IR 05000275/1986010
| ML17083B771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1986 |
| From: | Brown G, Fish R, Prendergast K, Temple G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B770 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-86-10, 50-323-86-11, NUDOCS 8607280197 | |
| Download: ML17083B771 (14) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275'/86"-10 and 50-323/86-11 Docket Nos.
50-275 and 50-323
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License Nos.
Iicensee:
Date Signed Pacific,Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale S'treet, Room 145l.
~ San Franc'isco,,California 94106 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
lt Inspection at: Diablo, Canyon, Nuclear Power Plant, San Luis Obispo County,
'alifornia Inspection conduct'ed:
tune 9-12,.1986 Inspectors:
K. M. Prendergast Emergency Preparedness Analyst
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h Temp Emer ncy Preparedness Analyst G. Brown Emergency Preparedness Analyst Date Signed 7>> fb Date Signed Team Member:
Dick Van Niel, USNRC Section Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch Approved by:
R. F.
F sh, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section te Signed
~Summa s:
Ins ection on June 9-12 1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-275/86-10 and 50-323 86-11 Announced inspection of the emergency preparedness exercise and associated.critique.
Inspection procedure 82301 was covered.
Results:
No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified.
Sb07280197 Bb07i i PDR ADDCK 05000275
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DETAILS Persons Contacted:
i J. Carroll, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support W. Raymond, Assistant Vice President R. Thornberry, Plant Manager J. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager W. Keywozth, Senior Power Production Engineer S. Joiner, Emergency Planner J. Gilfor, Emergency Planning Instructor T. Martin, Training Manager J. Raab, Shift Supervisor M. Smith, Nuclear Generation Engineer T. Polidoroff, Nuclear Generation Engineer B. Giffin, Supervising Engineer R. Powers, Senior Chem/Rad Engineer Contractors R. Wester, Impell Corporation Zmer enc Exercise Plannin The licensee's corporate, staff has the overall responsibility for developing and evaluating the emergency preparedness exercise.
The corporate staff is also responsible for conducting the exercise and preparing a report of the findings promulgated by the critique process.
In an effort to maintain strict security over the scenario, individuals who had been designate;dt by the licensee to assist in the preparation of the scenario were not "active playe'rs in the exercise.
The emergency prep'aredne'ss,exercise-objectives were established by Pacific Gas and Electric Co'mpany.
The scenario document, included:
the objectives and. guidelines,,'the scenario,,'a list of participants, the informational" messages", delivered during the exercise, the initial and subsequent plant, parameters,'eteorological parameters, radiological data, and'controller/evaluator'instructions and evaluation sheets.
The scenario, document was controlled by PGSE and distribution was limited to persons having a specific, need including onsite and offsite controller/observers, and the NRC who were evaluating the exercise.
This emergency preparedness exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.3 of Appendix E to 10'FR 50.
Controller/Evaluators were stationed at each of the licensee's emergency response facilities (ERFs), e.g.
Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSG),
and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started with the declaration of an alert and ultimately escalated to a general emergency.
The initiating event, of the scenario was the loss of all annunciators due to a failed DC annunciator
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Other events experienced during the scenario included:
loss of both residual heat removal system trains, loss of the component cooling system, loss of the auxiliary saltwater system, a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) into containment and subsequent leakage of the containment purge valves with a release to the atmosphere.
4.
Federal Observers Six NRC inspectors, which included two of the NRC resident inspectors, evaluated the licensee's response to the scenario.
The NRC observed activities in the CR, the OSC, the TSC, and the EOF.
In addition the activities of one of the licensee's onsite field teams and limited response by San Luis Obispo county were also observed.
5.
Control Room The following aspects.of CR operations were observed during the exercise; detection and classification of emergency events, proper use of procedures, mitigation of the accident, notification, and the promulgation of protective action reccomendations.
The following are NRC observations of Control Room activities.
a.
The Interim Emergency Coordinator properly recognized the emergency conditions and promptly declared the alert classification.
b.
CR personnel responded to the scenario events in a timely and appropriate manner.
During the period of simulated loss of annunciators, the operators implemented the proper EOP and maintained vigilance for plant conditions.
Co The Shift Foreman, acting as the Interim Emergency Coordinator, coordinated'the CR staff responses and all actions were in accordance with standard operating procedures.
Notifications to offsite agencies were performed in a timely manner.
Recordkeeping and documentation were well maintained.
Relief personnel were properly and adequately briefed by the Control Room Staff prior to assuming their emergency response positions.
No violations were identified in the review of this program area.
6.
Technical Su ort'enter (TSC)
The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:
activation, accident assessment/classification, dose assessment, notification and support of the CR in their efforts to mitigate the consequences of the accident.
The following are NRC observations of the TSC activities.
a ~
b.
The TSC staff was enthusiastic and professional in the conduct of the exercise.
Emergency response personnel were properly briefed prior to assuming their emergency response, positions.
There was an excellent flow of information and coordination among the several disciplines within the TS )
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TSC operations were effective in the support of the CR.
d.
There appeared to be a delay in setting up the TSC ventilation to the emergency mode.
The scenario described a reactor trip, safety injection and indication of a LOCA at 8:30 p.m., however it was not until approximately 20 minutes later (8:50 p.m.) when the ventilation system was manually (simulated)
changed to the emergency mode.
The repairs on the containment vent valve may have been expedited by prioritizing the team departure briefings and performing some briefings while the individuals were suiting up and checking equipment.
No violations were identified during the review of this program area.
7.
0 erations Su ort Center/Field Team The following aspects of OSC operations were observed:
Actuation, functional capabilities, and coordination with the CR and TSC.
In addition, the activities on one of the onsite field monitoring teams were also observed.
The following are observations of. these activities.
Management of the OSC was excellent.
The Emergency Maintenance Coordinator (EMC) asked many pertinent questions and provided much support to the TSC in the way of problem solving/trouble shooting.
b.
Communications between the onsite field team and the TSC were very effective.
Direction from the TSC was also excellent.
The field team performed very well.
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e.
The EMC in the OSC was delayed in contacting the TSC because he did not have the telephone number.
He obtained the number from the OSC Supervisor located at Access Control. It appeared that the section of the EMC's emergency book, which should have contained the phone numbers, was missing.
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It was very difficult to hear PAan'nouncements in the OSC Command Center (offices).
The EMC had no dosimetry and none w'as provided during the exercise.
The complete and total activation of'the OSC was somewhat delayed because the 1&C,technicians
.had not reported to the OSC.
At 2018,
hour and 48 minutes after the, alert was declared, the I&C Supervisor informed the EMC that the I&C Technicians-had been onsite for some time, however, apparently they did 'not report to the proper location.
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8.
Emer enc 0 erations Facilit The follows.ng aspects of EOF operations were observed:
activation by the interim staff; turnover to the senior corporate staff; communications among the various EOF staff members, the TSC and the County; preparation of press releases; and the development of protective action recommendations.
The following are NRC observations of the EOF activities.
a.
The facility layout was very good and the overall operation was effective.
b.
There was an excellent flow of information among the several disciplines within the EOF.
The interface between the EOF and the County response organization was especially effective.
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e.
The EOF was activated by the interim staff in 54 minutes with the personnel responding from their homes.
The EOF was operational with the senior corporate staff present in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 17 minutes following declaration of the alert.
The staff was enthusiastic and professional in the conduct of the exercise, The interim staff was particularly competent.
The status boards were well maintained and there was effective use of data sheets to show plant status.
f.
Press releases were prepared, coordinated with the Recovery Manager and issued in a timely manner.
No violations were identified during the review of this program area.
9.
~Criti ues A formal licensee critique was held in the plant Training Building on June 12, 1986, two days following the exercise.
The purpose of this critique was to summarize the findings of the exercise and to discuss weaknesses or deficiencies identified by the licensee.
The following is representative of the licensee's findings that were discussed during this meeting.
a.
The extensive use of alternates demonstrated the depth of capabilities availabl'e.
b.
The use of status boards to keep track of equipment that is out of service was recommended.
c.
Because of inventory changes, TSC personnel could not locate survey
'nstruments initially, however, additional instrumentation was promptly acquired.
d.
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Recovery procedures appeared somewhat redundant and should be improved.
f.
Problems were observed with the radios installed in the mobile laboratory.
The radios were not operable.
However, the mobile telephones functioned adequately for communication.
g.
The Control Room'ailed to'make,initial assessment for the inoperability of'he,containment fan cooler.
I 10.
Exit.'nterview I
I The exit interview was held 'on June 12, 1986.
The attachment to this report identifies some of'the licensee personnel present at this meeting.
The NRC was represented by the four evaluator team members and Mark Padovan, NRC residentinspector.
- 3uring this meeting the licensee was informed of the prelimi6ary findings of this inspection.
There were no violations of NRC requirements or significant deficiencies identified.
Based upon the scenario, the licensee demonstrated the capability to mitigate the consequences of the accident, return the plant to a safe condition, and to protect the health and safety of the public.
Other items specifically discussed during this meeting are contained within the body of this report, 'Sections five (5) through eight (8).
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ATTACHMENT Exit Interview Attendees Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
J. Carroll, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support W. Keyworth, Senior Power Production Engineer R. Thornberry, Plant Manager J. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager T. Pellisero, Power Production Engineer M. Smith, Nuclear Generation Engineer M. Angus, Senior Power Production Engineer B. Kelly, Power Production Engineer B. O'ara, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer T. Mack, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer W. Fujimoto, Supervising Engineer R. Kohout, Safety Supervisor R. Zorenz, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer R. Powers, Senior Chem/Rad Engineer D. Oatley, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer W. Vidalin, Senior Technical Advisor J.
Schmitz, Emergency Plan Coordinator M. Aiken, Shift Foreman L. Collins, Shift Foreman
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W. Davis, Operator M. Mattice, Telecomn Superintendent S. Joiner, Support Services C.
Cox, Emergency Planner J. Gilfor, EP Instructor K. Doss, Senior Nuclear Generation Engineer/OSRG R. Jett, Simulator Supervisor J.
Molden, Operations Training Supervisor R. Todaro, Security Supervisor
J. Sexton, Plant Superintendent D. Miklush;.Maintenance Manager Contractors R. Wester, Technica1 Mana'ger, Impel'.',Corporation I'
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