IR 05000250/1993027
| ML17352A376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1994 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17352A375 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-93-27, 50-251-93-27, NUDOCS 9401240109 | |
| Download: ML17352A376 (46) | |
Text
go S,~<egg (4
+4 po Op
~i nO'e Op Vp qO
+p*yW UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323-0199 Report Nos.:
50-250/93-27 and 50-251/93-27 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
'250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and
License Nos.:
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection Conducted:
De ember 13-17, 1993 Inspector:
W.
M. Sartor, Jr.
Accompanying Personnel:
G. Bethke A. Gooden B. Desai Date Signed Approved by:
iiz+
Ken eth P~arr, Chief Date Signed
'mergency Preparedness
'Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the full participation emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response Faci.lities including:
the Simulator Control Room;= Technical Support Center; Operations Support Center; and the Emergency Operations Facility.
The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's "post-exercise critique.
This exercise was-a full participation exercise for State and local response agencies and offsite activities were evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The licensee's performance was good in all the emergency response facilities throughout the exercise.
The exercise demonstrated that the onsite emergency plans were adequate to mitigate the simulated accident scenario and the licensee's responding emergency organization was capable of implementing them.
9401240109 940113 PDR ADOCK 05000250
i
An exercise strength was the excellent performance of the control room (simulator) staff which included:
Execution of procedures, accident classification and notification, and log-keepin REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted
- G. Casto, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, St. Lucie Plant
- R. Dodson,'Simulator Process Engineer
- G. Hollinger, Manager, Training
- A. Horvath, Health Physics Training Coordinator
- D. Huey, guality Assurance Analyst
- D. Jerrigan, Manager, Operations
- V. Kaminskas, Manager, Services
- F. King, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- J. Kirkpatrick, Fire Protection/Safety Supervisor
- J. Knorr, Manager, Licensing
- V. Laudato, Fire Protection Coordinator
- D. Hothena, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
- D. Powell, Technical Manager
- G. Warriner, Manager, Site guality Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector
- T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82302)
. The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of-the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and local emergency plans and organization as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
While no major problems with the scenario were identified during the review, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.
Although the inconsistencies caused some minor confusion with the players, they did not sufficiently detract from the overall performance of the licensee emergency organization.
No violations or deviations were identifie Assignment of Responsibil ity (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and whether adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's ERO and there were adequate personnel available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the planning capability for long-term staffing of the ERO was demonstrated.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine whether responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
10.CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV;A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspector determined that the licensee's onsite emergency organization was effective in dealing with the simulated emergency.
Adequate staffing of the ERFs was provided for the initial accident response and the interfaces between the onsite organization and offsite support agencies appeared to be adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301).
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assis'tance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's onsite EOF have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(3),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
Federal, State of Florida, and local staff were accommodated in the EOF located on the 5th floor of the Florida Power General Office in Miami..
The Metro-Dade Fire and Rescue Department and Mercy Hospital participated in the transport and treatment respectively of the simulated contaminated injured individual.
No violations or deviations were identifie '
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to "determine whether a standard emergency classification
'and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4,
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I.D..
EPIP-20101
"Duties of Emergency Coordinator" established the EAL scheme to identify and classify the simulated emergency conditions.
The Emergency Coordinator in the CRS properly classified the NOUE and Alert conditions.
The SAE'nd General Emergency classifications were properly made by the Emergency Coordinator, in the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Hethods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been established for notificatio'n by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel; that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ had been established as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and
.
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations.
The notifications were timely and properly made with'inor exceptions noted in messages
¹7 and ¹8.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
Thi's area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR'50.47(b)(6);
10 CFR,Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications, between the licensee's ERO and offsite authorities'ere good throughout the exercise.
Likewise, the communications among the licensee's ERFs were good.
No communications related problems of any significance were identified during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identifie P
'
9.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination'o the public as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
The licensee established its Emergency News Center in the company's Florida Power General Office located in Miami.
The facility and equipment operated as designed.
Hinor discrepancies included the excessive use of acronyms during a media briefing and delayed posting of the General Emergency Classification.
No violations or deviations were identified.-
10.
Emergency Facilities-and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of selected ERFs and evaluated equipment provided for emergency'use during the exercise.
a
~
b.
CRS - An inspector observed that CRS personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency.
The control room staff in the simulator was extremely effective through the first three hours of the exercise when an NRC evaluator was present.
Highlights of their performance included:
Execution of EOPs and ONOPs; classification and notification at the Unusual Event and Alert levels; log-keeping; and a very professional teamwork approach to thinking and planning ahead for future mitigation strategies.
TSC - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency condition leading toan Alert emergency classification.
The TSC appeared to have adequate equipment-for the support of the assigned staff.
c.
OSC - The OSC was staffed expeditiously following the order to activate.
Necessary emergency equipment was available to support OSC damage control team activities.
d.
EOF - The EOF was located in Miami.
The licensee had moved the EOF from the ground floor to the 5th floor of the General Office Huilding which significantly increased the floorspace.
As a
result, work areas for all aspects of the emergency response organization to include the offsite agency have been greatly enhanced..
The facility appeared to be adequately designed,
equipped and staffed to support an emergency response.
The minimum staffing that traveled from the site provided timely activation with the additional staffing from Juno Beach being pre-staged.
No violations or deviations were identified.
ll.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Both worked effectively in their support'to the TSC and EOF staffs in providing accident mitigation strategies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating PARs for the offsite populace within the 10-mile EPZ.
The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with their procedures and notifications were made to the appropriate State and local authorities within the 15 minute criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Radiological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether means for controlling radiological exposures during an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that these means included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations.
as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(11),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers and by periodic surveys in the ERFs.
Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate
protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used as appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency was observed to determine whether deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted player critiques following the exercise termination.
A formal licensee critique of the emergency exercise was held on December 17, 1993, with exercise controllers, licensee management, and NRC personnel attending.
The licensee reviewed the exercise objectives and objectively evaluated the performance of the emergency organization in meeting the objectives.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on December 17, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the exercise observations.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report CFR Code of Federal Regulations CRS Control Room Simulator EAL Emergency Action Level EOF Emergency Operations Facility EOP Emergency Operating Procedures EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERF Emergency Response Facility ERO Emergency Response Organization HP Health Physics NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ONOP Off-normal Operating Procedures
OSC PAR SAE SEH SAE TSC Operations Support Center Protective Action Recommendation Site Area Emergency Station Emergency Hanager Site Area Emergency Technical Support Center Attachment:
Scope, Objectives, Narrative Summary, and Scenario -Timeline
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE DECEMBER 15, 1993 2.1 SCOPE To assure that the health and safety of the general public is protected in the event of an accident at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN), it is necessary for the Florida Power and Light Company (FPL)
to conduct an annual emergency preparedness exercise.
This exercise involves mobilization of FPL, State of Florida and Local Government Agency personnel and resources to respond to a simulated accident scenario.
The exercise willbe evaluated onsite by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 'off-site by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). An FPL Controller organization willcontrol,'observe, evaluate'and critique the PTN portion of the exercise and the NRC will evaluate the FPL performance so that the emergency
, response capabilities of the utilitymay be assessed.
The State of Florida, and Dade and Monroe County emergency response organizations willparticipate fullyand FEMA willevaluate the off-site performance so that the emergency response capabilities of those agencies may be assessed.
Due to the compressed timeline of the exercise, some portions of the FPL Emergency Response Organization and State organization may be prepositioned.
All onsite Emergency Response Facilities willbe activated in accordance with simulated conditions and appropriate emergency response procedures for the exercise.
Exercise participants ("players" ) will not have any prior knowledge of the simulated accident events, operational sequence, radiological effluents or weather conditions.
In addition, the exercise incorporates the following:
r Health Physics Drill - both onsite and off-site teams will be dispatched during the exercise to obtain required air samples and measurements associated with a simulated offsite release of radioactivity-and communicate these results to the appropriate Emergency Response Facility (ERF).
(Field monitoring team protective clothing and respiratory protection will be simulated in the field.)
Teams will also demonstrate radiation exposure control, emergency dosimetry and the use of protective equipment onsite.
Communications Drill-Actual usage and demonstration of the integrity of emergency response communications links and equipment.
2.1-1 93 fXIRc&l/I0 12 93
2.1 SCOPE (Continued).
Medical Emergency Drill - a demonstration of the response to a simulated medical emergency siTuation involving radiological considerations including the packaging and, transport of the simulated injured person to the designated off-site treatment facility. The medical emergency will also test the ability of the designated off-site treatment facility, Mercy Hospital, to treat a contaminated/injured patient.
The preceding sub-drills are incorporated into the exercise scenario and will be demonstrated concurrently in the course of the exercise.
The overall intent of the exercise is to demonstrate that the FPL staff assigned responsibilities in an emergency situation are adequately trained to perform in accordance with the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures.
And to assist the State and local government agencies in demonstrating to FEMA that they are adequately trained to perform in accordance with emergency plans and procedures.
2.1-2 93 EE/Re&i/10 12-93
2.2 OB ECTIVES 2.2-0
,
93 EBRc%1%8-25.93 I
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE DECEMBER 15, 1993 2.2 ~OECTI HS The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN) emergency preparedness evaluated exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50:
a) 50.47, Emergency Plans', and b)
Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities. Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Po~er Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives.
The exercise will be conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities.
The following objectives for the PTN portion of the exercise are consistent with the aforementioned documents:
A.
Exercise Plannin 1.
Conduct an exercise of the PTN Emergency Plan.
2.
Provide an opportunity for the State of Florida and Dade and Monroe Counties to participate in an exercise.
3.
Prepare an exercise information package, original and dissimilar to practice drill(s), to include:
4, a.
The objectives of the exercise and appropriate evaluation criteria.
b. 'he date, time period, place, and a list of, participating organizations c.
The simulated sequence of events.
d.
The time schedule of real and simulated initiating events.
e.
The narrative summary.
Conduct a critique of the exercise and prepare an evaluation report.
2.2-1 93EBRcAKC 25-93
.2 ~OECY S (C ')
B.
Emer enc Oreanizations Su ort and Resources 1. -
Demonstrate the prompt activation, adequacy of the staffing and set up, as appropriate, of emergency response facilities as follows:
-Control Room-Technical Support Center (TSC)
-Operations Support Center (OSC)
-Emergenc'y Operations Facility (EOF)
-Emergency News Center (ENC)
2.
Demonstrate the capability of the FPL Emergency Response Organization to implement their Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Facility Managers/Supervisors to provide overall direction, including "command and control" by initiating, coordinating, and implementing timely and effective decisions during a radiological emergency.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively transfer command and control of emergency response functions from the Control Room to the TSC/EOF.
5.
Demonstrate the provisions for continuous staffing of the emergency facilities.
6.
Demonstrate the interface capability between the FPL Emergency Response Organization and the State of Florida and Dade and Monroe Counties for effective response coo'rdination to a radiological emergency and adequate protection of the health and safety of the public.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to control access to emergency facilities.
8.
Demonstrate adequacy of designated facilities and equipment to support emergency operations.
9.
Based on scenario events, demonstrate that outside support agencies and organizations are available to provide assistance, as necessary.
10.
Demonstrate the ability of corporate personnel to augment the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and support the plant staff.
2.2-2 SS EBRc&348.1S 93
2.
~OB CIIVE5 (C i
di C.
Accident Assessment and Classification 1.-
Demonstrate the availability of methods, equipment, and expertise to make assessments ofthe consequences ofradiological hazards, including the dispatch and coordination of Field Monitoring Teams.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to recognize emergency action levels (EALs) and properly classify emergencies in accordance with the Turkey Point Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)s.
D.
Notification and Communication Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite emergency organizations within approximately 15 minutes of each emergency classification.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC of any emergency classification within approximately one hour of the declaration.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify FPL Emergency Response Organization personnel.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to develop and send timely information to State and local 'authorities as required by the Emergency Plan.
5.
6:
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and ENC, as appropriate.
I Demonstrate that adequate communication capabilities exist between FPL, and the State and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
7.
Demonstrate that adequate communications capabilities exist among FPL, the State Radiation Monitoring Teams and the Turkey Point Plant.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate among the Control Room, TSC, and
.
'O E.
Radiolo ical Conse uence Assessment Demonstrate methods and techniques for determining the source term of releases or potential releases of radioactive material.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of methods and techniques for determining the'agnitude of the releases of radioactive materials based on plant system'arameters and effluent monitors.
2.2-3 93 EBRc&KC 2$.93
2.2 ~OEC ES (C i
d)
Radiolo ical Conse uence Assessment (Continued)
3-Demonstrate the ability to estimate integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and to formulate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).
4.
5.
Demonstrate" the ability to monitor and control emergency worker radiation exposure and implement exposure guidelines as appropriate.
Demonstrate the availability of respiratory protection, and protective clothing for onsite emergency response personnel.
6, 7.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
'emonstrate the ability to decontaminate onsite personnel, as appropriate.
Demonstrate the ability to evaluate the radiation exposure and contamination levels (external) of an accident victim, as appropriate.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite and offsite radiological monitoring, to include collection, and analysis of sample media (e.g. air) and provisions for communications and record keeping.
10.
Demonstrate the capability to use the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
(walk-through/simulate).
Demonstrate that a program exists to analyze'luid samples and provide the isotopic and chemical results of the analysis within three hours of the time the sample was first requested.
F.
Protective Action 1.
Demonstrate the ability to recommend protective actions to appropriate offsite authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to advise individuals onsite or in owner controlled areas of emergency conditions.
3.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite first aid, 4.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct search and rescue procedures ifpersons are identified as missing during accountability procedures.
I 2.2-4 93EBRc%3IOS 25-93
2.2 ~OECTI ES (C d)
G.
Public Information 1. -
Demonstrate the operations of the ENC and the availability of space for the media.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clearaccurate and timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to produce accurate press releases in appropriate time frames.
f 4.
Demonstrate coordination of information prior to its release.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
H.
Recove 0 erations 1.
Demonstrate the availability of procedures to support re-entry and recovery, including de-escalation/termination from the emergency phase, and transition to recovery phase.
I.
Medical Emer enc 1.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to a radiation medical emergency in a timely manner 2.
Demonstrate the capability of the First Aid Team to'respond to a medical emergency, administer first aid, and survey for contamination on a simulated contaminated, injured individual.
3.
Demonstrate the capability to arrange for and obtain transportation and off-site medical support for a radiological accident victim.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of Mercy Hospital personnel to treat a contaminated, injured patient.
2.2-5 9$ EE/Rc34$
2S 93
I
L2 ~OCTI S(C i
di J.
~Exem nnns Areas of 4he PTN Emergency Plan that will NOT be demonstrated during this exercise include:
1.'ite evacuation of non-essential personnel.
2.
Onsite personnel, accountability.
3.
Actual shift turnover (long term shift assignments will be demonstrated by rosters).
"
4.
Real time activation of the EOF and ENC by Corporate Emergency Response.
Organization and governmental agencies.
5.
Actual drawing of a sample utilizing the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS).
2.2-6 93.EBReKR8.25.9}
t CONFIDENTIAL(u a iw6.e)
3.1 NARRATIVESU1VBrIARY (Continued)
3.1.1 Initial Conditions (Continued)
System Operations:
Demand on the System is high with anticipated peak of 11,500 MW,, Service area conditions are at near critical with scheduled and unscheduled outages in the entire system.
St Lucie Unit 1 is off line for refueling (expected return December 28); Fort Lauderdale Units 1 and 2 aa: off line for forced outages (expected return February 10); unexpected shutdowns have occurred at both Martin and Cutler Plants and neither unit is expected to return to service for at least 5 days.
Meteorological Conditions:
Current temperature is 78', conditions are fair and warm with an anticipated high in the mid to upper eighties.
Winds are weak from the east southeast at 2 to 3 miles per hour, becoming predominately easterly by evening.
Probability of precipitation is 10% through Thursday.
A high pressure system stationed over the lower, southeast United States has brought mild winds, and clear skies to the area.
Conditions are stable and expected to continue for the next 72 to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />.
3.1.2 Scenario Narrative The scenario begins with Unit 3 experiencing an ongoing unidentified Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage of 0.5 gallons per minute (gpm).
Due to the leakage, a special power entry team has entered the Unit 3 Containment to perform a visual inspection for the source of the leakage.
One member of the power entry team falls in the containment and is injured and contaminated.
The injured-person has sustained a serious cut to the arm and neck.
The First Aid Team and the Onsite Medical Response personnel will be activated, but the injuries will be sufficient to require transport off-site prior to decontamination resulting in an Unusual Event declaration.
The RCS leak increases to 5 gpm. A shutdown is commenced and System requests a
slow load reduction because of critical grid conditions due to the unexpected outages at several plants.
At approximately 75-80% reactor power, the RCS leak increases to 70-80 gpm. An Alert Emergency should be declared due to the leak.
CONFIDENTIALgrimn. ir.w.m>
93-EBRevN/12-09.93
CONFIDENTIAL(un'
isa)
3.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY(Continued)
3.1.2 Scenario Narrative (Continued)
J At approximately 55% reactor power, the H8 Rod Control Cluster Assembly (RCCA)
sticks in position and willnot move in or out. Instrument and Calibration (1&C) should be dispatched to troubleshoot the stuck RCCA.
The inside isolation check valve on the Instrument Airheader in the Unit 3 Containment ruptures, resulting in a loss of instrument air to the containment and low pressure outside the containment until the ruptured line is isolated.
At the point of turbine and reactor trip in the shutdown, the RCS leak increases to 210 gpm. The operators manually trip'the reactor. When the reactor is tripped, two additional RCCAs mechanically bind in the center core region.
Safety Injection (SI) is started.
When Emergency Containment Cooling (ECC) System is started, an electrical fault in the 3C ECC causes the 3C Motor Control Center (MCC) supply breaker to trip, deenergizing the 3C MCC.
Motor Operated Valve (MOV) 1405, 3C Steam Generator (S/G) AFW steam supply fails as-is due to a jammed stem and a bad motor.
A Site Area Emergency should be declared due to the RCS leakage.
The Control Room Operators carry out Emergency Operating Procedures to stabilize the unit, and Emergency Response Teams are dispatched to repair equipment malfunctions.
Shortly after the:trip, MOV-750, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) suction valve jams and trips its breaker due to a bound-up stem nut.
A vibration alarm comes in on the operating Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP).
When the RCP is tripped, the impeller disintegrates, causing debris to be carried into the reactor vessel.
The impeller debris causes mechanical damage and flow blockage resulting in high Core Exit Thermocouples (CET) and fuel damage to several bundles.
RCS and containment radiation levels increase.
The S/G in the loop with the failed RCP steam ruptures inside the Unit 3 Containment.
Containment pressure quickly increases to greater than 20 pounds per square inch (psig).
3.1-3 CONFIDENTIAL(vms. u.i6 m)
9>EE/RevM/12.09.93
CONFIDENTIAL~ u ~~a)
'.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY(Continued)
3.1.2 Scenario Narrative (Continued)
A General Emergency should be declared based upon the RCS leak and containment pressure.
Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) should be generated based upon plant conditions.
The previously ruptured Instrument Airheader in, the Unit 3 Containment fails outside the containment downstream of the outside isolation valve.
This results in a release path through the ruptured 2" air line to the environment.
The Control Room crew will carry out the EOPs and ERTs will repair malfunctioning equipment.
After Containment pressure bleeds down through the leak the uncontrolled release reduces to nearly zero.
The radioactive plume willcontinue to be tracked and PARs updated based on field monitoring results.
Plant cooldown to Cold Shutdown will be initiated.
Exercise play will be terminated when exercise objectives have been evaluated.
3.14 CONFIDENTIALgmra. n.i6 n>
93-EE/Rev04/1249.93
CONFIDENTIAL(un'2-16-93)
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT'OMPANY TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT 1993 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE DECEMBER 15, 1993 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME 'VENT¹.
EVENT Initial Conditions Unit 3 is online. operating at 100% power in the middle of core life. The Unit has been online for 190 days and at 100% power for 180 days.
Load conditions on the system are in a critical status due to several unscheduled outages in the area.
There are no load theatening periodics scheduled for the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
Unit 3 has been experiencing a 0.5 gpm unidentified leakage of reactor coolant for the last 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
A special team will enter Unit 3 Containment in an attempt to locate the source of the leak.
The following equipment is out of service (OOS):
Unit 4 is in Mode 5 in a maintenance outage.
3C Charging Pump is OOS for gearbox replacement 3A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is OOS for crank bearing replacement.
3C Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pump is OOS for governor modification and repair.
0700-0730 Shift personnel (Control Room and Field Operators, Health Physics (HP)
Radiation Protection Monitors (RPMs), Chemistry Technicians, etc.) on station 0730-0745
Start Exercise.
Shift briefing accomplished in the Simulator and Operations Crew establishes steady-state operation.
The team that entered the Unit 3 Containment to investigate the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak exits carrying one of the members who has been seriously injured by a fall in the Containment.
0800 1A Security and Emergency Medical personnel are dispatched to the Unit 3 Personnel Access Hatch to respond to the injured person.
0800-0815 1B The injured person is determined to be contaminated and injured severely enough to require off-site assistance.
Off-site medical facility (Mercy Hospital) is informed, an ambulance is ordered and the patient is prepared for transport.
Note: Times in Ikrlics are Approximate FPL/HH 3.2-1 CONFIDENTIAL(unIl) n.i/) 93)
93 EBRevi)/)2.09.93
CONFIDENTIAL(Uau 12.1I3 93)
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, December 15, 1993 TIME EVENT¹ EVENT 0830 1C The injured person should be transported to the off-site treatment facility. Due to the nature and severity of the injuries, the patient could not be fully decontaminated prior to'transport.
1D The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) should assume the position of Emergency Coordinator (EC), declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) and make necessary notifications in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 20101, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator due to the-transport of a contaminated injured individual.
0845
The RCS leak increases to 5 gpm.
Shutdown is commenced in accordance with General Operating Procedure (GOP) 3-GOP-103, Power Operation to Hot Standby and Off-Normal Operating Procedure (ONOP) 3-ONOP-100, Fast Load Reduction.
The EC should update notifications and classification as a result of the RCS leakage.
System Dispatcher request a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> shutdown with most of it in the second 1/2 hour.
0900-0915
At 75-80% Reactor power, the RCS leak increases to 70-80 gpm.
An Alert should be declared in accordance with EPIP 20101, Duties ofthe Emergency Coordinator due to the RCS leakage.
0930
At approximately 55% Reactor power, the H8 Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) willstick in its current position and cannot be moved in or out.
0945 The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC)
should be activated by this time.
1000-1015
Instrument air check valve ¹3-40-336 ruptures inside the Unit 3 Containment losing its cap and internals.
Loss of instrument air in the Unit 3 Containment.
Note: Times in Italics are Approximate 3.2-2
. CONFIDENTIAL<Vcr 12-1693)
93 EE/Rcv 1 I/12-09.93
P CONFIDENTIAL(Unni l2-16-93)
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, December 15, 1993 TME EVENT¹ EVENT 1015-1030
At the point of reactor shutdown/turbine trip,'he leak increases to 210 gpm.
Reactor trip and Safety Injection (SI).
4A On the trip, two additional Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCA) in the, center core region jam and do no insert.
On the Emergency Containment Cooling (ECC) system start, the 3C Motor Control Center (MCC) supply breaker ¹30306 trips on a fault in the 3C ECC and cannot be closed..
Motor Operated Valve (MOV)-1405, 3C Steam Generator (SG) AuxiliaryFeed Water (AFW) steam supply valve fails as is due to a failed valve motor.
The EC should declare a Site Area Emergency (SAE) in accordance with EPIP 20101, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator based upon the RCS leakage,
Owner Controlled Area (OCA) evacuation should be implemented (simulated).
The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) should be activated with initial staffing.
1040 1050 Initial actions of Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 3-EOP,-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, should be completed.
Operators should transition to procedure 3-EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
During step 17 of procedure 3-EOP-E-1, MOV 750, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) suction valve breaker ¹30615 trips and willnot stay closed.
Operators should commence cool-down and depressurization.
1100 1115 The FPL Corporate, State and County emergency response personnel should be allowed access to the EOF.
The EOF and Emergency News Center (ENC) should be operational.
Note: Times in Italics are Approximate
~
~
FPI/PIIi 3.2-3 CONFIDENTIAL(un'2.It 93)
93-EEIev 1 I/12.09-93
CONFIDENTIAL(vatll 12.16.93)
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, December 15, 1993 TME EVENT¹ EVENT 1125
A high vibration alarm comes in on one of the operating Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP).
10A When tripped in accordance with 3-ONOP-041.1, RCP Og Normal Operarion, the impeller of the affected RCP begins to break up.
Debris from the disintegrating impeller is swept down into the reactor Cold Leg.
1130
Debris from the failed RCP impeller has been transported into the Reactor
. Vessel and has caused flow channel blockages and impact damage to 'several fuel bundles.
Blocked flow in the central core region causes Core Exit Thermocouples (CET) to increase.
CETs in the area of the jammed RCCAs increase to over 1,000 'F. exacerbating fuel damage.
RCS and Containment radiation levels begin to increase as gas gap activity is released from the damaged fuel pins.
The affected S/G faults into the Unit 3 Containment.
Containment pressure increases quickly to >20 psig.
12A A General. Emergency should be declared as a result of high containment pressure.
Initial Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) should be issued at this time.
1145
The cyclic pressure changes experienced by the instrument air header exposed on the rupture of the in-containment check valve causes a weak thread-root to crack on a pipe nipple outside the containment.
As Containment pressure increases, the nipple fails and the pipe elbow connected to it separates.
The broken pipe nipple outside the Containment and open check valve body inside the Containment provide a 2" unisolable and unfiltered release path to the environment.
Containment pressure begins to bleed down through the broken instrument air supply line.
I Note: Times in Italics are. Approximate 3,2-4 CONFIDENTIAL(Ua01 12 16-93)
93-EE/Revl 1/12 09-93
CONFIDENTIAL(Unt11 12.16 93)
3.2 SCENARIO 'IIMELINE(Continued)
Evaluated Exercise, December 15, 1993 TME EVENT¹ EVENT 1215 The following Emergency Resporise Teams (ERT) should be dispatched in accordance with EOPs and EPIPs:
-Evaluate the leakage from the containment and release to the environment.
-Chemistry team to align Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) for online monitoring and sample the Unit 3 Containment for activity.
-Investigate and repair 30615 Breaker (MOV-750).
-Investigate and repair 3C MCC.
1300 As Containment pressure decreases, leakage and the release to the environment decreases to nearly zero.
1315 Control Room-Simulator Crew reestablishes forced circulation RCS cooling in accordance with EOPs and continue cooldown to Cold Shutdown.
1400 IdentiTication of backshift personnel and logistical needs for continued operation ofEmergency Response Facilities (ERF) should be considered at this time.
1500
The Evaluated Exercise is terminated.
~
~
Note: Times in Italics are Approximate 3.2-5 CONFIDENTIAL(vnn1 12.1s93)
93 EEIRevl1/1249-93