IR 05000250/1982016
| ML20053E245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/06/1982 |
| From: | Barr K, Wray J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053E232 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-82-16, 50-251-82-15, NUDOCS 8206070725 | |
| Download: ML20053E245 (6) | |
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o-UNITED STATES
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~4, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
a REGION il
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o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 k..... o ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 MAY 101982 Report Nos. 50-250/82-16 and 50-251/82-15 l
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light
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P. O. Box 529100
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Miami, FL 33152 Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos. OPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at, Turke # Point site near Homestead, Florida j
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Inspec or:
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' /Date ' Signed Approved by:
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K. P. Ba/r, Se Chief
[at(Signed Technical Inspection Branch Divisf or, of Engineering and Technical Programs SUMMARY Inspection on April 12-16, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 30 inspector-hours on site in the areas of filtration system tests, health physics organization and qualifications, porta.ble instrumentation, internal exposure records, solid radwaste management and shipping, technical specification reports, and the refueling water _ storage tank overflow incident.
Results Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. E. Yaeger, Site Manager
- J. K. Hayes, Plant Manager - Nuclear
- P. W. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor J. S. Wade, Jr., Nuclear Chemistry Supervisor
- D. W. Jones, QC Supervisor
- R. M. Brown, HP Operatinns Supervisor J. R. Bates, HP ALARA Supervisor T. S. Peck, HP Administrative Supervisor
- F. Marder, Health Physics
- W. Shewbrooks, Health Physics E. R. Lapierre, Radiochemist
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 16, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
4.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspector Followup Items (Closed)(80-17-09/80-15-09)
Critiques of Non routine Tasks.
During the inspection, the inspector attended two department critique sessions covering specific topics from the Steam Generator Replacement Project (SGRP) and improper radwaste shipping liner dewatering procedures.
Both appeared to be worthwhile and useful. The inspector noted that on a pre-vious inspection (report no. 81-21) outage preplanning meetings were attended and determined to be adequate.
The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed)(80-17-29/80-15-29) Procedure for Dewatering Portable Demineral-izers.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that the vendor dewatering procedures have been reviewed and approved by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee as recommended during the previous health physics inspec-tion (report no. 82-05).
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5.
Filtration System Tests Section 4.7.1 of the plant Technical Specifications specifies the operating and performance tests that must be performed quarterly and during refueling for the Emergency Containment Filtering System. Section 4.7.2 specifies the test to be performed during each refueling on the Post-Accident Containment Vent System.
During the inspection, the inspector reviewed test results for DOP, Freon, and charcoal laboratory tests performed on both systems for units 3 and 4.
The tests were last performed for Unit 3 on March 16-17, 1982, just prior to power ascension following the lengthy Steam Generator Replacement Project (SGRP). The tests were last performed for Unit 4 on November 4-6, 1981.
All tests were perfermed in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 and plant procedures 4704.1, 4704.2, 4704.3, 4704.4 and 5504.1.
The inspector also reviewed results of HEPA and charcoal filter tests performed on the Control Room Post Accident filters in accordance with plant procedures 10304.1 and 10304.2 and the ANSI standard. No abnormal-ities were identified. The inspector had no further questions.
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Health Physics Organization and Staff Qualification Section 6.3.1 of the plant Technical Specifications ;tates that each member of the facility staff will meet or exceed the qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971 for comparable positions.
Section 6.3.2 specifies the HP Supervisor qualifications.
The inspector reviewed the latest HP organization chart and reviewed staff resumes to determine their qualifications. All techni-cians in responsible positions and supervisors appeared to meet or exceed the Tech Spec qualification prerequisites.
The inspector noted that one professional position for an ALARA engineer and nine technician positions (of 19 total technician slots) were not filled at the time of the inspec-tion.
Licensee representatives stated that since the termination of the SGRP, a vigorous ef fort has started to fill each staf f vacancy.
The inspector noted that interviews were being conducted during the inspection.
The inspector stated that any supervisory position that may need filling must be filled with a person with at least four years of experience in the discipline he supervises and that intermediate and first line supervisors are included in the category (as stated in sections 3.2.2 and 4.3.2 of ANSI N18.1-1971). The inspector had no further comments or questions regarding health physics qualifications or organization.
7.
Portable Instrumentation
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The inspector reviewed the plant's inventory of portable survey instru-mentation. A licensee representative stated that over 100 instruments were purchased for the SGRP and have nearly doubled the plant's inventory. The inspector noted that an adequate number of ion chamber and GM tube detectors were calibrated and available for use. However, during this inspection, the facility did not possess a PNR-4 (neutron rem meter) that was adequately source calibrated and available for containment entries at power.
The licensee uses PNR-4s to determine stay times in neutron fields.
Neutron TLD-albedo dosimeters are used for a worker's official dose record. A licensee representative stated that the plant has five PNR-4s but four are
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out of service due to mechanical failures. The remaining one was due for source calibration in February.
The inspector determined that no entries into neutron -fields had been made with an-out-of-calibration neutron rem meter.
A licensee representative stated that according to the instrument tech manual, an adequate substitute for the source calibration'is a pulse test and exposure to a neutron flux for a response check. - The inspector stated that Section 4.7.1 of ANSI N323-1978 specifies that each neutron survey instrument be calibrated to a neutron source at least annually. The inspector s*ated that the plant procedure should reflect the ANSI standard recommendations, that a calibrated neutron rem meter should be obtained as soon as possible, and that no entries into either containment at power where neutron exposure are possible should be made until a calibrated PNR-4 is onsite (82-16-01).
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Internal Exposure Records The inspector reviewed personnel contamination incident reports for 'calen-dar year 1982.
Only one significant personnel contamination incident has occurred since January 1, 1982. The individual was whole body counted and showed no internal deposition.
The inspector reviewed whole body count records for calendar year 1981 and 1982.
No individual received greater than 4.6 percent of a maximum permissible organ burden. The apparent good record of internal exposure control is believed to be the result of initial and continuous decontamination of Unit 3 containment for the SGRP.
The inspector noted that although the licensee conducts investigations' to determine the cause of any internal depositions, the whole body counting procedure states that such investigations need only be performed when an individual receives greater than 20 percent of a maximum permissible organ burden. Section 6 of ANSI N343-1978 states that an investigation to deter-mine the cause of an internal deposition ~should be performed at 10 percent of a maximum permissible organ burden.
The inspector stated the plant procedures should reflect the recommendations of ANSI N343-1978 (82-16-02).
9.
Solid Radwaste Management and Shipping The inspector selectively reviewed radwaste shipping records for 1982.
At the time of the inspection, 38 shipments had been made.
The inspector-
.noted that contaminated equipment had been sent to other NRC licensees and a contractor's base office. The inspector verified that the licensee had-copies of each license on file for each designated recipient of contaminated equipmen.. The records appeared to be complete.
No violations of NRC or DOT reguletions were identified.
On April 14, the inspector was informed that while dewatering a 170 cubic foot resin liner, the licensee pulled a vacuum and slightly buckled the container.
The inspector observed the liner and noted that no apparent breach of the outer wall was evident. The liner still maintains a vacuum indicating that the liner integrity remained intact.
On April 15, the inspector attended a meeting to discuss corrective actions.
A licensee representative stated that they will try to ship the liner and contents if at all practicable. However, the contents may be transferred to another
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liner if.necessary. The inspector stated that the structural stability of
the lif ting lugs should be verified prior to any lifting of the liner. The disposal of this liner and its contents will be reviewed during a future
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inspection (82-16-03).
The inspector discussed with corporate licensee representatives the planned use of the dry storage building (inaccurately identified in IE l
report no. 82-05 as the radwaste storage building) in the southeast sector of the plant. The building is expected to house site equipment and tools which presently remain environmentally unprotected. LThese tools and equip-
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ment may be contaminated and if so, will be properly bagged and labeled.
Sufficient design precautions have been effected such that the building may provide more contingent storage space for radwaste in the future, if
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necessary.
The inspector had no further questions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Technical Specification Reports The inspector reviewed the licensee's submittal ~ entitled '" Radioactive Effluent Release Data - July 1981 Through December 1981." - The licensee is
required to submit the report pursuant to Technical Specification 5.6.1.
The inspector noted that the reported data corresponds to individual release data examined during the previous health physics inspection (IE report no. 82-05).
The inspector had no questions or comments. No violations or deviations were identified.
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i The inspector reviewed the licensee's March 2, -1982 submittal entitled
" Occupational Data Report for 1981." The inspector noted that 2409 man-rem
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of a total 2925 man-rem was attributed to contract workers. Most of this exposure was due to the Steam Generator Replacement Project. An annual i
i man-rem report is required to be submitted by Specification 6.9.1.
The inspector reviewed the final unit 3 SGRP man-rem report which indicated that approximately 2152 man-rem was expended during the project.
This total includes some exposure in the first calendar quarter of 1982 and is approx-
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imately 3.3 percent higher than the estimated project total of 2084 man-rem.
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The main reason for the increase appears to be the unanticipated excessive
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time spent in installing the new channel head and divider plates.
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. welding took place in higher radiation fields than at first estimated which
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also contributed to exceeding the estimated exposure of 233 man-rem for
these tasks by approximately 360 man-rem. A licensee representative stated that alternate methods of installing the channel head and divider plates'is j
under review to reduce the man-rem exposure during the Unit 4 SGRP.
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inspector had no further questions or comments. No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Refueling Water Storage Tank Overflow Incident
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At approximately 8:00 p.m., on March 17, 1982, the licensee discovered that
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the Unit 4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was overflowing to the ground i
and storm drain system.
The licensee was lowering the water level in the j
Unit 3 refueling cavity for maintenance by transferring the water to the
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Unit 3 RWST. A cross connect between the Unit 3 and 4 RWSTs not previously addressed in operating procedure 16125.1 was the apparent cause of the over-flow. At the time of the incident, Unit 3 RWST contained 15000 gallons and Unit 4 RWST contained 326,114 gallon. The Spent Fuel Pit and Refueling Cavity levels were 27 inches and 26.5 inches from the top respectively.
Final tank levels af ter the release were:
Unit 3 RWST 31,000 gallons, Unit 4 RWST 328,607 gallons.
Water levels in the Spent Fuel Pit and Refueling Cavity were 47 inches and 46.5 inches below the top respectively.
Assuming 1476 gallons per inch in the Spent Fuel Pit and Refueling Cavity, the licensee calculated a total liquid discharge of 11,027 gallons. A sample of the release indicated 2.9E-03 microcuries per milliliter gross activity which implies that approximately 121 millicuries was released from the system.
Action was immediately taken to contain the release and dilute the release with fire hoses. No offsite release limits were exceeded. No worker was contaminated. Air sample taken in the immediate vicinity of the spill shows no significant airborne activity.
The Spent Fuel Pit was immediately isolated.
The inspector reviewed the event with licensee health physics and chemistry personnel, examined the contaminated isolated area, performed independent contamination and radiation surveys, and checked the licensee's release calculations.
By assuming that all the activity released from the tanks was discharged through the storm drain system, the inspector agreed that a conservative estimate was made for release accountability records.
The inspector noted that the contaminated soil around the acid pit was being removed and stored in the radiation controlled area. The licensee has not determined how to dispose of this contaminated dirt. The inspector stated that the final disposition of the soil will be reviewed during a future inspection (82-16-04).
The inspector verified through independent surveys that areas decontaminated and released for normal use did not exceed established contamination limits.
The inspector accompanied by a licensee representative removed three man hole covers accessing the storm drain discharge pipe and found the sludge and pipe surface to be contaminated.
The discnarge pipe appeared to con-tain fixed contamination at very low levels.
Samples of the sludge indicated a level of activity on the order of 1.0E-06 microcuries per gram.
The inspector stated that although it appeared less than ten times Appendix C quantities of radioactivity is contained in the storm drain system, access points should be posted and controlled.
The discharge pipe for the storm system was posted. The storm drain system is sampled monthly and af ter inadvertent releases for effluent accountability purposes as a result of a violation for overflowing the Spent Fuel Pit in 1979.
The inspector concluded that the health physics and nuclear chemistry activities following the RWST overflow were appropriate and adequate. No violations or deviations were identified. Operations activities with regard to the spill will be discussed in the resident inspection report for March 1982.
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