IR 05000269/1995004
| ML16154A787 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1995 |
| From: | Mcguire D, Tobin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16154A785 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-95-04, 50-269-95-4, 50-270-95-04, 50-270-95-4, 50-287-95-04, 50-287-95-4, NUDOCS 9505240123 | |
| Download: ML16154A787 (4) | |
Text
01p9 REG UNITED STATES OEF
,NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos.:
50-269/95-04, 50-270/95-04 and 50-287/95-04 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection Conducted:
April 3-5, 1995 Inspector:
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/ 5 >
W. J.Tobin, S or Safeguards Inspector Ddte igned Approved by:
David R. McGuire, Chief D ate Signed Safeguards Section Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced Safeguards Inspection was conducted to review the licensee's discovery, on February 20, 1995, of unsecured drawings stamped as being Safeguards Informatio Results:
One violation was identified relative to drawings, stamped as Safeguards Information, being unsecured in the licensee's automatic data processing system. (95-04-01)
The inspector reviewed the drawing and concluded that the drawings were either not current or not "as built"; additionally they lacked the specificity and detail necessary to be considered Safeguards Informatio PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
PDA
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- D. Durham, Safeguards Information Coordinator
- R. Eller, Corporate Licensing Coordinator
- W. Foster, Safety Assessment Manager
- J. Hampton, Site Vice President
- B. Jones, Training Manager
- T. McQuarrie, Security Manager
- M. Patrick, Licensing Manager (Catawba)
- J. Peele, Station Manager
- M. Satterfield, Security Compliance Coordinator
- L. Shehan, Modifications Engineer
- J. Smith, Licensing Coordinator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
- L. Keller, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the Exit Meeting Protection of Safeguards information (81810)
On February 20, 1995, a licensee modification engineer, whose office is exterior to the protected area, discovered several drawings, which were stamped as being Safeguards Information (SGI), in an unprotected automated data processing system. The engineer was scrolling through a computerized list of drawings when he happened to notice one file which was identified with the alpha-numeric code indicating it was a security related drawin Initially, he recovered 13 such drawings, and then, with the assistance of the Security Manager and representatives of the Corporate Information Technology group, several more files were extracted from the Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) system. Of the 29 identified files or "signatures," 18 specific drawings were recovere The licensee notified the Resident Inspector and the Region II office, as well as entered the event in the Safeguards Events Log on that da During this Special Inspection, the inspector interviewed persons knowledgeable about the event and reviewed the licensee's investigation (Security Incident Report) relative to this even Independent of the licensee, the inspector evaluated the safeguards significance of the drawings. The inspector also reviewed Quality Assurance Audit No. SA-ONS-9501 dated January 16-26, 1995, which had included an audit on the Oconee Nuclear Stations (ONS) SGI program. This Audit had concluded that the licensee had taken acceptable corrective measures to
the Special Assessment of SGI, which was a result of the NRC's Enforcement Action in March, 199 The Audit noted that the declassification of SGI was still ongoing until March 31, 199 Based upon the licensee's investigation, it appears that early in the 1980s the ONS was sending drawings, sketches, barrier studies and modification requests to the Corporate Offices to be added into the CAD system. A Priority 4 was assigned to these drawings indicating they were to be protected as security related (they were stamped as SGI),
but, at some unknown time, in order to expedite their processing the Priority was changed to a Priority 1 - RUSH. Once having lost their Priority 4 classification the drawings were unprotected in the CAD syste In July 1992, during the reorganization of the Corporate Offices, engineers being relocated to the nuclear sites had their drawings and files downloaded to their assigned sites. At that point, the drawings vacated the Corporate Offices CAD system and entered into the ONS CAD system, still in an unprotected environmen The licensee's corrective action to the March 1994 Enforcement Action verified there were no SGI drawings in the Corporate Office CAD system, but the licensee did not realize the drawings had been downloaded into the ONS CAD syste The inspector witnessed the engineer recreate his February 20th discovery. At the ONS there is one CAD server containing 8000 files or
"signatures" which identify drawings. In order to access the ONS CAD, a personal password is necessary, as well as, the server must be equipped with the software package needed to access a "file path" which scrolls through the "signatures."
There are 42 such servers at the ON Only two engineers have the need to know the "file path", one being the individual finding the February 20 event because he happened to see the alpha-numeric code of the "signature" and recalled it as being security relate As a result of this discovery, the licensee immediately took the ONS CAD off-line to preclude possible unauthorized disclosures, additionally the McGuire and Catawba Stations were alerted to review their drawing retrieval systems. At the ONS the licensee did a "signature" search of over 11,000 CAD files and found no other SGI presen The inspector reviewed each of the 18 specific drawings recovered from the ONS CAD; while all were stamped as being SGI, the inspector by review of the drawing concluded that the drawings were either not current or not "as built"; additionally they lacked the specificity and detail necessary to be considered SG In many cases the drawings did not reveal the presence of tamper alarms or randomly color coded wiring inside enclosure Some drawings revealed information readily observable from the parking lot exterior to the protected area (i.e. the kind of intrusion alarm system).
The drawings were of no SGI significanc It is the licensee's intent to declassify these drawings during it's search for and review of other SGI document In conclusion, the failure to retain these drawings in a secured automatic data processing system was identified as a violation (95-04-01) of 10 CFR 73.21(h) which permits Safeguards Information to be processed or -roduced on an automatic data processing (ADP) system, provided that the system is self-contained within the licensee's facility and requires the use of an entry code for access to stored informatio.'
Exit Meeting The Exit Meeting was held onsite on April 5, 1995, with those so noted in paragraph 1 in attendance. The licensee was advised of the inspector's findings, and, that Regional Managers would review these findings prior to a final determination. On April 19, 1994, the licensee's point of contact for corrective actions was informed of the one violation. No dissenting comments were voiced.