IR 05000250/1993006
| ML17349A771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1993 |
| From: | Butcher R, Landis K, Schnebli G, Trocine L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17349A770 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-93-06, 50-250-93-6, 50-251-93-06, 50-251-93-6, NUDOCS 9304010269 | |
| Download: ML17349A771 (20) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/93-06 and 50-251/93-06 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Dat S gned Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.:
DPR-31 and PR-41 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
Inspection Conducted:
Janu y 30 through February 26, 1993 I
Inspectors.
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R.
C. Butcher, Senior Resident Dat S, gned Inspector
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~ G. A. Schnebl 7, Resident Inspector
.. Trocine, Res 'nt Inspector Approved by:
K.
.
La is, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects 31~ fs D te Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspector inspection involved direct inspection at the site in the areas of surveillance observations, maintenance observations, operational safety, plant events, preparation for refueling, and license self-assessment capability.
Results:
Operations, quality control, health physics, security, mechanical maintenance, and reactor engineering personnel provided coverage and support during the receipt, inspection, and off-loading processes for two shipments of new fuel.
All evolutions were well handled and coordinated by the various personnel involved (paragraph 10).
In the safety assessment/quality verification area, a review of the operating experience feedback program identified that the review of an Information 9SOioa0269 930319 PDP QQOCK 0
Notice was=too narrow in scope to be fully effective.
The licensee's thorough review of another issue was considered to be a strength (paragraph Il.a).
Within the scope of this inspect.:on, the inspectors determined that the licensee continued to demonstrate satisfactory performance to ensure safe plant operations.
In addition, the -licensee, through self assessment, took prompt, action to correct'-the following non-cited violation:
Non-Cited Violation 50-250,25l/93-06-01, failure to establish continuous fire watches within one hour upon removal of the Unit 3 and 4 charging pump room deluge system from service (paragraph 9.b).
Persons Contacted REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees
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- V. Abbatiello, Site guality Manager J. Bowskill, Reactor Engineering Supervisor J. Earl, guality Assurance Supervisor J. Gianfrencesco, Support Services Supervisor F. Hayes, Instrumentation and Controls Maintenance G. Heisterman, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor C. Higgins, Outage Manager E. Jernigan, Technical
.Manager H. Johnson, Operations Supervisor A. Kaminskas, Operations Manager E. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection/Safety Supervisor E. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Analyst S. Kundalkar, Engineering Manager D. Lindsay, Health Physics Supervisor Marchese, Site Construction Manager W. Pearce, Plant General Manager 0. Pearce, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor.
F. Plunkett, Site Vice President R. Powell, Services Manager E.
Rose, Nuclear Materials Manager N. Steinke, Chemistry Supervisor R. Timmons, Security Supervisor B. Wayland, Maintenance Hanager J.
Weinkam, Licensing Manager Supervisor
- o8
- o Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsman, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.
NRC Resident Inspectors R.
C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector G. A. Schnebli, Resident Inspector L. Trocine, Resident Inspector Other NRC Personnel on Site o
J.
R. Curtiss, Commissioner, US NRC o
K. D. Landis, Chief, Reactor Project Section 2B, Region II 8 J.
P. Stohr, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Safeguards o
D.
C. Trimble, Technical Assistant, Office of the Commissioners o Attended February 11, 1993, meeting at TPNP to evaluate licensee's recovery from Hurricane Andrew.
8 Toured TPNP and met with licensee management on February 23, 1993.
- Attended exit interview on February 26, 199 Note:
An alphabetical tabulation of acronyms used in this report is listed in the last paragraph in this report.
Other NRC Inspections Performed During This Period Re ort No.
Dates Area Ins ected 50-250,251/93-02 February 8-12, 1993 50-250,251/93-07 February 22-24, 1993 Plant Status Unit 3 Licensed Operator Requalification Training Security At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 3 was operating at 100%
power and continued at this power level throughout this assessment period.
The unit had been on line since January 20, 1993.
Unit 4 At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 4 was operating at 100%
power and had been on line since January 7,
1993.
The following evolution occurred on this unit during this-assessment period:
On February 4,
1993, at 3:00 a.m.,
a load reduction was commenced in order to facilitate incore flux mapping, and 85% reactor power was reached at 4:45 a.m.
Power ascension was commenced at 3: 15 p.m.,
and 100% reactor power was re-achieved at 5:25 p.m..
Followup on Items of Noncompliance
{92702)
A review was conducted of the following noncompliances to assure that corrective actions were adequately implemented and resulted in conformance with regulatory requirements.
Verification of corrective action was achieved through record reviews, observation, and discussions with licensee personnel.
Licensee correspondence was-evaluated to ensure the responses were timely and corrective actions were implemented.
within the time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed)
VIO 50-250,251/92-24-03, Failure to Follow Procedure Resulting in Entering the Wrong RTD Constants Into the EAGLE 21 System.
The licensee responded to this violation by letter L-92-339 dated December 21, 1992.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them to be adequate.
This violation is close.
Onsite Followup and In-Office Review'f Written Reports of Nonroutine Events and
CFR Part 21 Reviews (90712/90713/92700)
The Licensee Event Reports and/or
CFR Part 21 Reports discussed below were reviewed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered.
Additionally, the inspectors verified the licensee had reviewed each event, corrective actions were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions not fully completed was clearly assigned, safety questions had been evaluated and resolved, and violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
When applicable, the criteria of
CFR Part 2, Appendix C, were applied.
(Closed)
LER 50-250/92-14, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage.
This event was discussed in detail in NRC IR No. 50-250,251/92-28, paragraph 9.g.
This LER is closed.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/92-10, Automatic Start of 4B Emergency Diesel Generator.
6.
This event was discussed in NRC IR No. 50-250,251/92-28 and was identified as NCV 50-250,251/92-28-04.
This LER is closed.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified that the test procedures conformed to the requirements of the TSs; testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspectors verified testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
3-0SP-024.2, Emergency Bus Load Sequencers Hanual Test, for the 3B Sequencer; 3-0SP-022.4, EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump and Valve Inservice Test, for the 3A EDG fuel oil transfer pump; and 0-OSP-040. 11, Receipt of New Fue The inspectors determined that the above testing activities were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of the TSs.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with the TSs.
The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting
'ctivities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performed; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; gC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were properly implemented; gC hold points were established and observed where required; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved gA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
overhaul of charging pump 'recirculation isolation valve 4-1321, re-installation of Fenwal temperature meters for the 4B condensate pump motor bearings following calibration and inspection, monthly preventative maintenance of the Unit 4 turbine lube oil centrifuge separator, and troubleshooting of cur rent/VAR swings on the 4B EDG (Refer to paragraph 9.c for additional information.).
,For those maintenance activities observed, the inspectors determined that the activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers, and monitored instrumentation.
The inspectors verified proper valve/switch alignment of-selected emergency systems, verified
maintenance work orders had been submitted as required, and verified followup and prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS LCOs, and verified the return to service of affected components.
By observation and direct interviews, verification was'ade
.that the physical security plan was being implemented.
The implementation of radiological controls and plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions were also observed.
Tours of the intake structure and diesel, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems/structures to verify proper valve/switch alignment:
A and B emergency diesel generators, control room vertical panels and safeguards racks, intake cooling water structure, 4160-volt buses and 480-volt load and motor control centers, Unit 3 and 4 feedwater platforms, Unit 3 and 4 condensate storage tank area, auxiliary feedwater area, Unit 3 and 4 main steam platforms, and auxiliary building.
The licensee routinely performs gA/gC audits/surveillances of activities required under its gA program and as requested by management.
To assess the effectiveness of these licensee audits, the inspectors examined the status, scope, and findings of the following audit reports:.
Number of Audit Number
~Findin s
gAO-PTN-92-041
OAO-PTN-92-043
gAO-PTN-92-047 T
e of Audit Corrective Action guality Procedures 12. 1 and 12.2,
"Heasuring and Test Equipment" December Performance Honitoring Audit
Number of Audit Mumben
~Findin s (Continued)
gAO-PTN-92-048 gAO-PTN-93-003 T
e of Audit Reports to the NRC January Performance Monitoring Audit No. additional NRC followup actions will be taken on the findings referenced above because they were identified by the licensee's gA program audits and corrective actions have either been completed or are currently underway.
Plant management has also been made aware of these issues.
As a result of routine plant tours and various operational observations, the inspectors determined that the general plant and system material conditions were satisfactorily maintained, the plant security program was effective, and the overall performance of plant operations was good.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Plant Events (93702)
The following plant events were reviewed to determine facility status and the need for further followup action.
Plant parameters were evaluated during transient response.
The significance of the event was evaluated along with the performance of the appropriate safety systems and the actions taken by the licensee.
The inspectors verified that required notifications were made to the NRC.
Evaluations were performed relative to the need for additional NRC response to the event.
Additionally, the following issues were examined, as appt opriate:
details regarding the cause of the event; event chronology; safety system performance; licensee compliance with approved procedures; radiological consequences, if any; and proposed corrective actions.
a
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b.
On January 14, 1993, Westinghouse Electric Corporation notified the licensee that the WABA assemblies utilized during the latest Unit 3 fuel load were not manufactured in accordance with the design specifications for fuel reload.
This resulted in the absorber centerline being positioned 1.368 inches lower than the fuel centerline.
Because of the possibility that the unit was operating in an unanalyzed condition due to the mispositioning of the WABA assemblies, the licensee reported a Significant Event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii)(A), at 4:44 p.m.
on February 10, 1993.
This event was discussed in paragraph B.e of NRC IR No.
50-250,251/93-01 and was identified as NCV 50-250,251/93-01-03, failure to implement measures to assure that WABA assemblies conformed to procurement documents.
At 10:35 a.m.
on February 22, 1993, with both units operating at rated power, the Unit 3 and 4 charging pump room deluge system was removed from service in order to permit welding in the Unit 4
, charging pump room.
At 6:00 p.m.,
a licensee manager performing
backshift walkdowns identified that continuous fire watches were not on duty in the Unit 3 and 4 charging pump rooms.,
Following investigation, it was determined that continuous fire watches had not been stationed since the system was isolated.
Fire watches with backup fire suppression equipment were established at 6: 14 p.m.
This event was attributed to personnel error in that a new fire watch shift supervisor failed to verify that the required continuous fire watches had actually been established even though he had indicated to the control room prior to system removal from service that adequate compensatory measures had been or would have been taken.
As a result of this event, the new fire watch shift supervisor was removed from duty and will be requalified.
The following measures were also taken to enhance fire protection process controls:
The licensee plans to develop a qualification guide by Harch 1,
1993, to implement a formalized fire protection on-the-job-training program.
In addition, by April 1, 1993, the licensee plans to revise procedure O-ADH-016.3, Fire Protection Impairments, to require actual verification of initiation and suspension of continuous fire watches.
A control room night order was also issued directing that operations personnel should not sign a fire protection impairment until the fire watch is in place.
TS 3.7.8.2.b requires that the spray and/or sprinkler systems for fire zones 45 and 55 (the charging pump rooms)
be operable whenever the equipment protected by the spray/sprinkler system is required to be operable.
The action statement for this TS requires that a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment be established within one hour when one or more of the required spray and/or sprinkler systems is inoperable.
Contrary to this requirement, with both units operating at rated power on February 22, 1993, the Unit 3 and 4 charging pump room deluge system was removed from service at 10:35 a.m.,
and continuous fire watches with backup fire suppression equipment were not established in the Unit 3 and 4 charging pump rooms until 6: 14 p.m.
This failure to establish continuous fire watches within one hour constitutes a violation; however, this violation is not being cited because the criteri a specified in Section VII.B of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
This item will be tracked as
. NCV 50-250,251/93-06-01, failure to establish continuous fire watches within one hour upon removal of the Unit 3 and 4 charging pump room deluge system from service.
During the performance of a monthly surveillance test of the 4B EDG on February 25, 1993, operators observed intermittent current swings from 400 to 600 amps (full scale on the meter),
VAR swings from 400 to 1500 VARs, and changes in the 4B 4KV bus voltage.
As a result of these intermittent current/VAR spikes, the 4B EDG was manually shut down and removed from service at 3:25 a.m.
Action statement b for TS 3.8. l.l.b was entered.
This required the
demonstration of the operability of the startup transformers and their associated circuits per TS 4.8. 1. 1. l.a within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least every 8 -hours thereafter, the demonstration of the operability of the remaining required EDGs per TS 4.8. 1. 1.2,a.4 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and the restoration of the inoperable EDG to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
The startup transformers and their associated circuits were verified to be operable at 4: 15 a.m.,
11.00 a.m.,
and 6:00 p.m.
Operability testing of the 4A EDG was completed at 12:20 p.m.,
and operability testing of the 38 EDG was completed at 10:30 p.m.
Troubleshooting revealed a cold solder joint on resistor R-17 in a remote gate firing module.
The cold solder joint was repaired, and the 4B EDG was tested and returned to service at 12:25 a.m.
on February 26, 1993.
One non-cited violation was identified.
10.
Preparation for Refueling (60705)
(Unit 4 Only)
On February 18-19, 22, and 25-26, 1993, the first two shipments of new fuel assemblies for the upcoming Unit 4 refueling outage were received onsite and off-loaded into the new fuel storage room.
The inspectors attended the pre-receipt briefing held by reactor engineering on February 17, 1993.
This pre-job briefing covered the fuel receipt and off-loading process as well as the schedule of activities for the upcoming fuel shipments.
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the transfer of the new fuel from the shipping containers to the new fuel room storage racks.
The following groups were present and provided coverage and support during this off-loading process:
Operations, guality Control, Health Physics, Security, Mechanical Maintenance, and Reactor Engineering.
The receipt and handling of the new fuel assemblies was performed in accordance with procedure 0-OSP-040. 1, Handling New Fuel Shipping Containers and New Fuel Assemblies, and procedure 0-OSP-040. 11, Receipt of New Fuel.
Operations personnel controlled the new fuel movement process, while Reactor Engineering and Health Physics performed inspections of the shipping containers and new fuel once the containers were opened.
The recorded results from these inspections were then compared to the shipping data for agreement.
All evolutions in this receipt process were well handled and coordinated by the various personnel involved.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
'I 11.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
a
~
The inspectors reviewed the processing of IN 92-61, Loss of High Head Safety Injection, to evaluate the licensee's OEF program.
Procedure AP 0103. 15, Operating Experience Feedback (OEF)
Program; Industry Events, provides the instructions for handling OEF events at TPNP to assure program objectives are achieved.
Upon receipt of FOP 92-106 (NRC IN 92-61)
from FPL Nuclear Licensing Department on September 21, 1992, the TPNP Operating Experience Group (part of the Licensing Department)
forwarded FOP 92-106 to the responsible system engineer, the Operations Manager, and the
Training Department Manager on September 21, 1992, for evaluation.
In reviewing the responses to FOP 92-106, the inspectors did not consider the responses as comprehensive as they could be.
As stated in the system engineer's response, the specific problem of IN 92-61 does not apply to the SI system at TPNP because the minimum recirculation flowpath to the RWST uses restricting orifices through valves *-898 E, F,
G, and H which are always open.
The flow diverted through the minimum recirculation flow path is included in the design basis calculations and is subtracted from the total flow required for adequate core, cooling.
There are no relief valves in the SI minimum recirculation lines.
However, the responses did not address related issues such as the following:
Could other safety systems be potentially affected due to designs. similar to that described in IN 92-61?
The SI system at TPNP does have a relief valve (RV-*-857) in the cold leg injection path.
Could the inadvertent opening of this relief valve (which recirculates back to the RWST)
prevent adequate flow from reaching the RCS?
Are procedures adequate to prevent potential water hammer events following the removal and reinstallation of relief valve RV-*-857?
The licensee is revising its OEF response to IN 92-61 to address the questions noted above.
Subsequent to this review, the inspector found that FOP 92-106 had not completed the review cycle in that the licensing manager had not reviewed the responses.
The inspectors consider the licensee's review of IN 92-61 to be too narrow in scope to be fully effective.
Review of industry events should include the full scope of potentially related issues to be effective.
The residents will review the licensee's revised r'esponse to IN 92-61 when available.
A recent Westinghouse advisory describing a potentially generic issue for Westinghouse PWRs was issued regarding potential check valve leakage during a small break LOCA that could result in a release exceeding
CFR Part 100 limits.
The scenario involved a
LOCA inside containment which would lead to a transfer from the injection phase to a recirculation phase of SI.
During the recirculation phase, the VCT outlet check valve is postulated to allow back leakage causing a seal water heat exchanger relief valve to lift, overfilling the VCT; and therefore, the VCT relief valve opens creating a
LOCA outside containment.
The source of.
recirculated coolant is from the discharge of the LHSI pumps which supplies flow to the charging pumps suction (HHSI pumps)
when in the recirculation mod The licensee had reviewed the Westinghouse advisory even though TPNP was not listed in the plant applicability list and had determined that, TPNP was not affected due to design differences.
The inspector considered the licensee's thorough review of this issue to be a strength.
At TPNP, the VCT feeds the charging pumps but the charging pumps are not part of the SI system, and therefore, the charging pumps'uction line is not subjected to the LHSI pump discharge.
Based on the above review, no further OEF program review was necessary.
No further action is required.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
12.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant General Hanager and selected members of his staff.
An exit, meeting was conducted on February 26, 1993.
The areas requiring management attention were. reviewed.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The inspectors had the following finding:
Item Number Descri tion and Reference 50-250,251/93-06-01 NCV - Failure to establish continuous fire watches within one hour upon removal of the Unit 3 and 4 charging pump room deluge system from service (paragraph 9.b).
13.
Acronyms and Abbreviations amp AP CFR EDG FPL HHSI IR KV LCO LER LHSI LOCA NCV NRC OEF OSP PTN PWR gA Ampere Administrative Procedure Code of Federal Regulations Emergency Diesel Generator Florida Power 5 Light High Head Safety Injection Information Notice Inspection Report Kilovolt Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Low Head Safety Injection Loss-of-Coolant Accident Non-Cited Violation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operating Experience Feedback Operations Surveillance Procedure Plant Turkey Nuclear Pressurized, Water Reactor guality Assurance
.
QAO QC RCS RTD RY RWST SI TPNP TS VAR VCT VIO WABA Quality Assurance Organization Quality Control Reactor Coolant System Resistance Thermal Detector Relief Valve Refueling Water Storage Tank Safety Injection Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Technic'al Specification Volts Amperes Reactive Volume Control Tank Violation Wet Annular Burnable Absorber
I t