IR 05000275/1992012
| ML16342A306 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1993 |
| From: | Mcqueen A, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A305 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-92-12-02, 50-275-92-12-2, 50-323-92-12, NUDOCS 9311040215 | |
| Download: ML16342A306 (20) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/92-12 and 50-323/92-12 License Nos.
DPR-80 DPR-82 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGKE)
77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant
{DCPP), Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
July 19 through 23, 1993, Inspector:
v kd g'e(ts Art ur D. Hcgueen, mergency Prepare ness Ana yst ate Signe i
Approved by:
~Summar:
R ert
. Pate, se
,
Sa eguar s,
mergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch zi~ r~
a e Signe Areas Ins ected:
This routine inspection by a region-based inspector examined the following portions of the licensee's emergency preparedness program:
Items identified during previous emergency preparedness exercises, Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program, Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors, and Inspector Identified Items.
During this inspection, portions of Inspection Procedures 82701 and 93702 were used.
Results:
In the areas inspected, the licensee's emergency preparedness program appeared adequate to accomplish its objectives and the licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements.
93ii040215 9308ib PDR ADOCK 05000275 Q
INSPECTION DETAILS
~
Ke Persons Contacted C.
P.
R.
D.
D.
- R,
- L
- K.
R.
- D C.
- W.
- D J.
- W D.
C, Belmont, Auditor, Site guality Assurance A. Bishop, Secretary, Emergency/Safety Services M. Bliss, Emergency Planner J.
Dye, Operations Superintendent J.
Fawcett, Consultant P.
Flohaug, Senior Supervisor, guality Performance tm Assessment A. Hagen, Director, Safety, Health S. Emergency Services A. Hubbard, Regulatory Compliance T, Hug, Supervisor, Emergency Planning M. Morris, Emergency Planner B,
Miklush, Manager, Operations Services B. Prince, Emergency Planner A. Rising, Jr., Auditor, Site equality Assurance A. Stetson, guality Control Engineer D. Toresdahl, Consultant R. White, Senior GET Instructor G.
Yows, Consultant The above indi,viduals denoted with an asterisk, were present during the exit meeting.
The inspector also contacted other members of the licensee's emergency preparedness, administrative, and technical staff during the course of the inspection, NRC Personnel at Exit Interview 2.
A. D. Mcgueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, RV
1
d FFF d
The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous level of performance in the following areas and their. program appeared adequate to accomplish their objectives.
a.
0 erational Status of the Emer enc Pre aredness Pro ram (MC-82701)
(1)
Emer enc Plan and Im lementin Procedures The inspector reviewed licensee emergency preparedness implementing procedures (EPIP) revised since the last emergency preparedness inspection.
The following EPIPS, were reviewed:
(a)
EP G-l, Accident Classification and Emergency Plan Activation, Revision 19, dated April 19, 1993.
This EPIP is under review at Region Y and will be the subject of a separate inspection report.
(b)
EP G-3, Notification of Off-Site Agencies and Emergency Organization'ersonnel, Revision 23, dated
Hay 24, 1993.
One item was noted in review of this EPIP that did not appear consistent with NRC regulatory requirements and guidance.
(Page 3, Section 2. 1. l.c)
As formerly read s
If NRC requests a continuous open line be maintained, provide at a minimum a licensed operator or STA knowledgeable of the event for this purpose.
had been changed to read If NRC requests an open communication channel with the Control Room, and personnel are available, a licensed operator or STA knowledgeable of the event should be provided for this purpose.
CFR 50.72(c)(3)
indicates that
"Each licensee shall, during the course of the event: Haintain an open, continuous communication channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC." - NRC Information Notice IN 85-80, Timel Oeclaration of an Emer enc Class Im lementation of an Emer enc Plan and Emer enc Notifications, dated October 15, 1985, reads in part "It is the licensee's responsibility to ensure that adequate personnel, knowledgeable about plant conditions and emergency plan implementing procedures, are available on shift to assist the shift supervisor to classify an emergency and activate the emergency plan, including making appropriate notifications, without interferin with lant
~aeration."
IN 85-80 further reads
"When
CFR 50.72 was published in the Federal Re ister (48 FR 39039),
the NRC made clear its intent that notifications on the Emergency Notification System to the NRC Operations Center should be made by those knowledgeabIe of the event."
~Emer enc Communications S stem, dated November 28, 1986,-reads in part,
"Licensees must provide qualified personnel to maintain an open, continuous communications channel with the NRC Operations Center upon request by the NRC, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(c)(3).
The licensee is responsible for supplying timely, reliable information concerning an event to the NRC via the Operations Center in Bethesda, Haryland.
Hembers of the NRC wil1 not relieve the licensee of this responsibility."
In discussing this item with the licensee, it was indicated there was no intent to be inconsistent with
(c)
(d)
(e)
(g)
(h)
regulatory requirements and/or guidance; and the change would be appropriately reworded.
A change appears necessary to insure consistency with regulatory requirements and guidance.
(93-20-01)
EP R-2, Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials, Revision 13, dated June 9,
1993.
EP R-7, Off-Site Transportation Accidents, Revision 10, dated May 24, 1993.
V EP RB-9, Calculation of Release Rate, Revision 7,
dated June 9,
1993.
EP RB-10; Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 3,
June 25, 1993.
EP -RB-11, Emergency Off-Site Dose Calculations, Revision 7, March 8, 1993.
EP RB-12, Plant Vent Iodine and Particulate Sampling During Accident Conditions, Revision 2, dated May 18, 1993.
(m)
(n)
(o)
EP RB-15:A, Post-Accident Sampling System Initial Actions, Revision 12, dated June 25, 1993.
EP RB-15:B, Post-Accident Sampling System Stripped-Gas and Diluted RCS, Revision 8, dated June 25, 1993.
EP RB-15:F, Sentry Post-Accident Sampling System-Data Analysis, Revision 6, dated April 23, 1993.
EP RF-l, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center, Revision 15, dated June 25, 1993.
EP EF-2, Activati on and Oper at i on of the Operati onal Support Center, Revision 14, dated June 25, 1993.
EP EF-3A, Interim EOF Activation and Operation,.
Revision 1, dated June 25, 1993.
EP EF-3B, Long-Term EOF Activation and operation, Revision 1, dated June 25, 1993.
No degradations in, site emergency preparedness were identified in the procedure reviewe Emer enc Facilities E ui ment Instrumentation and
~Su
'lies The inspector toured and inspected emergency preparedness facilities.which included the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The inspection included facility layout, response equipment, instrumentation and calibration, and supplies on hand.
Maintenance records for emergency preparedness facilities executed within the past two months were inspected as follows:
STPG-17F, Form Number 69-10766, Control Room Checklist, completed June 9,
1993.
STPG-17G, Form Number 69-10767, Technical Support Center Checklist, completed June 9,
1993.
STPG-17H, Form Number 69-10769, Operational Support Center Checklist, completed June 9,
1993.
STPG-171, Form Number 69-10770, Emergency Operations Facility Checklist, completed June 30, 1993.
It was verified that in instances where supply items were short, equipment deficient or malfunctioning, were identified; appropriate on-the-spot action or Action Requests (AR) for correction were initiated.
Equipment was verified as being in calibration and properly scheduled for re-calibration.
It was verified that these emergency facilities appear in a ready mode for activation, with appropriate supplies and equipment.
Or anization and Mana ement Control Changes to the emergency preparedness (EP) organization were reviewed and they appeared to appropriately reflect emergency plan and emergency procedures requirements.
A recent corporate reorganization effective Nay 28, 1993, moved the corporate Emergency Preparedness (EP) function to the site as a subelement of the site Safety, Health, and Emergency Services Organization.
It was further announced during this inspection that effective July 26, 1993, the Safety, Health and Emergency Services Organization would begin reporting to the Operations Services Hanager at the site.
In the past, reporting was to the Support Services Manager.
It was indicated that this should have no notable impact on the Emergency Preparedness Staff as their reporting chain is unchanged.
In addition to the full time
EP staff, the licensee is supported by consultant expertise as needed.
The Site EP staff had three consultants on special projects at the time of this inspection.
(4)
~Trainin Emergency Preparedness (EP) Training was reviewed and inspected.
The transfer of corporate EP training to the site and its integration with site EP training was completed since the last routine inspection and appears to be working efficiently.
Training records are maintained by computer and a random. spot check of individual records indicated they were current with EP training appropriately entered and scheduled.
Records indicated that key emergency personnel had been properly trained as required prior to being listed as emergency response organization personnel eligible for call-in during an emergency event.
Should a'n individual not complete retraining withi'n the required time frame, their name is removed from the call-in list until training has been accomplished.
Personnel are made
'aware of changes to the emergency preparedness program as they occur.
This is done through updating procedures, training, and special notices.
(5)
Inde endent and Internal Reviews and Audits (a)
Annual Audit The 1993 Emergency Plan Audit (Audit 93021I), report was reviewed during this inspection.
The audit was conducted from Nay 25 through June 3,
1993.
The audit identified six areas as program strengths.
Eight Action Requests (AR) and one guality Evaluation (gE) were initiated as appropriate to document program weaknesses.
One audit finding pertaining to NRC guidance was identified for NRC inspection followup (licensee AR¹ A0309135).
The finding was characterized as:
During the performance of onsite quality assurance audit 93021I (Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Annual Audit) the following concern that the Emergency Plan (EP)
and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) revisions are behind
'chedule.
The EP and EPIPs presently meet the minimum requirements for being reviewed and are able to be used.
The Emergency Planning Department during their procedure reviews has identified procedures that
~
'
should be revised.
These procedure revisions have been in progress for over a year.
tf Recommendation:
Identify, using PIMs, all procedures that need to be revised.
Assign the procedure revisions to responsible parties, assign a completion date and meet this date.
The NRC was briefed, by the licensee on a program to reorganize and improve EPIPs which implement the Emergency Plan (NRC Inspection Report Number 50-275/92-08, dated March 16, 1992).
At that time, it was indicated by the licensee that this project would be implemented over a period of a couple of years.
The licensee is still hoping to complete the project by about January 1994.
In conjunction with this updating of EPIPs, a revision to the site Emergency Plan is also nearing completion and is expected to be submitted to the NRC within the next few weeks.
This will be tracked as an inspection followup item until the project is completed.
(93-20-02)
(b)
Drills and Exercises Also reviewed during the inspection were three 1993 emergency response drill reports pertaining to drills conducted since the last EP inspection at the site.
The reports reviewed were:
Drill Report, 1st quarter Drill, February 10, 1993.
This drill was run live from the Simulator and was conducted primarily as a
training drill in preparation for the 1993 Annual Exercise.
.The report included the overall objectives of the drill for each emergency facility, a brief evaluation of the facility's performance during the drill, and actions that will be taken to improve performance during future drills.
Drill Report, 2nd quarter Drill, June 16, 1993.
This drill was observed by the NRC Senior Resident inspector and is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-275/93-16.
The licensee drill report contained a list of areas identified for improvement.
June 1993 Medical Drill, conducted with the French Hospital Medical Center, in conjunction with the 2nd quarter Drill abov The reports appeared appropriate to drill and exercise activities and areas for improvement and correction were identified and documented for action.
b.
Onsite Followu of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events at-Power Reactor Facilities (NC-92700)
One licensee event was reviewed during the inspection wherein the licensee had declared an emergency unusual event since the last routine inspection.
On February 6,
1993, at 00:56 (ET), the licensee notified the NRC that at about 21:06 (PST)
on February 5,
1993, An electrical fire occurred in the Unit
12 KY Cable Spreading Room due to an electrical ground in 1 of 2 Circ Water Pump Hotors (blI).
Licensee reduced power to 46% to remove 011 Circ Water Pump from service.
The licensee called the California Department of Forestry to assist in fighting the fire.
The fire lasted less than 10 minutes and is presently out.
=Smoke has been cleared from the room.
There were no personnel injuries...,
During power reduction, the digital rod position indications did not follow the Control Rod Indicators as control rods were inserted into the core.
Licensee declared Control Bank "D" (9 control rods)
A review of this event and documentation pertaining thereto indicated that the event classification appeared appropriate; and that timely notifications were made to the county, state and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Appropriate notification was also made to NRC Headquarters in accordance with approved procedures.
Follow-u on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(NC-92701)
(Open)
Follow-up'tem (92-15-01).
Failure to Yerif Reactor Shutdown in the 1992 Annual Emer enc Exercise.
It was observed by an NRC inspector during the 1992 annual emergency exercise that Control Room operators did not properly verify that the reactor was shutdown after a reactor trip.
Despite the clearly indicated failure of the Power Range (PR),
Intermediate Range (IR), and Source Range Nuclear Instruments (SRNIs)
and of Digital Rod Position Indicator (DRPI), step 1 of E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," was verified completed satisfactorily by the crew.
Subsequent questioning revealed the operators responsible for this verification believed the NIs and DRPI were operable during the performance of step 1.
Step
involves verifying power is decreasing by using these NIs and all rods are bottomed by using DRPI.
DRPI was flashing indicating failure and all NIs were pegged low indicating failure.
Seventeen minutes after the trip, the SRNI was reported failed to the Senior control Operator (SCO);
and 19 minutes after the trip, the DRPI was reported failed to the SC In this instance the operators did not properly verify the reactor was shutdown.
The inspectors concluded that the operators effectively, implemented the emergency plan based on the li'mited observation that the simulator mode of operation provided.
However, the inspectors also concluded that the fai lure of the crew to properly verify the reactor.,
was shutdown was of major concern.
The licensee followed up on this item with an Action Request (Number A0273101).
The licensee has conducted additional training in emergency response and in January 1993 determined that training would emphasize in requalification training session 92-7 (April and Hay of 1993) the importance of verifying that the reactor tripped.
This item will be reviewed for closure during the 1993 annual emergency exercise.
(Open)
Follow-up Item (92-15-02).
Simulator or Ta e Procedures in 0 erator Pla in the 1992 Annual Emer enc Exercise.
A problem regarding the use of a taped scenario for control room actions was identified by the NRC inspection team during the 1992 annual emergency exercise as an apparent weakness in scenario implementation and development.
NRC inspection procedure 82301 (Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors)
indicates that inspectors will assess the performance of the control room staff as it conducts the task of
"analysis of plant conditions and corrective actions."
This could not be appropriately observed during the most critical times of the exercise (after the explosion leading to a General Emergency)
since reactor control activity was taped and fed to the staff rather than their responding to the event in their normal manner.
This could result in an inability for the licensee and the NRC to evaluate the exercise due to lack of observation opportunity.
This type scenario activity will be reviewed in future NRC inspections to insure that ability of the control room staff to respond to degrading plant conditions is appropriate to effectively implement the site emergency plan and to respond to plant conditions, to mitigate the event in progress, and coordinate with other emergency response facilities.
The licensee followed up on this item with Action Request Number A0273101.
The. licensee has conducted the two 1993 quarterly emergency response drills (see section 2.a(5)(b)
above)
in an active simulator mode.
They are further prepar'ing to employ this mode for a significant portion of the 1993 annual emergency exercise, when this item will be reviewed for closure.
(Closed)
Follow-up Item (93-02-01).
Drill Credit Trainin Enhancement 1992 Audit Findin An audit finding of the 1992 annual emergency plan audit (Audit 920151)
indicated that licensee
"AP B-50/EP AD-1 and NUREG-0654 FERA-REP-I Rev 1" were inconsistent and issued an action request to track this item (AR'0269711).
The audit team recommended
"that methods used for requalification be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure consistency with NUREG-0654,,INPO training guidelines, and existing PGEE training department procedures governing instructor qualification and the administration of oral examinations,"
The finding pertained to the method for granting of training credit for participation in drills and
0'
exercises.
The licensee has ceased allowing training credit for exercise participation and this item has been accepted as closed by Site guality Assurance.
(Closed)
Follow-up Item (92-02-02).
Emer enc Event Classification
~Dela
.
On September 20, 1992, at 6:03 (ET), the licensee telephonically reported to the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO Event Number 24272) that the dedicated tie line and commercial AT&T line to the California Office of Emergency Services (CA OES)
was lost due to an automobile accident which took out a 'telephone pole in Sacramento, CA.
The event time was indicated by the HOO as I:30 a.m.
(PDT).
An Unusual Event (UE) was declared at 2:OS a.m.
(PDT)
and terminated at 2:25 a.m.
(PDT) after 'temporary communication was established between the site and the OES.
The HOO recorded the'time of notification as 6:03 a.m.
(ET)
(3:03 a.m.
PDT).
The event was reviewed during the previous EP inspection by interviews with personnel involved and documentation pertaining to circumstances of the event.
From those interviews and document reviews, a chronological time table was developed to establish the sequence of events.
The event was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report Number 50-275/93-02, dated January 29, 1993.
The review,of this event and documentation pertaining thereto indicated that the event classification was appropriate based on the emergency plan requirement and that notifications were made to the county, state and the NRC in accordance with approved procedures once the event was recognized and classified.
This did not however explain why the event was not classified at the time the (precursors) criteria for the unusual event was known or communicated to the DCPP CR.
The licensee indicated telephonically to the inspector on January 26, 1993, that the event circumstances, and in particular, the event identification and classification issue, would be reviewed to insure that all pertinent issues had been properly addressed.
This inspection determined that additional review of this event was conducted by the licensee, additional data was collected, root cause was analyzed, and additional corrective actions were added to those previously identified.
These actions appear appropriate and this item is Hosed.
Exit Interview.
On July 23, 1993, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspector met with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph I above to summarize the scope and the preliminary results of this inspection".
It was indicated that the review of EPIP changes had not been completed on site and would be performed at Region Y during the following wee f 0