IR 05000250/1994017

Insp Repts 50-250/94-17 & 50-251/94-17 on 940731-0827.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Plant Support,Chemistry,Fire Protection,Radiological Controls & Housekeeping

ML17352A795
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	09/16/1994
From:	Binoy Desai, Johnson T, Landis K, Trocine L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17352A794	List: IR 05000250/1994017 ML17352A793
References
50-250-94-17, 50-251-94-17, NUDOCS 9409290014
Download: ML17352A795 (38)

Text

s gp,8 ARCS UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos.:

50-250/94-17 and 50-251/94-17 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos s

50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:

DPR-31 and DPR-41 Facility Name:

Turkey Point Units 3 and

Date Sig ed Inspection Conducted:

Jul 31 through August 27, 1994 Inspectors:

T.

P.

Jo nson, Sen or Resident Inspector B.

B. Desai, R sip t Inspector Dat Signed

~r-L. Trocine, Residen Inspector t

Dat S gned Accompanied by:

R.

P. Schin, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 2B, Division of Reactor Projects M. S.

ilier, Resident Inspector, St.

Lucie,- Projects ecti n 28, Division of Reactor Projects Approved by:~ K.

.

andis, Chief Reacto Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects Date igned SUMMARY Scope:

This resident inspection was performed to assure public health and safety, and it involved direct inspection at the site and at the Florida Power and Light Juno Beach and 45th Street offices in the following areas:

plant operations including operational safety and plant events; maintenance including surveillance observations; engineering; and plant support including radiological controls, chemistry, fire protection, and housekeeping.

Backshift inspections were performed in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection guidance.

9409290014 9409lh

.PDR ADOCK 05000250

PDR

Results:

Within the scope of this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee continued to demonstrate satisfactory performance to ensure safe plant operations.

Violations or deviations were not identified; however, the following inspector followup item was identified:

IFI 50-250,251/94-17-01, Containment Airlock Technical Specification Clarifications and Associated Repairs (section 4.2.4)

During this inspection period, the inspectors had comments in the following Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance functional areas:

Plant 0 erations The licensee's plans and preparations for the Unit 4 Cycle 15 refueling outage were very good (section 4.2. 1).

A licensee self-assessment initiative was proactive and effective (section 4.2.2).

Operations personnel were knowledgeable of the clearance process.

Although one valve was not included as part of an initial clearance boundary, operations personnel appropriately modified the clearance boundary and correctly ensured that the system was depressurized and in a safe condition prior to the performance of work (section 4.2.3).

The licensee appropriately responded to a Unit 3 containment airlock

'interlock failure; however, long-term corrective actions for the interlock repair and technical specifications clarifications are an inspector follow item (section 4.2.4).

The licensee's actions with regard to the failure of an Eagle-21 system power distribution panel were appropriate (section 4.2.5).

The licensee appropriately responded to deficiencies associated with the environmental qualification of electrical conduit (section 4.2.6).

Haintenance The inspectors identified several items where electrical conduit insulation was damaged (section 4.2.6).

Inspector observed station maintenance and surveillance testing activities were completed in a satisfactory manner (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).

Planned maintenance outages for the 3A emergency diesel generator and the B and C auxiliary feedwater pumps were well planned and executed.

Further, the licensee's program for entry into technical specification action statements to perform maintenance appeared to be sound such that safety and risk were addressed and a net safety benefit was obtained (sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4).

The preventive maintenance optimization project appeared to have sufficient controls to ensure that necessary tasks were not deleted (section 5.2.5).

The inservice testing trending program was effective, and the decision to change out the 4B high head safety injection pump was conservative (section 5.2.6).

An inspector followup item regarding condition reports and inservice test failures was closed (section 5.2.7).

En ineerin The FPL metallurgical lab was an excellent facility which was well staffed and provided excellent support for the plant (section 6.2. 1).

A meeting with both licensee and Nuclear Regulatory Commission representati.ves was beneficial in understanding current engineering issues (section 6.2.2).

Engineering's programs for instrument and mechanical setpoints demonstrated very good support for the plant (section 6.2.3).

The licensee's operating experience feedback program was strong, as demonstrated by its proactive and appropriate review. of an industry power-operated relief valve failure event prior to receipt of an NRC Information Notice (section 6.2.4).

The licensee's actions with regard to followup on. an industry event involving an Eagle-21 system power distribution panel failure were prompt and comprehensive.

In addition, the licensee's decision to return. the spare power distribution panel to Westinghouse for modification, based on an industry event and prior to the occurrence of a similar event at Turkey Point, was proactive and conservative.

The system engineer was also very knowledgeable of the Eagle-21 system (section 6.2.5).

The monthly operating report and two licensee event reports were timely, accurate, and appropriate (sections 6.2.6 -through 6.2.8).

Plant Su ort A licensee self-assessment initiative for health physics and chemistry programs was proactive and effective (section 4.2.2).

The primary chemistry sampling program was effectively performed.

The chemistry technicians were very knowledgeable, and they demonstrated excellent procedural compliance (section 7.2. 1).

The licensee's program to improve plant material condition and housekeeping appeared to be effective (section 7.2.2).

The licensee's

.program for fire drills was noteworthy and'was effectively conducted (section 7.2.3).

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Persons Contacted..........................

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2.0 Other NRC Inspections Performed During This Period.............

3.0 Plant Status............................................

3.1 Unit 3 3.2 Unit 4..............

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Inspection Scope...'.

Inspection Findings

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6. 1 Inspection Scope....

6.2 Inspection Findings

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7. 1 Inspection Scope....

7.2 Inspection Findings

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16 8.0 Exit Interviews............................................

9.0 Acronyms and Abbreviations.......................

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REPORT DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted

1. 1 Licensee Employees T. V. Abbatiello, Site guality Manager G.

P. Alexander, Supervisor Inspections P.

H. Banaszak, Acting Technical Manager W. H. Bohlke, Vice President, Engineering and Licensing H. J. Bowskill, Reactor Engineering Supervisor S.

F. Collard, Metallurgical Laboratory S.

H. Franzone, Instrumentation and Controls Maintenance Supervisor R. J. Gianfrancesco, Maintenance Support Services Supervisor R.

G. Heisterman, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor P.

C. Higgins, Outage Manager G.

E. Hollinger, Training Manager J. J. Hutchinson, Manager, Component, Support, and Inspections D.

E. Jernigan, Operations Manager H.

H. Johnson, Operations Supervisor V. A. Kaminskas, Services Manager J.

E. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection/Safet'y Supervisor J.

E. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Analyst R.

S. Kundalkar, Engineering Manager H. L. Lacal, Plant Change Control Supervisor J.

D. Lindsay, Health Physics Supervisor J.

Harchese, Site Construction Manager F.

E. Harcussen, Security Supervisor C.

L. Mowrey, Licensing Assistant H. N. Paduano, Manager, Licensing and Special Projects L.

W. Pearce, Plant General Manager H. 0. Pearce, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor T. F. Plunkett, Site Vice President D.

R. Powell, Technical Manager R.

E.

Rose, Nuclear Materials Manager R.

N. Steinke, Chemistry Supervisor H.

B. Wayland, Maintenance Manager E. J.

Weinkam, Licensing Manager Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.

1.2 NRC Resident Inspectors B.

B. Desai, Resident Inspector T.

P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector L. Trocine, Resident Inspector 1.3 Other NRC Personnel on Site

• D.

G. Crain, Co-op, Technical Support Staff, Division of Reactor projects

H. S. Hiller, Resident Inspector, St. Lucie, Reactor Projects Section 2B, Division of Reactor Projects R.

P. Schin, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 2B, Division of Reactor Projects

Attended exit interview on August 31, 1994 Note:

An alphabetical tabulation of acronyms used in this report is listed in the last paragraph in this report.

2.0 Other NRC Inspections Performed During This Period None 3.0 Plant Status 3. 1 Unit 3 Unit 3 operated at or near 100% reactor power throughout this reporting period and had been on line since May 27, 1994.

3.2 Unit 4 Unit 4 operated at or near 100% reactor power throughout this l

reporting period and had been on line since Harch 18, 1994.

4.0 Plant Operations (40500, 60705, and 71707)

4.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors verified that FPL operated the facilities safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements.

They accomplished this by direct observation of activities, tours of the facilities, interviews and discussions with personnel, independent verification of safety system status and -technical specification compliance, review of facility records, and evaluation of the licensee's management control.

The inspectors reviewed plant events to determine facility status and the need for, further followup action.

The significance of these events,was evaluated along with the performance of the appropriate safety systems and the actions taken by the licensee.-

The inspectors verified that required notifications were made to the NRC and that licensee followup including event chronology, root cause determination, and corrective actions were appropriate.

The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's self-assessment capability by including PNSC and CNRB activities, gA/gC audits and reviews, line management self-assessments, individual self-checking techniques, and performance indicator.2 4.2.1 Inspection Findings Unit 4 Refueling Preparations The licensee intends to perform the Cycle 15 refueling outage on Unit 4 during the period October 3 to November 17, 1994.

The licensee conducted weekly meetings to discuss preparations, open issues, schedules, etc.

A weekly outage package was also prepared and distributed.

Outage goals, organization, critical path schedule, PC/Hs, work lists, material/parts issues, and work force were addressed.

4.2.2 The inspectors reviewed the weekly packages, attended selected meetings, discussed the outage plans with plant management, and assessed licensee overall preparations.

A listing of licensee commitments was also reviewed.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee appears well prepared for the upcoming refueling outage, and the inspectors intend to continue to follow these preparations.

Operations Department Self Assessment The Turkey Point operations department performed a self-assessment initiative during the period July 25-29, 1994.

This included a

team of specialists from both the Turkey Point and St.

Lucie sites, from Juno Beach (headquarters),

and from INPO.

The team reviewed operational activities including control room performance, non-licensed operator watch standing, and plant status.

Further, the team reviewed the health physics and chemistry program areas.

The team identified strengths and areas for improvement in each functional area.

Licensee operations management developed a

findings listing and self assessment summary from the team's exit meeting.

The licensee intends to track the issues and close out recommended actions using the PHAI system.

Prior to the self assessment, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations including associated documentation, team member listing and qualification, and review scope.

During the assessment, the inspectors maintained awareness of licensee's activities.

Following the assessment, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's findings and discussed them with operations management.

The inspectors determined that no safety issues were identified and that issues were not different than those previously identified by the NRC or by the licensee.

The inspectors verified that the licensee has a tracking and followup system in place, and the inspectors concluded that this review was proactive and was an effective self-assessment initiativ.2.3 Equipment Clearance Process The inspectors reviewed the licensee's equipment clearance process by reviewing administrative procedure O-ADM-212, In-Plant Equipment Clearance Orders, and by verifying that selected clearance orders were appropriately implemented.

The inspectors verified that the tags for clearance order, Nos. 0-94-08-013 and 3-94-08-055 were hung in the correct locations and.that the valves and breakers included in these clearance orders were in the correct positions.

Clearance order No. 0-94-08-013 involved the disabling of the C AFW pump and isolation of the oil cooling for maintenance, and clearance order No. 3-94-08-055-involved the isolation of the instrument air supply check valve (3-40-816) to the AFW control valves for the C steam generator to allow for removal, repair, and replacement.

After hanging clearance order No. 3-94-08-055, operators noted that the system could not be depressurized.

It was initially thought that one of the, valves that was isolated by the clearance may have been leaking by, but additional troubleshooting by operations personnel revealed that another valve should have been incorporated as part of the clearance boundary in order to isolate the system.

As a result, the licensee modified the clearance boundary and successfully depressurized the system prior to the performance of work.

The inspectors witnessed portions of the licensee's troubleshooting activities and concluded that the operations personnel involved were knowledgeable of the clearance process.

Although one valve was not included as part of the initial clearance boundary, operations personnel appropriately modified the clearance boundary and correctly performed steps 3. 17.3 and 5. 1.4 of procedure 0-ADH-212 to ensure that the system was depressurized and in a'afe condition prior to the performance of work.

4.2.4 Containment Air Lock Technical Specifications At 3: 10 a.m.

on August 10, 1994, during periodic containment air lock testing on Unit 3, the emergency escape hatch door linkage malfunctioned resulting in the inoperability of the inner door.

Because the licensee could not assure that the inner door was closed, control room operators entered action statement a.l of Technical Specification 3.6. 1.3.

This required the outer door to be verified closed and locked within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The licensee concluded that the air lock was operable; therefore, no shutdown action statement applied.

However, the licensee prepared to troubleshoot the air lock door interlocks in order to complete the periodic surveillance testing of Technical Specifications 4.6. 1.3.b and c.

A team comprised of maintenance personnel, operators, a vendor representative, a

4.2.5 health physics technician, and management personnel assembled to enter the Unit 3 containment to repair the emergency escape hatch door interlocks.

Pre-entry briefings were held to discuss individual actions, personnel safety due to the heat stress, radiological safety, and containment integrity assurance.

The licensee repaired the emergency escape hatch, the air lock interlock door cam mechanism; and key locking mechanism.

The air lock pressure, vacuum, and interlock tests were successfully completed later that day.

The emergency air lock interlock was inoperable for about 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

The inspectors followed up on this item by reviewing control room logs, technical specifications, surveillance procedures, and previous history.

Engineering was previously working on this known problem per REA No.94-045, including development of a minor modification package (PC/N).

The inspectors attended the pre-entry briefings, and confirmed that precautions relative to personnel, radiation, and nuclear safety were addressed.

The inspectors also witnessed selected maintenance and surveillance activities.

The inspectors noted that Technical Specifications 3.6. 1.3 and 4.6. 1.3 specifically addressed containment air 'lock and door operability and testing requirements; however, the door interlocks were only indirectly addressed.

A review of the Westinghouse Owner's Group standard technical specifications noted that door interlocks were specifically addressed and that the operability requirement was addressed similarly (e.g.,

same action statement to the air lock doors).

Discussions with licensee management indicated that the current technical specifications have room for interpretation.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee responded appropriately to this issue.

However, due to licensee future actions to repair or modify the interlock design and actions to clarify the technical specification, the inspectors will track this issue as IFI 50-250,251/94-17-01, Containment Air Lock Technical Specification Clarification and Associated Repairs.

Unit 4 Eagle-21 System Power Distribution Panel Failure At 5:35 a.m.

on August 11, 1994, Unit 4 annunciator J-7/4, EAGLE-

TROUBLE, alarmed and locked in.

At 5:40 a.m., operators verified that a problem existed with instrument rack 4(R14 and notified I&C.

At 8:55 a.m., the licensee removed T-ave/delta-T protection channel 3 and pressurizer level channel 3 from service and entered the action statements for Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.

The licensee also subsequently tripped the appropriate bistables in order to meet the technical specification action statements.

This placed the RPS in a non-coincident trip condition for these devices.

At 9:35 a.m., during troubleshooting activities, the power supply breaker for rack 4gR14 tripped and de-energized Eagle-21 channel 3.

Troubleshooting revealed a

problem with an internal power distribution pane.2.6 Following the replacement of the affected power distribution panel with a modified spare which had to be returned from Westinghouse (Refer to section 6.2.5 for additional information.), the licensee returned T-ave/delta-T protection channel 3 and pressurizer level channel 3 to service at 6:53 a.m.

on August 12, 1994.

The licensee subsequently returned the failed power distribution panel to Westinghouse for further root cause analysis and modification.

The licensee also currently plans to send the power distribution panels in the remaining five Eagle-21 racks (3(R1,, 3(Rll, 3(R14, 4(Rl, and 4(Rll) back to Westinghouse for modification if the root cause determination identifies a failure mechanism similar to the one that occurred at Zion.

(Refer to section 6.2.5 for additional information.)

Similar power distribution panels do not exist elsewhere in the plant.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions with regard to this event and deemed them to be appropriate.

The inspectors plan to follow up on the final root cause determination and additional licensee corrective actions during future inspections.

Damaged Insulation on Electrical Conduit During routine tours in the plant, the inspectors observed damaged insulation on safety-related electrical conduit located in the pipe and valve rooms and main feedwater platforms.

Two of the items had PWO tags attached and five did not.

The licensee promptly initiated PWOs for those items which did not have PWO tags.

The damage was such that the inspectors questioned whether the insulation would be able to keep water or steam out and might consequently affect any required Eg.

The affected equipment included a charging flow transmitter, two emergency containment cooler CCW return bypass valves, an RCDT containment isolation valve, an AFW flow control valve, and two main feedwater flow control valves.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's master Eg list and found that only two of the items were included.

These were the Unit 4 charging flow transmitter and the Unit 4 RCDT containment isolation valve open position switch.

The inspectors further reviewed the Eg documentation packages and found that those two items were required to be Eg for high radiation but not for a steam environment.

The inspectors concluded that there was no Eg operability problem and that the licensee appropriately responded to these issues.

4.2.7 Unit 4 Spent Fuel Pool Transfer Canal Liner Leakage Licensee engineers responded to an identified small bulge in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool transfer canal liner located on a side wall near the upender.

They took photographs and 'measurements of the bulge, reviewed past records, and determined that there had been

no change in the bulge since a previous documentation of this condition.

During this review, the engineers questioned whether the bulge could have been caused by water accumulation between the stainless steel liner and the concrete walls.

They found that construction drawings showed that the area between the Unit 3 transfer canal liner and its concrete walls was connected to the Unit 3 spent fuel pool leak recovery system, which in turn went to a r adwaste collection.

However, similar drawings for Unit 4 did not show any connection from the area between the Unit 4 transfer canal liner and its concrete walls to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool leak recovery system or any other drain system.

The inspectors reviewed related documents, drawings, and operating procedures; inspected installed piping; and discussed the issue with operators and engineers.

During this review, inspectors identified one drawing deficiency:

drawing 5613-H-3033 showed Unit 3 spent fuel -pool leak recovery drain valve 3-930 as normally open but operating procedures O-OSP-201.2, SNPO Daily Logs, and 3-OP-201, Filling/Draining the Refueling Cavity and the SFP Transfer Canal, maintained it normally closed.

The licensee promptly initiated a change to the drawing.

Licensee documents revealed that the transfer canal liners have occasionally leaked in the past.

The inspector questioned where the Unit 4 transfer canal liner leakage went if it was not being collected by the spent fuel pool leak recovery system.

The engineering manager stated that the licensee would conduct a

multi-disciplined review of this potential problem to address engineering, operating, and environmental considerations.

The licensee was very responsive to questions raised by the inspectors.

The resident inspectors plan to follow up on the licensee's further review of this issue.

5.0 Maintenance (62703, 61726, and 92902)

5.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors verified that station maintenance and surveillance testing activities associated with safety-related systems and components were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and the technical specifications.

They accomplished this by observing maintenance and surveillance testing activities, performing detailed technical procedure reviews, and reviewing completed maintenance and surveillance documents.

The inspectors reviewed a previous open item to assure that corrective actions were adequately implemented and resulted in conformance with regulatory requirement i

5.2 Inspection Findings 5.2. 1 Maintenance Witnessed The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the.following maintenance activities in progress:

valve work on the Unit 4 SJAE, repair of the Unit 3 emergency air lock (Refer to section 4.2.4 for additional information.),

planned outage,.work for the 3A EDG (Refer to section 5.2.3 for additional information),

and planned outage work for the 8 and C

AFW pumps.

(Refer to section 5.2.4 for additional information.)

For those maintenance activities observed, the inspectors determined that the activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders.

5.2.2 Surveillance Tests Observed The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:

procedure O-SME-003.3, 125 VDC Station Battery quarterly Maintenance, for the 3B station battery; procedure O-SME-003.7, 125 VDC Station Battery Weekly Maintenance, for the 3A station battery; procedure 4-0SP-049.2,'Reactor Protection System Logic Test; procedures 3/4-0SP-075.6, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Backup Nitrogen Test; procedure 0-OSP-075. 11, Auxiliary Feedwater Inservice Test, for the A AFW pump; procedure 3-0SP-051.6, Containment Air Lock Doors Operability Test (Refer to section 4.2.4 for additional information.);

and procedure 0-OSP-075. 11, Auxiliary Feedwater Inservice Test, for the 8 and C AFW pumps.

(Refer to section 5.2.4 for additional information.)

5.2.3 The inspectors determined that the above testing activities were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of the technical specifications.

3A Emergency Diesel Generator Maintenance Outage 5.2.4 The licensee planned to remove the 3A EDG from service to perform corrective and preventive maintenance,WOs.

The EDG was declared inoperable at 5:00 a.m.

on August 4, 1994, and a 72-hour technical specification action statement was entered.

Maintenance and surveillance testing was completed successfully, and the licensee

. declared the 3A EDG operable on August 5, 1994, after a 24-hour outage.

Prior to the outage, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's work list and the applicable technical specification action statement.

The inspectors also reviewed work in progress and the appropriate control room and maintenance supervision oversight.

The inspectors verified that the post-maintenance and surveillance testing was appropriate.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee conservatively performed maintenance,and testing activities.

Outages for the B and C Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps The licensee removed the B and C AFW pumps from service, one at a

time, on August 15 and 16, 1994, to repair an existing 1/2-inch schedule-80 pipe with a schedule-160 316L pipe for the lube oil cooler line supplied from the pump casing.

This pipe had previously failed on the A AFW pump on February 7, 1994.

(Refer to NRC Inspection Report 50-250,251/94-02 for additional information.)

Corrective actions for that failure were documented in condition report No.94-061 and included replacement of the similar pipes for the B and C AFW pumps.

The pipe affected provides cooling for the AFW. lube oil cooler.

1t The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plan, the condition report, the applicable technical specifications, the WO, the clearance documents, a risk impact, the overall process for LCO maintenance, and the root cause for the pipe failure.-

The inspectors also observed maintenance and surveillance test activities.

The inspectors concluded that observed activities were appropriate, that the overall program for technical specification maintenance was sound and conservative, and that a net safety benefit was obtained.

5.2.5 Preventive Maintenance Optimization Project The inspectors reviewed and discussed with the licensee the process associated with the PH optimization project that Turkey Point has initiated.

The thrust of. the PH optimization project is

5.2.6 to more efficiently utilize resources without compromising safety or reliability of critical equipment.

The PM optimization project involves screening current outage and non-outage PMs on a plant system basis and determining if a change is justified including frequency or minimization.

Additionally, a review is also performed to determine if a new PM needs to.be added

"on a component.

The determination is made with input from plant technical specifications, plant procedures, ISI/IST requirements, Eg requirements, industry failure information including information from NPRDS and EPRI, vendor manual recommendations, and component maintenance history.

The initial scope at Turkey Point includes 30 systems which 'are risk significant as defined in the proposed NRC maintenance rule or are major power production systems.

To date approximately

systems have been screened resulting in approximately 1580 PM tasks being reviewed.

The review resulted in approximately

tasks being added, 175 tasks being conducted less frequently, and 412 tasks being canceled.

This amounts to a saving of approximately 6936 equivalent man hours per year.

The inspectors audited a small sample of PMs affecting the AFW system.

The inspectors did not identify any required PM tasks being canceled.

The inspectors noted that currently there is no input from PSA during the review of PM tasks to determine if changes are justified.

The licensee agreed to look into this matter.

The inspectors concluded that the process appears to have sufficient controls to prevent inadvertent deletion of necessary PM tasks.

The inspectors plan to continue to review the PM optimization project.

Inservice Test Trending The inspectors reviewed IST data on the 4A CS and the 4B HHSI pumps and motors.

The trended parameters included differential pressure and vibration data taken from numerous locations.

The licensee observed that 4B HHSI pump differential pressure was trending down parti"cularly since the IST performed in January 1994.

However, as of the IST performed on July 13, 1994, the differential pressure was still within the acceptance criteria, and no operability issues existed.

Based on the declining differential pressure trend, the licensee planned to change out the 4B HHSI pump rotating element during the upcoming Unit 4 Cycle 15 refueling outage.

The 4A CS data did not particularly indicate any adverse trends.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's IST trending program was sound, and the decision to change the 4B HHSI pump rotating element was appropriate and conservative.

The inspectors plan to monitor licensee activities associated with the planned replacemen e 5.2.7 (Closed)

IFI 50-250,251/94-07-03, License Corrective Actions for IST Program As documented in section 7.2.2 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-250,251/94-07, the lack of IST program supervisory personnel knowledge of and IST procedure guidance on the need to initiate a condition report for IST failures was a deficiency.

As a result, the licensee revised procedure O-ADM-518, Condition Reports; procedure O-ADM-502, In-Service Testing (IST) Program; and procedures 3/4-0SP-072.5, Hain Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Verification Test.

The licensee revised enclosure 1,

Guidance for the Issuance of Condition Reports, of procedure 0-ADM-518 to require condition reports for ASHE Section XI failures which result in a repair, replacement, or modification as defined in ASME Section XI, Subsection IWA, and for safety/relief valves in the IST program which exceed their nameplate setpoint pressure by greater than 3% during as-found setpoint testing.

In addition, step 5.3. 1.7.i of procedure 0-ADH-502 now states that the IST coordinator shall ensure that a condition report is generated if the measured as-found setpoint deviates from the valve's nameplate setpoint by 3% or greater.

Step 4. 15 of procedure 3-0SP-072.5 and step 4. 13 of procedure 4-0SP-072.5 now reference the requirement of procedure 0-ADM-518 to write a condition report for failure of a safety/relief valve to meet the required setpoint criteria.

In addition, the licensee modified attachment 1, Main Steam Line Code

.Safety Valves Test Data Sheet, of procedure 3-0SP-072.5 to require the as-found test results, as-left test results, and post-test seat leakage to be marked as satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or not applicable and also to require a witness's signature.

Similar revisions to attachment 3, Hain Stream Line Code Safety Valves Test Data Sheet, of procedure 4-0SP-072.5 are currently scheduled to be incorporated by October 3, 1994, prior to the performance of this procedure.

The inspectors verified these procedure revisions and concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate.

This item is closed.

6.0 Engineering (30702, 37551, and 90712)

6.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors verified that licensee engineering problems and incidents were properly reviewed and assessed for root cause determination and corrective actions.

They accomplished this by ensuring that the licensee's processes included the identification, resolution, and prevention of problems and the evaluation of the self-assessment and control program.

The inspectors reviewed the reports discussed below.

The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared

6.2 6.2.2 appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered.

When applicable, the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, were applied.

Inspection Findings FPL Metallurgical Laboratory The inspectors toured the licensee's nuclear department metallurgical laboratory located on 45th Street in Palm Beach, Florida, near the Juno Beach corporate offices.

The licensee's facility has the capability to perform root cause determinations and studies of failure mechanisms under laboratory conditions.

An FPL staff supports this facility under the FPL Manager of Component Support and Inspection.

The inspectors examined the licensee's equipment, procedures, samples being tested, and selected root cause failure reports.'etallurgical laboratory personnel were also interviewed.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee has a sound and proactive facility that supports plant operations, maintenance, and engineering.

Licensee/NRC Engineering Meeting An FPL/NRC engineering meeting was conducted at the FPL corporate office in Juno Beach, Florida, on August 3, 1994.

Representatives from the licensee's Turkey Point, St. Lucie, and corporate offices as well as representatives from the NRC's Turkey Point and St.

Lucie resident inspector offices were in attendance.

The following topics were discussed:

maintenance support including maintenance specifications, preventive maintenance optimization, and the licensee's maintenance rule response; problem solving including the licensee's actions with regard to the Turkey Point flux mapper issue, the St.

Lucie RPS bypass switch issue, and the St. Lucie fire main failure analysis; FPL cost control efforts;

CFR 50.59 training; quality instruction overhaul; reload oversight; boraflex surveillance; and station blackout.

This meeting was beneficial in understanding current engineering issues.

6.2.3-Setpoint Control The inspectors reviewed the licensee's engineering programs for controlling instrument and mechanical setpoints.

The licensee completed a project in 1991 which reviewed all instrument setpoints.

This project resulted in the updating of instrument lists 5610, 5613, and 5614-H311 and H313.

In addition, a'project is currently underway to document and confirm mechanical setpoints, and it is scheduled for completion by the end of 199.2.4 The inspectors reviewed setpoint lists, and discussed these issues and programs with responsible engineering personnel.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee processes which assure setpoints were appropriately documented and controlled.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee has a sound process, and no deficiencies were identified.

Further, a licensee program underway to assure control of mechanical setpoints is considered to be a proactive effort.

In conclusion, the licensee's'ngineering organizations'rograms for controlling setpoints demonstrated very good support for the plant.

Copes-Vulcan PORVs The licensee received and internally responded to NRC Information Notice 94-55, Problems With Copes-Vulcan PORVs.

Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 have two PORVs each (PCV-455C and 456).

These are two-inch, air-operated, plug valves manufactured by Copes-Vulcan; and they are similar to the valves described in the information notice.

The inspectors noted that the licensee had previously received information about the subject industry event and related PORV failure issues prior to receiving the information notice.

The inspectors discussed this issue with licensee engineering personnel.

The licensee determined that the materials issue with, the inappropriate type-420 stainless steel plug did not occur at Turkey Point.

Further, the component alignment requirements were adequately addressed in the licensee's maintenance procedure 0-PMM-041. 1, Reactor Coolant System Power Operated Relief Valves Overhaul.

6.2.5 The inspectors reviewed procedure 0-PMM-041. 1, the appropriate Copes-Vulcan technical manual (SDC No. V250),

and the applicable drawings and parts list.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee proactively and appropriately responded to this issue prior to receiving the information notice.

CFR Part 21 Followup and Similar Event at Turkey Point The Unit 4 Eagle 21 system power distribution panel failure that occurred on August ll, 1994 (Refer to section 4.2.5 for additional information.),

appeared to be similar to one of the problems documented in a notification issued by Zion on April 8, 1994.

The problems experienced at Zion involved the premature failure of power supplies used in the Westinghouse Eagle-21 plant protection system.

Instrument rack de-energization and re-energization problems occur red due to failure of Douglas-Randall time delay relays in the Westinghouse Eagle-21 plant protection system.

The Zion root cause investigation concluded that one problem was caused by the failure of an aluminum electrolytic capacitor and that this end-of-life failure was accelerated by localized heating within the module due to a resistor in close proximity to the

capacitor.

The corrective action at Zion was to relocate the resistor to the outside of the epoxy module to separate it from the capacitor.

An NRC Information Notice regarding this issue (NRC Information Notice 94-33, Capacitor Failures in Westinghouse Eagle-21 Plant Protection Systems)

was also issued on Hay 9, 1994.

The licensee became aware of the Zion 10 CFR Part 21 notification via an INPO network plant status entry dated April ll, 1994.

In response, the licensee performed an operability assessment (No.

019-94)

on April 14, 1994, and determined that the protection channel would trip if a failure of the same capacitor were to occur.

This would place the RPS in a one-out-of-two trip logic (non-coincident) matrix in lieu of a two-out-of-three trip logic matrix.

The licensee had therefore determined that a failure of this type would not prevent a unit trip from occurring.

The licensee also contacted Westinghouse to determine if Turkey Point was susceptible to the same failure mode and planned to send affected power distribution panels back to Westinghouse for modification if'it was concluded that the concern applied to Turkey Point.

The licensee's subsequent discussions with Westinghouse revealed that the power distribution panels installed in the Turkey Point Eagle-21 system did contain the Douglas-Randall time delay relays which were the subject of the Zion 10 CFR Part 21 notification.

As a result, the licensee documented an action plan regarding the Eagle-21 power distribution panels on May 27, 1994.

The actions recommended by this plan included the shipment of the spare power distribution panel to Westinghouse for modification by June 30, 1994, and the monitoring of the Turkey Point Eagle-21 system for these problems.

The licensee also planned to send the power distribution panels in all six instrument racks back to Westinghouse for modification if any rack experienced this condition.

In addition, the operating experience feedback coordinator's review of this issue did not identify the requirement for any supplemental plant actions.

This review was documented on an operating experience feedback program FOP transmittal form (FOP No.94-044) dated June 3, 1994.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's initial actions in response to the

CFR Part 21 notifications during a previous inspection and determined that the licensee's initial approach to the resolution of this issue was aggressive and appropriate.

(Refer to section 9.2.6 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-250,251/94-07 for additional information.)

The inspectors also monitored the licensee's recent actions with regard to this issue, interviewed the system engineer involved, and reviewed the above referenced documentation.

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions were prompt and comprehensive and that the decision to return the spare power distribution panel to Westinghouse for

.

modification based on an industry event and prior to the occurrence of an event of a similar nature was proactive and

e 6.2.6 6."2. 7

conservative.

The system engineer was knowledgeable of this system.

t Monthly Operating Reports The inspectors reviewed.-the July 1994 Monthly Operating Report and determined it to be complete and accurate'Closed)

LER 50-250/94-001-01, Failure of Emergency Containment Cooler Component Cooling Water Discharge.Solenoid Valve The inspectors reviewed LER 50-250/94-001-01, Failure of Emergency Containment Cooler Component Cooling Water Discharge Solenoid Valve, that was submitted voluntarily by the licensee on July 26,-

1994.

This issue involved the failure of ASCO Model NPL8342B2E solenoid valves.

The original LER (LER 50-250/94-001)

was voluntarily submitted by the licensee on February 18, 1994, and it was previously closed in section 8.2.5 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-250,251/94-05.

IFI 50-250,251/93-26-01, ECC Valve Failures, was also opened and subsequently closed in sections 4.2. 1 and 5.2.9.1 of NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-250,251/93-26 and 50-250,251/94-10, respectively.

In addition, this issue was discussed in sections 6.2.2 and 5.2.1 of NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-250,251/93-24 and 50-250,251/94-01, respectively.

The inspectors reviewed the revised LER and determined that all pertinent issues were addressed.

Corrective actions were also verified to be complete.

Based on this review, this revised, LER is closed.

6.2.8 (Closed)

L'ER 50-250/94-003, Hissed Surveillances Due to Personnel Error:

quarterly Valve Stroke Timing Required by Inservice Test Program The inspectors reviewed LER 50-250/94-003 dated August 16, 1994.

The inspectors concluded that the LER was timely and discussed.all pertinent information.

This issue associated with the missed-surveillances was also discussed in NRC Inspection"Report No. 50-250,251/94-13 and is being tracked as VIO 50-250,251/94-13-01; Hissed Technical Specification Required Surveillances.

Based on this, LER 50-250/94-003 is considered closed.

The violation remains open.

7.0 Plant Support (71750)

7.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the licensee's appropriate implementation of the physical security plan; radiological controls; the fire protection program; the fitness-for-duty program; the chemistry programs; emergency preparedness; plant housekeeping/cleanliness

7.2 7.2.1 7.2.2 conditions; and the radiological effluent, waste treatment, and environmental monitoring programs.

Inspection Findings Primary Chemistry The inspectors reviewed the licensee's primary chemistry program including sampling, analyses, reporting, and trending aspects.

The inspectors observed reactor coolant sampling at the primary sample sink, reviewed chemistry operating procedures and the associated PAID, and monitored selected chemical analyses performed with in-line monitors and performed in the primary chemistry 1'aboratory.

Selected chemical and radiochemical analytical procedures were also reviewed and implementation observed.

The inspectors also verified that results were consistent with the plant and the technical specification limits.

The inspectors concluded that primary chemistry results were within the technical specifications required and licensee set limits and that results were trended and made available for management review.

The technicians were very knowledgeable and procedure compliance. was excellent.

Minor procedure comments were discussed with management.

Housekeeping The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program to maintain and improve overall plant housekeeping.

Periodic cleanup activities, routine painting, and area 'preservation activities continue.

During the period, painting and preservation work was completed on the RWSTs, the AFW cage, switchgear and HCC rooms, and other auxiliary building areas.

The licensee intends to continue this process.

The inspectors monitored the licensee's progress including specifically the AFW cage work.

This was done. in light of the issues that had previously occurred during EDB room painting as discussed with plant management and as documented in section 5.2.7 of NRC Inspection Report No. 50-250,251/94-11.

During. this inspection period, the inspectors noted that the painters were cautious, and no problems occurred.

During a routine tour, the inspectors noted that the Unit 3 gland steam condenser exhaust blower drip pots were blowing steam.

PWO No.

94010587 identified a condition with low gland steam condenser vacuum, which apparently was related to the problem.

The licensee was pursuing this issue via PWO followup and through the engineering department operator work-around program.

The inspectors considered this to be a housekeeping material condition issue as the steam and water was leaking into the turbine building.

A similar condition does not exist on Unit 4.

No

,17 safety issues were identified, and the inspectors were satisfied with the licensee's followup of this issue.

Further, the licensee's overall program to improve housekeeping and plant material condition appeared to be effective.

7.2.3 Fire Drills

'The inspectors observed licensee fire drills during the day shift on August 4, 1994, and during the peak (evening) shift on August 23, 1994.

The drills simulated a fire in the 3A EDG room with an injured fire brigade member (heat stroke).

Fire brigade response was prompt.

All fire brigade members were appropriately dressed including fire suits, boots, gloves, hats, face shields, and emergency breathing equipment.

They promptly and efficiently communicated with the control room by portable radio, laid out fire hoses, connected the hoses to the fire main, and prepared a

foam cart for use.

The first aid person arrived promptly to attend the simulated injured person.

Fire brigade members include three operators and two health physics representatives on shift.

The first aid person was a chemist.

During the August 23, 1994, drill, the fifth fire brigade member arrived about 11 minutes after the drill announcement and said that he had not heard the announcement in the auxiliary building.

The licensee subsequently tested the PA and 'blue light'ystems, in the auxiliary building and found no problems.

The licensee planned to conduct training with operators on the PA system and on the 'blue lights'hich should light up in high noise areas when an alarm is sounded or when the PA boost is operated from the control room for actual or drill emergency announcements.

The inspectors concluded that the fire drills were well conducted.

8.0 Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the plant general manager and selected members of his staff.

An exit meeting was conducted on August 31, 1994.

The areas requiring management attention were reviewed.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

Violations or deviations were not identified; however, the inspectors did have the following finding:

Item Number Status Descri tion and Reference 50-250,251/94-17-01 (Opened)

IFI - Containment Air Lock Technical Specification Clarification and Associated Repairs (section 4.2.4)

Additionally, the following previous items were discussed:

Item Number Status Descri tion and Reference 50-250,251/94-07-03 LER 50-250/94-001-01 LER 50-250/94-003 (Closed)

IFI - Licensee Corrective Actions for IST Program (section 5.2.7)

(Closed)

LER - Failure of Emergency Containment Cooler Component Cooling Mater Discharge Solenoid Valve (section 6.2.7)

(Closed)

LER - Missed Surveillances Due to Personnel Error: quarterly Valve Stroke Timing Required by Inservice Test Program (section 6.2.8)

9.0 Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADM AFW ASCO ASHE CCW CFR CNRB CS Delta-T ECC EDG EPRI Eg FOP FPL HHSI I&C IFI INPO ISI IST IWA LCO LER HCC NPRDS NRC OSP PAID PA PC/H PCV PH PMAI Administrative Auxiliary Feedwater Automatic Switch Company American Society of Mechanical Engineers Component Cooling Mater Code of Federal Regulations Company Nuclear Review Board Containment Spray Temperature Difference Between the RSC Hot an Emergency Containment Cooler Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Power Research Institute Environmental gualification Operating Experience Feedback Program Trackin Florida Power and Light High Head Safety Injection Instrumentation and Control Inspector Followup Item Institute for Nuclear Power Operations Inservice Inspection Inservice Test ASHE Section XI General Requ'irements Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Motor Control Center Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Surveillance Procedure Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Public Address Plant Change/Modification Pressure Control Valve Preventative Maintenance Plant Manager Action Item d Cold Legs g System

~

~

PMH PNSC PORV PSA PWO QA QC RCDT RCS REA RPS RWST SDC SJAE SME T-ave VDC VIO WO Preventive Maintenance

- Mechanical Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Power-Operated Relief Valve Probabilistic Safety Assessment Plant Work Order Quality Assurance Quality Control Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Reactor Coolant System Request for Engineering Assistance Reactor Protective System Refueling Water Storage Tank Site Document Control Steam Jet Air Ejector Surveillance Maintenance

- 'Electrical Average RCS Temperature Volts Direct Current Violation Work Order