IR 05000275/1986012
| ML17083B739 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1986 |
| From: | Ang W, Burdoin J, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B738 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-86-12, 50-323-86-13, NUDOCS 8605120478 | |
| Download: ML17083B739 (18) | |
Text
~
~
~
~
Report Nos.
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-275/86-12$
50-323/86-13 50-275, 50-323 DPR-80, DPR-81 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, CA Inspection conducted:
April 7-11,'986 Inspectors:
J.
F. Burdoin, Reactor Inspector W. P. Ang, Reactor Inspector Date Signed g 23'44 Date Signed Approved By:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor Project Section
Da e S gned Summary:
Ins ection durin eriod of April 7-11, 1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-275/86-12 and 50-323 86-13)
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced inspection by two regional inspectors of inservice inspection program for Unit l,,IE Bulletin(s)/Notice(s), Part
report(s),
licensee event reports, and independent inspection of the plant.
Inspection procedure numbers 30703, 36100, 71707, 73755, 92700 and 92703 were used as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified.
In the area of follow-up of licensee event reports.
(
8605120478 860424 PDR ADOCH, 05000275 G
F I
\\
> ~ r>
FL ', )Fhir
)'I F
if>
'h F
~
" '
>
)
>'<<) 0
!1><<r" $ f) r'
~
I)
', >>r'
j
"
>
I i'>V)>) 1}I.>>
f J)*g'-'I F>>))
)
l>>>)')
g')
> )
)
ii'>>
t'ai=>'>
rV> 'h "r ~ >>>
~
~
<<'>>) ',
'>ll,
~.)K
> f h ',
>>
>
'f
>'
'") " J J
<<') ')
)'Ir 3 I'>g
~
y>r>'I L
$ f h
>(>
~,
><<,>%>)
f> I
> <<>IM
> i f F)
~
)
'
>
"
',,>
ll', ~
) )
~ il'
~ ~ f
'>h >figih gf <<>
>w
<)
f)>>>,)
Fg I'
I~
$
I f
f'
'I ~) 5 F'
~ >>> bfi
>)
'I
,i If)
DETAILS Individuals Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an (PGSE)
J. D. Shiffer, Vice President-R.
C. Thornberry, Plant Manager
-"R. Patterson, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Superintendent J.
A. Sexton, Operation Manager D. R. Bell, QC Supervisor D. A. Taggart, Acting Director, Quality Support QA
="L. F. Womack, Manager, Engineering Department J.
M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Service W. J. Kelly, Lice'nsing Representative
>T. L. Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor R. L. Watson, Supervisor, Quality Support O. K. Franks, ISI/NDE Supervisor J. E. Hill, Lead ISI/NDE Specialist
,Various other engineering and QC personnel.
"-Denotes attendees at exit management meeting on, April 11, 1986.
In addition, NRC Resident Inspectors attended the exit, management meeting.
Area Ins ection An independent inspection was conducted in Units 1 and 2 Turbine Building and Auxiliary Buildings.
The equipment:
spaces inspected for both units included:
C.
d.
g ~
h.
Five Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms.
Six 4160 Volt Switchgear Rooms.
Six Battery Rooms.
Six 480 Volt Vital Bus Rooms.
e.
Two Cable Spreading Rooms.
f.
Combination Two-Units Control Room Two Hot Shutdown Panel Areas.
Turbine Building, Elevations 85', M4'. and 140'Unit 2).
I A number of action request tags which were;ide'ntified in diesel generator (DG) rooms 1-2 and 1-3 during the February,10-14, 1986,'inspection were still found hanging on the local contxol panel in DG Room 1-3 and other places in DG Rooms 1-2 and l-l during this inspection.
Engine exhaust manifold covers were found in the walk-way beside the machine in DG Room 1-1.
Other miscellaneous findings were found in the Unit 1 DG rooms.
These issues are identified and will remain as an unresolved item to be reported in a future report (50-275/86-12'-03).
)~
4 4\\
4 V I IV
I
I'
I
I
f Vt tf 4
4 I"
VVV ~
I 4 t
C
~
~
3.
CFR Part 21 Re ort (0 en) 50-275/323/85-19-P Part
S eed Increaser Gear Drive Model SU-1023-8X and SU-16-10 Lube Oil Pum Cou lin Ke a /Ke The licensee initiated a program to determine if the concern was a
problem at the Diablo Plant.
The program required examination of the four centrifugal charging pump speed increaser gears to determine if lube oil pump coupling key could travel in the keyway and causing the speed increaser gear to fail.
Centrifugal pump 2-2 was inspected in March 1986 and it was,found that the.key(1")/keyway(lg") and pin diameter (.465/.5)/drive hole (.615") dimensions would preclude the lube oil pump from becoming disengaged from the low speed shaft.
The remaining three charging pumps will be examined during the next few weeks when operating conditions allow taking the pumps out of service for the inspection.
This item is closed.
4.
Follow-u on Previous Identified Ins ection Items a.
(Closed) 50-275/86-05-01 ISI Pro ram as a Controlled Document The licensee's administrative procedure NPAP E-4 requires the inservice inspection (ISI) program to be issued as a controlled document.
Revision 3 of the ISI program for Unit 1 was issued as a
controlled document in February 1986 following review and approval by the Plant Safety Review Committee.
The revised edition (revision 3) of the inservice inspection program for Unit 1 was forward to the NRR staff for their review and acceptance under Diablo Canyon Letter (DCL)86-101, dated April 14, 1986.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) 50-275/86-05-02 Preservice Records for Modifications Followin Com letion of Construction The concern identified a need for adequate transfer of information to the preservice records for those modifications made to the primary piping system and associated pipe supports subsequent to plant construction (1977/78)
up to March 1982 when the ASME Section XI program became effective (March 1982) for repairs and replacements at Diablo Canyon Unit 1.
The inspector reviewed this concern with the licensee's ISI/NDE group and project team for general construction.
The inspector reviewed the following documents which describe the program and effort made to assure transfer of information to the preservice records for modifications made during the subject period (1977/78 tillMarch 1982).
PG&E's specification 8711, erecting main systems piping; and furnishing, fabricating, and erecting balance of power plant piping for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 and portions of Unit II h
I'
I I
S II CS S
I.
\\
LS S
'
S S
4I '
I H
l
- "
lw S
<l
I I.
,~
l ~
) I I'
- I
)
S
$ 1 5 I
'I
2)
3)
Pullman power products ESD-223, installation and inspection of pipe supports.
Audit report 83217A, pipe support 81-9R modifications.
4)
Audit report 83467A, Pullman power products ASME Section KI repair/replacement program.
5)
NCR DC1-83-RM-N001, ASME Section KI repair program.
6)
NCR DC1-83-RM-N006, ASME Section KI repiar program.
7)
Office memo to XSI Group dated June 18, 1985.
8)
ISI/NDE office memo dated August 2/1985.
One of the licensee's actions to.assure accurate preservice baseline records, was to check all applicable ISI Class I and IX pipe welds against Pullman power products isometric QA packages (approximately 90)
for modification, work and to make sure the associated NDE reports had been forwarded to the XSI/NDE group for incorporation into their records.
Another of the licensee actions was to review the latest revisions to 1643 XSI Class I, XI and XXX pipe supports to make sure the post construction NDE reports were included in the p'reservice records.
The latest revision drawings of ninety four pipe hangers, which are inaccessible during operation, show minor modifications (such as an added stiffener) that do not show on the examination record drawings.
These changes have indeterminate affect on the PSX status due to the level of detail on the original examination data sheets.
These hangers are scheduled for examination during the first refueling outage and the records will be updated to depict actual conditions.
It is concluded from a review of the above documents that the program to assure accurate and up-to-date preservice inspection records appeared to be adequate and complete.
This item is closed.
5.
(Closed)
50-275/50-323 IE Bulletin 85-01-Steam Bindin of Auxiliar Peedwater, Eum s This bulletin informed licensees of a potentially serious safety problem involving the inoperability of auxili'ary feedwater (AFW) pumps as a
result of steam binding.
The bulletin action required the licensee to:
ll a.
"Develop a procedure for monitoring fluid 'conditions within the APW system on a regular basis during times when the system is required to be operable.
This item is not intended to require elaborate instrumentation.
A simple means of monitoring temperature, such as touching the pipe, is a satisfactory approach."
IJ t
H I
F t
nr
In response to INPO's Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER)
84-3, "Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Disabled by Backleakage,"
and IE Information Notice 84-06,
"Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,"
PGandE implemented a monitoring program in which the auxiliary feedwater piping is hand touched'ach shift to identify excessive heat.
This action is included on the Auxiliary Operator rounds sheet.
This program satisfies the acquirement.
b.
, "Develop procedures for recognizing steam binding and for restoring the AFW system to operable status, should steam binding occur."
Operating Procedure OP 0-18, "Recognition and Alleviation of Steam Binding in Auxiliary Feedwater'umps,"
for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 has been developed to address this concern; the procedure was approved on January 24, 1986.
This procedure had been included in the Operator Requalification Training Program.
c ~
"Maintain procedural controls in effect until completion of hardware modifications to substantially reduce the likelihood of steam binding or until superseded by action implemented as a result of resolution of Generic Issue 93."
A hardware modification to place temperature detectors downstream of the auxiliary feedwater pumps with annunciation in the control room is scheduled to be installed during the first. refueling outage for Unit 1 and is presently being installed on Unit 2.
Once these modifications are completed, operating procedure OP 0-18 will be replaced with a permanent upgrade to the Annunciator Response Manual.
This annunciator response will ensure that steam binding is recognized and that the AFW system is restored to operable status should steam binding occur.
The inspector reviewed operating procedure OP 0-18 and found that it addressed the concern for recognizing and alleviating steam binding in the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
The inspector also examined design change notices DC2-EE/J-26792 for'he installation of temperature sensors on the discharge piping of the auxiliary feedwater pumps for Unit 2.
Everything appears to be in order.
This IE Bulletin is closed.
6.
Onsite Followu of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities Pertainin to Missed Surveillances a
~
The licensee submitted eight licensee event reports (IERs) between January 7,
1986, and April 3, 1986, involving 22 Technical, Specification (TS) required surveillances that had not been performed within the TS allowed time limits.
An inspection was performed to verify licensee compliance with the IZR committed corrective action, TS reporting requirements and licensee review and evaluation requirements.
The following table lists the LERs and pertinent details regarding the missed surveillance ~
~
r r
t TI EE E'
EE r E
EE EE E
EE IE
5'ER DATE ITEM 2-86-009 4/3/86 Iodine 6 Particulate 2-86-006 3/27/86 Axial Flux Diff Monitor
'.DATE IDENTIFIEID
'3/4/86 2/26/86 0330
,2/26/86 0330 125/
,DATE SURV.
DUE f
3/3/86 1905 2/20/86 0315 2/26/86 0115 DATE SURV.
PERF.-
3/4/86 0850 2/26/86 0330 2/26/86 0330 1-85-039 3/27/86 Control Room Ventl Sys HTR 1-EH"27A 2/25/86 10/10/85 2/28/86 1-86-001 3/10/86 RC temperature 1/3/86 Inst Channel 411/412 10/25/84 9/23/85 431/432 441/442 Ctmt Press Inst Ch.
935 1-84-036 3/10/86 Unit 1 BIT Recizc Chk Vlv 8912 Unit 2 BIT Recirc Chk Vlv 8912 1/3/86 10/31/84 4/22/85 1/3/86 11/5/84 9/17/85 2/8/86 12/26/85 2/11/86 1/6/86 3/3/84 10/30/85 1/6/86 7/25/85 10/30/85 1-86-002 3/3/86 Unit 1 Operator 2/4/86 Heat Balance Unit 2 Operator 2/18/86 Heat Balance 2/1/86 2/2/86 11/24/85 11/25/85 2-85-023 1/24/86 Chg 6 SI Pump Suet from RHR Vlvs 8804AGB Ctmt Recirc Sump to RHR Isol Vlvs 8982ARB 10/2/85 7/25/85 10/3/85 10/2/85 7/25/85 10/3/85
I ll I"
I
II
RHR Hx Outlet to Ctmt Spray Xsol Vlvs 9003ASB Suet Vlvs 8700ASB 10/2/85 7/25/85 10/3/85 12/9/85 10/30/85 12/4/85 SX Pump Recirc 10/2/85 7/25/85 10/3/85 to TD RUST ISOL Vlvs 8974AM 1-85-037 1-7-86 Ctmt Spray Pump 1-2
, Ctmt Spray Pump 2-2 12/9/85 11/1/85 12/5/85 b.
Administrative Procedure AP C-3S1 revision 6, Surveillance Testing and Inspection, was reviewed and discussed with the licensee.
The inspector noted the following items regarding the procedure:
(1)
The existing revision of the procedure did not accurately reflect the current surveillance test program being implemented.
A new revision had been prepared but had not yet been issued.
(2)
The functional responsibilities for control and scheduling of surveillance tests is assigned, by the current procedure to a senior power production engineer (Nuclear)
and a senior power production engineer (scheduling) respectively, these functions are actually being performed by a surveillance test supervisor.
(3)
The procedure requires the periodic issuance of a surveillance test schedule but, does not specify the frequency for issuance.
The schedules are currently issued on a demand basis; i.e.,
as requested by the individual departments.
(4)
The procedure requires that the test coordinator and the senior power production engineer be notified iX circumstances prohibit conducting surveillance tests within the prescribed time intervals.
The procedure does not mention notification of senior site management of potential TS violations.
(5)
The procedure specifies that QC review of surveillance tests will be on an as needed basis as determined by the QC supervisor.
The procedure does not provide for independent QC monitoring of surveillance test performance, monitoring of surveillance test schedules (File 08 and File 58) and monitoring of overdue surveillance test. schedules.
(6)
The procedure does not define when a surveillance test is considered to be complete; i.e.,
when performed, when verified when equipment is 'returned to service and considered operable, when surveillance test results are reviewed, approved and
p I
H A Ip fg
considered to be acceptable.
Discussion with plant personnel indicate some confusion and inconsistency exists between departments regarding this definition.
t (7)
The procedure requires all TS required surveillances to be scheduled and coordinated by means of a master surveillance schedule and working schedule (File 08 and File 58).
The master surveillance schedule and,. working schedule, however, does not include all TS required suryeillances such as chemistry and radiation surveillances.
The above noted inspector concerns regarding administrative procedure C-3S1 was identified as inspector follow-up item 50-275/86-12-02 and 50-323/86-13-02,
"Surveillance Test.
Administrative Procedure Inspector Concerns".
The inspector reviewed records for the surveillances performed by the licensee to compensate for the missed surveillances reported on LERs 2-86-009, 2-86-006, 1-86-001-01 and 1-86-002.
In addition, the inspector selected the following random sample of surveillances to verify TS compliance with the frequency and time requirements:
Unit
2 1&2 1&2 1&2 STP X79A CH 75 I79B CH 76 I1A&IlBDay Shift 4-9-86 I1A&X1B Swing Shift 4-9-86 IlA&IlB.Grave Shift 4-10-86 Unit 2 STP-I-79A CH75 and STP-l-79B were performed within the TS 25'/
allowed time frame but the surveillance test results were not reviewed and accepted within the TS allowed time frame.
The review, however, did not appear to have changed the test results.
The apparent lack of definition of when a surveillance. is complete was noted as a procedural concern in the preceding paragraph of this report.
The repetitive missed surveillances reported by the LERs listed on paragraph 6.a. of this report and the inspector concerns regarding Administrative Procedure C-3Sl noted in paragraph 6.b of this report were discussed with Senior Licensee Management.
The licensee noted and the inspector verified and acknowledged that an action plan to improve performance in the surveillance area had be'en requested by and submitted to the PG&E Vice President for Nuclear Power Generation in December of 1985.
The plan, included provisions for additional manpower resources, organizational changes to integrate the control responsibilities for surveillance test within a surveillance test department, and the appointment of a surveillance test supervisor.
The plan also provides for improvements to the surveillance test administrative procedure to reflect the organizational 'changes and to improve the surveillance test scheduling mechanism.
The plan further provides for engineering department monitoring and proactive involvement in surveillance related problems.
As yet, the plan has not been fully implemente 'i A
)
g II
F 4'
e
~
ls
~,
~
~
The repetitiveness of the missed TS surveillance violations identified by the IERs noted in paragraph 6.a of this report and the apparent failure of the corrective actions specified to preclude recurrence appear to be a violation (50-275/86-12-01 and 50-323/86"13"01).
'The inspectors conducted an exit meeting on April 11, 1986, with the Plant Manager, Plant Superintendent, and other members of the plant staff.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the report.
The licensee had no dissenting comment regarding violation 50-275/86-12-01 and 50-323/86-13-01 but. noted that corrective action was already in progress.
The licensee acknowledged that no proprietary information was reviewed during this inspectio, ~ I A
r C
~ I I
W
~ $
Jt
L'l
't