IR 05000263/1983009
| ML20024C354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1983 |
| From: | Axelson W, Gloarsen W, Gloersen W, Patterson J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024C345 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0654, RTR-NUREG-654 50-263-83-09, 50-263-83-9, NUDOCS 8307120547 | |
| Download: ML20024C354 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-263/83-09(DRMSP)
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Monticello Plant Site, Monticello, MN Inspection Conducted: May 16-20, 1983 hR
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Inspectors: Co. P. Patterson
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W. B.
loersen 6/R/ #3 Dite '
Approved By:
W.
elson, Chief 7 73
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Emergency Preparedness Section Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on May 16-20, 1983 (Report No. 50-263/83-09(DRMSP))
Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of the following areas of the emergency preparedness program:
licensee actions on previously identified items from the Emergency Preparedness Appraisal including Appendix A - Improvement Items and Appendix C - Open Items, also emergency detection and classification; protective action decisionmaking, notifications and communications; changes to the emergency preparedness program; shift staffing and augmentation; training; dose calculation and assessment, post-accident measurements and instrumentation; public information program; and
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licensee audits. The inspection involved 180 inspector-hours onsite by two
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NRC inspectors and two NRC consultants.
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Results: One Notice of Violation was issued due to the licensee not reporting an Unusual Event within 15 minutes as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.
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307120547 830628 DR ADOCK 05000263 PDR
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Persons Contacted
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- W. Shamla, Plant Manager
- E. Ward, Manager, Nuclear Environmental Services (Corporate)
- G. Hudson, Assistant Administrator, Emergency Preparedness (Corporate)
- M. Clarity, Plant Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection
- F. Fey, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- G. Mathiasen, Supervisor, Radiological Services, Emergency Planning Coordinator M. Onnen, Site Superintendent / Shift Supervisor M. Brant, Site Superintendent / Shift Supervisor W. Boehme, Site Superintendnet/ Shift Supervisor W. Dhein, Site Superintendent / Shift Supervisor a
B. Day, Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services G. Goering, General Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services (Corporate)
R. Anderson, Headquarters Emergency Center Coordinator (Corporate)
G. Webster, Systems Dispatcher (Corporate)
G. Earney, Training Supervisor, Production Training B. Schmitt, Technical Instructor of Health Physics Production Training
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J. Petersen, Chemistry Coordinator
- C. Brown, Senior Resident Inspector, RIII
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Review of Appraisal Improvement Items, Appendix A - (Letter from J. G. Keppler to D. E. Gilberts, May 4, 1982) Report No. 50-263/82-05)
Licensee actions on Improvement Items 1, 2 and 3 were found acceptable as determined by the inspectors.
Item 4 has been satisfied by increasing
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the number of qualified persons available on shift for dose assessment calculations on both the computer and hand calculators. Dose assessment
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training, has been added to the qualification program for Radiation Protection Specialists (RPS) and is now a requirement for shift work. A total of seven RPSs were trained to perform dose calculations. The inspector confirmed this training by conducting walk-throughs with four RPSs. All four RPSs performed satisfactorily.
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Regarding Item 5, the inspectors interviewed the Health Physics Technical Instructor to verify that the training program for Site Superintendents
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and Shift Supervisors has been upgraded to include familiarity with the application of dose assessment information provided to them by the on-shift Radiation Chemical Technicians. Revisions to pertinent Emergency
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Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) affecting the Site Superintendents and Shift Supervisors are included in their annual training programs.
EPIP A.2-406 (page 16) has been changed by adding a note to the Shift Supervisor (SS) or Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC) concerning protective action guidance (PAG) procedures. This note instructs the SS or REC to initiate EPIP A.2-105, Attachment 2, " Emergency Notification Report." Licensee action on this item is considered acceptable.
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Items 6, 7, 9 and 10 relate to first aid equipment and supplies,
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communication. equipment and purchase of a dedicated emergency response enclosed vehicle. These items have been rc. viewed by the inspection team, and actions taken by the licensee were found acceptable. For Item 10, the licensee now has available two dedicated enclosed vehicles.
Other licensee vehicles have four wheel drive and could respond in any emergency which might include severe weather conditions. Keys for the
two dedicated vehicles are assigned to the Emergency Planning Coordinator and the Radiation Safety Protection Coordinator.
j The licensee has taken exception to improvement Items 8 and 15.
A joint
nearsite press briefing area for use by State, local and licensee media
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i personnel is not feasible according to the licensee. The State EOC at the State Capitol Building is preferred by the State of Minnesota and the
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licensee has exercized it at the recent Prairie Island and Monticello
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emergency exercises. For Item 15, the present notification procedure for
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Wright County includes the local telephone exchange as the primary link with a dedicated radio as a backup. The licensee contends that after the
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initial call from the plant, most subsequent information would come from
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the State EOC. The licensee chose not to install a dedicated telephone
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line from the plant's EOF and TSC to the Wright County EOC.
Because these items relate to offsite preparedness, the NRC staff will await for FEMA's i
findings and conclusion.
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Items 11, 13 and 14 have also been reviewed by the inspection team and
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licensee actions have been determined to be acceptable.
Item 12 relates to the updating and reviewing the Letters of Agreement with offsite support agencies. The Corporate Emergency Plan contains
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copies of Letters of Agreement with several support agencies with j
agreement dates two to three years old.
Included in the plan are letters
from Hazelton Environmental Services dated February 20, 1980, and from j
the Monticello - Big Lake Community Hospital dated December 11, 1980.
These two letters plus any others requiring updating or revisions will be
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included as Appendix A to the revised Corporate Emergency Plan due for j
issue in about 30 days. The inspector obtained this information from the
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Assistant Administrator, Emergency Preparedness.
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A surveillance procedure for yearly review of these Letters of Agreement is also being followed. The licensee's plan is to issue new letters where changes in agreement or conditions have occurred.
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Review of Appraisal Open Items, Appendix C - (Letter from J. G. Keppler l
to D. E. Gilberts, May 4, 1982)
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a.
(263/82-05-12) Open. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response i
to minimum shift staffing regarding implementation of two Senior l
Reactor Operators (SRO) available on shift 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day. The
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licensee's minimum shift staff implementation was not achieved by
the extended date of February 15, 1983. However, a March 14, 1983, j
letter from Mr. D. B. Vassallo, Chief, Operatiag Reactors Branch i
No. 2, Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to Mr. D. M. Musolf, Nuclear Support Services Department, i
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i Northern States Power Company, stated that Item 1.A.I.3.2 of NURE3-0737 items will be addressed separately from other post-TMI related items. This item relating to minimum shift staffing will be addressed by the licensee when the final rule on Licensed Operator Staffing at Nuclear Power Units is issued by the NRC.
b.
(263/82-05-13) Closed. The permanent Technical Support Center (TSC)
has been completed and is functional for communications and dose assessment capability.
Installation and testing of all needed assessment equipment such as the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) or a similar assessment system has not been completed. The ventilation system including KEPA filters and normal air supply was going through final testing at the time of the inspection.
For the purpose of tracking, this item is considered closed.
A final review of this facility will be conducted as part of the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) appraisals tentatively scheduled for 1985.
c.
(263/82-05-14) Closed. The permanent Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) has been completed in the Training Center Building approxim-ately 1 1/2 eiles from the plant. This new EOF functioned satisfactorily during the February 23, 1983, emergency exercise.
Since then, computer equipment has become available for dose
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assessment capability in the EOF. A new dose assessment system, due for completion in late summer of 1983, will have access terminals available in the EOF, TSC and Control Room plus the Chemistry
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Supervisor's office. For tracking purposes, this item is considered closed.
A final review of this facility will be conducted as part of the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) appraisals tentatively scheduled for 1985.
d.
(263/82-05-15) Closed. The inspector confirmed that the permanent post-accident coolant sampling system was installed and fully operational.
In addition to examining the equipment, walk-throughs were conducted utilizing this sampling system.
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(263/82-05-16) Closed. The inspector confirmed that the permanent post-accident containment air sampling system was installed and fully operational. This system's capability was demonstrated successfully as part of the February 23, 1983, emergency exercise.
f.
(263/82-05-17) and (263/82-05-18) Closed.
Procedures for the permanent primary coolant sampling system have been completed and implemented. EPIP A.2-413 and EPIP A.2-414 describe primary coolant sampling methods. Procedures for the permanent containment air sampling system have been completed and implemented. These pro-cedures are EPIP A.2-415 and EPIP A.2-416.
Both sets of procedures were reviewed by the inspector and found to be adequate.
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(263/82-05-19) Open. The licensee has requested that the Site Superintendent's office be included as part of the Control Room.
Presently, the meteorological measurements readout is installed in the Site Superintendent's office. The Division of Licensing of NRR has removed this item from other post TMI related items in NUREG-0737 which were included as part an order confirming licensee commitments on Post-TMI related issues. This is the same letter as referred to in Section 3.a of this report. This item is still unresolved.
4.
Implementation of the Emergency Plan (263/82-XX-02); (263/82-XX-03); (263/82-XX-04) and (263/82-XX-05):
Emergency Plan Activation. The reporting of these events were investigated and considered closed by the inspection team. The pertinent information for reporting purposes is shown in Table 1.
As indicated in the Appendix to this letter the State of Minnesota was not notified until 66 minutes after the notification of Unusual Event (NUE) declaration on April 11, 1983. The inspectors noted that EPIP A.2-102, Attachment 4 does not include a space for recording the time that the County Sheriffs or Monticello Civil Defense are called.
Only a place for the Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC) to write his initials is included.
The licensee is required to have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3.
This capability was not demonstrated for the NUE occurring on April 11, 1983.
Further, the licensee failed to follow Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure A.2-102, Attachment 4, which states that both counties and State shall be notified with 15 minutes after declaring an emergency.
This procedure is required to be followed by T/S 6.5.A.6.
This item appears to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements, and is further detailed in the Appendix to the letter accompanying this report (263/83-09-01).
A description of this NUE is as follows: At 4:50 a.m. on April 11, 1983, the 480 volt circuit breaker (No.52-304) was lost.
Power was lost to part of the Emergency Core Cooling System, No. 11 Core Spray and No. 11 Standby Liquid Control System. The Shift Supervisor (SS) immediately declared an NUE. He examined the circuit breaker to investigate the problem and later returned to the Control Room and activated the Emergency Plan at 5:20 a.m.
The notification scheme requires the SS to call the SEC, who then calls the Minnesota Division of Emergency Services.
The licensee has indicated that an internal procedural change has been i
made to permit the SEC to make the State / local notifications from the
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shift quarters (a mobile trailer nearby) instead of first returning to the Control Room.
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Table 1: Emergency Plan Activations at Monticello during the period January 1, 1982, through April 30, 1983 Licensee Time Elapsed Emergency EPIP Time of State / Local Time Date Classification Guideline No.
Declaration 1 Notified 2 (min)
04/08/82 NUE
4:20 p.m.
4:35 p.m.
12/13/82 NUE
10:29 p.m.
10:38 p.m.
04/11/83 NUE
4:50 a.m.
5:56 a.m.
1.
Time of declaration is the time listed on Attachment 2 of EPIP A.2-102 Form 5790-102-2 or Form 5790-101-1 both of which should coincide.
It is not the time when the event occurred.
2.
Time given on Attachment 4 EPIP A.2-102 Form 5790-102-4 when Minnesota State of Emergency Services was notified. Documentation on when local authorities were notified is not provided on Form.
5.
Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)
Emergency classification and initiating conditions for each of the four emergency classes are described in Section 4.0 of the Emergency Plan and also in EPIP A.2-101.
These were reviewed by the inspector and found to be consistent in both the Plan and the EPIP. Also, they were consistent with the initiating events described in NUREG-0654, Revision 1, Appendix 1.
EPIP A.2-101 contains as Attachment I a list of initiating condition categories called guidelines. These 30 guidelines are then correlated with specific reactor conditions or others at various levels which coincide with one of the four emergency classifications. These are contained in Attachment 2 to EPIP A.2-101.
These Emergency Action
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Levels (EALs) include actual radiation monitoring readings, Control Room panel monitors and other monitoring equipment. The inspector concluded that this was an adequate method for classifying emergencies utilizing these quantifiable EALs.
The inspectors examined Guidelines 1, 4, 5 and 8 from Attachment I to EPIP A.2-101 and for each of the four emergency classifications compared Control Room panel readings as listed with actual Control Room panel readings. Readings were consistent with ranges on the monitors and the monitors were correctly identified in Attachment 1.
The licensee is reviewing EALs annually with both State and County officials as determined by the inspectors from a meeting with the licensee's Manager of Nuclear Environmental Services. The inspectors reviewed the May 1983 correspondence from both the State and County officials confirming mutual agreement to use the EALs as specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654. These EALs and other general information about the Monticello plant had been discussed previously in separate State and County meetings.
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The Shift Supervisor as the initial Emergency Director has the sole responsibility and authority for classifying an emergency, recommending offsite protective measures, and notifying State and local governmental agencies. These duties are described in the Plan and in the EPIPs.
Each of the four EPIPs describe what steps are to be taken for declaring the event and include attachments which state that notifications shall be made within 15 minutes of declaring the emergency class.
The actual reporting by the licensee of incidents and emergency classification are addressed in Paragraph 4.
6.
Protective Action Decisionmaking (82202)
The Emergency Director has the authority and responsibility to recommend protective actions for licensee personnel and any others onsite at the time of an emergency. These actions which may include evacuation of site personnel will be based on a recommendation from the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC). A plant evacuation will normally be initiated during a Site Area Emergency, however mitigating weather conditions or other factors may make it unadvisable. A General Emergency always requires plant evacuation. This evacuation includes the owner-controlled area outside the protected area.
Prior to the EOF being activated, the Emergency Director will make recommendations for protective actions if necessary. These recommenda-tions will be to the State Emergency Operations Center (E0C).
If it is determined that immediate protective actions should first be initiated locally, the recommendations will be made to Ccunty authorities. These recommendation functions will be transferred to the EOF and the Emergency Manager upon activation of the EOF. Offsite radiation survey results from the EOF radiation protection group will be analyzed at the EOF.
Results will then be used to assess the consequences of the offsite radiological conditions and generate protective action recommendations based on EPA guidelines.
Protective action responsibilities are described in the Site Emergency Plan, EPIP A.2-201, Onsite Monitoring and Protective Action Criteria and EPIP A.2-204, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations. The Corporate Nuclear Emergency Plan and Corporate EPIP 1.1.11, Accident Assessment, also include description and guidance for recommending protective actions to the State.
EPIP A.2-204 includes several tables for recommended protective action from exposure to a gaseous plume, against injection of contamination, and also for potential release situations. Attachment 12 to EPIP A.2-204, Recommended Protective Actions for Potential Release Situations, lists four progressively degrading situations including core melt sequence, fission products release to containment, and two conditions of con-tainment failure leading to atmospheric release.
Protective action recommendations are briefly stated for each of these four conditions.
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1 Rue inspection team interviewed four Site Superintendents (SS) and one REC on protective action recommendations. All were aware of these
measures and their own related responsibilities. Also the inspection team verified in these interviews that the individuals involved in making offsite protective action recommendations _ understood that these actions involving sheltering / evacuations were based on plant conditions including core and containment degradation. Even if no release is in progress, offsite protective _ actions are based on actual plant conditions.
7.
Notifications and Communications (82203)
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Notification of an emergency begins with the SS notifying the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and the SEC. The STA and the SEC each carry personal pagers. The SEC has the responsibility to notify the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members. The key ERO members will be noti-fied by a pager system activated by the SEC. The remainder of the ERO members will be notified by radio tonal alert system. The SEC also notifies State / local governmental agencies and later the NRC. He also notifies the Northern States Power Company (NSP) Systems Dispatcher, who in turn notifies Corporate officials.
The notification procedures are described for each of the four emergency classifications in EPIP A.2-102 through EPIP A.2-105.
The steps to follow in sequence are clearly listed including an announcement on the plant public address system. The SEC as directed by the SS or Emergency Director is responsible for implementing these notifications. He may request assistance in notifications if Federal, State and local govern-mental agencies support is required.
The content of messages given on notification of an emergency is included in attachments to EPIP A.2-102 through EPIP A.2-105.
Provisions are also included for message verification in these EPIPs. A separate Nuclear Emergency Preparedness telephone Directory was issued in January 1983.
This directory also includes phone numbers for governmental agency support groups and Prairie' Island Plant support personnel.. This directory will be updated quarterly and presently is in addition to telephone numbers supplied in the EPIPs.
Communication equipment in the Control Room, TSC and EOF was examined by the inspector and found to be adequate. Radio communications are available as backup in each of these facilities. Telecopiers are also available in the TSC and EOF and are primarily used to provide a hard copy to corporate headquarters and the State of Minnesota. Portable radios are provided for offsite radiation monitoring teams. All com-munication equipment is tested monthly for operability, including those requiring an annual test with Federal emergency response organizations.
The inspector reviewed records of these monthly tests and found them to be satisfactory.
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i The prompt public notification system is described in Section 8.1 of the Corporate Nuclear Emergency Plan. The siren system has been installed and operable since February 1, 1982. Monthly siren tests are currently being conducted in Sherburne and Wright County. Last year, there was some opposition to monthly testing in Wright County by local farmers and monthly tests were temporarily discontinued. The inspector learned from a licensee representative that Wright County officials have the sirens on a monthly testing frequency again. Tone alert radios (receivers only)
supplement the siren system in both counties. These radios are located in schools, hospitals and nursing homes plus some large commercial and institutional facilities within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
Besides these two methods, alert and notification information is relayed through communication links described in the Minnesota Emergency Response Plan. The State Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) is activated when State and local governments are notified of an emergency.
As part of this inspection procedure, the inspector interviewed the HQEC Coordinator and the Systems Dispatcher in the Corporate office. Both were well versed in their responsibilities and emergency related duties related to emergency notifications and communications.
8.
Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program (82204)
i The inspectors confirmed that changes to the emergency plan and EPIPs are reviewed by licensee management as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q). The changes to the emergency plans are submitted to Nuclear Environmental Services for review and coordination with other NSP plans and procedures.
Also these changes are reviewed and compared with State and local govern-mental agencies emergency plans. One review criterion includes emergency plan review by someone knowledgeable in Health Physics to verify the technical accuracy of pertainent information.
Another review of the plan is conducted by the Plant Operations Committee (onsite review). The Safety Audit Committee (offsite review)
also has review responsibility, but after issuance. These same steps are followed for EPIPs except there is no Safety Audit Committee review.
Changes to the emergency plans, both Corporate and Site, and related EPIPs to each plan have been submitted to Region III within 30 days of such changes, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR Appendix E,Section V.
9.
Shift Staffing and Augmentation (82205)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's shift staffing and augmentation capability to determine its adequacy. The administrative and physical means of these capabilities were also reviewed to assure their avail-ability to augment the emergency organization in a timely manner. These requirements were discussed and reviewed with the Emergency Planning Coordinator.
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The plant shift staffing complement and related functional capabilities were compared with the goals of Table B-1 of NUREG-0654. Beginning on February 1, 1983, a chemistry technician has been assigned to each shift. With this addition, the licensee meets minimum shift staffing 1evels as indicated in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654. Another NRC acticn item
to have two SR0s available on each shift has not been met as yet by the
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licensee. This item is separately addressed in Paragraph 3.a of this report.
The inspector determined that an administrative system is in place so that adequate numbers of shift personnel are available or on call if needed. Currently, there are 67 tone alert radios assigned to key plant personnel to facilitate this shift agumentation. These home located radios were tested to determine the 30 minutes and 60 minutes response times. A test on March 10, 1982, indicated that only three individuals out of 31 contacted were not capable of meeting the 30 minutes response time. All first line emergency response titles were included in this shift augmentation drill. Another shift augmentation test is planned sometime during the next two months.
10.
Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) - (82206)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's training program, including development and maintenance of course outlines, lesson plans, training schedules, individual training records, drills, written exams, and other necessary emergency training material.
These emergency training program components were discussed with the Training Supervisor and a Technical Instructor of Health Physics Production Training.
Individual records of Shift Supervisors, Shift Radiation Protection Specialists and Shift Chemistry Technicians were reviewed to verify that initial training and
retraining were provided. Training records and retraining frequency were also reviewed by the inspectors for offsite support organizations such as ambulance / rescue and fire department service and found to be
satisfactory.
The Training Center is in the process of developing a Radiation Protection Specialist (RPS) Plan which will establish the requirements for a training progression program for RPSs. This plan should provide a marked improvement in that portion of the Emergency Training Program.
Walkthroughs and interviews were conducted with Shift Supervisors, Shift Chemistry technicians and two offsite firemen to determine that they were knowledgeable in their emergency assignments and could respond satisfac-torily in an emergency. Questions asked by the inspectors included areas of energency classification, dose assessment, post accident sampling and analysis, and offsite organization response. All interviews were considered satisfactory by the inspectors and showed the adequacy of training provided to these individuals.
Interviews were also conducted with an Emergency Manager and EOF Coordinator, whose position would be as manager of the EOF. The E0F Coordinator would activate the EOF (within one hour) and be in charge
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until the EOF Manager arrived.
Both indicated they had participated
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in the recent February 1983 exercise or in drills, besides receiving formal training. Both were responsive and knowledgeable in their emergency functions.
11.
Dose Calculation and Assessment (82207)
The inspectors determined that adequate procedures exist for offsite dose calculations and assessment under actual and potential release conditions. These procedures are consistent with those used by the State of Minnesota. EPIP A.2-406, Offsite Dose Projection, was
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reviewed during the inspection. This procedure provides guidance and j
instructions for estimating offsite doses resulting from actual or anticipated releases.
It utilizes a computer projection method (MODCOM) or a hand calculator. Input for either calculational method was from the meteorological tower computer system, the plant stack, effluent monitor, and the reactor building ventilation release rate.
The turbine building vents have been sealed, and the only expected release path is through the reactor building vents or the main plant stack.
Meteorological information is available in the Control Room, TSC and EOF. Backup information is available from the National Weather Information Service. Dose rate values are printed out in millirem / hour at the site boundary, the nearest receptor, and out to 10 miles in one mile increments. The printout also displays the dose guidelines for the site boundary and nearest receptor. Data is accumulated in this computer program at 15, 30 or 60 minute intervals and can be converted to accumulated dose at a preselected time for whole body and infant thyroid for a selected sector. The accumulated doses are then keyed to a specific EPIP for offsite protective action decisionmaking.
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The training records of Shift RPSs were reviewed by the inspectors for
completion and qualification in dose assessment and found to be up to date. From these records four RPSs were selected for interviews and
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walk throughs by the inspectors. The RPSs utilized the computer equipment to perform dose calculations based upon information supplied by the inspectors. All four individuals demonstrated knowledge of the dose assessment procedure and promptly and correctly performed the calculations using the computer in the TSC. Similiar computer equipment for dose calculations were in place in the EOF.
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computers are inoperable, dose calculations could be performed using i
hand calculators as per Attachment 2 to EPIP A.2-406.
During the inspection, it was noted that the licensee is installing a
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new computer system for dose calculations (MIDAS). Terminals for access to this system are in place in the Control Room, TSC, EOF and
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the Chemistry Supervisor's office. The MIDAS system is tentatively scheduled to be fully operational by the end of summer 1983.
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Postaccident Measurements and Instrumentation (82208)
The inspectors determined that radiological and meteorological instrumentation described in the Emergency Plan and EPIPs used for assessment of plant radiological conditions during an accident are available and usintained. The plant Area Radiological Monitoring System (ARMS) is being maintained by the plant technical support staff.
Instrumentation is calibrated quarterly by the instrumentation and calibration staff. High range portable instrumentation is contained in the emergency kits described in the plan. These instruments are also calibrated quarterly. Two multi-channel analyzers are available in the counting laboratory. These are calibrated daily. The inspectors also examined the high range containment monitors and determined that they were operable and calibrated.
EPIP A.2-101 contains initiating radiological conditions that can result in emergency classification using off-normal radiological instrumentation readings as plant installed ARMS, reactor building vent readings and the plant stack readings. The post-accident sampling system (PASS) for sampling primary coolant and containment atmosphere were in place and operable as determined by the inspectors. PASS procedures are contained in EPIPs A.2-419, -420 and -421.
Walkthroughs of the PASS procedures were conducted with four RPSs and observed by the inspectors. All individuals demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the sampling and analysis procedures and familiarity with the equipment.
Stack and reactor building vents sampling and analysis procedures are contained in A.2-422 and A.2-423.
Additional counting and analysis facilities are provided in the EOF. These procedures are listed in EPIP A.2-424.
All these procedures were considered adequate by the inspectors.
13.
Public Information Program (82209)
The inspectors met with the Manager, Nuclear Environmental Services, and discussed the current status of the public information brochure distributed to the public and transients within the 10 mile EPZ. A new updated brochure is presently being printed and should be distributed within two to three months. Besides the annual distribution of this brochure, the licensee distributes a Plant Manager's letter annually which highlights the plant's yearly activities.
Included in this letter is an article on emergency preparedness including a list of local stations which will broadcast initial emergency information.
The current brochure is distributed to transient populations including parks and other recreational areas, motels, public meeting halls, libraries, hospitals, large commercial and industrial organizations and other places where the public may gather. A point of contact for the public to acquire more information is listed in the brochure.
Evacuation routes within the 10 mile EPZ are listed on a partial area map included in the brochure. Provisions for the elderly, handicapped or blind are addressed in the brochure. A chart showing what protective
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actions will be planned depending on the category of emergency is included in the brochure.
The inspectors have determined that the licensee's Public Information Program is adequate for the dissemination of basic emergency planning information.
14.
Licensee Audits (82210)
The inspectors confirmed that an independent audit of the licensee's emergency preparedness program is being conducted on an annual basis by a group independent of the program. The most recent audit / review was conducted by Nuclear Operations - Quality Assurance Branch on an intermittent basis from February 21 to April 1,1983.
The inspectors noted in their review of this yearly audit that it included a review of licensee interface with State and local government aw well as a review of the licensee's program including its emergency facilities and related equipment.
It appeared to be a thorough review and addressed all pertinent emergency program areas. A response to any deficiency findings is required within 30 days by the Corporate Emergency Preparedness Group.
Deficiencies or weaknesses identified as a result of drills and annual exercises are critiqued after the event. Formal reports are issued on these items and are put on an internal tracking system for resolutions within varying time spans depending on the item. This information is made available to the independent audit team for review and comments as part of the yearly activities.
The inspectors concluded that this independent review meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t).
15.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on May 20, 1983. The team leader summarized the scope and findings of the inspection including an apparent Notice of Violation for not notifying State and local govern-ment agencies within 15 minutes after the declaration of an Unusual Event.
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