IR 05000271/1997010
| ML20217B366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1998 |
| From: | Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Reid D VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217B369 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-97-10, EA-98-531, NUDOCS 9804230020 | |
| Download: ML20217B366 (7) | |
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April 14, 1998 EA 97-531 Mr. Donald A. Reid Senior Vice President, Operations Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation RD 5, Box 169 Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY
- $55,000 (NRC Inspection Report No. 50-271/97-10)
Dcar Mr. Reid:
This letter refers to the subject NRC inspection conducted between September 29 and November 20,1997, at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Brattleboro, Vermont, the findings of which were discussed with Mr. G. Maret and other members of your staff at exit meetings on October 3 and November 20,1997. The purpose of the inspection was to follow up on the findings of the NRC Architect / Engineer (A/E) team inspection conducted between May 5 and June 13,1997. During the follow-up inspection, apparent violations were identified associated with control of the design process, corrective actions for conditions adverse to quality, and reportability. The inspection reports for the A/E team inspection and the followup inspection were sent to you previously on August 27,1997, and February 5, 1998, respectively. On March 2,1998, a predecisional enforcement conference (conference)
was conducted with Mr. R. Barkhurst, you, and other members of the Vermont Yankee staff, to discuss the /iolations, their causes, and your corrective actions.
Based on the findings of the inspection and information provided during the conference, twelve violations are being cited and are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). These violations involved a number of failures to: (1)
properly translate the design basis of the plant into specifications, procedures, and instructions, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lil; (2) promptly consct design deficiencies once they were identified, contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVl; and (3) report conditions to the NRC in Licensee Event Reports (LERs), pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73.
The three most significant of these violations are set forth in section I of the Notice and relate to the Technical Specification (TS) limit for maximum normal torus operating temperature. In 1982, you submitted a TS license amendment request to increase the normal torus water temperature limit from 90 F to 100 F. The NRC approved the request in 1985; however, the analyses performed to support the change were inadequate in that they failed to consider the impact of the change on all of the affected design basis analyses, namely, the emergency core OFFICIAL RECORD COPY a: PROP-VY.DSN
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 2 cooling system (ECCS) pump net positive suction head (NPSH) margin calculations, loss of coolant accident (LOCA) containment analyses, ECCS piping stress and support load calculations, and equipment qualification. Specifically, no evaluation was performed to demonstrate that these previously performed analyses were still acceptable assuming on initial torus temperature of 100 F.
In May 1994, you identified that the TS limit of 100 F for maximum torus normal operating temperature (in place as of June 6,1985, when a TS amendment was issued) was not consistent with assumptions made in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) description of LOCA containment response; however, you did not properly evaluate and correct this condition adverse to quality in a timely manner. Specifically, you did not initiate formal analyses and calculations to support a safety evaluation of this condition until November 1995, and did not complete the safety evaluation and operability determination until April 1996. More importantly, you did not put in place interim administrative controls to limit torus l
temperature to 90 F, consistent with the design basis, until December 1995. Although you identified, in March 1996, that you might not be able to justify plant operation with a torus temperature in excess of 90 F, and later confirmed that you could not operate with torus temperature above this limit, you did not initiate the necessary detailed design basis reviews until 1997, and, as of November 1997, you had not requested a TS amendment to correct the nonconservative torus temperature limit.
Although you identified, in March 1996, that operation of the plant with torus temperature above 90 F was a condition potentially outside of the design basis, you did not perform a comprehensive review to determine if torus temperature had actually exceeded 90 F until May 1997, when questioned by the A/E inspection team. At that time, you identified that the plant had operatec: with torus temperature above 90 F for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in two instances between 1985 and 1995; however, you did not report this condition to the NRC in an LER within 30 days, as required.
While no actual safety consequences resulted from operation of the plant with torus temperature above 90 F, if a LOCA had occurred, with an initial torus temperature above 90 F, there was not high confidence that the emergency core cooling systems ar.d the contHnment would have been able to perform their safety functions. Additionally, the failure to take prompt action to evaluate and correct an identified discrepancy between the FSAR and
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the Technical Specifications is a significant concern because the NRC relies upon licensees to operate the plant within the design basis and to promptly identify and report nonconforming conditions. These violations collectively represent breakdowns in your processes for design control, corrective actions, and reportability; therefore, these violations, set forth in Section I of the enclosed Notice, are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level 111 problem in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
In addition to your failure to ensure that the design basis was maintained when you increased the torus temperature limit, the NRC identified other violations involving design deficiencies and errors in design calculations. These violations are set forth in Section ll.A of the Notice.
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 3 For example, a nonsafety-related component was used in a subsystem essential to the safety-related function of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, air to the solenoid valves that operated the EDG service water cooling flow control valves (FCVs) was supplied from a nonsafety-related pressure regulator. Failure of the pressure regulator could have resulted in a malfunction that could have prevented operation of the EDGs due to a loss of all service water. In another case, incorrect design inputs were used in the calculation of NPSH margin for the RHR pumps. Nonconservative data was used in lieu of actual test data, The NRC also identified other violations involving your failure to take timely, effective action to correct conditions adverse to quality, and your failure to report a condition that could have j
prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. These violations are set forth in Sections ll.B and ll.C of the Notice.
For example, you failed to properly evaluate and correct a
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nonconformance between the vendor recommended residual heat removal (RHR) pump minimum flow requirement and the installed minimum flow capacity. Your determination that the installed minimum flow capacity was adequate lacked the technical basis to conclude that the pumps would be able to operate for several hours under minimum flow conditions during postulated accident scenarios because it was not supported by verification from the vendor or test results. Additionally, the precautions added to the RHR operating and surveillance procedures concerning RHR pump minimum flow operation did not adequately reflect the vendor recommendations.
The violations cited in Section 11 of the enclosed Notice have been classified individually at Severity Level IV in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.
Following the A/E inspection, the NRC was concerned that, at the time of the inspection, it did not appear that your design basis document (DBD) reviews would have identified the design issues identified by the A/E team. At the conference, you stated that you had committed to perform the DBD reviews and had identified the need for DBD validation prior to issuance of the NRC's 50.54(f) letter regarding the adequacy and availability of design basis information. However, while the DBD reviews were in progress, the validation effort had not been fully defined at the time of the A/E inspection. You indicated that the validation effort would have been designed to identify the type of problems identified by the A/E team. Based on the findings of our follow-up inspection and the information provided at the conference, we have no current concern with your DBD validation effort. We will review your DBD program again as part of our followup to your response to the violations described in the Notice.
With respect to the violations in Section I of the Notice, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level lit problem. Since Vermont Yankee has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and 1. e.g., A Notice of Violation with a proposed $50,000 civil penalty was issued on August 23,1996, for a Severity levelIII violation involving failure to analyze ECCS equipment to be free from single failures (EA 96-210).
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 4 Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No credit is warranted for identification because, while you identified the discrepancy between the FSAR and the TS limit for torus temperature, the NRC ider.tified your failure to promptly evaluate and correct the discrepancy and your failure to report the condition outside of the design basis. Credit is warranted for corrective actions because your actions, once the violations were identified, were considered prompt and j
comprehensive. Those actions, as described at the conference, include: 1) reconstitution of I
the containment design basis; 2) development of a more formal document design change process; 3) improvements to your corrective action process, including establishing a single
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event report process, reduction of the backlog, and development of a trending program; and 4) revision of the reportability procedure to implement interim expectations pending further j
review of your administrative controls and guidelines for considering event complexity.
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i Therefore, to emphasize the importance of maintaining your facility in accordance with its design, and promptly correcting conditions that are contrary to the design, and in recognition of your previous escalated enforcement actions, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and
Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $55,000.
During the inspection, the NRC identified three additional apparent violations involving failure to take timely corrective actions. With respect to the first of these apparent violations, after further review, the NRC has concluded that the failure to enter TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) when performing testing does not constitute a condition adverse to quality in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
Therefore, the failure to take prompt corrective action to address this issue did not constitute a violation of NRC requirements.
However, the NRC considers the failure to enter LCOs during testing an administrative weakness. By not tracking LCO entries during surveillance testing, the control room staff loses an opportunity to better control planned maintenance activities and to better respond to emergent system operability concerns.
With respect to the remaining two apparent violations, the NRC has concluded that your failure to request revisions to the service water subsystem and battery charger Technical Specifications in a timely manner did not constitute violations, because, in both cases, you had put interim administrative controls in place to compensate for the nonconservative TSs.
However, the NRC is concerned that the revision of the nonconservative TSs and corrective action to address entry into LCOs for testing were delayed due to deferral of your Improved Technical Specification (ITS) program. As stated in our regulations, TSs are derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report. By maintaining your TSs current, you help maintain our mutual confidence in your safety analysis and your ability to operate the plant in accordance with that analysis. We acknowledge your commitment to submit your application for ITS soon.
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 5 You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
i in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
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Sincerely, Original Signed by:
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Hubert J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28 Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty l
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 6 cc w/ encl:
R. McCullough, Operating Experience Coordinator - Vermont Yankee G. Sen, Licensing Manager, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation D. Rapaport, Director, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
D. Tefft, Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts D. Lewis, Esquire G. Bisbee, Esquire
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J. Block, Esquire T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety State of New Hampshire, SLO Designee State of Vermont, SLO Designee Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee
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D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
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Verrnont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
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DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC SECY
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CA LCallan, EDO l
AThadani, DEDE JLieberman, OE l
HMiller, Ri FDavis, OGC SCollins, NRR RZimmerman, NRR Enforcement Coordinators RI, Rll, Rlli, RIV
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DBangart, OSP I
HBell, OlG l
TMartin, AEOD OE:Chron OE:EA DCS j
NUDOCS
DScrenci, PAO-RI NSheehan, PAO-RI LTremper, OC Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident inspector - Vermont Yankee i
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