IR 05000275/1986007
| ML17083B730 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1986 |
| From: | Fish R, Prendergast K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083B729 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-86-07, 50-275-86-7, 50-323-86-09, 50-323-86-9, NUDOCS 8604250222 | |
| Download: ML17083B730 (12) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-275/86-07 and 50-323/86-09 License Nos.
DPR-80 and
Licensee:
Pacific, Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street
,. San Francisco, California 94106
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Facility Name: 'iablo Canyon Units 1 and
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Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon'Site, San Luis Obispo County, CA Inspection. Conducted:
March 3-7, 1986 I
Xnspectors:
K. M. Prendergast Emergency Preparedness Analyst Da e Signed Approved by:
R. Fish, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Da e Signed Ins ection on March 3-7 1986 (Re ort Nos. 50-275/86-07 and 50-323/86-09)
Areas Xns ected:
Unannounced routine inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness program including:
knowledge and performance of duties, protective action decision making, shift staffing and augmentation, emergency detection and classification, changes to the emergency preparedness program, notification and communication, and followup on open, items'dentified during previous NRC inspections.
Inspection procedures 82201, 82202, 82203, 82204, 82205, 82206, and 92701 were addressed.
Results:
No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC remi'rements were identified.
8604280222 860410 PDR ADOCK 05000275
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DETAILS Persons Contacted
- T. Martin, Acting Assistant Plant Manager W. Keyworth, Senior Power Production Engineer
- C. Cox, Emergency Planner
- J. Molden, Operations Training Supervisor S. Hyatt, Senior Control Operator M. Abramovitz, Senior Technical Assistant M. Lemke,, Shift Foreman T. Grebel, Senior Engineer J. Bard, Shift Foreman
- Persons present at exit interview (Closed)
85-24-01, Intercom for the TSC.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGGE) Letter No. 85004481 which was written to address this item was reviewed.
The review indicates there already appear to be numereous acceptable methods to transfer information within the Technical Support Center (TSC), i.e. telephone, public address, and runner.
In addition, exercise reports for 1984 and 1985 (NRC Reports 50-275/84-29 and 50-275/85-31)
do not document any TSC communication problems.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
85-24-03, Provide the TSC Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
system with a control function.
PG&E Letter 85004481 addresses this issue.
A,review of the letter indicates there are numerous methods available to obtain desired plant parameters in the TSC (ERFDS 14 Channel Recorder, Control Room (CR) video recorders, HP 2621 terminal, ears, telephone, etc.) which may be used to supplement information not immediately displayed on the SPDS.
There does not appear to be a problem in obtaining desired information in the TSC.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
85-24-04, Verify the reliability (availability) to deliver meteorological data to the Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) from the onsite Meterological Monitoring Systems.
The licensee has performed a
review of Instrumentation and Control (I6C) records for the primary Meteorological System.
This review indicated an availability of 97.1X in the Control Room.
In addition meteorological information is provided to the CR and TSC via the Emergency Assessment and Response Systems (EARS)
and HP-2621 Terminals.
The calculated availability for EARS was determined to be 99.3X.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) IN-85-44, Monthly testing of ENS and HPN.
A review of the Regulatory Compliance files concerning this information notice, indicated the, licensee had received Information Notice 85-44, distributed this notice for review, and confirmed action and an adequate review during a Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) meeting held 'on November 7, 198 I
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In addition records of monthly communications checks were reviewed and observed to incorporate guidance contained in 85-44.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed)
IN-85-62, Backup telephone numbers for the NRC Operations Center.
A review of the licensee's file for this notice was performed.
The review indicated the notice had been received and distributed for review.
The licensee's action on this item was to place backup telephone numbers for the NRC Operations Center on labels and attach the labels to the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phones in the CR'nd TSC.
This item is considered closed.
Shift,Staffin and Au entation The Emergency Plan (EP), Final Safety Analysis Report, and a selection of duty rosters were reviewed to verify that shift staffing numbers and functional capabilities were consistent with, the goals of Table B-1 of NUREG-0654.
The review showed that the licensee consistently exceeded the goals listed in NUREG 0654 for staffing and capabilities.
In addition, augmentation drills were reviewed.
The last augmentation drill was held on November 25, 1985.
The review indicated that 28 key managerial positions were evaluated on site and 11 interim managerial positions were evaluated at the EOF.
Records of the drill indicate that the EOF and the site met the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> staffing capability contained in NUREG-0654.
The November 25, 1985 augmentation drill was held at a time when key managerial attention was focused on Unit 2 startup.
Because of this fact, 17 managerial positions were already on site at the start of this drill.
Discussions with the licensee indicate the licensee is planning further communications and augmentation drills for late night, holidays, and weekend periods to further assure themselves that adequate staffing and functional capabilities are available to augment the emergency organization in a timely manner.
There were no violations of NRC requirements observed in this area.
Emer enc Classification and Protective Action Decisionmakin A review of the EP and implementing procedures was performed.
The review indicated the EP and implementing procedures contained the criteria for measurable and observable emergency actions levels (EALS).
The EALS were based upon inplant conditions and onsite and offsite radiological results.
The review also determined that the EALS had been reviewed and concurred with by state and local agencies.
The licensee's EP and implementing procedures clearly provide for an individual onsite at all times to fillthe position of Emergency Coordinator (EC).
The EC is the responsible individual who has the authority and responsibility to classify the accident and to make protective action recommendations to the offsite authorities.
Initially the Shift Foreman (SF) is identified as the "Interim Site Emergency Coordinator."
This individual is assisted by a Sh'ift Technical Advisor (STA) and aReactor Operator (RO).
The licensee is currently planning to add another level of management to the shift crew.
A new position of Shift Supervisor is planned and would fulfillthe duties of the EC.
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Shift Supervisor will be assisted by a Shift Foreman, an STA and a
Reactor Operator.
This new position is to remove some of the administrative burden from the SF and allow the SF to focus more of his attention on restoring the plant to a safe condition.
Notification procedures were reviewed and observed to include criteria, based upon emergency action levels, for initiating offsite notification within 15 minutes of the declaration of an emergency event.
The procedures also specified protective action recommendations for the evacuation of non-essential personnel at the site area emergency classification, if the conditions for an imminent release are present.
Procedures also require the evacuation of the site and the low population zone upon the declaration of a general emergency.
Interviews were held with two Shift Foreman, one STA, and one Senior Control Operator.
In general the Shift Foreman had a clear understanding of responsibilities given to them and were aware of which responsibilities were theirs alone and those that were delegable.
The SF were also aware of the proper offsite agencies to contact and the time frame in which to make that contact (15 minutes).
The interviews determined that the individuals interviewed had received training in emergency preparedness during simulator training and through the routine training required by their job description.
During the interviews, a number of accident scenarios were described in order to determine if the proper classification and protective action recommendation, specified in the EP and implementing procedures, would be made by the SF's.
The Shift Foremen were able to properly classify the conditions described in the scenarios, and to make appropriate protective action recommendations.
One Shift, Foreman was able to estimate containment activity following a loss of coolant accident.
It was noted that the procedure utilized to figure containment activity used the counts per minute readings from both high range containment dome
'onitors, and averaged these readings to derive a number for the containment activity.
Because both monitors may not have the same field of view i.e. obstructions or differing locations, the inspector suggested the licensee review this area to assure themselves that this procedure will offer a valid method for',the determination of containment activity.
Based upon the interviews held, the Shift Foremen appear to be able to properly use the'P and implementing procedures to classify the accident scenarios within 15 minutes, and to take appropriate action.
f No significant'eficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified.
5.
Notification and Communicat'ions The license uses the Rapid Alert Notification System (RANS) for the notification of the onsite emergency organization.
The RANS will perform the onsite emergency organization call out when activated and deliver a
pre-selected message.
The person called responds with an acknowledgement code, and the system acknowledges this action and continues to call the remaining individuals.
The RANS has the capacity to automatically
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contact up to 512 individuals and to,record whether the call is either acknowledged or not. If the call is not acknowledged, the system will continue to call the remaining individuals in the group requested until the programmed number of attempts have been reached.
Records of a RANS dr'ill held on November 25, 1985 were examined and the system appeared to function properly.
However the licensee is still experiencing some difficulties with its operation and is still working to improve'he system and related operating procedures.
In addition to the RANS, 'the licensee uses:
pa'gers, radio telephones, and the routine phone list as a means 'to insure adequate capabilities exist for notifying emergency organization personnel.
The licensee's offsite prompt notification system consists of approximately 150 sirens and the use of the Emergency 'Broadcast System.
The system was evaluated by FEMA on August, ll, 1984.
Based upon the FEMA evaluation, the system meets the specific design requirements of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and FEMA-43.
According to FEMA there are adequate
'eans for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway zone around Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
The EP implementing procedure for notifying the offsite emergency organization (EP G-3) was reviewed and noted to contain appropriate state, local, and federal agencies.
The procedure clearly defines
minutes as the time in which to make the notification. The notification procedure was also observed to be consistent with the classification procedure and procedure EP-G-l.
A recent change to the procedure allows updates to be made to the offsite organization every 30 minutes.
This change was accomplished to allow the offsite"agencies time to assimilate the information they had been provided.
The initial message forms contain appropriate information when compared to the guidance contained in NUREG-0654.
Provisions for message verification were also noted on the forms.
At the present time the licensee is currently revising their notification form with the goal of devising one form that could be used for all notifications.
There were no violations of NRC requirements identified in this area.
Chan es to the Emer enc Pre aredness Pro ram The inspector reviewed a random sampling of changes to the EP and implementing procedures.
All changes were noted to have been reviewed by the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC)
and signed by the Plant Manager.
Changes examined were sent to document control for distributon and to the NRC witfxin the required 30 day time period.
Of the changes examined none appeared to decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or implementing procedures.
In addition, a random sampling of PSRC minutes were reviewed.
The minutes document discussions concerning changes to emergency procedures and the EP.
There have been no significant personnel changes in the emergency response organization that would appear to impact the organization.
FEMA Region IX was contacted to ascertain if there were any significant changes of personnel, in the state or local organization.
The FEMA
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representative stated that there were none having an impact on the emergency organization.
There were no violations of NRC requirements identified in this area.
Other Ins ection Pindin s
During this portion of the inspection IE Bulletin No. 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel from High Noise Areas, was reviewed because of problems encountered at other facilities.
The review disclosed that the licensee had received the bulletin; however, there was no documentation available addressing the issues contained within 79-18.
Diablo Canyon was still under a construction permit during the time p'eriod that'E Bulletin 79-18 was issued and the bulletin was issued for information only'. There did not appear to be any documentation available to address the licensee's evaluation, and action if necessary, of this matter. It was suggested that the licensee review their startup testing results and other documentation to insure that adequate methods of notification 'exist for individuals in high noise areas.
This item was discussed 'during the exit interview and is considered an open item (86-06-01).
Exit Interview An exit interview was held with the licensee on March 7, 1986.
Personnel present have been previously identified in Section I of this report.
The licensee was informed of the preliminary results of this inspection.
There were no violations or deficiencies identified within the scope of this inspection.
During the exit interview, a suggestion was made that the licensee evaluate IE Bulletin 79-18 to insure adequate precautions have been taken regarding the evacuation of individuals in high noise areas.
Other areas discussed during the exit interview are contained in Sections 2 through 6 of this repor V
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