IR 05000272/1991028
| ML18096A451 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1992 |
| From: | Jason White NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18096A450 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-91-28, 50-311-91-28, 50-354-91-21, NUDOCS 9201280051 | |
| Download: ML18096A451 (67) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No License No Licensee:
Facilities:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved:
50-272/91-28 50-311/91-28 50~354/91-21 DPR-70 DPR-75 NPF-57 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station October 23 - December 28, 1991
_ T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector S. M. Pin dale, Resident Inspector S. T. Barr, Resident Inspector H. K. Lathrop, Resident Inspector R. L. Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist B. C. Westreich, Reactor Engineer R. G. Schaaf, R ctor n *nee *. n
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J. Inspection Summary:
Date Inspection 50-272/91-28; 50-311191-28; 50-354/91-21 on October 23 - December 28, 1991 Areas Inspected: Resident safety inspection to assure public health and safety. The following areas were reviewed: operations, radiological controls, maintenance and surveillance testing, emergency preparedness, security, engineering/technical support, safety assessment/quality verification, and licensee event reports and open item followu Results: Tfie inspectors concluded that public health and safety was assured. The inspectors also identified one non-cited violation for Salem. An executive summary follows.
9201280051 920115 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Salem Inspection Reports 50-272/91-28; 50-311/91-28 Hope Creek Inspection Report 50-354/91-21 October 23 - December 28, 1991 OPERATIONS (Modules 60705, 60710, 71707, 71710, 71714, 93702)
Salem:
The Salem units were operated in a safe manne Radiation monitoring system actuations were reported and licensee actions were appropriat Licensee response was appropriate for two failures of the lB safeguards equipment cabinet (SEC). The Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generators were appropriately aligned for standby automatic operation. An equipment operator failed to follow an operating procedure resulting in damage to the No. 12 boric acid transfer pump. This is a non-cited violation. Several open items were closed~
Hope Creek: The unit was operated in a safe manner. An open item concerning an engineered safety feature walkdown of the Standby Liquid Control System was closed. Material deficiencies and a programmatic weakness in the procedure revision process had been appropriately addressed and housekeeping had returned to pre-refueling outage standard RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (Modules 71707, 93702)
Common:
The licensee implemented timely and aggressive corrective actions to correct dosimetry program deficiencies identified by an independent NVLAP assessment. However, this item is unresolved pending completion of licensee action *
Salem: Periodic inspector observation of station workers and Radiation Protection personnel implementation of radiological controls and protection program requirements did not res_ult in any identified deficiencies. A Unit 2 containment entry at power demonstrated a conservative approach to radiation protection. One open item was close Hope Creek:
Periodic inspector observation of station workers and Radiation Protection personnel i"mplementation of radiological controls and protection program requirements did not result in any any identified deficiencie Licensee actions following the detection of radionuclides in sewage sludge were successful in identifying the source of the contaminatio The acceptability of remedial actions remains unresolved pending review of the licensee's plans for sewage disposal and contamination control. The third refueling outage report was well written and thorough with substantive recommendations for future outages.
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Executive Summary MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE (Modules 61726, 62703)
Salem: Routine observations did not result in any deficiencies.. A technician error resulted in an actuation of the SEC during troubleshooting. testing.. The power operated relief valves continued to receive licensee attention due to historical failures.. Licensee action_s to address these failures were determined to be appropriate. Several open items were close *Hope Creek: Routine observations did not result in any identified deficiencies. An open item concerning corrective actions taken for an inadvertent core spray pump start-during surveillance testing was closed. *
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (Modules 71707, 93702)
Licensee performance was good during two drills and one graded exercise that occurred this perio SECURITY (Modules 71707, 93702)
Security program implementation was appropriat ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT (Modules 57050, 57080, 71707)
Salem: The management of engineering work activities was performed in accordapce with applicable procedures and was properly prioritized and executed. FSAR assumed auxiliary feedwater flow during a steam line break 'accident was found to be non-conservative by the
- licensee, and remains unresolved. Several open items were close Hope Creek: The management of engineering work activities was performed in accordance with
.applicable procedures and was properly prioritized and executed. The licensee was aggressive in the analysis of predictive problems with GE-9 fuel and their effects on cycle 4 core*
performance Actions taken *to maintain adequate margins to core thermal limits were conservative and appropriat SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION (Modules 30702, 71707, 90712, 90713, 92700, 92701, 94702)
Salem: Management and control of the sixth Unit 2 refueling -outage to date was determined to be conservative, effective and proactive. Several open items were closed.
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Executive Summary Hope Creek: An open item concerning material receipt inspections and inspector qualifications was closed. Station_ QA inspectors were found to be qualified and certified to perform receipt inspections and implementing procedures had been appropriately.revised to reflect station quality
- assurance certification and qualificatio *
IV
_ SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS 1. 1 Salem Units 1 and 2 Unit I operated at power during the period. Unit 2 operated at power until a turbine/reactor trip occurred on November 9, 1991 (see NRC Inspection 50~311/91-81). The unit entered its sixth refueling outage and remained defueled at the end of the perio.2 Hope Creek The unit operated at power during the perio. '
OPERA TIO NS Inspection Activities The inspectors verified that the facilities were operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirement Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company management control was evaluated by direct observation of activities, tours of the facilities, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and Technical Specification compliance, and review of facility record These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedures 60705, 60710, 71707, 71714, and 93702. The inspectors performed normal and back-shift inspections, including deep back-shift (85.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) inspections as follows:
I 0/22/91 1119191 11110191 11 /11 /91 11112191 11 /16/91 I I /17 /91 12/22/91 Inspection Hours 10:00 p.m. - 11 :30 :30 p.m. - 6:30 : 15 a.m. - 6:30 :45 a.m. - 6:30 :00 a.m. - 7:30 :00 a.m. - 3:30 :30 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. -
10:00 a.m. - 4:00.2 Inspection Findings and Significant Plant Events 2.2.1 Salem Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC) Self-Test Failures; Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation On two occasions, Salem Unit 1 commenced a unit shutdown from full power as required by Technical Specificatioris (TSs) due to an inoperable safeguards equipment cabinet (SEC). The SEC starts and stops equipment due to accident and/or loss of power signals from the solid state
protec.tion system. On November 14, 1991, a self-test fault alarm on the No. lB (one of three)
SEC annunciated. An ENS call was made, and the resident inspectors were informed. The SEC was declared inoperable, and a unit shutdown was initiated. Th~ licensee replaced the electrical *
chassis, successfully performed a functionru test, and declared the No. lB SEC operable. The load reduction was terminated at 80%, and the unit was subsequently restored to 100% powe On November 15, 1991, a.self-test fault again annunciated for the No. lB SEC. The SEC was declared inopeq1ble at 6:05 a.m., and a second unit shutdown was initiated. A second ENS call was made, and again the *residents were informed. Due to successful testing of the SEC chassis removed from the No. lB SEC on November 14, 1991 and a relatively good maintenance record that chassis was reinstalled in the No. lB SEC on November 15, * 1991. The licensee also
' evaluated the condition of the SEC and determined that the SEC would function as designed if called upon to actuate. Therefore, the unit shutdown was terminated at about 11:30 a.m. on Novernber 15, 1991 with the unit at 25% power. The licensee remained at 25%. power pending further evaluation and development of a monitoring progra "<.**
On November 16, 1991 at 1 :04 a.m., the No. lB emergency diesel generator (EDG)
automatically started (ESF actuation) while technicians were installing monitoring equipment to the No. 1 B SEC. Specifically, maintenance personnel incorrectly connected test equipment leads to the SEC, resulting in the EDG star Deficient voltage indication labelling on the test equipment contributed t0. the error. The EDG was subsequently secured and restored to its *
normal standby configuration (See Licensee Event Report 91-33)
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A !so on November 16, 1991, the licensee elected to replace the installed No. lB SEC chassis with a highly reliable chassis removed from Unit 2. After successfully testing the No. lB SEC
. and successfully installing monitoring equipment, the licensee observed satisfactory performance of the No. 1 B SEC for about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A unit load increase to 100% power was subsequently initiated. Full *power was achieved on.November 18, 1991 without inciden The licensee counseled the maintenance department personnel who incorrectly connected the test leads and stressed the importance of attention to detai In addition, the deficient voltage indication label was corrected. System Engineering is continuing its review of multiple SEC failures/actuations (See NRC Inspection 50-272 and 311/91-23). The inspector verified that Unit 2 design *change package (DCP) No. 2SC-2267 is scheduled to be implemented during the current refueling/maintenance outage. This DCP upgrades the SEC electronics in an effort to *
improve overall SEC reliability. The inspector also verified that the Unit 1 SEC electronics are
- scheduled for replacement in the next refueling outage (April 1992). The inspector had no further questions and concluded that the licensee's response. to the No. lB SEC failures and the EOG start were appropriat *
3 Radiation Monitor Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation_
The following radiation monitoring equipment initiated EsF actuations as indicated. Except as noted, none of the actuations were caused by high radiation levels but rather resulted from operational problems with the radiation monitoring equipmen Unit Radiation Monitor Date Time
lRl lA 11/14/91 8:42 Rl2B 11/19/91 5:43 lRllA 11/26/91 6:06 R12A 11/27/91 12:42 R1A 11/29/91 8:35 R41C 11/30/91 2:04 R11A 12/2/91 11:00 RlA 12/5/91 6:40 R12A
12/7/91 6:19 lRl 1 A 12/26/91 5:38 * LER 50-311/91-019 applies. See Section 9 of this report.
Systems responded as designed, resulting in ventilation system isolations. As stated in previous LERs and management meetings, licensee actions include short term and long term equipment upgrade The inspector reviewed licensee actions regarding this event. The licensee has submitted or will submit LERs for these events. No unacceptable conditions were note Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown The inspector independently verified the operability of the Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the system The inspector performed the walkdowns to confirm that system lineups-and procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration and to identify adverse equipment conditions which could degrade performance. This inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7171 The inspector walked down selected EDGs and related support systems and concluded that the systems were fully functional and appropriately aligned in the standby automatic mode. Valves and breakers were positioned as indicated by the computer generated (TRIS) lineup sheets. The inspector also reviewed the appropriate sections of the UFSAR, Technical Specifications, electrical schematic and piping drawings, the EDG configuration baseline documentation, and surveillance testing and operating procedure The inspector noted that the material condition of the Unit 1 and 2 EDGs was satisfactory.
Housekeeping in areas inspected was determined to be adequate. Efforts to improve these areas is ongoin "
Based on the above, the inspector concluded that both units' EDGs were fully operational and capable of performing their design functio Salem Unit 1 No. 12 Boron Acid Transfer Pump Damage On November 15, 1991 while Unit 1 was operating at fOO % power, operators were preparing to perform portions of Procedure OP II-3.3.5, "Boric Acid Solution Preparation and Transfer."
This transfers the contents of the boric acid batching tank to a boron acid storage tank (BAST).
Both of the Unit 1 (No. 11 and No. 12) boron acid transfer (BAT) pumps were running, recirculating their respective BAST' The purpose of the procedure was to secure the No. 12 BAST recirculation in order to make a batch addition from the boric acid batching tank. This required operators to stop the No. 12 BAT pump, switch the pump suction lineup to the boron acid batching tank, then restart the N BAT pump. Specifically, step 5.3.3 of procedure OP II-3.3.5 required operators to verify that the No. 11 BAT pump was in service and the No. 12 BAT was out of service. The next step isolated the pump suction from the BAST by shutting valve 12CV163. Although required by the procedure to be shut down, operators left the No. 12 BAT pump running. The equipment operator (EO) performing the procedure called the control room operator to verify that step 5.3.3 was complete, but he only asked what the status of the BAT pumps were. The control room operator confirmed that both the BAT pumps were operating, which was normal for the recirculation lineup. The EO mistakenly assumed that the report back from the control room operator indicating that both pumps running was appropriate and complied with the procedur The EO then continued with the valve manipulations and shut 12CV163 isolating the suction supply to the pump. A few minutes later, a fire alann was received in the BAT pump area, and the EO found the No. 12 BAT pump very hot and smoking. The pump was secured, and upon inspection, the licensee determined that the pump casing was cracked and the impeller severely damaged. The extent of the damage required pump replacemen The procedure is a Category II procedure and requires a review prior to performance. In this case, the operators failed to ensure they understood which portions of the procedure were being performed and did not adequately communicate individual step requirements during procedure performanc Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.2.6 requires one boric acid transfer pump to be in service when operating with a boric acid storage system acting as the TS required source of borated wate The No. 11 BAT pump was in service prior to and after the damage to the No. 12 BAT pump, therefore satisfying TS requirement The licensee took appropriate corrective actions to emphasize the requirements for formal communication and procedural compliance when performing coordinated activities in the plant The inspector concluded that this licensee-identified procedure violation should not be cited, because the criteria in Section V.G.1. of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
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5 Open Item Followup (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272/89".'26-02: Programmatic weal_messes with respect to reporting engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations per 10CFR50. 72 reporting requirements. As noted in NRC Inspection No. 50-272/91~19, previous licensee action on this.issue was neither timely nor effective. However, revised ESF actuation reportability guidance was issued to both the Salem and Hope Creek Operation Managers by letter dated August 29, 1991. The inspector reviewed the most recent guidance and concluded that it was consistent with NRC reportability requirements and current guidance (NUREG-1022).
Additionally, a review of recent ESF actuations indicated that station personnel have adhered to the revised reportability guidanc This item is close (Closed) Violation 50-272/90-05-03: Control of combustible material. The licensee responded to the violation in a letter dated May 14, 1990. Corrective actions included removal of the material, re-instruction given to fire protection personnel, counselling of personnel involved, issuance of a letter to all station personnel, revision to the nuclear administrative procedure (NAP-25), and a walkdown of other safety related areas. Based on these acceptable actions, this item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272&311/90-81-09: Licensee performance of containment walkdowns. The licensee improved their procedures and processes for containment walkdowns in accordance with procedure PI/S-CONT-1. The inspector verified these corrective actions and accompanied licensee personnel on recent containment entries and walkdowns. This item is considered close.2.2 Hope Creek Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System Walkdown Update (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-354/91-19-01: On October 17, 1991, the inspector performed an independent walkdown of the SLC System to verify system operability and conformance to design. (See NRC Inspection Report 50-354/91-19, Section 2.2.2.A for details.) The licensee accomplished a number of corrective actions in response to the inspector's findings and documented the results in a November 5, 1991 letter. Revisions which appeared to adequately address those procedure-related deficiencies were submitted to procedures HC.OP-SO.BH-001 (Q), HC.OP-IS.BR-OOl(Q) and HC.OP-ST.BH-002(Q). Material deficiencies were noted to have either been rectified completely or partially by the generation-of work requests, as appropriate. The level of housekeeping in SLC equipment room was acceptable. The licensee's Nuclear Safety Review Group was assigned responsibility for addressing the programmatic weakness relative to incorporation of procedure changes in all affected procedures. The licensee approved a revision to procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0032, "Preparation, Review and Approval of Procedures," on December 23, 1991. The inspector reviewed the applicable changes in Section 5 and the new verification checklist, Form NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0032-10, and determined that the revisions established sufficient guidelines to ensure that changes to one procedure would be
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considered for incorporation, if appropriate, in both companion and related procedures. The inspector concluded that these corrective actions appropriately addressed the unresolved issu This item is close.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS Inspection Activities PSE&G' s conformance with the radiological protection program was verified on a periodic basi These inspection activities were conducted in *accordance with NRC inspection procedures 71707, 83750 and 9370.2 Personnel Dosimetry Program*
3.2.1 General I 0 CFR Part 20 requires that the licensee use personnel monitoring devices accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP).
On October 7-9, 1991, a NVLAP on-site assessment of the licensee's personnel monitoring program was performed. The assessment identified 21 apparent problems. The assessment was performed refative 'to 15 CFR 7, National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program Procedures and the NVLAP Program Handboo The inspector reviewed the findings to determine if the apparent problems affected the capability of the licensee;s personnel dosimetry
. program to adequately monitor personnel exposure to radiatio.2.2 Dosimetry Program The licensee implements a personnel dosimetry program for the Salem and Hope Creek stations that uses a Panasonic Model UD-802 thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD). The dosimeter provides personnel monitoring capabilities for gamma and beta radiation but can also be used for neutron monitoring when a special algorithm is applied. Currently, the licensee relies on a vendor to provide neutron monitorin The licensee's Panasonic Program was initially NVLAP accredited in 1984 and continues to be accredited through October, 1992. The initial 1984 NVLAP accreditation involved proficiency testing by irradiation of the TLD's with certain types of radiation outlined in the applicable testing standard (ANSI N13.11). The licensee has been in conformance with the NVLAP criteria since initial application. The licensee's neutron monitor (film badge) was also NVLAP accredite Although the licensee's dosimeter results have generally exhibited a slightly high bias resulting.
in readings slightly above the actual true exposure, the licensee has been able to adequately
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measure personnel radiation exposure. In 1987, NVLAP initiated an on-site assessment program to supplement the proficiency testing. The licensee has generally exhibited good performance during the on-site assessmen_t.2.3 Program Assessment Findings The findings of the October 1991, NVLAP Assessment identified a number of weaknesses in the dosimetry program. The weaknesses were identified in the areas of organization, management, and facilities. The inspector's review indicated that the prinicipal findings involved the loss of key personnel responsible for implementing the NVLAP Program, Le., the Principal Engineer (NVLAP Authorized Representative) and the Radiation Protection Supervisor - Radiation Protection/Chemistry Services (NVLAP Technical Director), and the assumptiOn of program
- responsibilities by individuals with limited knowledge of NVLAP requirements. As a result of the identified wea.1,rnesses,. the licen*see implemented or was in the process of implementing the
. following actions:
The licensee reorganized the Radiation Protection Services - Dosimetry Group to enhance its technical and managerial capabilitie The licensee retained a consultant to assist in the implementation of corrective measures and provide additional staff support.
The licensee_ developed a long-term project team, and a procedure development team and provided additional technical support for the Dosimetry Superviso The licensee developed a plan to upgrade the training progra The licensee is in the process of reviewing previous Quality Assurance Audits and NVLAP assessments to ensure that appropriate actions were taken and completed for identified finding The licensee is in the process of reviewing the dosimetry processing algorithm in use and has temporarily suspended processing of TLDs. The licensee indicated that processing would not resume until applicable program findings are resolved and appropriate personnel were trained. As a contingency measure, the licensee has established a contract with a personnel dosimetry vendor and has made arrangements with another nuclear facility for supplementary dosimetry processin.2.4. Conclusion The inspector's review indicated that there did not appear to be a degradation in the capability of the licensee's program to adequately monitor personnel radiation exposure and meet applicable NRC personnel radiation exposure monitoring requirements. However, the licensee's failure to recognize and appropriately respond to the departure of key personnel to ensure I
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applicable NRC personnel radiation exposure monitoring requirements. However, the licensee's failure to recognize and appropriately respond to the departure of key personnel to ensure continued conformance with applicable NVLAP requirements indicated apparent weaknesses in the oversight of the dosimetry program. The inspector concluded that the licensee took timely and* aggressive corrective actions once the NVLAP assessment findings were brought to its attentio The inspector identified apparent procedure implementation weaknesses relative to: 1) laboratory inter-comparison of dosimetry irradiation results, 2) completion of blind testing evaluations, 3)
completion of documentation for competency evaluations of dosimetry personnel, and 4) bi~
annual review of procedures. The licensee's action on these matters is considered unresolved pending completion of corrective measures. (50-272&311/91-28-01 and 354/91-21-01). Salem Containment Entry At Power The licensee made a Unit 2 containment entry on October 31 ~ 1991 in order to inspect and stroke test the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) 2PR1 and 2PR (See section 4.3.1.A.) The entry was performed in accordance with procedure SC.RP-TI-ZZ-110 The entry team was composed of operations, system engineering, and radiation protection personnel. Prior to entry, a meeting was conducted and attended by the entry team, site protection, safety, and management personne The inspector accori1panied the containment entry, including attendance at the pre-entry.
meetin The inspector verified that the containment entry was conducted per the procedure. Radiation protection measures were appropriate, including neutron surveys and dosimetry. The inspector concluded that the licensee displayed conservative and safe actions in conducting this at-power containment entr The inspector concluded that the licensee demonstrated a conservative approach to radiation protectio Open Item Followup (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272/89-15-08: High oxygen concentration in the Unit 1 waste decay tank. In NRC Inspection No. 50-272/91-20, the inspector determined that the root causes of the frequent high oxygen concentration were system design deficiencies and procedure weaknesses, and noted that the Salem Revitalization Program was addressing the system design evaluation. During thi_s inspection, the inspector verified that the appropriate Unit 1 and 2 procedures, ARP-OHA-D, "Alarm Response Procedure
- Gas Analyzer Trouble," and OP Il-12.3.1, "Gaseous \\Vaste Disposal System - Normal Operation," were revised to address the previously identified procedure weaknesses. The i1ispector had no further questions. This item is close '*
9 Hope Creek Monitoring of Sew~ge Sludge General During routine sampling and analysis of sewage sludge on November 12, 1991, low level concentrations of radioactivity were identified. The principle radionuclides were Zn-65,
. Mn-54, and Co-60. Confirmatory samples were collected and analyzed. As a result of confirmation of the low levels of radioactivity, the licensee did not release the sewage for off-site disposal but rather transferred the sewage to the "old" Hope Creek Treatment plant. On November 22, 1991, the licensee issued a Radiological Occurrence Report on this matte Currently, the licensee has 5,000 gallons of sewage sludge isolated with an estimated*
radioactivity of 9 microcuries (uCi) of Zinc 65. At the current generation rates, the licensee has sufficient space to provide on-site storage for about one year. The licensee is currently evaluating disposal option Licensee Follow-up Actions The licensee established a task force to review and evaluate the causes of the contamination, performed surveys of non-contaminated drains including sewage and collection points, and identified and isolated the source of the contamination to the "E" sewage collection lift station for the Hope Creek Administrative Building. As a remedial measure, the sewage discharge from the lift station has been re-routed to an oxidation ditch for holdin The licensee's review indicated that ten percent or less of the sewage was solids and that the solids contained essentially all the radioactivity. The licensee has the capability to hold-up all sewage generated on-site for a year. The licensee is currently evaluating options for the disposal of the contaminated sewage sludge'.
The licensee's normal disposal methods are the release of liquids off-site via discharge into the cooling tower blowdown and the release of sewage solids via transport to an off-site incinerato The licensee analyzed inputs to. the lift station and concluded that mop water and carpet cleaning residue from the Hope Creek Administrative Building was the source of the contaminatio The licensee concluded that very low levels of radioactivity were apparently tracked out of the radiological controlled area and later concentrated in the wash water used for cleaning areas outside of the RCA. Subsequently, the wash water was dumped into floor drains which were directed to the sewage system.
Upon identification of the problem, the licensee suspended dumping wash water to the sewage system. Currently, wash water is transferred to the detergent drain tank for processing by the radwaste system. Recent samples of influent to the sewage treatment'
facility jndicates no radioactivity above environmental lower limits of detectio As a result of this problem, the.licensee reviewed the contamination control practices at the Hope Creek station and conducted that no apparent weaknesses. were present. The licensee performed. smear sampling for loose surface contamination outside the RCA and did not identify any radioactive contaminatio The licensee had previously enhanced the contamination control program to address identification of Zn-65 radioactivity relative to guidance contained in NRC Circular 81-07. Further, on May 23,. 1991, the licensee established and implemented instructions to provide for enhansed monitoring of potentialiy contaminated materia After identification of the low level concentrations of radionuclides in the sewage sludge, the licensee initiated use of sticky mats to retain low level activity that may be tracked by personnel. The licensee also plans to implement a pilot program to use shoe covers in the RC The licensee evaluated the contaminated sewage system relative to IE Bulletin 80-10 and
. concluded that the system could be operated with no radiological impac *
Radionuclide Detection
. The NRC has taken a position that sewage sludge should be analyzed to environmental radioactivity levels to detect any apparent radioactivity. This position was provided in NRC Information Notice 88-22. The licensee has received and reviewed Information 88-
. 22, which recommended that sewage samples should be counted to a lower limit of detection (LLD) appropriate to environmental sample However, the licensee has interpreted this to mean reasonableness of count times with existing equipmen Consequently, the licensee previoulsly analyzed sewage sludge to to conform to effluent LLD level *
Subsequent to the identification of contamination in the sewage sludge using the effluent LLDs, the licensee contacted the NRC and determined that an analysis to environmental LLDs should be performe Samples of the sewage subsequently counted at environmental levels showed good comparison of sample activity results, as compared to counting at effluent LLD levels, with a decrease in erro The licensee made a procedure change on December 3, 1991 to provide for counting sewage sludge samples to environmental levels. Appropriate supervisors were notified of the procedure change.
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The licensee currently provides for analysis of all liquids and semi-solids at environmental LLDs. The licensee will composite samples sent off-site for analysis of bulk liquids and free-flowing solid The inspector's preliminary review of this matter indicated the licensee's contamination control program, refative.to the identified problem, was consistent with IE Circular 81.:.07 and IE Bulletin 80-1 The licensee's review and evaluation of disposal options for the sewage and actions to preclude tracking of very low levels of radioactivity outside the RCA is an unresolved item (50-354/91-21-02).
- Third Refueling Outage Report Review The inspector reviewed the licensee's report detailing the third refueling outage (RF03)
performance of the radiation protection department in the areas of personnel radiation exposure, control of contamination, ALARA reviews, and radiological incidents. Based in part on the results of the previous refueling outages, the licensee had set aggressive goals for total personnel exposure (less than 270 Rem, later changed to less than 300 Rem due to emergent work) and number of personnel contaminations (less than 110).
. While both goals were slightly exceeded (316 Rem and 129 personnel contaminations),
the inspector noted that performance in each *area was significantly better than the previous refueling outage when considering that about 25 percent more work was performed in RF0 *
(Details of inspection findings during RF03 may be found in NRC Inspection Reports 50-354/91-01 and 91-04.)
- The inspector noted that the report identified very useful information relative to specific ALARA reviews of activities performed by various departments during the outage, and detailed recommendations* for resolving several types of problems that are likely to be encountered in future outages. The report also identified several radiation protection recommendations derived from RF03 experience The inspector concluded that the RP RF03 report was well written and thorough. The lessons learned and recommendations, if implemented, could provide significant performance enhancements for the fourth refueling outage scheduled to start in September 199.
- MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE TESTING 4.1
. Maintenance Inspection Activity The inspectors observed selected maintenance activities on safety-related equipment to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and appropriate industrial codes and standards. These inspections were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 6270 Portions of the following activities were observed by the inspector:
Salem 1&2 Salem Salem 2 Salem 1&2 Hope Creek Hope Creek
- Work Request (WR)/Order (WO) or Procedure Various WO and troubleshooting plan Various Various W0911028131 W0911205151 Description Service water leaks IB safeguards equipment cabinet (SEC) troubleshooting Turbine generator disassembly /inspection Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance (2C, 2A, lA)
"B" Reactor Protection Motor Generator Set replacement System bearing High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Isolation Valve FOOl steam leak With the exception of the lB SEC actuation caused by a technician error (See Section 2.2.1.A),
the maintenance activities inspected were effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives of the maintenance progra * * Surveillance Testing Inspection Activity The inspectors performed detailed technical procedure reviews, witnessed in-progress surveillance testing, and reviewed completed surveillance packages. The inspectors verified that the surveillance tests were performed in ac~ordance with Technical Specifications, approved procedures, and NRC regulations. These inspection activities were conducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 61726.
The following surveillance tests were reviewed, with portions witnessed by the inspector:
Salem 1 Salem 2 Salem 1 Salem 1 Hope Creek Hope Creek Procedure N SP(0)4.8. l. SP(0)4.0.5. V-MISC Sl.MD-FT.SEC-0002(Q)
Sl.MD-FT.4KV-0002(Q)
OP-ST.KJ-002 OP-IS.BE-002 lB and lC diesel generator tests Power Operated Relief Valves lB (SEC)
Sequencer Monthly Surveillance Test Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Monthly Functional Test
"B" Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly
"B" Core Spray Loop 92 Day Run The surveillance testing activities inspected were effective witli respect to meeting the safety objectives of the surveillance testfog program. * Inspection Findings 4.3.1 Salem Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
The Unit 2 PORVs were inspected/tested on Octo\\Jer 31, 1991. This was in response to PORV failures as described in NRC Inspection 50-272 and 311/91-26. The inspector accompanied the licensee during the local valve inspection and testing, and observed the following items:
The 2PR1 valve was successfully stroked and held in the open 'position. No air leaks were identified, and the valve was close Lifting eye bolts were installed at two locations on each of the 2PR1 and 2PR2 actuator The lifting eye bolts had a shoulder area that appeared to be equivalent to the installed bolt head are The installed actuator bolts on 2PR1 were of varying length. The nut was flush with the bolt at three locations. Varying bolt lengths were not observed on the 2PR2 valve.
Teflon tape was noted on the control air threaded fittings. Teflon tape application was evaluated in engineering evaluation S-C-ZZ-MEE-0442 and alternate material guidance using grafoil was given in field directive S-C-A900-MFP-29 No operability issues were identified or created during the inspection and valve strokin The inspector verified that the licensee had *developed a PORV Action Plan to be implemented on both Salem Unit 1 and 2 PORVs. The plan includes the establishment of a PORV stroke testing/inspection schedule on about a monthly frequency, with appropriate planned contingency actions. On November 6, 1991, Unit 1 PORV No. 1PR2 was tested in accordance with the proposed schedule and failed to stroke successfully due to excessive air leakage. The licensee replaced the diaphragm for the valve actuator using the enhanced torquing process and subsequently stroke tested 1PR2 satisfactorily on November 7, 1991. All other PORV stroke
- tests were completed as scheduled and tested successfully, with some air leakage recently observed on lPR The licensee's.Action Plan documents proposed corrective actions, such as diaphragm material replacement, new actuator design (24-bolt pattern), enhanced incremental torquing sequence, and pressurizer insulation replacemen The inspector concluded that the licensee's currently proposed PORV Action Plan is adequate to effectively monitor PORV performance and is being properly implemented. The inspector had no further questions. Open Item Followup (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272/89-15-02: Conduct of pump surveillance tests and evaluation of test Tesults. The licensee was questioned regarding criteria for rerunning surveillance tests and conducting engineering evaluations with more than one set of data availabl *
The inspector reviewed current pump inservice testing and data evaluation guideline Procedures provide explicit guidance to data reviewers and system engineers regarding conduct of tests, operability determinations, and evaluation of duplicate data set Discussions with licensee personnel verified their understanding of these requirements. The inspector concluded that the licensee has appropriately addressed this item. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272 and 311/90-81-10: Surveillance test data calculational error for the number 11 boric acid transfer (BAT) pump. Licensee actions included verification of pump operability, counselling of engineering and operations personnel, procedural enhancements, pump baseline re-verification, and performance of a safety evaluation to assure design basis performance. Based on the acceptability of these actions, this item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272/90-13-02: Belzona repair performed on the No. 12 charging pump. This item was discussed onsite and at the NRC Region I office. The licensee stated that the repair was performed in 1980 and did not affect the ASME pressure retaining materia NRC specialist personnel also reviewed this issue. The licensee stated that this type of repair
would probably not be performed currently. The pump casing was replaced with a new one during the 1990 outage. Based on the above, this item is close ~3.2 Hope Creek.
- Inadvertent Core Spray Pump Start Update On October 22, 1990, a personnel-error during the performance of a surveillance caused the inadvertent start of the "A" core spray pump.* No reactor vessel injection occurred as the injection valve low reactor pressure opening permissive was not satisfied. (See NRC Inspection Report 50-354/90-20, Section 4.3.2.A for a discussion of this event.) The licensee's corrective actions were described in Licensee Event Report (LER) 90-22. However, the LER. did not specifically address propet identification and labeling of electrical components, cables, and*
terminal positions. The inspector discussed the issue with maintenance department managemen Previously maintenance management representatives met with maintenance technicians on*
October 31, 1990 reiterate and reinforce policy and training requirements on this matte. Management indicated that their expectations would be reiterated during the technicians'
continuing training lectures and that an enhanced labeling method: would be develope After extensive evaluation of a number of alternatives, the licensee approved the use of colored, non-conducting plastic spring dips in mid-1991. This method appeared to have been well received and effective in preventing mis-identification of leads. There have been no similar occurrences since the spring clips were introduce On November 4, 1991, the licensee submitted a revision to LER 90-22.describing these additional corrective actions. The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions appeared appropriate and effectiv * EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Inspection Activity The inspector reviewed PSE&G's conformance with 10CFR50.47 regarding implementation of*
the emergency plan and procedures. In addition, licensee event notifications and reporting requirements per 10CFR50. 72 and 73 were reviewe.2 Inspection Findings A.*
Emergency Drills and Annual Exercise Two emergency drills and the annual NRC graded exercise were conducted during this report period. Oir October 23 and November 6,' 1991, the Hope Creek station conducted emergency
- drills. The inspector observed and participated in the drill from the control room, the technical support center, and the operations support center. Drill performance was evaluated to be good,
and the IiCensee successfully demonstrated that they could protect the public health and safet The licensee simulated an NRC Site Team during the November 6th drill. This was a new in.itiative and was determined to be beneficia *
The annual NRCevaluated emergency exercise was conducted on December 5, 1991. (See NRC Inspection 50-272 and 311/91-27 and 50-354/91-20.) Salem Unusual Event and Alert An unusual event and an alert were declared at Salem Unit 2 during the turbine-generator failure and fire. (See NRC Inspection 50-311/91-81.).SECURITY Inspection Activity PSE&G's conformance with the seeurity program was verified on a periodic basis, including the adequacy of staffing, entry control, alarm stations, and physical boundaries. These inspection activities were co.nducted in accordance with NRC inspection procedure 7170.2 Inspection Findings The inspectors determined that security program implementatiQn was appropriat.
ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT.Salem Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow in Steam Line Break (SLB) Analysis Preliminary PSE&G calculation of AFW.f1ow during postulated SLB transients indicated that original flow assumptions in FSAR Table 10.4.2 were too low (non conservative). Verification of the revised flow rates is in progress. An initial assessment of impact on the SLB analyses using Salem Unit 1 cycle IO-parameters indicated no safety limits will be exc~ed, and the plant is operating within its design basis.. This assessment is based on preliminary calculations presently being verified. Impact on Salem Unit 2 and previous Salem Unit 1 cycles has not been evaluate Based on this, at 1:30 p.m. on December 13, 1991, the licensee reported this condition to the NRC via the ENS phon With higher than expected AFW flow, containment pressure increase is higher than expected, and a higher primary cooldown results in a lower shut down margin. Licensee review of thi discovery is continuing; this item will remain unresolved pending completion of licensee actions and subsequent NRC review. (50-272 and 311/91-28-02)
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17 Open Item Followup (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272/89-15-04!
Engineering eyaluation of pump operabilit Licensee evaluation did not contain sufficient information to justify operability determinatio Technical Department instructions were reviewed to determine current guidance provided to system engineers performing evaluations of pump surveillance data.* Representative evaluations were examined and determin_ed to be adequate. Discussions wlth system engineers demonstrated their knowledge and use of the guidance regarding engineering evaluations. The inspector concluded that licensee response to this item has been effective in improving the quality of engineering evaluations. This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Items 50-272 and 311/89-23-02 and 03: Incomplete review of° an industry operational event in which th_e input electrical power for the A TWS Mitigation Systems Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) system was de-energized. Also, the AMSAC was not lined up as *required by the procedure *during surveillance testin The inspector verified that the licensee's subsequent. review provided a sufficient basis. for the conclusion that a similar event
- would not occur at Salem. The licensee concluded that the surveillance test was acceptable and initiated a revision. No additional licensee actions were therefore necessary, and these items are close (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272 and 31i/90-81-22: Teflon tape within containment. The Integrated Performance Assessment Team (!PAT) (NRC Inspection 50-272 and 311/90-81) *
identified the use of teflon tape within containment. *Teflon tape was found to be used to seal certain threaded pipe connections and was found available for use in the containment Instrumentation and Control work cage. The licensee completed Engineering Evaluation S-C- *
ZZ-MEE-0442, Revision 1, "Use of Teflon Tape for Stainless Steel Pipe Threaded Connections Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2," dated May 31, 1990.. The licensee concluded that the presence of teflon tape on stainless steel threaded connections has no adverse impact on system operations. On. May 21, 1990, the Station Planning engineer issued a memorandum to the operations engineers and to the maintenance department management personnel stating that Grafoil tape, Folio x37-0111, should be used instead of teflon tape in the auxiliary buildings, mechanical penetration rooms, and containmen Additionally, on fone 21, 1990, the Manager - Nuclear Engineering Design, iss:ued a memorandum to the General Manager - Salem Operations, reiterating the discontinued use of teflon tape inside the containment and auxiliary buildings. This item is close :2 Hope Creek Cycle Four Fuel Management The nuclear fuel for fuel cycle four was loaded into the core during the third refueling outage (RF03) in January/February 1991. In order to accommodate the longer cycle length (about22
months), the reload consisted of 500 GE7 design and 264 GE9 design fl,lel assemblies. Both designs utilize a basic 8x8 fuel rod array per assembl However,.there are significant differences:
GE9 fuel has a single large water rod, displacing four fuel rods, while GE7 fuel has two smaller water rods.*
GE9 fuel is enriched to 3.25%, GE7 between 2.48 and 3.0%.
GE9 fuel has axial gadolinia (burnable poison) and uranium enrichments, while these enrichments in GE7 fuel are constant (homogeneous) along the fuel rod's lengt Using the predictive performance codes supplied by the fuel vendor, General Electric (GE),
resulted in a number of operational differences; the most significant of which was an increase in the maximum linear heat generation rate (LHGR) from the GE7 design limit of 13.4 kW/ft to 14.4 kW/ft. The Core Operating Limits Report for cycle four (licensee submittal NLR-N91012, dated January 24, 1991) provides allthe core operating limits in the current mixed GE7 and GE9 fuel clad core. Additional details on cycle four core management were provided to the operations staff on February 1, 1991, in letter HTE-91-0037, which were also incorporated into the operators' required reading and lesson plan On August 9, 1991, a control rod pattern adjustment was made to increase the fuel's margin to LHGR as the power density had reached 13.11 kW/ft. This value was about 10% higher than that predicted by the original design. In licensee letter NFV-91-514, from the Nuclear Fuels Group to Hope Creek management, dated August 28, 1991, the licensee stated that the fuels group had performed economic, safety, and reliability design reviews prior to purchasing GE9 fuel. The results of the reviews were satisfactory for the economic issues but were inconclusive on certain safety and reliability aspects if the GE9 fuel was operated at its designed thermal limits (including 14.4 kW/ft). However, using GE7 design limits, the GE9 fuel was considered at least as safe and reliable, and perhaps superior to GE7 fuel. It was also pointed out that both the licensee's and GE's predictive capabilities were inadequate for a mixed core of GE7 and GE9 fuel. Until resolution of the issue, the fuels group recommended that a maximum LHGR of 13.4 kW/ft, the same as GE7 fuel, be applied to GE9 fuel. Station management concurred, and the necessary changes to the process computer were made on September 12, 1991 via design change package (DCP) No. 4E0328 Since that time, a number of control rod pattern adjustments have been required to maintain LHGR conservativeiy below 13.4 kW/f On November 7, 1991, the NRC resident staff met with licensee personnel from the Nuclear Fuels Group to discuss the observed problems with GE9 fuel, impact on. fuel safety and reliability, and the long term effects on plant performance. The licensee reviewed the issues up to that time and showed that, while the predictive tools had not given the expected results, the core was operating (burning) as GE had designed. Margins to the maximum critical power ratio
- (MCPR) were conservative.. The licensee was tracking the fuel exposure and axial power slopes on a monthly basis and trending non-conservative changes such that prompt corrective measures (i.e. rod pattern adjustments) could be instituted before any margins were significantly reduce Following the meeting with the licensee, the resident staff discussed the fuel safety and reliability issues with NRC Headquarters technical specialist At the close of this report period, the licensee's actions to resolve the GE9 fuel issues with GE were continuin The inspector concluded that the actions taken by the licensee to address the unusual behavior of the core, including a reduction in the LHGR limit for GE9 fuel to 13.4 kW/ft were conservative and appropriate. The inspector further concluded that critical parameters were being tracked such that the development of any trends which could reduce the margin to a thermal limit would be detected before significant degradation occurre.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION
.. Salem* Unit 2 Refueling Outage Unit 2 entered its sixth refueling outage after the turbine generator failure event on November 9, 199 The reactor was disassembled and the core was offloade Maintenance and modification activities were started. _The inspectors observed various refueling outage activities, including core defueling, periodic management meetings, shift turnovers, equipment status, in-field work, etc. The inspector noted effective management oversight of all observed activitie The licensee demonstrated a conservative and proactive approach to the scheduling of work and equipment out of service. For example, the licensee removed only one power source from
. service (offsite or onsite) at a time. In addition, the licensee elected to fully offload the core to eliminate shutdown risks associated with mid-loop operation (The management meeting identified in Section 10.3 of this report pertains.) Open Item Followup (Closed) Violation 50-272/89-25-01:
Inadequate 10CFR50.59 evaluation for Emergency Operating Procedure The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation by letter dated February 8, 1990. The inspector verified that the stated corrective actions were taken, including revisions to the governing station administrative procedures, and had no further questions. This item is close (Closed) Violation 50-272/89-27-04 and Unresolved Item 50-27289-27-05: Licen-see measures, established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified,* corrected, and prevented from recurring, were not adequate following the failure of power range nuclear instrument N44 on November 9, 1989. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the violation, dated February 8, 1990, and found the response to be adequat The inspector verified that the revised administrative procedures provide sufficient guidance relative to
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evaluating conditions adverse to quality; no deficiencies were identified. The inspector als<;>
verified that root cause training for appropriate personnel have been either completed or scheduled. Subsequent similar station events have been evaluat~ in timely fashion. Based on the above, these items are close.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-272 and 311/90-81-19: Excessive overtime worked without prior management approval. Licensee corrective actions include issuance of a memorandum and a revision of administrative procedure NC,NA.-AP.ZZ-0005(Q). The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and sampled overtime records and requests. -Based on-the above, this iteni is close.2 Hope Creek Material Receipt. Inspections and Inspector Qualifications (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-354/90-24-01 and 50-272/90-28-01:
During an NRC team inspection of Artificial Island's spare parts and material control programs on December 3-7, 1990, an apparent weakness was noted in the licensee's quality assurance progra The responsibilities and qualifications of the station quality assurance (SQA) and the material control groups were not adequately integrated in applicable implementing procedures. Two specific areas of concern were noted: (1) some of the receipt inspection requirements of procedure GM9-QAP 4-1 were not always performed, and (2) SQA inspectors were not certified to perform receipt inspection of material other than contaminated or radioactive equipment' and new nuclear fue The licensee's response included letters (reference SQA 91-0080 and 91-0179) from both Salem and Hope Creek SQA managers detailing their corrective actions. The licensee contended that the station inspectors were certified to one or more of the various discipline qualification requirements which were more rigorous than those of receiving inspection requrements which were primarily administrative in nature. Receipt inspections performed by SQA personnel were of a technical verification.nature, such as visual inspeetion for damage, dimensional checks, physical identification, etc., and that their discipline certification(s) adequately qualified them to perform *such inspections. Additionally, procedure GM9-QAP 4-1 would be revised to clearly delineate the responsibilities and acceptability of SQA personnel in performance of station receipt inspection After a review of the discipline SQA certification requirements and noting that the requirements of the receipt inspection checklist used were primarily administrative in nature and covered by SQA inspector training, the inspector concurred with the SQA manager's assessment that SQA inspection personnel were qualified and, by the nature of their SQA certification, certified to perform receipt inspections. Procedure GM9-QAP 4-1, Revision 9 was revised and, along with four other procedures, incorporated into a new procedure, ND.QA-AP.ZZ-0013(Q), "Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and Services Program," which was approved on November 15. 1991. The inspector reviewed the sections of this procedure dealing with QA inspector l
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qualifications (Section 5.1) and SQA activities (Section 5.4) and concluded that they adequately addressed the concerns generating this unresolved item. This item is close.. LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LER)~ PERIODIC AND SPECIAL REPORTS,
. AND, OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP
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9.1 LERs and Report PSE&G submitted the following licensee even.t reports and special and periodic reports, which were reviewed for accuracy and evaluation adequac Salem and Hope Creek Monthly Operating Reports for October and November, 199 * No inadequacies were noted in these report Hope Creek Third Refueling Outage Report (See Section 3.2.3.B).
Salem LERs Unit 1 LERs 91-32, 34, and 35 concerned radiation monitor actuations caused by a failure of the 1R11 A and 1Rl2A monitors. Licensee corrective actions are consistent with long and short term actions previously discussed. No inadequacies were noted relative to these LER LER 91-33 (See Section 2.2.1.A).
Unit 2 LER 91-14 documented a radiation monitor actuation caused by a failure of 2R12B on October 10, 1991. The event was reviewed in NRC Inspection 50-311191-26. No inadequacies were noted relative to this LE LER 91-15 documented an entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to two power range channels less conservative (2 % low) than the required 1. 74 %. This occurred at 4:00 a.m. on October 21, 1991 while at 30% power during power ascension. The TS was exited at 4:25 when the channels were adjusted. The cause of the non-conservatism was abnormal flux levels that occurred* during a power transient with Unit 2 late in its core life. Licensee corrective actions included TS compliance, channel adjustment, and a* re-evaluation of setpoint methodology. The inspector concluded that licensee actions appeared appropriate, and the
. inspector had no further questions at this time. *
. LER 91-19 documented a radiation monitor actuation caused by the noble gas 2Rl2A monito The monitor had been set to trip at two times background in accordance with Technical Specification. The core was offloaded and the steam generator primary manway diaphragms
were being removed. This caused a small amount of noble gas to be released. No offsite release occurred. Normal 2Rl2A setpoint is 20,000 cpm. The lower setpoint was 240 cpm, and the highest reading was 500 cpm. No inadequacies were noted relative to this LE Hope Creek LER 90-22-01 (See Section 4.3.2.A).
LER 91-19 described the spurious start of the "E" Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System (FRVS) fan due to moisture in the "C" FRVS fan low flow switch. This event is similar to one described in LER 91-18, which is discussed in detail in NRC Inspection Report 50-354/91-19. No significant discrepancies were noted in this LE.2 Open Items The following previous inspection items were followed up during this inspection and are tabulated below for cross reference purpose /89-26-02 272/90-05-03 272&3 l l /90-81-09 272/89-15-08 272/89-15-02 272&311/90-81-10 272/90-13-02 272/89-15-04 272&311189-23-02&03 272&3 I 1 /90-81-22 272&311/90-81-19 272/89-25-01 272/89-27-04&05 272/90-28-01 Hope Creek 354/91-19-01 354/90-24-01 Report Sectfon 2.2..2..2..2..3..3..3.........2.. Clos~
Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed
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1 EXIT INTERVIEWS/MEETINGS 1 Resident Exit Meeting The inspectors met with Mr. C. Vondra and Mr. J. Hagan and other PSE&G personnel periodically and at the end of.the inspection report period to summarize the scope and findings of their inspection activitie Based on Region I review and discussions with PSE&G, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CPR 2 restriction.2 Specialist Entrance and Exit Meetings Date(s)
11 /4-8/91 12/2-13/91 12/4-6/91 12/9-13/91 12/16-20/91 12/16-20/91 12117-20/91 Subject Security Engineering Emergency Exercise Operator Licensin Operator Licensing
~adiological Controls In service Inspection I Management Meetings Inspection Report N &311/91-29; 354/91-22
.272&311/91-30; 354/91-23 272&311/91-27; 354/91-20 354/91-25 272&311/91-31 272/91-32; 311191-33 311/91-32'
Reporting Inspector Albert Woodard Gordon Fish Silk Nimitz
- Patnaik On December 9, 1991, a management meeting was held to discuss PSE&G's activities related to the three (both Salem Units and Hope Creek) refueling outages scheduled for 1992.
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The licensee disc.ussed their plans, work scope, * schedules, shutdown risk management, manpower loading, etc. A list of attendees is included in Attachment 1. Attachment 2 is a copy of the licensee's handou *
ATTACHMENT 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES DECEMBER 9, 1991 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R. Blough, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
J.. White, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2A, DRP, RI T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector S. Barr, Resident Inspector K. Lathrop, Resident Inspector J: Stone, Salem Project Manager, NRR I. Moghissi, Reactor Engineer Intern, NRR R. Schaaf, Reactor Engineer Intern, DRP, RI" PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY S. LaBruna, Vice President - Nuclear Operations C. Vondra, General Manager - Salem Operations J. Hagan, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations F. Thomson, Manager - Licensing and Regulation M. Trum, Outage Manager - Hope Creek B. O'Grady, Outage Manager - Salem B. Preston, Manager - Salem Projects M. LeFevre, External Affairs J. Trejo, Manager - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Services M. Alpaugh, Lead Engineer C. Connor, General Manager - Material Control C. Munzenmaier, General Manager - Nuclear Services C. Manges, Jr., Engineer OTHER D. Vann, NJ DEP/BNE Emergency Response T. Kolesnik, Nuclear Engineer, State of New Jersey P. Duca, Delmarva Power Site R_epresentative
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ATTACHMENT 2 Ps~G Public SerYice f:j Electric and 'Gas
_Company
PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON
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OUT AGE MANAGEMENT -
DECEMBER 9, 1991 SALEM BEN:RATIN6 STATION
AGENDA
OUTAGE MANAGEMENT INTRODUCTION PSE'6 OUTAGE PHILOSOPHY OUTAGE SCHEDULING & PERFORMANCE OUTAGE ORGANIZATION & PROCESS MJCLEAR ENGINEERING
~CLEAR SERVICES Sl.FPORT PROCUREMENT & MATERIAL CONTROL SALEM 2 OUTAGE SALEM 1 OUTAGE HOPE CREEK OUTA&E OUTAGE INCENTIVE PROGRAM SUMMARY S. l.ABRUNA
'1P - Ma 'AR CFBIATIM S. LABAUNA VP - 'la EAR CFERATIM S. LABRUNA
\\IP - 'la HR DPERATIM C. YONlRA
- ---lflml B. PFESTON
___...., __
C. fllMZBli4AIER
- - 'la,. IERYICEI 6. CCN<<>R
- -....:
B. O'GRADY
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ULEN llCIT 2.
B. O'GRADY
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BM.EN llCIT 2 M. TRUM aur* *
tlFE CJEEK J. HASAN
- Hlft IJEEK S. LABRUNA
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PSE&G/hfle ~INS ON OUTAGE NANASENENT
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. OUTAGE PHILOSPHY SCHEDULING & PERFOR_MANCE OUTAGE PHILOSOPHY -
- SAFETY FOCUS
- ORGANIZATION
- APPROACH/PROCESS *
- OUTAGE OBJECTIVES
OUTAGE.SCHEDULING OUTAGE PERFORMANCE 12/1/11
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- PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT OUTAGE PHILOSOPHY SAFETY FOCUS
- SAFETY IS OUR f 1 PRIORITY
- REACTOR SAFETY
... RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY
- INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
. *OUTAGE OPTIMIZES PLANT SAFETY & RELIABILITY-COMPONENT UPGRADES/MODIFICATIONS
- DESIGN CHANGES
- COMPONENT REPLACEMENTS/REPAIRS-CORRECTIVE & PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE-INSPECTION & TESTING
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91MM5.-1-1~/9./91
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PSE&G/NRC _MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT OUTAGE PHILOSOPHY (CONT)
SAFETY FOCUS (CONT)
- *SAFETY BUILT INTO SCHEDULING
--Focus ON PRE-PLANNING-RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT (ACTIVITIES & PLANT CONFIGURATION)
-SUPPORTS AN ATTENTION TO DETAIL APPROACH ORGANIZATIO *DEDICATED OUTAGE ORGANIZATION
- DEDICATED OPERATING UNIT RESOURCES
- NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT SUPPORT TEAM 12/1/11
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT OUTAGE PHILOSOPHY (CONT)
APPROACH/PROCESS
- EXTENSIVE FRONT ENO PLANNING, SO£Dll.IM6 ;
REVIEW (WITH RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT)
- MATCH OF WORK SCOPE & RESOURCES
- CONTINGENCY PLANNING
- MAXIMIZE USE OF ESTABLISHED POLICIES, STANDARDS
& PROCEDURES e EFFECTIVE COtiiMJNICATIONS
- SHIFT TURNOVER
- MANAGEMENT INTERFACE
- DEPARTMENT WIDE (NUCLEAR TODAY)
- INCENTIVE PROGRAM WITH SAFETY FOCUS e TRACK & MONITOR PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT 121v11
- PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT OUTAGE PHILOSOPHY (CONT)
OUTAGE OBJECTIVES
- SAFE COMPLETION OF ALL OUTAGE ACTIVITIES
- SAFETY FOCUSED POST OUTAGE PLANT STARTUP
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- ASSURE SAFE & RELIABLE OPERATION OF ALL UNITS-NON-OUTAGE OPERATING UNITS
- OUTAGE UNIT (DURING & POST OUTAGE)
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PSE&6/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT OUTAGE SCHEDULING & PERFORMANCE
- 3 PLANTS NECESSITATE 2 OUTAGES PER CALENDAR YEAR
- PAST OUTAGE SCHEDULES
- BACK TO BACK
- OVERLAPPING OUTAGES
- 3 OUTAGES IN 12 MONTH WINDOW
- OUTAGE ORGANIZATION PROVIDES-CONTINUOUS OUTAGE PLANNING-SMOOTH TRANSITION INTO & OUT OF OUTAGES-CONTINUUM OF PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
- CONSISTENT & IMPROVING PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN THE NORM AT SALEM & HOPE CREEK 91MM5-5 12/9/91
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REV*IEW OF SALEM & HOPE CREEK MAJOR OUTAGES.
HOPE SI 1§§1-e E
m CREEK MID 1 RO MID 2 RO 3 RO SALEM ISBSS Em 881 UNIT 2
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£88881 UNIT 1 7~
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JUN JAN JUN JAN JUN JAN JUN JAN JUN JAN 1987 1988 1919 1990 1991
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91~-33 12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANASEMENT
OUTAGE ORGANIZATION & PROCESS OUTAGE ORGANIZATION
- ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
- OUT AGE MANAGER
- OUT AGE MANAGEMENT TEAM
OUTAGE _RISK MANAGEMENT OUTAGE PROCESS MANNING/CONTRACTORS/OVERTIME MANAGEMENT OF OUTAGES (CONCLUSIONS)
- . -.
- I OPERATIONS MANAGER I
OUTAGE
~CT IWWER
ORGANIZATIONAL CHAR SALEM & HOPE CREEK OPERATIONS
.r l:RAL MANABER IPERATIONS TECHNICAL twl/GIBI I
OUT NI **
PROJECT MAM8EA RAD PAO ctEMISTRY MANA8ER I
I
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..... --..
PL#t1IN6 SC~IN6 STAFF
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PUNNDll*&
FINMCI Wll'tHUL MAINTBWICE M4Hf9P?
..... _.~
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t2/1/1 tftf -- mrl'M'J! PAD.ET 1WME1 Allll m AT... ITATml
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OUTAGE IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT ORGANIZATION STATION GENERAL MANAGER I
I OUTAGE MANAGER OUTAGE PLANNING I
SHIFT AREA
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OUTAGE COORDINATOR SHIFT MANAGER
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STATION NUCLEAR ENGINEERING ANO MANAGEMENT SERVICES PLANT BETTERMENT
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I OPERATIONS
!* SITE PROTECTION I
PROJECT MGMT I
I I
TECHNICAL
- RAO PRO SERVICES I
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ut::i~Mmrr I
I*~*--*-
'~TION I
MAINTENANCE I SITE SERVICES I
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I CHEM/RAO PRO PROCUREMENT ANO
- ouALITY ASSURANCE MATERIAL CONTROL 12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT OUTAGE MANAGER
- YEAR ROUND OUTAGE MANAGER FOR EACH UNIT (WITH PLANNIN6/SCJ-EDULIN6 TEAM)
- SINGLE POINT ACCOUNT ABILITY
- PRIMARY INTERFACE FOR OUTAGE PROBLEMS
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91MM5-6 12(9/91
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PSE&S/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE -MANAGEMENT OUTAGE MANGER (CONT)
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PRE-OUTAGE RESPONSIBILITIES
- ESTABLISH OUTAGE SCOPE
- SETTING PL~IN6 MILESTONES
- DEVELOPMENT OF OUT AGE SCHEDULES
- RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSllENT OF SCHEDULE
- MONITORING OF OUTAGE PERFORMANCE OUTAGE PROBLEM/INTERFACE RESPONSIBILITIES
- SCHEDULE DEVIATION
- ASSESSMENT 9F ~LE CHANGES
- PROCUREMENT ISSUES
- CONTRACT & CONTRACTOR ISSUES
- PSE&G SERVICES SUPPORT ISSUES
- e DESIGN CHANGE ISSUES
- OUTAGE SCOPE CHANGES
- ..
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12/9/91
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PSE&G/N=IC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANlSEJBIT OUTAGE RISK MANAGEMENT
- THE. OBJECTIVE IS TO MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF:
- - FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS BREECHED
- SAFETY SYSTEMS RE~RED INOPEAASLE OR PLACED AT RISK
- CONFIGURATIONS/CONOITIOHS ASSESSED IN SCHEDUL PREPARATION-DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY
- EMERGENCY PONER SOURCES
- OFFS I TE POWER SOURCES
- CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
- RCS CHAAGIN& FLOW PATHS
- MIDLOOP CJIERA TIONS
- INVENTORY CONTROL
- TIME FROM SHUT DOWN TO OPENING OF RCS
- REACTIVITY CONTROL
- MANPOWER/RES~CE LOADING
.12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT OUTAGE RISK MANAGEMENT (CONT)
ADDITIONAL SCHEDULING ISSUES
- TREAT CHA~LS, TRAINS,. HEADERS & SYSTEMS UNIQUELY
- MINIMIZE WORK IN CONGESTED AREAS
- ENSURE ADEQUATE TIME FOR RETURN TO SERVICE ACTIVITIES
- TESTING
-*LINEUP
- DEVELOP CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR:
- HIGH RISK ACTIVITIES
- INSPECTION BASED ACTIVITIES SCHEDULE REVIEW & APPROVAL
- OUT AGE MANAGEMENT
- ST AT I ON MANAGEMENT
- SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS
- SAFETY REVIEW 91MM5-10 12/9/91
.I*
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PSE&G/NAC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGENENT OUTAGE PROCESS PRE-OUTAGE PLANNING
- ESTABLISH WORK SCOPE
- DEVELOP PERFORMANCE MONITORING INDICATORS &
PLANNING MILESTONES
- PREPARE DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGES
- SCt-EDULE DEVELOPMENT/REVIEW/APPROVAL
- ESTABLISH ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT (PSE&G/CONTRACT)
- COMPLETE AEOOIM:O TRAINING
- COMMENCE MClfM.. Y. MEETING
- MONITOR/TRAD( PLANNING PERFORMANCE OUTAGE IMPLEMENTATION FORMAL REVIEW & CRITIQUE *
, 12/9/91
PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT MANNING/CONTRACTORS/OVERTIM MANNING
- OUT.AGE TEAM & St.PPORT STAFFS AUGME~TED WITH:
- NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL
~ CONTRACTORS CONTRACT SUPPORT
- PROVIDES MANPOWER AND EXPERTISE (TRAINING/EXPERIENCE/EQUIPMENT)
OVERTIME CONTROL
- ENSURES SAFE & RELIABLE WORK FORCE
- NRC GUIDELINES
- IMPROVES MORALE. & PERFORMANCE
- CONTROLS COST*
1~/,t/91
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PSE&6/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT OF OUTAGES CONCLUSIONS.
ORGANIZATION
- OED I CA TED RESOlllCES
- EXPERIENCED PERSCllEL e PROVEN PERFORMANCE -
- DEPARTMENT WIDE SUPPORT
PROCESS
- NELL DEFINED PL~IN6 C DFL.EMENTATION
- TRACKING/MONITORING
- REVIEW/CRITIQUE
. '.
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT NUCLEAR ENGINEERING SUPPORT DESIGN/ENGINEERING *
- DESIGN AUTHORITY
- MOOIFICATION PACKAGES
- EMERGENT SUPPORT
- BASELOAD FUNCTIONS
- OPERATING PLANT SUPPORT PROJECT MANAGEMENT
- WORK SCOPE INTESRATION WITH STATION PLANNING
- MANAGEMENT OF ~CT TEAMS e CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES
. ~.~!-'5--13 12/'-'91
...
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTA6E MANASBENT NUCLEAR SERVICES SUPPORT
- SITE PROTECTION
- SECURITY
- FIRE PROTECTION -
-SAFETY-I~ESSIN6
- SITE SERVICES
- INSPECTION SERVICES
- MAINTENANCE SERVICES
- YARD SERVICES
- RADIATION PROTECTION SERVICES
- DOSIMETRY*
- INSTALMENT CALIBRATION & REPAIR
- RE9PIAA TOR FIT
- WHOLE BODY COlMT
PSE&G/NRC MEETING*ON OUTAGE MANA&EMENT
NUCLEAR SERVICES.
SECURITY PAST OUTAGES
- EXTENDED SCHEDULED OVERTIME
- FREQUENT WORKER SCHEDULE CHANGES
- MINIMAL TIME FOR CLASSROOM TRAINING
- DECREAS.ED MORALE
- FLAT PERFORMANCE
NEW OPERATIONS
- 20 I INCREASE IN STAFFING
- STABLE OUTAGE PERIOD SCHEDULES (8 HOUR SHIFTS)
- NO PLANNED OVERTIME
- CLASSROOM TRAINING DURING OUTAGE PERIOOS
- ' "-.
...
12/1/11
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT NUCLEAR SERVICES INPROCESSIN *STATE OF THE ART FACILITIES
- TRAINED & KNOWLEDGEABLE STAFF (AUGMENTED WITH EXPERIENCED CONTRACTORS)
- CAPABLE OF PROCESSING 50-60 NEW PEOPLE PER DAY
- CATEGORIZED PROCESSING/TRAINING SYSTEM
- OUT AGE SCHEDULE ALLOWS FOR ROLL OVER OF CONTRACT SUPPORT
- DECREASES PROCESSING EFFORT
- IMPROVES OVERALL EXPERIENCE/KNOWLEDGE LEVEL OF CClfTRACT SUPPORT
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- 9-~MM5-16 12/9/9,
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. PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE NANA$EMENT NUCLEAR SERVICES DOSIMETRY BIENNIAL NVLAP ACCREDITATION REVIEW
. * TWO ST AGE PROCESS *
- PROFICIENCY TESTING.
.
- ON-SITE ASSESSMENT
- MEETING HELD WITH NVLAP TO DISCUSS FINDINGS &
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
- INCREASE STAFFING
- UPGRADE GA/IC METHODS
... PROCEDURAL IMPROVEMENTS & TRAINING
- READER. RECALIBRATION
- ACCREDITATION RENEWED THROUGH OCTOBER 1992
..~:1MM5-*17 12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT PROC~EMENT & MATERIAL CONTROL OUTAGE SUPPORT
- SUPPORT FOR ALL THREE UNITS
- OUTAGE PLANNING ACTIVITIES PROVIDES:
- STRUCTURED ENVIRONMENT
- INCREASED COMMUNICATION LINKS-ABILITY TO PRESTAGE MATERIAL-ABILITY TO BETTER PRIORITIZE WORK ACTIVITIES
~
-IMPROVED SAFE & RELIABLE MATERIAL HANDLING CURRENT STATUS
- lltATERIAL CEN-'fER. TRANSITION (LOGISTICAL BENEFIT)
- WAMMS PHASE 2 I~EMENTATION
- WORKING LESS OVERTIME THAN FOR SIMILAR PERIODS IN PAST
9iMM5~tB ia/!;1/91
PSE&6/tR: MEETIN6*0N OOTA6E MANA6aENT
- FEFlELINI SALEM UNIT 2 OUT AGE SCOPE-
- REACTOR COOUNT PllF WORK
- STEAM 6ENERA TOR MORK
- DIESEL 6ENERA TOR MORK
- .Wir.E UTER PIPINB REPLACEMENT
- CINlNI...... MDDifICATICIE.
- "RMMll* llnATDIVCalJBIEA AEPAIAI
... * Fifi MIDLOOP BttANCEMENT
- ROSEMONT TRANSMITTERS
- RAD MONITOR SYSTEM DETECTCM I POIER SlFPLIES
- APPBC>IX R t<<JIC
- SEC CHANBEOUT
- lHlERVOI.. TA6E REI.A YS
- MOTOR CFEAA TED VAL VE TESTING
- RTD
- FM.IS
- MSIV
- 6AMMAME"n1ICS 12/t/11
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PSE&G/~C MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT
.SALEM UNIT 2 OUTAGE EFFECT OF TURBINE/GENERATOR EVENT
- PRE-PLANNING EFFORT ALLOWED FOR SIGNIFICANT OUTAGE PROGRESS TO DATE
- FURTHER APPLICATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
'
TO DECREASE SHUT DOWN RISK I
- LENGTHEN SYSTEM WINDOWS
~ *REDUCE OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS
- NON-OUTAGE WORK ADDED TO OUTAGE SCOPE
- RESOURCES STILL AVAILABLE TO PLAN SALEM UNIT 1 OUTAGE 12/..t/.l 1
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PSE&6/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT SALEM UNIT 2 OUTAGE TURBINE/GENERATOR/CONDENSER REPAIR PLANS
- GENERATOR* WCA< IS CRITICAL PATH
- GENERATOR REPAIR OPTIONS
- REWIND GENERATOR-REPLACE WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC GENERATOR
--
-REPLACE WITH WESTINGHOUSE GENERATO * TURBINE REPAIRS
- LC* PRESSlR Tl.NINES
- HIGH PRESSlR T\\HINES
- CONDENSER REPAIRS
- SUPPORT SYSTEM INSPECTIONS/REPAIRS
91MM5.-20 12/~/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT
- REFUELING SALEM UNIT 1 OUTAGE SCOPE
- REACTOR COOLANT Pllf> W(JI(
- STEAM &ENERA T~ 1<<11<
- DIESEL &ENERATOA *AC
- SERVICE MA TEA PIPIN& AEPUCEMENT
- CONTROL ROOM MOOIFICATIONS
- TURBINE* INsPECTIH
- INSERVICE IN9P£CTIDNS
. * Fifi (MICLO<F EN W<<ZNENT I DEADHEAD IN&)
- FllSEMONT TRANSMIT I ERS
- * RAD MONITOR. SYSTEM DETECTORS
-. APPBl>IX R MOA<
- SEC ctWOUT
- lll>BMI.. T lllE. AEU YS
- RTD
. * CONTAINMENT LINER 91Mtil5-30 12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE NANASENENT HOPE CREEK OUTAGE
- REFUELING (FULL CORE OFFLOAD)
- SCRAM REDUCTION Itf>ROVEMENTS
- LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR (LPAM) REPLACEMENTS
- INSERVICE INSPECTIONS
- SNUBBER INSPECTIONS
- RECIRC PIPING MELD INSPECTIONS
- CONTROL ROD DRIVE & BLADE CHANGE OUT
- ROSEMONT TRANSMITTERS
- INST ALL HARD Jll.-r VEMT
- MOTOR e>>aERATED VALVE TESTING
- DIESEL &ENERATOR WORK
- SERVICE NATER PIPING REPLACEMENT 91MM5-32 12/1/11
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- ....
PSE&G/NAC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT--
OUTAGE INCENTIVE PROGRAM
_*PURPOSE
- REC06NITION OF -6000 PERFORMANCE
-- FOCUS & REihFORCE DESIRED BEHAVIORS
- ESTABLis.ES CHALLENGING BUT ACHIEVABLE GOALS
- WEIGHTED TO A SAFETY FOCUS -
- OFFERS UP TO 3 DAYS OFF FOR ALL NUCLEAR
-
DEPARTMENT EMPLOYESS
- PROGRAM DESIGNED AS INCENTIVE -TO ENTIRE NUCLEAR DEPARTMENT
91MM5-34 12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM
- BASE INCEMTIVE -(UP TO 2 'DAYS OFF)
- SAFETY (APPROX IMA TEL Y, 60 I) -
- DURATION (APPROXIMATELY 20 I)
- FINANCIAL PEAFQFIUJICE (APPROXIMATELY 10 I)
- SCOPE COMPLETION- (APPROX IMA TEL Y 10 I)
- BONJS INCENTIVE (AVAILABLE IF ONE DAY OF BASE INCENTIVE EARNED)
-EFFECTIVENESS/RELIABILITY (POST OUTAGE EVENT-FREE OPERATION)
'
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'91MM5-35 12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT
COMPONENTS OF INCENTIVE ELEMENTS SAFETY
- REACTOR SAFETY
--NO LOSS OF _SHJTDOWN COOLING
- PERSONNEL ERRORS
- NRC VIOLATIONS
- RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY
- PERSONNEL EXPOSURE-PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION EVENTS
- INDUSTRIAL SAFET EVENTS RECIJIRING* MEDICAL ATTENTION
- NO LOST TIME ACCIDENTS
- .
91MM5-~*
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12/9/91
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PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT.
COMPONENTS OF INCENTIVE ELEMENTS OUTAGE DURATION
- RECOGNITION FOR BAND OF PERFORMANCE
- 10 I AHEAD OF SCHEDLLE TO 5 I BEHitll SCHEDULE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
- BASED ON * KNOWN/PLAhtED * WORK SCOPE SCOPE
- PERCENT AGE GOALS FOR PLANNED WORK
- DESIGN CHAN&E PACKAGE PLANNING ;,
COMPLETION
'..
12/9/91
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.,
PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT SUMMARY OUTAGE EXPECTATIONS
- EXCERCISE MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINE WITH RESPECT TO:
~ SCOPE CONTROL-EMERGENT WORK PLANNING & SCHEDULING
- FOCUS ON SAFETY
- ACTIVELY IMPLEMENT THE OUTAGE WITH:
-SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN ADVANCED PLANNING
- ASSURED PRODUCTIVITY
- FOCUS ON *oo IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME*
- IT'S A TEAM EFFORT TO MINIMIZE THE DISTRACTION OF THE OPERATING PLANT STAFF
- ACCOMPLISH GOALS & OBJECTIVES THROUGH FOCUSED ENERGY CONSISTENT WITH OAGAINIZATIOHAL BELIEFS
& VALUES 12t~,(91
- PSE&G/NRC MEETING ON OUTAGE MANAGEMENT SUMMARY
- MANAGEMENT HAS TAKEN AN ACTIVE ROLE IN:
-.PLANNING
. - IMPLEMENT AT ION
- MONITORING
- REVIEW
- RESULTING IN A CONTINUUM OF INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
- SUCCESSFUL & OPTIMIZED OUT AGES REQUIRES:
-COMMITMENT & PARTICIPATION BY THE TOTAL ORGANIZATION
- APPLICATION OF NECESSARY RESOURCES, INCENTIVES & SUPPORT-CLEARLY COMMUNICATED SAFETY EXPECTATIONS
- FOCUS ON TEAMWORK & FUNDAMENTAL PROFESSIONAL.
BEHAVIOR
- WHILE MEETING ALL OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS
... : 91MM5:-25
, 1~/9/9,