IR 05000275/1978012
| ML16340A371 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1978 |
| From: | Haynes R, Kirsch D, Vorderbrueggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340A368 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-78-12, 50-323-78-12, NUDOCS 7902260615 | |
| Download: ML16340A371 (28) | |
Text
50-275/78-12 Report'o.
50-323/78-12
REGION V
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONt'1ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-275 Docket No.
50-323 CPPR-39 License No.
CPPR-69 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name; Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site and General Office go-4- /d Date Signed ro- -7f Date Signed Inspection Conducted:
Ruuust 24 through September 22, 1978 Inspectors:
D. F. Kirsch, Reactor Inspector L.
.
rd rbrueggen, Reactor Inspector
~
~
~
~
.
E in, Reactor Inspector
>8 R. C. Haynes~-R ef, Prodect Section, Reactor
>ate SIRned Construction and Engineering Su ort Branch Approved By:
os.
50-
-
an
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8-Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of icensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee action on reported 50.55(e)
items. (Steam Generator Pipe to Nozzle Meld deficiencies and discrepant welds on pipe supports);
component and pipe support installation work and records; structural steel bolting and welding work and records; electrical redundant circuit'separations; equipment support modifications; environmental-qualification of safety related electrical equipment; and gA audits.
The inspection involved 78 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
pp
'urrmary:
Ins ection durin eriod of Au ust 24 throu h Se tember 22, 1978 Re ort.
7 fo R gG CbG(5 IE:Y Form 219 (2)
Summary (Con't.)
Results:
Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or
~evsatsons were identified in seven areas; one apparent item of non-compliance was identified in the area of redundant electrical circuit separation (Infraction - Paragraph 7.a).
DETAILS l.
Individuals Contacted a.
Pacific Gas and Electric Com an P68E b.
J.
R.
R.
T.
R.
- T
- M
- J
- D
- J C.
R.
C.
S.
D.
D.
Gu B. Hoch, Project Engineer D. Etzler, Project Superintendent A. Young, Electrical Engineer N. Crawford, Electrical Engineer E. Bacher, Senior Mechanical Engineer E. DeUriante, Senior gA Engineer E. Leppke, gA Supervisor N. Cochran, Resident Civil Engineer A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical Engineer Arnold, Coordinating gC Engineer M. Seward, gA Engineer N. Norem, Startup Engineer Bell, Civil gC Engineer Braff, Resident Mechanical Engineer, Acting Foat, Electrical gC Engineer Adamson, NDE Supervisor Wright, Electrical gC Engineer F. Atkinson Com an GFA c ~
M. M. Walsh, gA Manager A. Kridle, Structural Steel Inspector M. Anderson, Lead Inspector C. Agueda, Structural Steel Inspector C.
W. Gunderson, Office Engineer Endurance Metal Products Com an EMPCO D.
J.
J. Gragg, gC Manager Rudder, Weld Rod Issue Clerk d.
Pullman Power Products Pullman e.
J.
D.
W.
Y.
H.
P. Runyon, gA Manager Geske, Assistant gA Manager Tilley, gC Inspector Casey, NDE (II) Examiner P. Foie Com an Foie Y. Tenneyson, gA Manager
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a.'Closed)
Sand, A
re ate and Cement Test Re orts 50-275 and 50-323 The results of'and, aggregate and cement testing (required by Specification 5422) were examined and appeared satisfactory.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed)
Fra'ed'Varqlass Slekvin in Diesel Generator Control
'anels'0-an 5 -323 c ~
The licensee initiated Nuclear Plant Problem Report No. gC-P0025 identifying that varglass sleeving was frayed and Scotch 7700 tape did not extend into the conduit for Diesel Generator Con-trol Boards l-l, 2 and 3.
The Engineering Department provided a resolution for the condition and the work was scheduled to be completed prior to fuel load.
(Closed)
GFA S stem for Identification of Work Remainin and
'eview of's ection ocumentatson
-
an
-
8- 0 d.
GFA had placed into each folder of area Field Erection Inspection sheets an inventory sheet identifying each work item in the folder requiring inspection, including a means for tracking completion.
GFA generated and the licensee approved a procedure for "Preparation and Review of guality Assurance Records" (No. (CP-15) which appeared to adequately address these activities.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Weldin of Reinforcin Steel with a Hi her Carbon E uivalent t an use for We in Proce ure ua if>cation 50-2 5 an 50-3 3 78- 0 The licensee had initiated and resolved NCR RC-008 identifying that rebar of carbon equivalent higher than those used to quali-fy welding procedures WS-RS-l, 2, 6 and 7 had been welded in the Turbine Building shear wall structure.
The carbon equiva-lent was within the AWS D12.1 preheat range.
The licensee accepted the nonconformance based on satisfactory test results obtained for welded rebar having a carbon equivalent greater than 64.0 (Closed)
S ecification of Concrete Slum Tolerance (50-275 and 50-323/ 8-10 The licensee modified Specification No. 5422 to specify a 5 +
1 inch slump requirement for walls and slabs less than or equal to 11" thickness.
(Closed)
Concrete Batch Plant 0 erator Certifications (50-275 an 50-323/ 8- 0 GFA had written NCR 074-Rl identifying that the operator had not been formally certified, as required by GFA procedure.
GFA resolved the NCR by providing the formal certification.
The inspector reviewed the certification bases and had no further questions.
(Closed)
Noncom liance:
Failure to Install Pi e
Su orts in Conformance'w>t S ecs scat>on Re usrements'he remaining 19 spray ring header supports in Unit 2 Containment had been reinspected by the licensee's contractor.
The inspector reviewed the documented reinspection results and noted that three Nelson studs used to anchor the support baseplates to the contain-ment liner surface were found missing.
This condition was docu-mented on a Pullman Deviation Report and turned over to the licensee for resolution.
The licensee is developing a Nelson stud replace-ment program for'oth Units
and 2 which will be reviewed during subsequent inspections (see Paragraph 8).
(Open)
Bolt Tension Settinqs on Pi e
Ru ture Restraints 50-323/
-
, 0 an The licensee developed a "final walkdown inspection" program for rupture restraints which has just commenced on Unit l.
The program is intended to be the final acceptance inspection for each restraint.
Pullman Engineering examines the documenta-tion "package" for each restraint and fills out a special review form listing all applicable design drawings and sketches in-cluding design changes and discrepancies.
From this information, an inspection package is prepared for each restraint and turned over to Pullman's gA group.
The gA inspector documents the inspection findings on a newly developed gA Final Walkdown Documentation form.
This form serves as the inspector's checklist for verifying restraint configuration, weld con-formity, bolt type and torque, pipe clearance dimensions,
4-etc.
The inspection findings are reviewed by the Pullman gA t1anager who, with licensee consultation and approval, resolves any questionable issues and initiates any required rewor k or repair action.
Regarding bolt torquing, a retorquing program had been completed on Unit 1 restraints:
for Unit 2, bolts will be retorqued if the final walkdown inspection is unable to verify the presence of undisturbed
"torque seal" on the bolt/nut interfaces.
This program will be examined during subsequent inspections.
3.
Licensee Action on 50.55 e) Items a ~
Steam Generator Pi e to Nozzle Meld Deficiencies Reference:
'IE'Ins ection Re ort No.
5 -2
8-02 The licensee, on March 22, 1978, issued the final report on investigations concerning steam generator feedwater and main-steam nozzle to pipe weldments.
The inspector examined the General Computation Sheet for Field Meld 212 on the Steam Generator 1-2 Feedwater Nozzle to Pipe Meldment Stress Check.
The licensee had evaluated the weldment based on actual aver-age wall thickness and the actual material test report for the heat of material installed.
The basis for the evaluation was USAS 831.1.0 (Power Piping Code).
The analyses showed that the actual induced stresses due to pressure, temperature and seismic conditions were less than the maximum allowable stress.
The inspector examined weld No. 276, which had been completed immediately prior to this inspection.
The weld crown had been ground to the contour required for inservice inspection and appeared to be of high quality workmanship.
The Pullman docu-mentation package for the weld was also examined.
Included were the field process sheets, filler metal issue slips, root and final radiographs, and temperature recorder chart.
The inspector verified that all steps in the procedure had been met; the proper materials were used; the preheat interpass and stress relief temperature requirements were satisfied; and the radio-graphs displayed no rejectable indications.
No inconsistencies were noted in the records.
At the time of the inspection, initial preparations were in progress for welding the feedwater inlet piping to Steam Generator 2-4.
Mhen that work is finished, the main feed-
water piping to all steam generators will have been com-pleted.
The inspector had no further questions and,this 50.55(e)
item is considered to be closed.
b.
Discre ant Melds on Pi e
Su orts Inspection Report No. 50-323/78-07, Paragraph 4, discussed this topic and the licensee's test program to evaluate the significance of the weld discrepancies.
At the time of this inspection, all involved welds in'nit 1 and all Code Class
welds in Unit 2 had been ground out and replaced.
For the remaining subject welds in Unit 2, PGSE site personnel are awaiting recommendations from their San Francisco design en-gineering group based on their evaluation of the results of the test program.
This is considered to be an open item which will be examined further following the submission of the final 50.55(e) report.
4.
Com onent Su orts The inspector examined the baseplate support modification welds and the seismic restraint modifications for Evaporator Feed Ion Exchangers 1-1 through 1-4 and 2-1 through 2-4.
In addition, the completed mechanical process travelers for seismic restraint in-stallation, including the anchor bolt inspection reports and weld inspection sheets, were examined for the following components:
a.
Cation Bed Demineralizer s 1-1 and 2-1.
b.
Mixed Bed Demineralizers 1-1, 2 and 2-1, 2.
c.
Deborating Demineralizers l-l, 2 and 2-1, 2.
d.
Evaporator Feed Ion Exchangers l-l through 1-4 and 2-1 through 2-4.
The installations and documentation sampl.ed appeared to be as required by drawing details and procedures.
No items of noncom-
.pliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Structural Steel Weldin a.
Observation of Work and Work Activities The following EMPCO work activities were examined:
(1)
Welding electrode oven Nos.
1 and 2 contents, content charts, and temperature and issue logs for compliance with EYiPCO procedures.
(2)
Plug and stitch welds on 13 completed checker plates at the 104'evel of the Turbine Building for compliance with AWS Dl.l (Structural Welding Code).
(3)
Storage conditions for welding electrode and wire adjacent to the electrode ovens.
IP No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b. "Review'of"'llit 'Records
The following EMPCO quality records were examined:
(1)
Welder qualification documentation for ll welders, (2)
Dai'ly oven temperature records for period from 6-78 through 9-19-78.
(3)
Welding electrode issue logs for period 9-1 through 9-14-78.
(4)
Welding electrode r eceipt inspection documentation and material certifications for 11 lots/heats of low hydro-gen electrode and 3 lots of wire welding material.
The welding electrode issue sheets were compared to'the list of gC accepted welding electrode and no anomalies were noted.
(5)
gualification documentation for four welding inspectors..
(6)
Field installation inspection documentation for 13 completed checker plates (see Paragraph 5.a.(2)).
No items of nonconformance or deviations were identified.
6. Structural Steel 'Boltin a.
Observation'of Work and Work Activities The following GFA activities were examined for compliance with structural steel erection procedures and the AISC Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTN A325 or A490 Bolt (1)
gC material storage areas at the 140'evel of the Turbine Building and on the scaffolding for the truss modification work area.
It was noted that the storage areas contained the following items which had no gC Accept tags attached:
seven bags of A490 nuts, bolts and washers; two boxes of A490 nuts, bolts and washers; and one box of four Hilti concrete anchor bolts.
In addition, one bag of uncontrolled nuts and washers were observed in a storage area.
GFA personnel immediately placed the storage areas on "hold."
GFA had identified storage area deficiencies during the previous week and the areas had been placed on "Hold, " cleaned and accepted.
GFA per sonnel noted that traceability of material would be estab-lished or the material would be scrapped.
The NRC inspector examined the quality and non-quality related procurement and receipt documentation for A490 bolting materi-als.
The documents established that no A490 bolting material of a size used for quality related bolting activities had been purchased and that no A490 bolting materials procured for qual-ity related bolting had been rejected on receipt inspection of certifications and condition.
The storage of quality related material is considered to be an open item and will be examined further during a subsequent in-spection.
(2)
Nine completed bolted connections, in Bay 18 trusswork, were tested with the inspection torque wrench at the request of the NRC inspector.
In one joint, one of six bolts turned on application of the inspecting torque.
GFA personnel rejected the joint. It was noted that subsequent to bolting, the joint had been heated by welding operations.
Review of GFA steel erection procedures indicated that sequencing of work was not addressed.
The li-censee stated that the advisability of work sequencing would be evaluated.
One completed joint was observed which had one of six bolts removed.
The inspector removing the bolt had annotated in red on a
beam adjacent to the joint that the bolt had been removed, but failed to change the quality documentation to reflect that condition.
GFA personnel rejected the joint and
-8-b.
noted that the bolt had been removed only shortly before and that the inspector had not yet completed the necessary docu-mentation change.
It was observed that, in the prepared records package,
.the GFA inspector had completed the wrong documentation sheets for two joints.
GFA personnel rejected the joints in question.
The package had an inventory and joint status list attached and this minor error would probably have been discovered during review prior to completion of bolting work in Bay 18.
The structural steel bolting activities will be examined fur ther during future inspections.
Review of ualit Records The inspector examined the area of drawing control by sampling seven work location drawings and verifying proper revision by comparison to the master drawing list.
The field erection inspection documents for Bay 16 and Bay 18 wer e examined and appeared satisfactory and consistent with work status.
The calibration documentation and calibration status sheets for inspecting torque wrenches TW-1 and TW-2 were examined and appeared satisfactory.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Electrical a ~
Observation of Work and Wor k Activities On September 19, 1978, an inspection was conducted of the wiring internal to certain Control Room panels for Units
and 2.
The criteria used to determine acceptability of mu-tually redundant circuit separation are contained in the FSAR (Paragraph 8.3.3) which states, in part, that,
"Hutually redun-dant circuits in boards and panels are separated by one of the following (8) methods:
five inch minimum separation in air, metallic barrier, metallic conduit, glastic barrier, sealtite flex, scotch brand 7700 tape, varflex type HA or varflex silifex sleeving."
It appears that wiring from certain switches and devices mounted in the Control Room panels do not conform to the FSAR specified separation criteria for mutually redundant circuits, as id entified bel ow:
Unit 1:
Wires from Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
pump 1-2 suction valve switch (No. 8700B)
and RHR pump 1-1 switch, were not separated by one of the FSAR specified methods.
(2)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(8)
Unit 1:
Wires from control switches for valves 8802A (Safety Injection (SI)
pump 1-1 discharge stop valve),
8835 (SI pump 1-1 cold leg valve) and 8821A (SI pump l-l crossover valve) were not separated by one of the FSAR specified criteria from valve 8802B control switch wir-ing (SI pump 1-2 discharge valve).
Unit 1:
Wires from Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valve YLV-2 (No.
LCV-112C control switch and VCT outlet valve VLV-1 (No. LCY-112B control switch were not separa-ted by one of the FSAR specified methods.
Unit 2:
Wires from Containment Spray Pump 2-1 control switch and Containment Spray Pump 2-2 control switch were not separated by one of the FSAR specified methods.
Unit 2 Wires from control switches for valves 8802A (SI pump 2-1 discharge stop valve), 8835 (SI pump 2-1 cold leg valve)
and 8821A (SI pump 2-1 crossover valve)
were not separated by one of the FSAR specified criteria from valve 8802B control switch wiring (SI pump 2-2 discharge valve).
Unit 2:
Wires from the control switches for RHR pump 2-1 and RHR pump 2-2 were not separated by one of the.
FSAR specified methods.
Unit 2:
Wires from the control switches for valve 8106 (Charging pump 2-1 and 2-2 minimum flow recirc valve 1)
and valve 8105 (Charging pump 2-1 and 2-2 minimum. flow recirc valve 2) were not separated by one of the FSAR specified criteria.
Unit 2:
Wires from the control switches for valve 8805B (Charging pump supply valve B from Refueling Water Tank)
and valve 8805A (Charging pump supply valve A from Re-fueling Water Tank) were not separated by one of the FSAR specified criteri The licensee utilized a system where mutually redundant circuits were marked by design engineering with an asterisk on the drawings approved for construction.
The circuits so marked had the required separations continued into the boards and panels where the circuits terminated.
The inspectors noted that the circuits identified above had apparently not been marked with the asterisk for separation within the boards and panels.
This is an Rem of noncompliance.
8.
Containment S ra Rin Su orts'- Nelson Studs One of the plant modifications required by the more severe Hosgri seismic criteria is the strengthening of certain supports which carry the containment spray rings.
In Unit 1, the licensee had examined 50K (440 of 882} of the Nelson studs which fasten the spray ring support baseplates to the containment liner; one was found defective.
A similar inspection was to be performed in Unit 2.
The
. licensee had identified 18 supports which require larger diameter Nelson studs, and five which may require larger studs.
The stud replacement process is complicated by the requirement that they must be located only where a backing insert is present in the concrete.
This item is considered to be open pending review of the modification during a subsequent inspection.
9.
'
ui ment'Modifications a.
Re enerative Heat Exchan ers The licensee modified the U-bolt support on the center section of both the Unit
and Unit 2 heat exchangers in order to meet the Hosgri seismic criteria.
The modification entailed substituting an integrally welded saddle type support for the U-bolt.
While the work was being done on the Unit 2 heat ex-hanger, linear porosity was observed on the surface of a shop girth seam weld.
The porosity was clustered in a weld length of approximately 1/2-inch.
The condition was documented on Pg&E Deviation Report No. HYR-3756.
The repair as determined by West'inghouse was to grind out the indication, but to limit
.,the depth of material removed to 0.285 inch.
Pullman had de-veloped a field process sheet to accomplish this repair work, which had not yet commenced at the time of this inspection.
The inspector examined the quality records associated with the saddle support modification.
The documents included the materi-
.al certification for the saddle material, weld rod issue slips, and NDE reports.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie b.
Reactor Coolant'Drain Tanks A piping extension on the inlet nozzle inside the tanks (one for each unit) was added in order that the end of the nozzle inlet would remain below the liquid level so that the nitrogen cover gas blanket inside the tanks would be maintained.
The inspector examined the quality records per-taining to the completed work on Unit 1 tank.
These in-cluded the engineering change order for the work (No. 1129),
field warehouse requisitions for the materials used, weld rod issue slips, field process sheet for each weld, and the NDE reports.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Environmental ualifications of Safet Related Electrical E ui ment The licensee had been actively pursuing the matter of electrical equipment environmental qualifications with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and additional meetings were to be held.
The licensee intends to address this subject in his submittal for Supplement 8 to the Safety Evaluation Report.
The licensee had formally assigned responsibility for the review of the IE Circular 78-08 referenced material on August 18, 1978..
The stated purpose of the review was to compare the Diablo Canyon plant circumstances with those identified by the references.
Licensee representatives anticipate the issuance of a memo-to-file by,.Octo-ber 1, 1978, documenting the results of these reviews.
ll.
gA Audits The licensee's internal audit system was inspected by examining
gA audits performed since July 15, 1978.
In the conduct of these audits, the licensee identified 17 findings which required corrective action.
The corrective actions had been initiated, and/or completed, in accordance with the licensee's nonconformance reporting system or open item resolution system.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12. 'Exit'Inter view The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 21, 1978 (site portion), and summarized the inspection purpose, scope and findings.
n H
-12-The licensee telephoned Region V on September 28, 1978, and made verbal notification that a report would be issued pursuant to the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e)
regarding the matter of separation of mutually redundant circuits in Control Room panels (see Paragraph 7.a).
The NRC inspector informed the licensee that the failure to separate mutually redundant circuits in the Control Room panels is considered to be an item of noncomplianc e