IR 05000275/1992022
| ML16342B917 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1992 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341G704 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-92-22, 50-323-92-22, NUDOCS 9210090087 | |
| Download: ML16342B917 (30) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Inspection Conducted:
Inspectors:
50-275/92-22 and 50-323/92-22 50-275 and 50-323 DPR-80 and DPR-82
. Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California July 14 through August 24, 1992 P. Morrill, Senior Resident, Inspector H. Hiller, Resident Inspector, C. Hyers, Region V Engineering Inspector Approved by:
P.
Joh s n, Chief, Reactor Projec Secti'on
p/zS/~~
Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection from Jul 14 throu h Au ust
992 Re ort Nos.
50-275 92-22 and
~5- >>-2
~d:
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- tions; maintenance and surveillance activities; followup of onsite events, open items, and -licensee event reports (LERs);
and selected independent inspection activities.
Inspection Procedures TI.2515/115, 41701, 61726, 62703, 70300, 70312, 70329, 71500, 71707, 71710, 90712, and 93702 were used as guidance during this inspection.
Safet Issues Mana ement S stem SIMS Items:
None Results General Conclusions on Stren ths and Weaknesses'trengths:
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Normal maintenance and surveillance activities observed by the inspectors appeared to be well thought out and deficiencies properly dispositioned.
Licensee operations and maintenance personnel appeared professional and dedicated in accomplishing their work, 9210090087 920925 PDR ADOCK 05000275 Q
Training of licensed and non-licensed operations personnel appeared to have been well timed and as realistic as possible.
The incorporation of Auxiliary Operators into simulator training scenarios should enhance teamwork and realism.
Weaknesses:
One of the procedures used for installation testing of the new emergency diesel, generator lacked formal acceptance criteria.
This and other inspector observations indicated that the test program may not be subject to sufficient controls and quality oversight (para-
'raph 10.a).
Insufficient supervision of outage preparations for Unit 1 resulted in three i.nstances of inadvertent mispositioning of plant equipment (paragraph 3.d).
Si nificant Safet Hatters:
None Summar of Violations:
The lack of acceptance criteria for the EDG-test procedure noted above is considered a violation of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
0 en Items Summar
Two items were opened and one item was close ~
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DETAILS h
Persons Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager, Nuclear Power Generation Business Unit Townsend, Vice President
.and Plant Manager, Diablo Canyon Operations Fujimoto, Vice President, Nuclear Technical Services Hiklush, Manager, Operations Services Angus, Hanager, Technical Services Giffin, Manager, Maintenance Services'rockett, Manager, Technical Services Holden, Instrumentation and Controls Director Barkhuff, guality Control Director Powers, Manager, Support Services Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor Bard, Mechanical Maintenance Director Phillips, Electrical Maintenance Director Shoulders, Onsite Project Engineer Taggart, Director, guality Performance and Administration Fridley, Operations Director y, Radiation Protection Director Vosburg, Work Planning Director Hardesty, Nuclear Engineering and Construction Services Goelzer, System Engineer, Sixth Diesel Generator Project Manager Pendleton, System Engineering Supervisor Powell, Test Engineer Ricks, Test Coordinator Moulia, Assistant to Vice President,.Diablo Canyon Operations Kohout, Safety, Health and Emergency Services Director Sisk, Regulatory Compliance Engineer, Tresler, Project Engineer Farradj, Fire Protection Engineer Haynes, Training Instructor Price, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor ero, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor Cooper, G.C. Mechanical Work Package Coordinator Cosgrove, Fire Protection Supervisor G. H.
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- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
The inspectors interviewed other licensee employees including shift supervisors, shift foremen, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personne ~
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2.
0 erational Status of Diablo Can on Units 1 and
0 Unit 1 reduced power from full power to 50X on July 19 to repair the circulating water pump 1-1 guide bearing oil reservoir and returned to full power on July 21.
Unit 1 also reduced power to 50X on August 8-9 and again on August 13, to repair a steam leak in the.steam supply to main feed pump 1-1.
On July 24, after observing excessive flow noise from main turbine governor valve No. 4, the licensee closed the valve, resulting in Unit 1 operating at approximately 98N power for the duration of the report period.
Unit. 2 reduced to 50X for routine cleaning of condensers and circulating water piping on August 1-3 and August 21-23:
Unit 2 operated at full power for the rest of the period.
3.
Operational Safet Verification 71707 a ~
General During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility.
The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with selected Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs)
as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications (TS).
Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions and to evaluate trends.
This operational information was then evaluated to determine whether regulatory requirements were satisfied.
Shift turnovers were observed on a sample basis to verify that all pertinent information on plant status was relayed to the oncoming
'crew.
During each week, the inspectors toured accessible areas of the facility to observe the following:
(1)
General plant and equipment conditions (2)
Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment (3)
Conduct of selected activities for compliance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures (4)
Interiors of electrical and control panels (5)
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness (6)
Engineered safety features equipment alignment and conditions (7)
Storage of pressurized gas bottles The inspectors talked with control room operators and other plant personnel.
The discussions centered on pertinent topics of general
plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other aspects of the work activ'ities.
Radiolo ical Protection The inspectors periodically observed radiological protection practices to determine whether the licensee's program was being implemented in conformance with facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors verified that health physics supervisors and professionals conducted frequent plant tours to observe activities in progress and were aware of significant plant activities, particularly those related to radio-logical conditions and/or challenges.
ALARA considerations were found to be an integral part of each RWP (Radiation Work Permit).
Ph sical Securit Security activities were observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures, including vehicle and personnel access screening, personnel badging, site security force manning, compensatory measures, and protected and vital area integrity.
Exterior lighting was checked during backshift inspections.
Outa e Pre arations During the inspection period the inspectors observed increasing numbers of workers in the cable spreading room and the 480 V motor control centers performing work on block walls.
Further inquiry found that many of the individuals were new on site.
The licensee had previously committed to the NRC to complete the block wall work on Unit 1 by the end of the 1R5 outage, but subsequently scheduled the completion of the block wall work prior to the outage to allow for outage required switchgear maintenance.
The inspectors voiced concern to plant management that instances of inadvertent misposi-tioning of plant equipment controls or personnel injury were more likely as a result of the crowded working conditions in these areas.
The inspectors observed that six of the past eight outages were entered ahead of schedule due to a plant trip or early shutdown.
Specific findings which NRC inspectors raised with plant management included:
The low ratio of field engineers to workers, Need for involvement by operations in identifying sensitive plant equipment in the local work areas, Use of oxygen and acetylene gas bottles in the 480 V motor control switchgear areas and containment penetration areas, Placement of tools and documentation on safety related and sensitive equipment, and
i Equipment which was not secured after work hours to preclude adverse effects during a seismic event.
As a result, construction management had work crews perform daily tailboards with operations personnel to identify sensitive plant equipment near work sites, and initiated efforts to address the concerns described above.
During the next two weeks, the inspectors observed increasing numbers of workers in other plant areas, and also observed many instances of an attitude of haste among 'the workers to finish projects before the start of the outage (scheduled to start September 13).
Two 'instances of accidental circuit breaker tripping by workers also occurred in a three week period.
Inspectors related these observations to plant management, and stated that undue haste had been determined to be a contributing cause of operator errors and safety system challenges during past plant events.
The inspec-tors considered that the block wall work was already crowded and challenging due to the large number of interferences, and reiterated to plant management on August 20 the concern that a plant trip would inadvertently challenge plant safety systems.
Licensee management stated that adequate supervision and oversight was available, and that an increased awareness of sensitive to plant equipment would be emphasized to work crews.
On August 21, workers dropped.a knuckle for a scaffold installation at the north end of the turbine building.
It struck and actuated the water deluge system for the main generator hydrogen seal oil system.
Had this grounded or shorted components of the system, a
plant load rejection and trip would have occurred.
Plant operators almost immediately stopped the deluge and were able to avert a
significant plant transient.
After this event, licensee management stopped all scaffolding work, conducted joint operations and construction walkdowns, and met with construction supervision to review what could be done to avoid similar situations.
The licensee also established a scaffolding installation schedule for Plant Operations and met with all personnel involved to ensure they understood management's expectations.
The inspectors noted that to accomplish the volume of work scheduled without significant incident the licensee would need continued supervisory attention to work planning for personnel working in the plant.
No violations or deviations were identified.
P 4.
Onsite Event Follow-u 93702 a ~
Steam Leak in the Low Pressure Su
Line to the l-l Hain Feed Pum On July 27 the licensee identified a steam leak from the low pressure steam supply line to main feedwater pump (HFP) l-l.
A three-quarter inch drain line off the subject pipe had cracked at a
socket weld.
On August 5, mechanical maintenance installed 'a
strongback supported off the steam supply line to retain the drain line and associated valve.
While tightening the strongback, the steam leak was observed to stop and the licensee concluded that the problem could be left until the Unit 1 outage.
On August 8, the drain line broke away from the steam supply line and was pushed to the side by the resulting steam leak.
The strong-back retained the drain line so it did not become a missile.
The operators identified the problem, decreased plant power to approxi-mately 50%,
removed HFP 1-1 from service, and isolated the steam leak.
A new drain pipe and associated valve were welded back to the steam supply pipe to HFP 1-1 and Unit 1 returned to full power'on August 9.
The licensee concluded that the socket weld failure was due to a poor weld combined with the additional stress caused by the weight of the strongback.
The inspector examined the repaired drain line and the three other drain lines.
He observed that the'ibration of the drain lines for HFP l-l and 1-2 appeared excessive
.and warranted further concern.
The inspector expressed concern to management that the piping was vibrating excessively, that this phenomenon needed to be investigated to see what was causing the problem, and that other areas of the plant should be examined for similar problems.
Licensee Hanagement stated that the broken weld would be examined to determine the root cause and that the situation would be followed up.
On August 13 the licensee found a new crack in the same drain line-to HFP 1-1.
The crack was observed to grow in length about 1 inch over an eight hour period.
On August 13 the licensee decreased power to 50% again to repair the cracked weld and to install a
support off a bolting flange of the steam supply piping for the drain lines of HFP l-l and 1-2.
Subsequent licensee evaluations concluded that the failures were caused by cyclic fatigue which was due to the piping being in resonance with the HFP turbine.
This appeared to occur due to the plant operating at 98% power, which is not the usual mode of operation.
Subsequently, the licensee checked the steam'leads for both units'FPs, measured actual vibration levels of the subject drain lines, and initiated a
gE to determine and document the root cause.
Additional licensee examinations of steam and feed water piping did not identify any additional excessive vibration problems.
The licensee's vibration readings indicated that the new supports lowered vibration to an acceptable level.
uxiliar and Fuel Handlin Buildin Ventilation Cont
S stem Failure
'n August 8, a surge suppression diode in the Unit 2 auxiliary building ventilation system shorted and caused the fuse that supplies DC power to the Unit 2 ventilation control logic panel (POV1) to blow.
Subsequently, both the E-1 and E-2 (auxiliary building ventilation exhaust)
fans did not restart.
The E-2 fan should have restarted and ventilation dampers should have shifted appropriately.
The operators placed all dampers for the auxiliary
-6-and fuel handling 'building in the safeguards/iodine'removal mode'and.'estarted fan E-2.
The ventilation system control fuses were replaced and the failures caused by the shorted diode were identified and corrected.
The licensee identified that'he loss of DC.control power to one train of ventilation could cause a loss of the fans in the other train, resulting in a total loss of auxiliary building and fuel handling building ventilation.
The licensee reported this as a four hour non-emergency report pursuant to
CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D).
The inspector subsequently'xamined the licensee's operability evaluation and interim corrective actions.
The inspector found that the ventilation control system was unique to Diablo Canyon and was scheduled for replacement.
In the event the ventilation-control system were to fail again, the licensee had directed the operators to go to the cable spreading room (immediately under the control room), turn off the DC control power to. both affected trains (which would fail all dampers to their safeguards mode),
and manually start one set of fans.
The licensee revised Emergency Procedure E-0;
"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," to provide for restoration of the ventilation systems.
The inspector asked the licensee if the ventilation systems were operable and whether they met their design basis requirements with a known common mode failure.
The licensee stated that the auxiliary building ventilation system is required to maintain the temperature of the ESF pump motors within acceptable'imits and to ensure that radioactive material leaking from the ECCS equipment following a LOCA is filtered prior to release.
If the ventilation system stops, then any.radioactive releases would remain in the auxiliary building until ventilation is restarted.
The licensee also stated that their review of equipment heatup curves showed that ESF motors would not be adversely affected for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee expected that plant operators would identify and manually recover from a loss of auxiliary building ventilation in approximately thirty minutes.
,The licensee went on to explain that a loss of ventilation in the fuel handling building would require stopping all fuel movement and that this is the action required by the Technical Specifications.
The licensee concluded that the auxiliary and fuel handling ventilation systems are operable and that corrective actions would be tracked-and documented in NCR DCO-92-EN-N014.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's corrective actions appeaeed adequate until a new auxiliary and fuel handling building ventilation control system could be installed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance 62703 71500 The inspectors observed portions of, and reviewed records on, selected maintenance activities to assure compliance with approved procedures,
Technical Specifications, and appropriate industry codes and standards.
Furthermore, the inspectors verified that maintenance activities were performed by qualified personnel, in accordance with fire protection and housekeeping controls, and that replacement parts were appropriately certified.
These activities included:
Work Order, C0100483, Replace Mechanical Seal - Emergency Diesel 2-1, Maintenance Procedure HP-H21.5, Diesel Engine Water Pump Maintenance Work Order, R0102607, Check Dew Point of Emergency Diesel Start Air Receiver 1-1A Work Order',
C0101576 (Activity 4), Perform Weld and Install Spool ASW 2-2 Annubar Work Order, C0101576 (Activity 5), Perform Hydro on ASW 2-2 Annubar, No violations or deviations were identified.
Verification of Plant Records TI 2515 115 The inspector examined the licensee's guality Performance and Assessment (gP&A) audit report 920201,
"Operator Readings,"
dated August 19, 1992 and gP&A Surveillance Report number 92-022,
"Radiological Surveys in Security Zones," dated July 23, 1992. 'his examination was conducted to
- determine the adequacy of the licensee's audits and associated corrective actions.
gP&A report 920201 documented the licensee's evaluation of 268 required area entries and concluded that in two instances no one on watch entered one specific required area in Unit 2. It was determined that the assigned individual did enter the equivalent area for Unit 1 on both occasions.
The licensee initiated Non-Conformance Report (NCR) DC2-92-OP-N032 to identify the root cause and corrective actions.
The licensee also initiated actions to change existing procedures to provide clear accountability for completion of operator readings.
These actions are scheduled to be complete by December 31, 1992.
The licensee's guality Assurance Department stated that they planned four additional assessments in this area to be completed by December 31, 1994.
gP&A Surveillance 92-022 documented the licensee's evaluation of 46 access card histories for nine Radiation Protection Technicians.
The
'icensee found that all but one required entry had been completed.
The individual who had omitted the required entry had been subsequently terminated.
An evaluation 'by the licensee's Director of Radiation Protection concluded that situation had been evaluated and there had been no loss of radiological controls.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Item 50-275/92-20-02 and TI 2515/115 are close Ins ection of Limitor ue Valve 0 erator S win Pack Assembl 90712 On June 2,
1992, a motor operated valve failed to open fully due to a
loose setscrew on the worm cartridge bearing lock nut.
This failure and the associated investigation by the licensee were documented in NRC inspection report 92-20.
The following documents additional inspection effort in this area.
n a.
Review of Emer enc 0 eratin Procedures The inspector reviewed the applicable Operability Evaluation, Revision 2 of OE 92-12.
As part of this operability evaluation, the licensee reviewed emergency operating procedures to ensure safety functions were identified for affected valves.
In'addition, based on the results of the review and recommendations of the operations staff, the licensee performed inspections of additional safety related valves to ensure correct installation of the setscrew associated with the locknut.
The licensee plans to revise the operability evaluation to reflect the additional inspections.
In an independent review, the inspector reviewed a sample of emergency operating procedures and procedures used in response to design basis accidents, and concluded that the EOP review appeared to have been comprehensive.
b.
Failure to Address All Accident Situations The inspector identified the concern that, although the operability evaluation had addressed design basis accidents which were covered by EOP's, the accidents addressed by abnormal procedures had not been reviewed.
Specific examples would be fire response procedures and radiation release event procedures.
The licensee acknowledged that these accidents had not been reviewed for this OE, and agreed
'that operability evaluations should address all applicable design basis accidents.
The licensee initiated a review of all operability evaluations to determine if the appropriate scope of design.basis accidents were addressed.
The licensee stated that the results of the review would be documented, and would be available for NRC review.
C.
Lack of Guidance to 0 erators in an Abnormal Procedure The inspector reviewed the procedure to be used in the event of a control room fire to determine if the valves required to achieve safe shut down would be affected.
During review of one of the design basis fire response procedures,'OP AP-S, "Control Room Inaccessibility," the inspector noted that no guidance was provided if the RCS inventory could not be maintained.
The lack of guidance was inconsistent with the much more detailed instructions for other safe shutdown functions in the procedure.
Because the flow path via the RCP seals is credited in the licensing basis as a safe shutdown charging path, and because interviews with licensed operators indicated thorough familiarity with troubleshooting actions for the various charging paths, the safety significance of this lack of
explicit guidance appears to be low.
The licensee has documented the lack of guidance in an AR, and plans to review the need for this guidance to be consistent with guidance provided in other sections of the procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Surveillance 61726 By direct observation and record review of selected surveillance testing, the inspectors checked compliance with TS requ'irements and plant procedures.
The inspectors verified that test equipment was calibrated, and that test results met acceptance criteria or were appropriately dispositioned.
These tests included:
STP P-6B, Routine Surveillance Test of Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump STP I-108B, Calibration of Miscellaneous Air Particulate Monitors RM-13 and RM-21 STP M-77, Main Steam Safety and Relief Valve testing STP M-16A, Operation of Trains A and B Slave Relays K603 (Safety Injection)
and K605 (Phase A Isolation)
STP M-9A, Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
En ineerin Safet Feature Verification 71710 During the inspection period, selected portions of the auxiliary salt water (ASW) system for Units
and 2 were inspected to verify that system configuration, equipment condition, valve and electrical lineups, and local breaker positions were in accordance with plant drawings and Technical Specifications.
During walkdown of the ASW system, the inspectors identified that the general condition of the intake structure, where the ASW pumps are located, showed evidence of aggressive salt water corrosion.
The inspectors also identified that two fittings in safety related instrument lines appeared to have been incorrect material, since they showed sig-nificant corrosion, while the rest of the line was corrosion resistant.
The inspectors also identified that one of the ASW pump roe'.flood detectors was missing two fasteners on a flange.
A 2x6" plank used to support railing was also resting on the moving part of a non-safety related actuator for a de-musseling valve (FCV-605).
Additionally, the many examples of general corrosion of the intake structure components indicated that additional action above the requirements of the existing program may be necessary to forestall the effects of salt water corrosio '- 10-The inspectors expressed concern to the licensee that the intake struc-ture was not getting sufficient attention (as evidenced by the plank resting on the valve actuator), particularly in view of the high corrosion rate of that environment.
The licensee agreed that attention was required, initiated corrective action to correct deficiencies, and conducted additional problem identification walkdowns of the intake
'tructure, Although the inspectors'indings did not have direct safety signifi-cance, the inspe'ctors were concerned that these conditions continue to exist.
The degraded condition of plant equipment at the intake structure has been the subject of several inspection findings and management discussions (see Inspection Report 91-03).
In discussions with plant management, it was emphasized that the remote location of the intake structure appeared to have been a factor in the apparent lower level of
. management and engineering attention.
No violations or deviations were identified..
10.
Prep erational Testin of Sixth Diesel Generator 70300 70312 70329 The inspector reviewed the licensee's progress in the install'ation of the sixth emergency diesel generator, EDG 2-3,.
The inspector found that most of the installation work activities had been completed.
Preoperational testing of the diesel engine subsystems had been initiated.
Preparations for functional testing of the'iesel generator using a temporary load
- bank were still in progress.
The inspector reviewed completed post modification test (PHT) procedures and observed preoperational testing in progress for the following diesel subsystems:
Lube Oil System, PHT 2108,
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Starting Air and Turbo Air Test, PHT 2104, Fuel Oil Test, PHT 2106.
The following findings resulted from these inspection activities:
a.
Fuel Oil Da Tank Level.
The inspector reviewed licensee procedure PHT 2106, Revision 1,
Fuel Oil System Test.
The. licensee had initiated this test to verify safety related level switch setpoints for the fuel oil day tank using calibrated quantities of fuel oil.
The setpoints had been previously established based on instrument loop cali~tions.
In addition', the test procedure calibrated the sightglass level indicator, LI-81.
This level indicator would subsequently be used to verify the minimum quantity of fuel oil required by Technical Specifications.
(1)
High Level Setpoint Not Verified.
The inspector found that the procedure did not verify the high level switch setpoint for stopping the fuel transfer pumps and
e
-11-(2,)
(3)
closing the level control valves for the day tank.
The licensee identified that 'subsequent testing would have func-tionally verified the operation of the high level switch.
However, the licensee acknowledged the need to include the measurement of the level at switch actuation to verify the loop calibration setpoint.
Since the test was on hold at the time, the licensee stated that the procedure would be changed to include the high level setpoint,prior to continuation of the test.
The inspector found the licensee actions adequate.
Lack of Acceptance Criteria.
The inspector found that procedure PMT 2 1 06 d id not include specific acceptance cr iteri a for the test data.
While expected
'alues were identi fied for required measurements
, the procedur e did not establish an acceptable tolerance for the measured data.
The inspector found this lack of appropriate acceptance criteri a for verification of safety related level switch setpo ints to be an apparent violation ( Enforcement Item 50-3 23 /92-22- 0I ).
The licensee stated that appropri ate acceptance criteria had been informal 1 y established for the test data.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector '
concern for the weakness in procedure PMT 2 1 06.
Lack of Documentation of Test Conditions.
The inspector noted that PMT 2 1 06 did not record'he tempera-ture or spec ific gravity of the fuel oi 1
- used for calibrating the level switches and s ightgl as s.
While considered of minor safety'ignificance, the inspector found the lack of documenta-ti on of these test conditions to be a weakness in the licensee's control of testing.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern.
Non-conservative Minimum Volume Determination.
The inspector found that the licensee did not account for the unusable quantity of fuel in'he day tank when establishing the minimum volume reference level.
Procedure PMT 2106 introduced a calibrated quantity of 200 gallons of fuel oil into the day tank when empty.
The resulting sightglass level was designated the minimum volume required by Technical Specification 3.8. 1. 1.
The inspector was concerned that the licensee's method of compliance with the Technical Specification requirement for operability 'did not appear to be'onservatively established based on a usable quantity of fuel oil.
Additional information provided by the licensee established that approximately 30 gallons was the quantity of fuel oil considered to be unusable.
At the minimum required level in the day tank, only 170 gallons would be usable.
Furthermore,
-12-the licensee identified that the fuel consumption for the diesel engine under full rated load was approximately 190 gallons per hour.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's minimum level indication did not appear to be based on assuring operation of the diesel for a minimum of one hour.
The inspector noted that the day.tank low level alarm setpoint had been established to assure operation for a minimum of one hour.
The inspector considered the licensee's indication of minimum required fuel oil quantity to be nonconservative.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern and committed to review the basis for the minimum fuel oil quantity for the day tank and initiate any'orrective action necessary including clarification of the Technical Specifications if warranted.
The inspector found the licensee actions to be adequate.
The licensee's review and corrective actions will be reviewed during a future inspection (Followup Item 50-323/92-22-02).
Late in the inspection period, the resident inspectors identified additional concerns related to control and quality oversight of the test program for the new EOG.
These weaknesses,manifested partly in the above observations, included insufficient supervision of test procedure development, inadequ'ate gA review of test program con-trols, and improper documentation of test deficiencies.
These issues will be reviewed further during future inspections.
b.
Use of Installed Plant Gau es Durin Testin The inspector observed testing in progress in accordance with PHT 2104, Engine Air Start System.
The inspector found the test to be well controlled.
The procedure was in use at the test location.
Procedure steps were conducted in order.
The inspector observed that a permanently installed air gauge was being used during portions of the test.
However, the inspector noted that the air gauge,had not been identified on the instrument list in the procedure.
The instrument list was used to control the calibration of instruments used for data satisfying acceptance criteria.
The inspector was concerned that the gauge may not have been calibrated prior to its use in the test.
The test engineer identified that the instrument calibration had been established during prior testing.
The inspector found that the additional documentation resolved his concern for the calibration of the air gauge.
However, the inspector considered the lack of stand-alone documentation of the test instrument calibration to be a weakness in the licensee's test procedure.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern.
One violation and one followup item were identified.'
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11.
Observation of Licensed 0 erator Trainin 41701 a.
Observation of Simulator Trainin On July 29, the inspectors observed licensed operator training in the s,imulator (Course LR92, Lesson LR92. 1SS, dated 7/24/92).
The training was for a loss of power and loss of cooling during shutdown (Mode 6) operation.
Abnormal Procedures SD-O, Loss of, or Inadequate Decay Heat Removal; SD-I, Loss of AC Power; and SD-5, Loss of Residual Heat Removal, were utilized.
Auxiliary operators observed the scenario from the simulator control booth and provided a simulated response to the operators'equests for in-plant operations.
Training personnel stated to the inspectors that they had started to include the Auxiliary Operators (AOs) several months ago to add fidelity to the simulated in-plant responses and to acquaint the AOs with control room operations during high stress
.
events.
b.
Observation of Trainin for Local 0 eration of Circuit Breakers On July 17, 1992 the inspector observed the licensee training staff conducting training for licensed and non-licensed Operations personnel.
This training demonstrated, using spare breakers in the plant, how to, locally operate 480 V and 4 KV circuit breakers.
Operating Procedure OP 0-22, Emergency Operation of Motor Operated Valves, was used for the.480 V breaker training.
The training appeared satisfactory.
No deviations or violations were identified.
ll. ~Ei<<i An exit meeting was conducted on August 27, 1992, with the licensee representatives identified in Paragraph 1.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as described in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials reviewed by or discussed with the inspectors during this inspectio E 0