supplemental LER in a future inspection.
2.7 Emer enc Li htin Exem tion Re vest By letters dated Harch 15, 1994, and Hay 25, 1994, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J, to the extent that it requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply be provided for access and egress routes to areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment.
Alternatively, the licensee proposed the use of hand-held portable lights for personnel access and egress routes to 45 fire areas or zones at DCPP, during post-fire safe shutdown operations.
During this inspection the inspectors walked down emergency lighting areas discussed in the licensee exemption request.
The evaluation of the proposed emergency lighting in these areas will be addressed separately in a safety evaluation report to be issued by the NRR staf.8
~Staffin i
The inspectors reviewed the plant staffing for the implementation of the fire protection program.
The licensee appeared to have sufficient engineers associated with the fire protection program.
Discussions with the engineers indicated that they knew the fire protection program and the national fire protection association code requirements.
They also demonstrated a detailed understanding of fire hazards associated with the station.
2. 9
~Tra in in 2.9. 1 Fire Brigade The inspectors reviewed the readiness of the DCPP personnel to prevent, and fight fires.
The fire brigade composition, qualifications, and training were reviewed.
In addition, manual fire fighting equipment and protective clothing availability and operability were inspected.
The DCPP fire brigade consisted of five individuals per shift, one leader and four crew members.
The fire brigade leader was trained for the fire brigade leader position and had been designated as such by the plant fire marshall.
A licensed operator was to accompany the fire brigade leader in all emergency responses, unless the licensed operator was the fire brigade leader.
The fire brigade performed quarterly fire drills, and each fire brigade member was required to participate in at least one drill per year.
The fire brigade members were maintained in a requalification program.
The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade training records for selected personnel.
The inspectors'eview of training records indicated all selected personnel were trained in DCPP's initial fire brigade training classes and selected requalification classes.
Annual physical examinations were conducted on all fire brigade members.
The training records reviewed by the inspectors indicated that the examinations were completed on time.
Licensee fire brigade personnel who were interviewed by the inspectors were knowledgeable of the fire brigade program requirements, specific locations of safety equipment in the plant, and understood the effects of fire on the safe shutdown capability of the units.
The inspectors visually inspected the fire brigade equipment necessary for fire fighting.
The fire equipment included personal protective equipment such as turnout coats, boots, gloves, hard hats, emergency communications equipment, self-contained breathing apparatuses, portable lights, portable ventilation equipment, and portable extinguishers.
Each fire brigade member's personal protection equipment was in an unsealed locker, normally unlocked, in an unlocked fire brigade locker room.
This fire brigade locker room was located in the turbine building at the 140-foot elevation outside the control room.
The inspectors noted that while the fire brigade equipment was in an unlocked fire brigade locker room, it was staged and accounted for.
Backup fire brigade equipment was maintained on Fire Engine I (located in a locked
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garage)
and in a locked maintenance fire brigade locker room (wire cage)
located at the 85-foot elevation of the turbine building.
Spare supplies of hoses, spray nozzles, and ventilation hoses were evident, 2.9.2 Fire Watches The licensee had established a specific training program for individuals who were assigned as fire watch personnel.
There was no specific requalification program for fire watches.
The inspectors reviewed the training documents and records for fire watch personnel and verified that personnel were trained in accordance with the established training requirements.
Fire watch personnel were expected by the licensee to inform the control room of a fire and to attempt to extinguish small fires.
The inspectors interviewed three individuals that were assigned to perform fire watch duties.
The fire watch personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of their station fire watch duties, responsibilities, and general program requirements.
The inspectors reviewed selected fire watch logs required by Procedure OMS. ID3, "Fire Watch And Welding Personnel Training and Responsibility," Revision 0.
No discrepancies were observed in the reviewed fire watch logs.
The inspectors noted from the review of the fire watch logs, other available documents, and discussions with licensee personnel/management that the licensee had reduced the fire watches from two per shift to one per shift.
However, the licensee had identified problems in performing roving fire watch tours with a crew size of one per shift and had i.ncreased the crew size back to two per shift to address the identified problems.
2.9.3 Licensee Personnel The inspectors interviewed six licensee personnel to evaluate their understanding and knowledge of the fire protection program.
The personnel were knowledgeable because of training and/or they were previously members of the fire brigade.
All six of the people interviewed were familiar with the duties, responsibilities, and general program requirements of both the fire brigade and the fire watches.
This was considered a strength of the licensee's fire protection program.
2. 10 Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance records listed in Attachment 2 of this report to verify that fire detection and suppression systems met operability testing requirements.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the completed surveillances to ensure that the surveillances had been satisfactorily performed at the required frequencies.
The inspectors concluded that, except for surveillances of the four fire extinguishers noted in Section 2.3 of this report, the surveillances reviewed were performed satisfactoril. 11 ualit Assurance Audit The inspectors reviewed the licensee's quality assurance audits for 1994.
These audits were identified as:
(1) guality Assurance Audit Report 94011I,
"Annual and Biennial Fire Protection Audit," performed February 15 through March 9, 1994, and (2) guality Assurance Audit Report 94023I, "Audit of Postfire Safe Shutdown - Followup Items from Audit 94011I,"
and
CFR Part 50, Appendix R,Section III.G and L," performed July 19 through August 3, 1994.
These audits were performed to assess the implementation and effectiveness of the fire protection program at DCPP and included system and equipment alteration, tests, surveillances, maintenance records, organization, training and qualification of personnel, and fire barriers.
The review indicated that these audits were comprehensive in scope and performed in-depth evaluations of the fire protection program at DCPP.
From the audit records, the inspectors noted that the auditors had identified program strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies which were formally presented to the responsible organizations.
In addition, the auditors had monitored the responses fo>
closeout to ensure that the actions were appropriate for the identified concerns.
From their review, the inspectors concluded that the audits were effective.
2. 12 Conclusion The inspectors concluded within the area inspected, except for the non-cited violation identified in Section 2.3 of this report, the licensee had an effective fire protection program.
FOLLOWUP PLANT SUPPORT (92904)
3. 1 Closed Unresolved Item 50-275 93-34-03:
Safet Si nificance of Lack of Rated Fire Barrier for Power 0 erator Relief Valve Dedicated Conduits 3. 1. 1 Original Unresolved Item During a previous NRC fire protection inspection, a concern was identified regarding the use of dedicated conduit to protect against spurious operation of components as the result of hot shorts.
The inspectors viewed the term
"dedicated conduits" to be analogous to a fire barrier with a 3-hour or 1-hour rating (in conjunction with fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system)
consistent with the requirements delineated in Section III.G.2 of
CFR Part 50, Appendix R.
The inspectors questioned whether the conduit was installed to protect the cable from hot shorts or the component from spuriously operation.
3. 1.2 Licensee Action in Response to this Unresolved Item The licensee stated that the original analysis to assess compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G, was performed in 1983 for Unit 1 and 1984 for Unit 2.
The methodology used to evaluate circuit damage (due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground) involved
'
-10-analyzing sources of hot short potential.
The affected safe shutdown circuits were protected by verifying the circuits were located singularly in a conduit or with other circuits that were normally in a deenergized state.
Therefore, those conduits were considered
"dedicated" conduits in the analysis.
The installation of additional normally energized circuits (potential hot shorts)
in a dedicated conduit was administratively "blocked" by procedure.
3. 1.3 Inspectors'ction During this Inspection The inspectors performed an onsite review of the licensee's documentation associated with this unresolved item to verify appropriate actions were taken.
The inspectors walked down the areas where the licensee had taken credit for dedicated conduits and noted that these conduits were credited for safe shutdown components whose cables were routed in a single conduit which did not contain other cables or cables which could becomP a source for a fire-induced hot short.
This configuration protected against conditions which could spuriously operate the component via a wire-to-wire short between the hot short source and the safe shutdown cable.
Additionally, it should be noted that these conduits were not credited by the licensee as 1-hour or 3-hour rated fire barriers.
The lack of a hot short source in the dedicated conduit provided assurance that the associated safe shutdown component would not spuriously operate.
3. 1.4 Conclusion On the basis of the inspectors review of the licensee documentation and a
walked down inspection in the plant, it was concluded that the dedicated conduit configuration which protects circuits from hot shorts, open circuits and shorts to ground was an acceptable approach to meet the requirements of Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.
This item was closed.
3.2 0 en Licensee Event Re ort 275 94-001 Revision 01:
Inade uate Silicon Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Currentl Installed Without
~Dammin Boards Due to a Pro rammatic Deficienc 3.2.1 Original Licensee Event On January 28, 1994, the licensee made a preliminary assessment based on an engineering review, that certain silicone foam fire barrier penetration seals required to maintain separation between specified fire areas may not have met their required Appendix R design basis fire barrier rating.
The subject seals did not have damming boards installed at one or both ends of the seals.
The licensee established fire watches as a compensatory measure.
3.2.2 Licensee's Action in Response to the License Event Report (LER)
In response to the LER the licensee issued a supplement (Revision 01) to the original LER 94-001 on August 11, 1994.
In the supplement the licensee stated that on December 3,
1993, a plant problem report was updated to document a
3-hour fire barrier penetration seal that was deficient due to lack of a damming board.
The penetration seal was repaired, and a root cause and corrective action was initiated.
On January 18, 1994, during a training session presented by a vendor of silicone foam penetration seals, a question was asked regarding the acceptability of silicone foam penetration seals without damming boards.
The vendor representative stated that they did not have test results that could be used to qualify penetration seals that did not have damming boards as a 3-hour barrier.
The licensee performed a preliminary review of the available industry qualification test documentation to evaluate the need for damming.
This review determined that the damming material was required on all existing penetration seal details issued for installation of silicone foam at Diablo Canyon.
The licensee conducted walkdown inspections of specific areas of the plant and identified approximately 100 representative silicone foam barrier seals that did not have damming boards.
The licensee declared these seals inoperable and established fire watches in the effected areas.
The licensee concluded that the root cause of this event was a programmatic deficiency, in that the review of documents during development of the penetration seal specifications and design drawings apparently did not include a detailed review of vendor installation procedures and associated fire tests.
3.2.3 Inspectors'ctions During the Present Inspection The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensee's performance-based approach for qualifying silicone foam fire barrier penetration seals without damming boards.
The licensee's approach would include assessing the fire loading in each area and if the fire loading was low, the licensee would propose not meeting the cold-side temperature criteria.
The licensee noted that the other standards such as flame and hose stream tests would continue to be met.
The licensee emphasized that this was a Diablo Canyon-specific approach.
The inspectors and NRR staff emphasized that the ability to base the evaluations on tests, whether ones already completed or ones which the licensee would conduct, was the key to NRC acceptance of this approach.
The licensee stated that the first phase of the penetration program was scheduled to be completed by July of 1995.
At that time the licensee will inform the NRR staff and the region of the results of their first evaluations.
The inspectors performed visual inspections of fire barrier penetration seals in several areas of the plant and did not identify any fire barrier penetration seals that exhibited evidence of physical damage.
The inspectors also noted that the licensee had taken appropriate corrective actions and had established roving fire watches in the effected areas.
3.2.4 Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the licensee had taken appropriate initial corrective actions to mitigate this event.
However, further NRC review will
-12-be required after the licensee completes the first phase of the penetration program and submits the results to the NRR staff and the region.
This LER shall remain ope ATTACHNENT 1
PERSONS CONTACTED 1. 1 Licensee Personnel
- D. Cosgrove,Supervisor, Safety and Fire Protection
- W. Crockett, Nanager, Engineering Services
- J. Ellis, Instructor, Learning Services
- W. Fujimoto, Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation
- T. Grebel, Director, Regulatory Compliance
"J. Gregerson, Engineer, Balance of Plant Systems Engineering
- L. Hagen, Director, Safety, Health, and Emergency Services
- D. Hampshire, Engineer, Engineering Services
- R. Leatham, Engineer, Electrical Design
- J. HcClintock, Specialist, Safety, Health, and Emergency Services
- D. Powell, Engineer, Safety, Health, and Emergency Services
- J. Radford, Engineer, Regulatory Compliance
- R. Snyder, Leader, Learning Services
- R. Stephens, Analyst, guality Assurance
- R. Waltos, Director, Engineering Services
- J.
Wood, Auditor, (}uality Assurance
- J. Young, Director, Nuclear guality Services 1.2 Contractor Personnel
- F. de Peralta, Engineer, Design Basis/Licensing (Tri-En Corporation)
f 1.3 NRC Personnel
- H. Hiller, Senior Resident Inspector
- H. Tschiltz, Senior Resident Inspector
- Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.
EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on Harch 31, 1995.
During the meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and preliminary findings of the inspection.
The licensee indicated that they understood the inspection findings.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors.
Proprietary information was not included in this inspection repor ATTACHHENT 2 LIST OF DOCUHENTS REVIEWED 1.
equality Assurance Audit Report 94011I,
"Annual and Biennial Fire Protection Audit," performed February 15 to Harch 9, 1994 2.
equality Assurance Report 94023I,
"Audit of Postfire Safe Shutdown-Followup Items from Audit 94011I,"
and
CFR 50, Appendix R,Section III.G and L," performed July 19 to August 3, 1994 3.
OHB, "Fire Protection Program,"
Revision 1,
September 20, 1994 4.
OH8. ID2, "Fire Loss Prevention,"
Revision 3, Harch 17, 1995 5.
OM8. ID2, "Fire System Impairment," Revision 1, Harch 9, 1995 6.
OM8. ID3, "Fire Watch and Welding Personnel Training and Responsibilities,"
Revision 0, January 6,
1994 7.
OHB. ID4, "Control of Combustion Haterials," Revision 0, March 9, 1995 8.
s.
EP H-10, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment," Revision 11, April 18, 1994, Unit
EP H-10, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment," Revision 9, October 20, 1994, Unit 2 10.
EP H-18.2,
"Tagging, Charging, Inspection and Hydrostatic Testing of Portable Fire Extinguishers,"
Revision 8, April 19, 1994 11.
HP H-56. 11,
"Door Haintenance,"
Revision 1A, October 23, 1994 12.
OP AP-BA, "Control Room Inaccessibility - Establishing Hot Standby,"
Revision 6, July 12, 1994 13.
14.
STP H-69A, "Honthly Fire Extinguisher Inspection,"
Revision 13A, August 2, 1994 STP H-69A, "Honthly Fire Extinguisher Inspection,"
Revision 15, February 23, 1995 LIST OF SURVEILLANCES REVIEWED STP H-13A, "Fire Pumps Performance Test," Revision 12, data package for the month of February 1995 2.
STP H-67A, "Weekly and Honthly Fire Valve Inspection,"
data package for Harch 1995
STP M-69A, "Monthly Fire Extinguisher Inspection," Revision 15, data package for March 1995 STP M-69B, "Monthly Co2 Hose Reel and Deluge Valve Inspection,"
Revision 7, data package for March 1995
0'