IR 05000271/1978026
| ML19276D972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1978 |
| From: | Bettenhausen L, Mccabe E, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276D961 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-78-26, NUDOCS 7903020046 | |
| Download: ML19276D972 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-271/78-26 Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corcoration 20 Turnpike Road Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Facility Name:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Vernon, Vermont Inspection conducted: November 28 - December 1,1978 d e.4u,
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8 /98 Inspectors: ~T.F.StetPd[Reacfor' Inspector date signed W $ Y vbe e
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/8/7?
L$ H. Bettenhausen, Reactor Inspector date signed date signed Approved by:
Netz c/w
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E. C. McCabe/J8., C(ief', Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 2, R0 & NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 28 - December 1, 1978 (Recort No. 50-271/78-26)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations, post refueling plant system restoration, post refueling start-up testing, core and reactivity surveil-lance, environmental qualifications of stem mounted limit switches, IE Circular followup, and licensee action on previous inspection items. The inspection involved 58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> onsite by two regional based inspectors.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were found in five areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Infraction - failure to lock a high radiation area).
790so2ocq(
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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. DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- Mr. R. Burke, Engineering Support Supervisor
- Mr. W. Conway, Plant Superintendent Mr. A. Diaz, I&C Supervisor
- Mr. D. Girroir, Engineering Assistant
- Mr. S. Jefferson, Reactor and Computer Supervisor Mr. B. Leach, Health Physicist
- Mr. W. Murphy, Assistant Plant Supervisor Mr. J. Pelletier, Maintenance Supervisor Mr. W. Penniman, Security Supervisor Mr. L. Rau, Reactor Engineer
- Mr. R. Sojka, Operations Supervisor
- Mr. G. Weyman, Chemistry and HP Supervisor Other personnel contacted included operations, engineering, maintenance, and health physics personnel.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (271/78-22-03): Installation of new under-voltage and overvoltage relays has been completed.
This installation, including calibration of these new relays and the existing under-frequency relays, was completed on October 7,1978.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/78-16-02): The licensee provided documentation showing traceability of the psychrometer thermometer calibration to the National Bureau of Standards.
(Closed) Noncompliance (271/77-28-03): The licensee issued procedure OP 2429, Recirculation System Baseline Data on September 11, 1978, and obtained data subsequent to the startup of Cycle 6.
The inspec-tor reviewed the data obtained and the curves generated for loop drive flow verses recirculation pump speed and loop drive flow verses total flow curv.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/78-09-02): Procedure 0P 4511 was approved by PORC on November 21, 1978 in Meeting No. 78-48 and was issued on November 30, 1978.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/78-16-06): The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation to determine if the bolt had been tightened and also verified completion of the work by observation during a plant tour.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/77-23-05): Technical Specification Amendment No. 47, issued on October 10, 1978, removes the inconsis-tency between the literal requirements of the TS and the licensee's action with regard to adjustment of the scram and rod block setpoints.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/77-16-08): The licensee has written and issued procedure D.P. 5334, TIP Shear Valve Squib Charge Replacement, on July 13, 1978, and has added replacement of these explosive charges every three years to the Shutdown Surveillance List.
3.
Review of Plant Operations a.
Shift Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the records listed below for compliance with the licensee's administrative procedure for Operations Department logs.
(1)
Night Orders.
(2)
Lifted Lead / Installed Jumper Log.
(3) Maintenance Request Log.
(.4) Tagging Log.
(5)
Control Room Operator (CRO) Log Sheet for November 28, 1978.
(6)
Control Room Log.
(7)
Daily Supervisor's Log.
(8)
Process Computer Data sheets for November 28, 197.
The period selected for review was October through November, 1978.
Inspection consisted of verifying adequate management review, correct identification of problem areas, completeness, and determination that conditions contrary to the Technical Specifications did not exist.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
Tour of Accessible Areas The inspectors observed Control Room operations.
A tour was conducted of the Reactor Building (including Corner Rooms),
Turbine Building, Diesel Generator Rooms, Radwaste Facility, Cable Spreading Room, and the Switchgear Room.
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation.
Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure, Reactor Power Level, Control Rod Positions, Equipment Status, Area Radiation and Stack Gas Monitors were observed.
The indicated parameters were in accor-dance with Technical Specification Limits.
(2) Annucciator Alarms.
The inspectors observed various alarm conditions received and acknowledged by the Control Room Operator on duty.
These conditions were discussed with the Shift Supervisor who was knowledgeable of the alarms and the actions required by the Control Room Operator.
Continuous alarms were identified and the reasons for these were known to operating person;.el.
(3)
Shift Staffing. The inspectors verified by spot checks that the operating shift met Section 6 of the Technical Specification with regard to numbers and licenses.
(4)
Radiation Areas.
Radiation control zones were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
These observations resulted in the following findings.
a.
On November 28, at approximately 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />, while touring the Turbine Building, the inspectors entered the radiation control area on the 248 ft. 6 inch level of the turbine building from the Switchgear Room (an unrestricted, non-radiation area).
The inspectors observed that the door from the switch-gear room to the turbine building was not posted to inform personnel that they were entering a radiation control area, and the other side of the door (pro-viding entry to the switchgear room from the radi-ation control area) was not posted to insure
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that personnel frisk themselves prior to entering the clean area.
The inspectors' also observed that an unposted frisking station was available to one side of the switchgear room doors, however, due to the building configuratiten this station was not obvious prior to entering the switchgear room.
This posting discrepancy was discussed with licensee representativt s.
The representatives stated that the area would be reviewed.
Actual radiation levels in the turbine building were not determined by inspection. This item is unresolved pending further NRC inspection. (271/78-26-01)
b.
At approximately 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on November 29, while touring the 280 ft. level of the reactor building, the inspectors noted that door #4 providing access to the Reactor Water Cleanup regenerative and non-regenerative heat exchanger room was open.
This door is normally maintained locked during reactor operation due to the high radiation levels in this room. The door was locked and the shift supervisor noti fied.
Subsequent review of the health physics logbook revealed that on November 27, 1978, the room contained radiation levels of up to 4000 mr/hr in contact with pipelines running through the room.
An additional survey conducted at 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> on November 30 revealed that general area levels in the left walkway area and at two feet from a drain line in the room were up to 2000 mr/hr.
Technical Specification 6.5.B requires that areas with radiation levels in excess of 1000 mr/hr, have locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry into such areas. This is an item of noncompliance.
(271/78-26-02)
(5)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions.
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to safety and fire hazards.
General housekeeping appeared acceptable.
Cable trays in the Cable Spreading Room were observed to contain coiled cables.
Some of these cables appeared to be terminated at both ends while other cables appeared to be terminated at one end with the other end tape.
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The inspector questioned the acceptability of this practice from the viewpoint of fire propogation potential.
Cables run parallel to each other should provide a lesser potential for fire propogation and for damaging other cables than cables coiled in trays.
This item is unresolved (271/78-26-03) pending further NRC review.
(6)
Fluid Leaks. No significant leaks were noted.
(7)
Piping Vibration.
No excessive piping vibration was noted.
(8)
Pipe Hanaers/ Seismic Restraints.
Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubber) on safety-related systems were observed.
Findings were acceptable.
(9)
Valve Position /Eauipment Start Positions.
The position of valves in the Emergency Diesel Start, HPCI, and Standby Liquid Control Systems were observed to be in the positions required by the Technical Specifications.
4.
Post Refueling Plant System Restoration a.
The inspector reviewed the following facility records to verify that selected systems disturbed during the refueling outage were returned to service in accordance with approved procedures.
(1) OP 4101, RPV Operational Hydro Test, Revision 7, and the data for the hydrostatic leak test performed on October 7, 1978.
(2) OP 0100, Reactor Startup to Criticality, Revision 8 and the data for the In-Sequence Critical Prerequisite List completed on October 9,1978 and the Reactor Startup Prerequisite Lists completed on October 10 and 18,1978.
This procedure and the prerequisite lists provide documen-tation that the control rod withdrawal authorization was available for the startup.
(3) OP 4111, Control Rod Drive System Surveillance, Revision 9 and the data for the nuclear instrument response to control rod movement recorded on October 2-7, 1978 and the conttol rod coupling integrity verification and with-drawal rate recorded on October 2-4, 197 e
(4) OP 2111, Control Rod Drive System, Revision 8 and the valve lineup sheets completed on October 2 and 5, 1978.
(5) OP 2124, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 11 and the valve lineup sheets completed on October 16, 1978.
(6)
Recirculation Loop Temperature Recorder Chart #31 for the period August 27, 1978 to October 13, 1978. This chart was reviewed to determine the heat-up and cool-down rates that occurred during the refueling outage.
Review of the valve lineups for OP 2111 and OP 2124 revealed that changes were made to the valve lineups and the reasons for these changes were not documented.
The inspector reviewed seven additional valve lineups and determined that an additional valve lineup (_0P 2112, Reactor Water Cleanup System) contained some valve cilanges that were not documented.
The licensee's administrative procedure AP 0156, Current Valve Lineup File, allows changes to be made to valve lineups pro-vided the reason for this change is noted in the " Exception" section of the valve lineup sheet and the change is reviewed and approved by the Shift Supervisor.
The inspector discussed these discrepancies with licensee representatives. The licensee representative acknowledged the inspector's remarks and stated that a review of the valve lineup would be conductec and notes added on the lineups where the valve positions are different from the position designated on the lineup.
This item is unresolved (271/78-26-04).
b.
The inspector reviewed the following facility records to verify that Technical Specifications required surveillance was con-ducted durir.g the refueling outage.
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Auxiliary Operator No. 2 Rounds Sheets and the Shutdown CR0 Log Sheets for the period September 17 through October 12, 1978 to verify monitoring of the Standby Liquid Control tank level and temperature;
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0.P. 4111, Control Rod Drive System Surveillance, Rev.
9, data sheet 4111.01, HCU Pressure for the period of September 17 through October 30, 1978;
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OP 4123, Core Spray System Surveillance, Revision 9 and
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the data for the pump and motor operated valve operability tests performed on August 28, 1978 and October 8 and 31, 1978; OP 4300, Source Range Monitor Functional / Calibration
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Procedure, Revision 3 and the data recorded for the period September 16, 1978 to October 26, 1978; and,
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OP 4301, Intermediate Range Monitoring Functional /Cali-bration, Revision 3 and the data recorded for the period September 16, 1978 to October 26, 1978.
No inadequacies were identified.
5.
Post Refueling Startuo Testing The inspector reviewed the following tests and checks to verify that startup testing was conducted in accordance with technically adequate procedures, a.
Control Rod Drive Scram Insertion Times The scram time test data for Scram #82, performed October 6, 1978 under procedure OP 4424, Control Rod Scram Testing, was reviewed. A summary of test results and Technical Specifi-cations follows:
% Inserted Test Results, Sec.
Technical Specification, Sec.
2.680 7.00 Slowest Rod
2.474 3.419 Average, All Rods
1.387 1.860 Average, All Rods
0.859 1.096 Average, All Rods
0.332 0.358 Average, All Rods No items of noncompliance were identifie.
b.
Control Rod Sequence and Reactivity Checks The inspector reviewed the data and work sheets for the in-sequence criticality performed on October 9, 1978 in accordance with procedure OP 2404, Revision 4, Determination and Implementation of Rod Withdrawal Sequence.
Criticality was observed at step 16 on rod 34-23; the nuclear steam supplier predicted criticality at step 48 on rod 34-23.
A reactivity anomaly comparison was then performed according to procedure YYOPF 4430 using change 78-09 for cycle 6 updating.
The observed criticality was well within the + 1% ak/k predicted rod positions.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
Core Thermal Power The inspector reviewed heat balance comparisons between plant computer program edit 00-3 and out-of-plant time-share compu-tation by the program, CTP, using plant parameters observed in the control room. These comparisons were performed on October 16, 1978 and November 8, 1978 with good agreement (0.4 and 0.06%,respectively). The inspector independently checked portions of the computations; the checks gave satisfactory agreement.
The time-share computation and data forms are controlled by procedure OP 2411, Core Thermal Power Evaluation.
A manual calculational procedure, OP 2410, Core Thermal Power Evaluation, is also available in the event computer service is not available; the inspector reviewed this procedure and found it acceptable.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
d.
Initialization of Process Computer Data The inspector reviewed the implementation of procedure DP 5401, Data Shuffling and Data Checks for Process Computer at Beginning of Core, begun October 10, 1978 and completed October 12, 1978.
The implementation was documented by data printouts and cross-checked data sheets.
No items of noncompliance were identifie.
6.
Fuel Assembly and Reactivity Surveillance The inspector reviewed completed data sheets VYOPF 4401.01 from procedure OP 4401, Revision 5, Core Thermal Hydraulic Limits Evaluation, with DI-78-M updating for cycle 6 for the period November 1-29, 1978. Computer printouts for NSS periodic per-formance for the pericd November 1-29, 1978 were also reviewed and randomly cross-checked with data sheets for such values as Core Thermal Power, Linear Heat Generation Rate, Minimum Critical Power Ratio, and Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate.
The inspector reviewed OP 4450, Rod Worth Minimizer Surveillance and Shutdown Margin Checks, and completed data sheets VYOPF 4450.01 for October 8, 1978 and November 11, 1978 for this pro-cedure.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Core Thermal Power Surveillance The inspector observed the cognizant licensee engineer request the performance of the demand program "0D-3, Core Thermal Power and APRM Calibration,' ar.d reviewed the resultant printout.
The cognizant licensee engineer also obtained data for performing OP 2411, Revision 4, Core Thermal Power Evaluation (TSS), and performed the off-site computer program CTP.
The inspector independently obtained control room' indicator / recorder readings and perfarmed a verification calculation.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Closeout of IE Circulars The following IE Circulars were reviewed on site to determine if the licensee had received them and taken appropriate action.
IEC 77-12, Dropped Fuel Assemblies at BWR Facilities;
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IEC 78-09, Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2
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IEC 78-11, Recirculation M-G Set Overspeed Stops; IEC 78-12, HCPI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending;
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IEC 78-14, HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Hold Down Bolting;
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IEC 78-15, Tilting Disk Check Valves Fail To Close With
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Gravity In Vertical Position; and, IEC 78-16, Limitorque Valve Actuators.
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No inadequacies were identified.
9.
Environmental Oualifications of Stem Mounted Limit Switches (SMLSs)
located In Drywell The licensee was informed of the NRC's position regarding SMLSs in the Drywell and used to indicate valve position.
That position requires that SMLSs used for valve position indication be qualified for operation under LOCA conditions.
The licensee acknowledged the position, and forwarded documentation supplied by the inspector to their Yankee Engineering office in Westborough, Massachusetts, for review.
Further licensee action on this item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those items for which further information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or items of non-compliance. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 3.b(4)i, 3.b(5), and 4.a of this report.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 1,1978.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During this meeting, the un-resolved items and item of noncompliance were identified.