IR 05000269/1995021
| ML15118A044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1995 |
| From: | Crlenjak R, Harmon P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15118A043 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-95-21, 50-270-95-21, 50-287-95-21, NUDOCS 9512110477 | |
| Download: ML15118A044 (11) | |
Text
0V REG(,
UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos.:
50-269/95-21, 50-270/95-21, and 50-287/95-21 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242-0001 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: October 8 - November 4, 1995 Inspectors:
.n, Senior er t Inspector Date Signed L. A. Keller, Resident Inspector P. G. Humphrey, Resident Inspector N. gado, Resi nt nspector Approved by:
-//
=1 R. V. rlenjake hief Date Signed Reactor Projects Branch 1 SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant operations, maintenance and surveillance testing, onsite engineering, and plant suppor Results:
In the operations area, Unit 1 was shut down for the End-Of-Cycle 16 Refueling Outage. The reduced inventory/mid-loop evolution was well coordinated and controlled by the Operations staff, paragraph In the Maintenance area, the non-vital 250 volt power batteries 1PA and 1PB were capacity tested. The 1PA battery was at 67 percent, well below the minimum design value of 80 percent capacity, and the 1PB battery was at 81 percent capacity, paragraph 3.b.(2).
In the Engineering area, a strength was identified in the licensee's self-assessment of the circumstances involved when a Limiting Condition for Operation was exceeded during a modification on the Keowee units, paragraph PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
In the Plant Support area, the Annual Emergency Exercise was considered well planned and challenging. The drill successfully demonstrated the plant staff's emergency response capabilities, paragraph ENCLOSURE
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- E. Burchfield, Regulatory Compliance Manager T. Coutu, Operations Support Manager 0. Coyle, Systems Engineering Manager J. Davis, Engineering Manager
- . Foster, Safety Assurance Manager
- J. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Site D. Hubbard, Maintenance Superintendent C. Little, Electrical Systems/Equipment Manager
- B. Peele, Station Manager G. Rothenberger, Operations Superintendent
- J. Smith, Regulatory Compliance R. Sweigart, Work Control Superintenden Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineer Other Nuclear Regulatory Commission employees
- R. Carroll, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Branch 1, Region II
- Attended exit intervie Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are identified in the last paragrap.
Plant Operations (71707) General The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, TS, and adm'nistrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover records, temporary modification log, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinely. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, I&E, and engineering personne Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basi Inspections were condu'cted on day and night shifts, during weekdays and on weekend Inspectors attended some shift changes to evaluate shift turnover performanc Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's Administrative Procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of T Operators were
ENLOUR
II
responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant condition Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basi During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation controL practices were observe Plant Status Unit 1 operated at full power until November 1, 1995, when the unit began shutting down for a scheduled 35-day End of Cycle refueling outag Units 2 & 3 operated at full power throughout the reporting perio Mid-loop/Reduced Inventory Activities During the Unit 1 End-Of-Cycle 16 Refueling Outage, the licensee reduced RCS inventory and reached the mid-loop operations level on November 6, 1995. This was done for the purpose of installing nozzle dams in the steam generators. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program prior to the reduction of RCS inventory and verified that the requirements were met while operating at the reduced inventory levels as specified in Operations Procedure OP/1/A/1103/11, Draining and Nitrogen Purging of RCS, Enclosure 3.6, Requirements for Reducing Reactor Vessel Level to < 50" on LT-5. This procedure stipulated the sequence and steps required for reduction of RCS inventory and mid-loop operation. It further specified the precautions and limitations to be adhered to while in mid-loo Step 1 of Enclosure 3.6 specifically addressed the ability to establish containment closure. The licensee implemented a Shutdown Protection Plan for the outage which required containment closure to be maintained, except as necessary to bring materials and tools in and out of the reactor building. The Plan further required that penetrations be closed as necessary, except for those with temporary cables installed, for outage activities such as steam generator tube testing and maintenanc The inspector verified that the requirement for two independent trains of RCS level monitoring was met while at reduced inventor This was accomplished by the use of two permanently installed instruments (LT-5A and LT-5B) and two temporary ultrasonic instruments. Level indications.were displayed in the control room on the LT-5A and LT-5B indicators, the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor, and on the Operator Aid Compute The inspector verified that two trains of core exit thermocouples were available and utilized while at reduced inventory, as well as ENCLOSURE
that the two sources of inventory makeup and cooling were available for operation. Multiple sources of off-site power were also available. The inspector reviewed the licensee's contingency plans to repower vital busses from available alternate electrical power supplies in the event of a loss of the primary sourc Unit 1 was in reduced inventory status for approximately 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> During that time, the licensee implemented and maintained the requirements specified by procedure while accomplishing reduced inventory operations without incident. The inspector concluded that this reduced inventory evolution was well coordinated and controlle Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactor.
Maintenance and Surveillance Testing (62703 and 61726) Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures adequately described work that was not within the skill of the craft. Activities, procedures and work orders were examined to verify that proper authorization and clearance to begin work was given, cleanliness was maintained, exposure was controlled, equipment was properly returned to service, and LCOs were me Maintenance activities observed or reviewed in whole or in part are as follows:
(1) Replace 1A LPSW Pump Outboard Bearing, WO 96079496 On October 15, 1995, the inspector observed activities during the replacement of the 1A LPSW outboard bearing. The work effort was performed in accordance with MP/O/A/1300/003, Pump Ingersoll Rand - Low Pressure Service Water - Rotating Assembly - Removal And Replacemen Cleanliness was maintained to a QA level 3 standard and the work was performed to a QA level 1 standar Work documentation was current with the work progress and the work met acceptable standard (2) Reactor Building Wide Range Pressure Calibration, WO 95078107 On October 16, 1995, the inspector observed the calibration of transmitter 3PT-7P. The inspector verified that the control room operators were aware of the work, that the appropriate procedure was being utilized, and that the technicians were working under the appropriate SRWP. All activities observed were satisfactor ENCLOSURE
(3) Keowee Governor Oil Pump 1A Preventive Maintenance, WO 95059434 On October 23, 1995, the inspector observed the disassembly and inspection of the 1A Governor Oil Pump. The work was conducted per MP/O/A/2200/001, Governor #1 Oil Pump Assemblies Inspection and Maintenance. The inspector noted that the Keowee unit was not taken out of service for this work. The inspector verified that taking this pump out of service did not effect operability of the Keowee unit. All activities observed were satisfactor The inspectors observed surveillance activities to ensure they were conducted with approved procedures and in accordance with site directives. The inspectors reviewed surveillance performance, as well as system alignments and restorations. The inspectors assessed the licensee's disposition of any discrepancies which were identified during the surveillanc Surveillance activities observed or reviewed in whole or in part are as follows:
(1) Control Rod Movement, PT/2/A/600/15 The inspector reviewed the completed documentation of the Unit 2 control rod movement tes The purpose of the test is to verify that all control rods move as commanded by moving control rods in groups 1 through 6 into the core by approximately 10 percent and groups 7 and 8 into the core by 2.5 percent. The results of the test indicated that the acceptance criteria was met and no deficiencies were note However, later that day, October 12, 1995, it was noted that rod 5 in group 7 had drifted out of position approximately 4 percent. The rod was re-aligned and a PIP was generated to evaluate the movemen The test data was found to be acceptabl (2) Power Battery Capacity Tests, IP/O/B/3000/023C NRC Inspection Reports 50-269,270,287/95-01 and 95-14 describe problems with low capacity for various safety related batteries. The affected batteries were Exide FTC-23 batteries. The 250 Vdc power system also uses Exide FTC-23 battery banks. Although the 250 Vdc system is not designated safety-related, there are several safety significant loads supplied by this system, including the TDEFW pump's DC oil pump, and the ATWS system. There are two power batteries per unit (PA & PB bus). The units' 250 Vdc systems can be cross-connected per SLC 16.8.3. The Unit ENCLOSURE
2 and 3 power batteries were tested earlier in 1995 with all four of these batteries indicating capacities greater than 90 percen On August 30, 1995, the inspectors witnessed a capacity test conducted on the IPA battery. This was the first capacity test for this Unit 1 battery since installation in August 1986. The test indicated that IPA had a capacity of 67 percent. The power battery voltage calculations assume the worst case conditions for the power batteries is 80 percen Therefore, Power Battery IPA was outside the bounds of the design calculations. The battery was declared out of service but the 250 Vdc power system remained operable with the Unit 1, 2, and 3 PA buses cross-connected. The licensee subsequently replaced 6 cells and retested Power Battery IPA on October 18, 1995. This second test indicated a capacity of 71.8 percent. On October 19, 1995, the inspectors attended a PORC meeting in which the licensee discussed whether to continue efforts to restore IPA or test 1PB. The licensee decided to test 1PB to determine its status in order to know how best to proceed. The inspectors considered this to be a conservative decisio On November 1, 1995, the inspectors observed the capacity test for Power Battery 1PB. This was the first capacity test for this battery since installation in September 198 The test indicated 1PB had a capacity of 81 percent. The 1PB battery was returned to service on November 3, 1995. As of the end of the inspection period the licensee was still developing short-term plans to restore IPA to greater than 80 percent capacity. The issue of degraded battery capacity will continue to be tracked under IFI 50-270/95-01-0 (3) SSF Instrument Surveillance, PT/0/A/600/20 On October 30, 1995, the inspector observed a surveillance of the SSF control room instruments. The inspector observed that the SSF control room instrumentation agreed with the Oconee main control room instrumentatio All activities observed were satisfactor (4) Unit 3 TDEFW Pump Test, PT/3/A/0600/12 On October 31, 1995, the inspector observed a performance test of the Unit 3 TDEFW pump. The inspector verified that the pump's discharge pressure and flow were consistent with the pump curve and that all procedural acceptance criteria were met. All activities observed were satisfactor Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactor ENCLOSURE
- I6 Onsite Engineering (37551, 40500)
During the inspection period, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the onsite design and engineering processes by reviewing engineering evaluations, operability determinations, modification packages and other areas involving the Engineering Departmen Spent Fuel Pool Design Basis The inspector reviewed the design basis of the Oconee Spent Fuel Pools. The review was in response to a concern identified at the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant, where the original design assumed a partial (1/3 core) unloading. Recent refueling outage strategy typically unloads the entire cor The inspector verified that the Oconee SFP design basis assumed the worst case heat load, including the full core unload cas Assessment Report On Problems Associated With Keowee Modification NRC Inspection Report 50-269,270,287/95-18 documented problems identified during the attempted implementation of NSM-52966. This modification would have allowed simultaneous generation of both Keowee units to the grid. Because of problems encountered during the implementation of this NSM, work was suspended and actions taken to return the overhead power path to service. Due to problems in backing out of the modification, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was exceeded by a yoximately 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (a request for NOED had been submitted and approved earlier). The licensee conducted an independent investigation (composed of personnel from the General Office and other Duke sites) to determine the root cause for exceeding the LCO and make recommendations for actions to be accomplished prior to resuming work on this modificatio The licensee's assessment report was completed and issued on September 26, 1995. The report stated that the root cause for exceeding the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO was inadequate communication, coordination, planning, and preparation associated with NSM activities. The inspectors reviewed the report [Report Number SA 95-31(ON)(PA)] and noted that the findings were thorough and captured the concerns of the inspectors. The inspectors noted that the report was of good quality and that the proposed corrective actions were extensive. The inspectors concluded that this investigation and report represented a strength in self assessmen Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory. A strength was identified in the area of self-assessment for the investigation and report into the circumstances of exceeding a TS LCO for the Keowee overhead path, paragraph ENCLOSURE
- I7 Plant Support (71750 and 82301)
The inspectors assessed selected activities of licensee programs to ensure conformance with facility policies and regulatory requirement During the inspection period, the following areas were reviewed: Annual Emergency Exercise On October 10, 1995, the licensee conducted the annual Emergency Response Exercise. The drill scenario was prepared and conducted by Duke Personne Offsite participation was limited to receiving notification messages and acknowledgement of the proper communications links. All drill objectives were met. Personnel accountability was completed on time with two individuals unaccounted for. These were later determined to be "injured" as part of the drill. A medical emergency was simulated as a drill objective, and adequate response observed. Another objective, demonstration of prompt.response by the fire brigade, was considered very well controlle The inspectors observed activities in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and the Offsite Emergency Response Facility. Limited observations were also made at the Oconee Simulator. One resident inspector was designated as a participant in the drill and performed as the NRC on-sit Following the drill, the inspectors witnessed the licensee's critique process for players and later as a presentation to managemen The inspectors determined that the drill scenario was very well conceived, planned, and implemented. The drill controllers and evaluators were able to compensate for several simulator problems which could have compromised the course of the dril They were unobtrusive and provided good assessments and critiques. The drill addressed a previously identified exercise weakness, IFI 50-269, 270,287/94-10-01, Failure to Communicate the Need for the Fire Brigade Response in a Timely Manner. In the current drill, the Fire Brigade was promptly notified and responded well within the drill parameters. Accordingly, Exercise Weakness IFI 50-269, 270,287/94-10-01 is considered close Participants in the drill consistently demonstrated ingenuity in resolving situations as they developed. These solutions were well thought out and planned before implementation. In particular, the TSC management team was effective in restoring (or attempting to restore) electric power to a HPI pump and a water source to the ASW system. The operating crew and the TSC made Emergency Mode Classification determinations at the proper time ENCLOSURE
The inspectors were in general agreement with the conclusions of the licensee's evaluation of the exercise. In particular, some weaknesses in the simulator's capabilities are severe enough to require some corrective action and upgrade The licensee had previously identified one of the weaknesses, inability to model containment pressure and temperature response, as a modeling deficiency requiring correction. Other, less severe problems are under consideration for upgrad Auxiliary Service Water Activation Drill On October 29, 1995, the inspector witnessed a drill to determine the time necessary to activate the ASW Pump. A previous drill was not able to demonstrate activation within the allowable time frame. The licensee investigated the circumstances involved in the dril The investigation determined that the drill scenario did not allow a reasonable indication that a tornado had occurred which would require manning the ASW pump. As a result, delays in the determination caused the minimum time to activate the ASW pump to be exceeded. Problems with ASW pump activation times had been identified in IFI 269,270,287/93-25-0 The drill conducted October 29, adequately demonstrated that the ASW pump could be activated within the allowable time. The
inspector witnessed the drill through the ASW manning phase. The drill appeared to have reasonable conditions and symptoms available to the operators to allow them to conclude that ASW activation was required. Other aspects of IFI 269,270,287/93-25 06 were not evaluated; therefore, it remains ope Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactor.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized.on November 9, 1995, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspecfors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings addressed in the Summary and listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio Item Number Status Description/Reference Paragraph IFI 270/95-01-01 Open Unit 2 Control Battery Capacities, paragraph 3.b.(2).
ENCLOSURE
- I9 Item Number Status Description/Reference Paraqraph IFI 269,270,287/94-10-01 Closed Exercise Weakness for Failure to Communicate the Need for Fire Brigade Response in a Timely Manner, paragraph IFI 269,270,287/93-25-06 Open Actions to Improve Operator Responses to Abnormal Events, paragraph.
Acronyms ASW Auxiliary Service Water ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram CFR Code of Federal Regulations DC Direct Current EFW Emergency Feedwater HPI High Pressure Injection IFI Inspector Followup Item I&E Instrument & Electrical IR
Inspection Report
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
Low Pressure Service Water
LT
Level Transmitter
Notice Of Enforcement Discretion
NSM
Nuclear Station Modification
Oconee Nuclear Station
Plant Operations Review Committee
Pressure Transmitter
Problem Investigation Process
Quality Assurance
Selected Licensee Commitment
Spent Fuel Pool
SSF
Standby Shutdown Facility
SRWP
Standing Radiation Work Permit
TS
Technical Specification
Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater
Vdc
Volts Direct Current
Work Order
ENCLOSURE