IR 05000275/1978015
| ML16340A339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1978 |
| From: | Bishop T, Eckhardt J, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340A338 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-78-15, 50-323-78-15, NUDOCS 7901110336 | |
| Download: ML16340A339 (34) | |
Text
JR~port No.
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CObl~"lISSIOH OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEHEIIT REGIOi'l V
.50-275/78-15 50-323/78-15
. Docket No.
/
50-275 50-323 CPPR-39 License No.
CPPR-69 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco,'alifornia 94106 Faci 'lity Name Diabl o Canyon Units
and
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California
,Inspection Conducted.
November 6-9, 1978 Inspectors:
.
'(".i
. F. KIr Rea tor Inspector l
T. ll. Bis op,, React r Inspector Fll ( d.
Eckhardt, Reacto Inspector Pk3.
I
~P.
P.
Nar ut, Reactor Inspector zr-Date Signed ate Signed fz I /l6 Date. Signed
/~
(
v'8
. 0; Elin, Reactor Inspector Approved by:
R. C.
Hay es, Chief, Project Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:
Da e Signe
>~/i/7Z'ate Soigne Ins ection durin eriod of November 6-9, 1978 Re ort Nos.
50-275 78-15 and 50-323/78-15-A~Id:
R i
di p
i b r
b di p
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
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of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee action on reported 50.55(e)
items (discrepant welds on pipe supports and auxiliary feedwater pump
'7 9 P g y y 0 3p Q IE:Y Form 219 (2)
~ it
Summary:
(Report Nos.
50-275/78-15 and 50-323/78-15)
(Continued)
"power capacity);
component and pipe support installation work and records; struc-
"tural steel bolting and welding work and records; various electrical and instru-
"mentation seismic modifications; fire protection and suppression system installation gA procedures, work observation and records; records of steam regenerator primary nozzle closure ring fillet weld nondestructive examinations;
.gA audits and nonconformance system review.
The inspection involved. 122 inspector hours by five NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in eight areas and one unresolved item was identified in the area of component and pipe'upports (Paragraph 6).'
DETAILS Individuals Contacted a ~
Pacific Gas and Electric Com an PGKE b.
- R
- M.
- M
- D
- J
- g
%J C.
C.
J.
J.
J.
J.
J.
J.
A.
0.
J.
K.
p.
R.
R.
J.
J.
T.
J.
R.
R.
Gu D. Etzler, Project Superintendent E. Leppke, gA Supervisor N. Norem, Startup Engineer A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical Engineer N. Cochran, Resident Civil Engineer L. Killpack, Resident Mechanical Engineer Arnold, Coordinating gC Engineer Braff, Pipe Support Supervisor M. Seward, gA Engineer E; Herbst, Electrical Engineer Bell, gC Inspector A. Holley, Piping Inspection Group Supervisor Bratton, Field Engineer B. Martin, Civil Inspector Hanna, NSSS Group Supervisor Cordone, Field Engineer Crass, Electrical Inspector Cucco, Field Engineer Graf, Electrical Inspector Gilbreath, Electrical Engineer Hhitd, Electrical Inspector Campbell, Electrical Inspector Grant, Electrical Inspector Langley, Electrical Inspector Bowls, Field Engineer Mechanical Grant, Field Engineer - Electrical Johnson, Field Engineer - Civil A. Young, Electrical Engineer F. Atkinson Co.
GFA M.
D.
K.
D.
M.
M. Walsh, gA Manager Hedrick, llelding Inspector Brainard, Concrete and Reinforcing Steel Inspector Karr, gC Inspector Anderson, Lead Inspector McDermott, gC Inspector
A
c.
Endurance Metal Products Com an (EMPCO)
D. J. Gragg, QC Manager J.
N. Yrooman, QC Inspector d.
Pullman Power Products Pullman)
'.
Geske, Assistant QA Manager J.
P.
Runyon, QA Manager V. Casey, Level II Examiner K. Guy, Lead Field QC Inspector e.
Westin house Electric Cor oration G. Glassbergen, Site Manager f.
H. P. Foie Com an Foie H. Domingo, QC Inspector R. Llewellyn, QC Inspector C. Waechter, Clerk g.
Tech-Sil J. Robertson, Manager V. Talbert, QC Representative 2.
General The licensee plans to load Unit 1 fuel on or about the end of February 1979 pending completion of the operating license hear-ings and issuance of an operating license.
Licensee representatives onsite informed the inspector that the Quality Assurance Director had been promoted to project responsi-bility, effective at a later date, and that a successor had not yet been announced.
It was noted that the QA Director would retain his duties until a replacement assumed the duties.
3.
Licensee Action on 0 en Items of Enforcement (0 en Infraction - Failure to se grate mutuall redundant circuits in contro room pane s in a manner re uire 50-2 5 an 3 3 t e P
an icensee The licensee was engaged in wrapping certain control board circuits with Scotch 7700 tape and tying other circuits in a manner such
that the PSAR specified separations criteria are satisfied.
Li-censee representatives stated that General Office Engineering Department personnel would, in addition, inspect the control board
'vertical sections, Auxiliary Relay Racks and Solid State Protection Racks.
The inspection results would be documented.
This item will be examined during a future NRC inspection.
(275/323/78-12/01)
Licensee Action on 50.55 e
Items a.
Ade uac of Motor Driven Auxiliar Feedwater Pum s
The licensee submitted an interim report on March 23, 1978, identifying that the operating current of the motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFll) pumps exceeded the name plate rating.
The licensee subsequently returned a motor to the manufacturer for determination of motor adequacy.
Based upon the results of manufacturer's tests, the current capability of the motor was upgraded and new nameplates. were installed on the four pump motors.
The licensee was in the process of submitting a final 50.55(e) report identifying the corrective actions taken to resolve the discrepancy.
The inspector reviewed the recording traces of'Fll pumps 1-2 and 1-3 diesel generator. loading (bus voltage and frequency)
for compliance with the voltage and droop criteria specified
'y the FSAR and test procedure.
The traces showed that, the voltage and frequency droop remained well within the established acceptance criteria.
This item remains open pending receipt and satisfactory review of the licensee's final report on this matter.
b.
Discre ant Melds on Pi e Su orts (Reference
Inspection Report
Nos.,50-323/78-07
and 78-2.
The inspector
examined the completed work and records for
seven of the 19 repaired
Code Class
1 welds in Unit 2.
The
Field Welds
and Component
Supports
inspected
were as follows:
Field Held
379
1069
1068
378
305
177
310
~Su
orat
71/8SL
71/4SL
71/3SL
71/5SL
92/71 A
92/23A
71/25SL
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
This item will be examined during a future inspection
and
following the submission of the final 50.55(e) report.
(50-275/323/78-15/02)
Safety Related
Pi
e Weld Preservice
Examination Results
L'icensee preservice
examination
personnel
had identified approximately
54 reportable indications (arc strikes
and weld spatter resulting
from the pipe support repair program work) in the course of liquid
penetrant
(LP) examination of Unit
Code Class
1,
2 and
3 pressure
boundaries';
and reported
these
on Nuclear Plant Problem Reports
DC 1-78-gC-P0016,
P0017
and
P0018.
Kellogg'personnel
were unsuccess-
ful in repeating
the findings during subsequent
LP examinations.
Licensee representatives
stated that the preservice
examination
and
Kellogg personnel
would reexamine
the areas
in question
and provide
more precise locating information to facilitate repair.
This item
will be examined during a future inspection.
(50-275/323/78-15/03)
Com onent
Su
orts and Pi in
Restraints
The inspector
examined
the following spring and mechanical
hangers
in Unit 2 safety related
systems
for compliance with Pullman pro-
cedure
No.
ESD-223 (Installation and Inspection of Class
1 Pipe
Supports)
and applicable installation drawings:
Support
Nos.
2626-1V, 2042-9Y, 70-35SL, 564-90,'64-160,
564-95,
5-9R,15-23R,
and 889-4.
The inspector observed. that support 564-90, which had
been
inspected
and accepted
on 1-6-77, did not have the proper
clearance
between
the pipe and U-bolt.
In addition,
he observed that support
564-95.
which had been inspected
and accepted
on 9-16-76,.had
a loose turn-
buckle and a loose bolted fastener
on the pipe clamp.
Licensee
'epresentatives
stated that the contractor
was performing
a final
audit and walkdown of mechanical
hangers
to identify such discre-
pancies,
and that discrepancies
noted during the final walkdown
would be corrected.
I
The final walkdown/audit results will be examined during a future
inspection.
(50-323/78-15/04)
It was observed that
a stainless
steel
pipe to stanchion
on support 89-25R in Unit 2, appeared
to be rough and the inspec-
tor questioned
the ability to adequately
perform a liquid penetrant
examination of the surface.
This was
a shop weld and licensee
representatives
stated that it had
been liquid penetrant
examined
and accepted
by the manufacturer,
Pullman-Kellogg onsite inspectors
and the licensee's
inservice inspection personnel.
The weld in ques-
tion was reexamined with liquid penetrant
methods
by a qualified Level
II examiner at the inspector's
request.
The examination disclosed
an apparent
1/8" long linear indication and
a Yee-shaped
apparent
linear indication with each leg being about 1/16" long.
Pullman
procedure
ESD-255 states
that linear indications are unacceptable
and indications
suspected
of being non-relevant
be regarded
as
unacceptable
until shown otherwise.
The licensee stated
that. the
weld joint would be evaluated
by the Level III examiner.
This
is an unresolved
item.
(50-323/78-15/05)
7.
Containment
S ra
Line Su
ort Modifications
,
Certain Unit
1 containment spray line support modification work was
examined
by.the inspector to ascertain
compliance with PGSE pipe
support drawing 049282.
Two hangers
(No;- 176-30A on spray ring
1-S3-2375-6
and
No. 176-42A on spray ring 1-S3-2377-6)
were inspected.
The modification of each of these
hangers
was approximately
50 percent
complete
and appeared
to be in compliance with the applicable drawings.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
Diesel
Fuel Oil Transfer Pi in
Modifications
a.
Observation of l<ork and llork Activities
The inspector
examined the diesel
fuel oil transfer piping
modification work in the fuel oil and
CO
pipe trench.
The
pipe welding was compared with the requifements
of the
B31.7 Power Piping Code
and the pipe support installations
were compared with applicable support drawings
and requirements
of-Ke'llogg Engineering Specification
ESD-223 (Requirements for
Installation and Inspection of All Class I Pipe Supports).
Specifically, welds 272,
280,
330,
339, 340,
and 356 were
visually examined
by the
NRC inspector.
Also, numerous
pipe
supports
were examined,
although final
gC inspection
had not
yet been performed.
No deviations
or items of noncompliance
were identified.
b.
Review of ualit
Records
guality records
including field process
sheets,
examination records,
and weld rod withdrawal records
were re-
viewed for the pipe welds noted above.
No deviations or items
of noncompliance
were identifie Verification of Steam Generator
Primar
Nozzle Closure
Rin Fillet
Weld Li uid Penetrant
Test Records
The inspector
reviewed liquid penetrant'(LP)
test records
(retained
onsi te by Westinghouse
Electric Corporation) of fillet welds of the
S/G primary nozzle closure
hold down rings.
The records
were for LP
tests
performed to the requirements
of process
specification
84350-JA and included tests for both the inlet and outlet nozzles
for all Unit
1 and
The final Unit
LP tests
were performed October 2, 1975,
and Unit 2 tests
performed
Novem-
ber 18-20,
1975.
The records
documented
that the tests
had been wit-
nessed
by an
ASNE Code inspector.
No items of noncompliance or
deviations
were identified.
Protection of Safet
Related
Com onents
I
During the inspector,'.s
plant tour,
a manway on the primary side of
2-2 channel
head
was observed
to be open
and there did
not appear to be any work in progress
necessitating
the opening.
The
visually accessible
areas
inside the opening appeared
to be free of
foreign material.
Due to inaccessibility,
an inspection of the attached
main coolant piping was not performed.
Discussions
with the cognizant licensee
engineer indicated that
he was not aware of any recent, work authorizations
necessitating
the opening
and that openings,
when not actively being worked,
were to be covered with Visquine and taped shut.
Licensee representa-
tives did note however, that inspection
personnel
had
been
engaged
in nondestructive
examination of the root pass for several
welds in
Unit 2 reactor
coolant loop piping.
The inspector
noted that licensee
procedure NFI-3-2 and Specifica-
tion 8752 require that component
openings
remain closed except for
installation or fitup, that contractors
must assure
components
are
protected
through the use of protective seals
and that clean areas
are required for reactor coolant flow components
which will be
.
"
inaccessible for postwork cleanup.
The licensee's
program for verifying cleanliness
inside primary
system openings,
prior to closure, will be examined during a
subsequent
inspection.
(50-323/78-15/06)
Structural
Concrete
a ~
Safet
Related Outside Tank Foundations
The licensee
was engaged
in excavating to bedrock below the
outside safety related tanks.
The volume will be filled with
lean concrete
and grout as
a replacement for the removed
backfill material.
The tank foundations
are to be anchored
to the lean concrete
using rebar dowel The inspector
examined
the rebar
the
welding procedure utilized, welder qualification records
and
weld inspection
documentation for six bar-to-plate
welds for
compliance with licensee
procedures
and the
AMS D12.1 rein-
forcing steel
welding code.
No items of noncompliance or
deviations
were identified.
The 'licensee
noted, in response
to the inspector's
concerns,
that void formation would be precluded
by pumping grout into
the last portion of the foundation through five holes drilled
through the existing tank and foundation
(one at the center
and one in each quadrant).
In addition, the existing con-
crete foundation would be sloped to a
1% grade, with the high
point in the tank center,
and inspected
to preclude, void form-
ation.
This area will be examined during a future inspection.
(50-275/323/78-15/07)
Alle ed Performance of Work Without A
roved Instructions
On October 15, 1978, the
NRC resident
inspector
received
a
note requesting
that the
NRC check into -a particular modifica-
tion since the individual believed that the work was being
performed without proper authorization;
consequently,
the work
would not be inspected
by gA personnel.
The
NRC inspector
determined that the work in question involved moving a single
piece of rebar,
due to interference,
more than one bar diameter
from the location specified
by approved
drawings.
In addition,
the inspector determined that the licensee
had not yet obtained
approval for the relocation of the rebar but had taken action.
to obtain the required approvals.
The
NRC inspector contacted
the individual submitting the note
on November 7, 1978, to discuss
the situation
and identify any
other concerns.
The individual stated that work was being per-
formed by GFA production crews
on orders
from licensee
personnel
and without prior written approval
as is required
by the
GFA gA
program.
He supplied the inspector with two specific areas of
concern.
These
two areas of concern (reinforcing steel
place-
ment in Unit 1 liftT31F and Unit 2 lifts S31C and
D) had been.
documented
in GFA nonconformance
report Nos.
175 and 174, respec-
tively, after the individual notified the
GFA gA department.
The
nonconformances
were each dispositioned
"accept as-is"
based
upon approval
by the licensee's
responsible
engineer
and
documentation of the change
on "as-built" drawing The inspector discussed
the concerns with licensee
management,
the licensee civil inspector involved and
GFA gA management.
The licensee's civil inspector stated that all of the
identified "dowel holes grouted to an unknown depth"
had
been
measured
by himself prior to grouting and that
GFA production
crews
had grouted the dowels, in error, prior to the
GFA gA
inspection.
Furthermore,
the civil inspector stated that
there
may have
been
some instances
where
GFA production crews
had proceeded
with work while the civil inspector
was contact-.
ing the responsible
engineer for drawing change approval.
How-
ever, the approvals
had
been obtained prior to completion
of work.
The
NRC inspector
examined reinforcing steel
welding
inspection
documentation,
licensee
engineering
department
design
change
documentation
and telecon documentation
showing
the change
approvals for the lifts in question.
The above
documentation
appeared
satisfactory
and indicated that work
had
been adequately controlled.
Licensee
management
stated
that meetings
had
been held with GFA gA and production manage-
ment to reemphasize. the
GFA gA program requirement that work
may not proceed without prior. written approval.
They also
noted that the stop-work authority delegated
to GFA gA depart-
'ent provides
adequate. control to assure that gA program direc-
tives are implemented.
The
NRC inspector
examined lift T31F for reinforcing steel
placement
and configuration
and noted that
GFA gC had not yet
inspected
the area.
One horizontal
bar was not placed, within
one bar diameter of nominal spacing
due to
a doorway inter-
ference;
but GFA gC personnel
stated that this was
known and
would be resolved prior to final preplacement
acceptance.
The inspector
had
no further questions
on these matters
and
no items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
12. Structural
Steel
Erection
a ~
GFA Activities
The
GFA storage
areas
on the 140'evel of the Turbine Building
and
on the crane scaffold were examined
by the inspector.
In
addition, eight high strength bolts in four Bay 27 joints were
tested
by site personnel
at the inspector's
request for proper
bolt torque.
Acceptance criteria for the above examinations
were contained
in GFA gA procedures
and the AISC supplement. on
high strength boltin b.
The contents
and temperatures
of three
GFA welding electrode
ovens
and the associated
welding electrode
issue logs were
examined for compliance with OA procedures
and the AtlS Dl.l
structural
steel
welding standard.
The rod ovens
were riot
locked but were manned
by gC'personnel.
The contents of one
welder's electrode
can were compared with the issue log entry
and found satisfactory.
GFA had prepared
and satisfactorily resolved three
nonconformance
.
reports
documenting
the minor discrepancies
noted
by the
NRC
inspector during the previous inspection
(see
IE Inspection
Re-
port No. 50-275 and 323/78-12).
The inspector
sampled
and examined the Field Erection
Inspection documentation for structural
steel
bolting and
welding performed in Bay 26 of the Turbine Building trusswork.
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
BIPCO-Activi0ies
The inspector
examined
the installation of approximately
concrete
anchor
bolts attaching
ledger angle iron to the
Turbine Building walls for compliance with OCP-11
(Field
Insta'llation-Stud Anchors).
In addition,.the inspector
sampled
and examined certain
anchor bolt and ledger angle
receipt inspection
and field installation inspection
documentation.-
The installation,
and associated field installation inspection
documentation of thirteen installed Unit
and
2 checker plates
were examined for compliance with gC procedures
and
AMS Dl.l.
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified.
13. Electrical
and Instrumentation
a
~
'10% Steam
Dum
S stem Modifications
The licensee
had installed
a seismically qualified
10% Steam
Dump Valve actuation
system (consisting of air bottles
and
associated
piping) to augment the instrument air system supply
to the valve operation.
The inspector reviewed the Engineer-
ing Change
Order
(ECO) authorizing the modification, examined
the installation instructions
and examined
selected
portions
of the air and electrical
systems for compliance with the
ECO
and installation instructions.
No items of noncompliance
or
deviations
were identifie b.
Seismic Stron
Motion Indication and Reactor Tri
S stem
The Engineering, Change
Order authorizing the modifications was
examined.
The inspector
noted that conduit installation
has
recently started
and observed that only a small
amount of wir-
ing had
been installed.
This area will be examined during a
'uture inspection.
(50-275/323/78-15/08)
c.
Re lacement of Unit 2 Motor Controller Solenoid
S rinqs
eference:
0 CFR
Item - IE Inspection
Report
Nos.
50-275/78-05,
50-323/78-06,
and 50-275
and 323/78-09.)
The licensee
was inspecting Unit
1 motor controller solenoid
springs with a Go/No-Go gage to assure that the Unit
1 motor
controllers
have the required
heavy spring installed.
This
work was scheduled
to be completed prior to fuel loading.
Replacement
of the Unit 2 spring with the heavier springs
will begin
sometime after January 1, 1979.
This item will be
examined during
a subsequent
inspection.
(50-'275/323/78-. 15/09)
d.
Switch ear Modifications
(1)
480 Yolt Switch ear
The licensee
was replacing Unit
1 compression
type cable
terminations at individual controllers with lug type
terminations.
The Unit 2 controllers
were installed with
lug cable terminations.
The installation procedure
and
circuit termination/determination
logs were examined.
Hork activities were observed
on the 1F,
1G and
1H 480 volt
vital busses for procedure
compliance.
The work appeared
to be adequately controlled
and
no items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
(2)
4160 Volt Switch ear
Seismic testing at Hiley Laboratories
resulted in the
necessity for certain
4KY switchgear cell modifications,
which the licensee
was performing.
General
Electric
changed
the design
and supplied drawings detailing the
modifications required.
Licensee representatives
stated
that
a modified
4KY switchgear cell
had
been retested
satisfactorily at Hiley Laboratories
to verify accepta-
bility of the design
change.
The following documents
and activities
wer e examined:
-11-
{a)
H,
P. Foley
gC procedures
applicable to the work and
Melding Procedure Specifications
HPS-1-SG-1
through
7 for compliance witn applicable welding codes.
(b)
Circuit termination/determination
log sections
applicable
to the modification.
(c)
A sampl e of compl eted wel d inspection documentation.
(d)
Mork in progress
and completed
work on vital switchgear
1H for compliance with applicable
gC procedures.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
e.
Dedicated
Shutdown
Panel
The licensee
was installing
a dedicated
shutdown
system capable
of monitoring the parameters
and Pressurizer
fluid levels
and the pressure
and temperature of one loop.
The
.
above parameters,
with the exception of loop temperature,
are
measured
by separate
redundant transmitters installed
on taps
of existing sensing lines.
The parameters
monitored are quality
class
1, with the exception of loop temperature.
Licensee
per-
sonnel
noted that the transmitters utilized for sensing
the
Dedicated
Shutdown
Panel
parameters
of level. and pressure
would
not be environmentally qualified to worst case
containment
atmospheric
conditions.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
14. Fire Protection
and
Su
ression
S stem
a.
Review of ?mal ementin
Procedures
The inspector
examined the following procedures
which related
to upgrading of the installed fire suppression
system
and
current work activities for fire protection:=
(1)
PG8E Drawing
No. 049243,
Rev. 9, "Pipe Supports for Field
Run, Design Class
1 Piping"
(2)
PG8E Specification
No. 2552, "Specification for Furnishing
and Installing Silicone
Foam Penetration
Seals,
Diablo
Canyon Unit 2"
(3)
Cardox tlechanical
Specifications
(no number),
Revised
February 16,
1965
(4*)
PGKE Procedure
(no number)
"Unit
1 Fire Stop Inspection,"
.Rev. 0, June 9, 1978
The procedures
appeared
adequate for the work in progress.
No
items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
b.
Observations
of Work and
Work Activities (50-275/323/78-15-10)
Compl'eted
and in-process
work activities related to fire
protection
and suppression
were examined.
This included
observations
of: fire protection for Unit
1 auxiliary sea
water pumps,
component cooling water
pumps,
and residual
heat
removal
pumps; installation of fire stops in penetrations
and
cable trays; fire door ratings;
containment of flammable li-
quids including associated
curbing and drains; fire water hose
reel
system installation; fire water sprinkler piping to Unit
pumps;
and Cardox suppression
system piping and
hose reel installations.
The work activities and completed
work were compared to requirements
provided 'in the procedures
identified in Paragraph
14.a,
above,
and
amendment
No.
51 to
the
FSAR (titled "Diablo Canyon Fir e Protection
Review" ).
No items of noncompliance or deviations
were identified, but
the following conditions were noted:
(1)
Installation of ten randomly selected
cable trays in
Units
1 and
2 cable spreading
rooms revealed
one tray
in Unit
1 which had fire stops installed at an interval
of 12 feet, whereas,
the specification requir es stops at
10+1
feet intervals.
The inspector
then examined
additional trays to determine if similar discrepancies
existed.
All other trays were found to be within spec-
.
ification requirements.
Licensee
representatives
stated
that the one tray identified would be brought into
specification requirements.
In addition, licensee re-
presentatives
stated that the Unit
1 fire stop inspection,
currently in progress,
would identify such discrepancies.
The inspector
had
no further questions
on this item.
(2)
Of 25 fire doors
and frames inspected,
only'hree
were found to have adequate
identification of fire rating.
Discussions with licensee
r epresentatives
established
that this problem had
been previously identified and that
corrective action was underway.
The fire door manufacturer"
has
been requested
to inspect
each door/frame which does
not have labels
and provide certification of'-the fire
rating..
In addition, action is currently in progress
to
replace approximately
80 doors which have ratings
known
to be less
than require (3)
(7)
(8)
Drains located in fuel piping
sumps for all Unit
1 and
diesel
generator
rooms were found to be blocked with debris.
Licensee representatives
stated that 'the drains would be
cleaned prior to use of th
fuel lines.
The inspector
had
no further questions
on this item.
One fire water hose reel
system piping support
(No. FPS-18)
was found to
be anchored
to a concrete
block type wall..
Licensee representatives
could not readily provide evi-
dence that anchorage
in this type of wall structure
was
adequate for seismic loading, but stated that the situa-
tion would be examined
and appropriate action taken.
This
item will be re-examined
during
a subsequent
NRC inspection.
Existing nonseismic
pipe supports
used for restraining
fire water
hose reel piping in the vicinity of the fire
pumps were found to have numerous
inadequately
tightened
threaded
fasteners.
Licensee
representatives
stated that
actions
are currently in progress
to install seismic pipe
supports for the fire water system
and that
no credit will
be taken for support provided
by existing nonseismic
restraints.
It was further stated that the seismic
up-
grading of the system is scheduled
to be completed
by
mid-triarch 1979.
This subject will be re-examined
during
a subsequent
inspection.
One of five fire water sprinkler heads
surrounding. Unit
pump No. 1-3 was found to be taped.
The
tape
was removed during the inspection.
Subsequent
exam-
ination of all sprinkler heads for each of the other
Unit
pump sprinkler heads
revealed that
they were free of foreign material.
The inspector
had
no further questions
on this matter.
One cardox pipe support for the 2>" cardox supply header
outside diesel
generator
room 1-3 was found to have loose
locking nuts
and
was missing
one U-bolt nut.
In addition,
it was not immediately possible to verify the seismic ade-
quacy of the support'.
Licensee
representatives
stated that
this situation would be reviewed
and appropriate action
taken.
This subject will be re-examined
during
a subsequent
inspection.
The two 1500
gpm fire pumps were found to be located in
the
same
room without a fire barrier between the
pumps.
Subsequent
to the.inspection,
licensee
representatives
-14-
stated that the separation
of the
pumps
was adequate
and
that
a fire barrier would not be provided.
This informa-
tion is under evaluation.
This matter will be examined
during
a subsequent
inspection
pending the results of the
NRC evaluation.
c. 'eview of ualit
Records
Records
associated
with the Unit 2 cable
spr'eading
room tray and
east wall fire stop installation,
and Unit
1 cable spreading
room fire stop repairs
were examined
by the inspector.
No'items
of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
15. gA Audits
The licensee's
internal audit system
was inspected
by examining
15..gA audits
per formed since September
26, 1978.
In the conduct.
of these audits,
the licensee identified nine findings which re-
quired corrective action.
The corrective actions
had
been initiated
and/or completed
in accordance
with the licensee's
nonconformance
reporting system or open item resolution
system.
No items of non-
compliance or deviations
were identified.
16.
Nonconformance
Re ortin
The licensee's
nonconformance
and minor variation reporting
systems
were examined
by selectively reviewing reports in the civil and
mechanical
disciplines
and the general
category.
The documented
deficiencies
appeared
to have
been properly classified
and resolved
in accordance
with the licensee's
gA implementing procedures.
17. Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items are matters
about which more information. is required
in order to ascertain
whether they are acceptable
items,
items of non-
compliance,
or deviations.
Unresolved
items disclosed
during the
inspection
are discussed
in Paragraph
6.
18. Exit'nterview
The inspector met with licensee
representatives
(denoted in
Paragraph
1) at the conclusion of the inspection
on November 9,
1978,
and
summarized
the inspection
purpose,
scope
and findings.
The inspector discussed
the findings resulting from an individual 's
concerns
which had
been
brought to
NRC attention
(see
Paragraph
11.b)
and noted that, while control of work in the field appeared
to be satisfactory,
care should
be exercised
to assure that work
-15-
was performed in accordance
with prior approved written instruc-
tions as required
by the
GFA gA manual.
The licensee
noted that
requirements for prior approval of work had.been
re-emphasized
to field personnel.