IR 05000250/1982013
| ML20052C277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1982 |
| From: | Cline W, Jenkins G, Stansberry W NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052C268 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-82-13, 50-251-82-13, NUDOCS 8205040563 | |
| Download: ML20052C277 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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r REGION Il t'o
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
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Report Nos. 50-250/82-13 and 50-251/82-13 Licensee:
Florida Power & Light Company P O Box 529100
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Miami, FL 33152 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turke Point Nuclear Plant Inspectors:
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W. E. Cline Date Sig ed d
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W. W. Stansberry Date Signed Accompanying Personn 1 9. Perotti, J, Knoyer, M. Smith, J. Myers, H. Ryder,
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an J. Jensen f
cfA Approved by:
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- ptL M.~R. Jen t, Sedtion Chief Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on March 14-17, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 192 inspector-hours on site in the areas of a full scale coordinated' Radiological Emergency Exercise.
Results Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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8205040563 820413 PDR ADOCK 05000250
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Williams, Director Nuclear Energy
- J. H. Francis, Information Manager
- K. N. Harris, Assistant Manager Nuclear Energy
- H. E. Yaeger, Site Manager
- J. K. Hays, Plent Manager - Nuclear
- H. Johnson, Corporate Emergency Planning Supervisor
- D. W. Haase, Operation Superintendent
- P. Hughes. HP Supervisor
- J. Mendieta, Maintenance Superintendent - Nuclear
- H. Paduano, Manager, Nuclear Services
- J. Whitehead, Nuclear Plant Supervisor J. Maisler, Emergency Planner
- J. Danek, Health Physicst, General Office T. S. Peck, Health Physicist M. A. Ammennan, Health Physicist J. A. Ferguson, Health Physicist D. W. Jones, QC Supervisor
- W. Rogers, Manager, Technical Services
- F. Fabor, Security Manager Other licensee employees contacted included several technician, operators, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations R. J. Merlino, HMM Associates, Controller H. K. Wong, EDS Nuclear, Controller
- T. R. Phillips, EDS Nuclear, Controller P. Meshette, EDS Nuclear, Controller e
- R. Webster, EDS Nuclear, Controller V. Baratta, EDS Nuclear, Controller S. Weldon, EDS Nuclear, Controller J.-Robyn, EDS Nuclear, Controller P. Kenny, MD, Chief, Nuclear Medicine Mt. Sinai Hospital W. Smoak, MD, Attending Physician, Mt. Sinai Hospital A. Gilson, MD, Attending Physician, Mt. Sinai Hospital Chemistry T. McLeod, MD, Hospital Health Physicist R. Finn, MD, Technical Director, Mt. Sinai Cyclotron, Radiological Chemistry Other Government Agencies
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J. Heard, FEMA
R. Payne, EPA
W. Johnson, Florida Office of Radiological Health
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R. Wilkerson, Director, Florida Division of Public Safety Planning and
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Assistance
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L.-Jarrett, Director, Florida Office of Radiological Health
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A. Fischer, Deputy Director, Dade County Civil Defense S. Ballard, Dade County Civil Defense NRC
- G. R. Jenkins, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section, RII R. Vogt-Lowell, Senior Resident Inspector t
- Attended exit interview i
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Exit Interview t
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 17, 1982, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items I
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Exercise Scenario j
The emergency response exercise scenario developed by the licensee met the requirement of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG 0654, Section N.3.
The scenario contained
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simulated events which started with an Unusual Event and progressed through sequential events escalated to a General Emergency. The major elements of the scenario included provision for a -fire drill, medical drill, and
radiological accident drill.
The scenario was coordinated with offsite
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. agencies (federal, state, ab. local government) prior to the exercise.
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The inspector reviewed the scenario and discussed findings with licensee representatives on March 15 and'17, 1982. The inspector noted that as the scenario 'was written the sequence of events was such that neither the control room operator nor the shift supervisor had the opportunity to make offsite dose projections. The inspector discussed the merits of developing
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a future scenario which would allow these staff members an opportunity to make offsite dose projections.
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6.
Assignment of Responsibility
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This area was reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II. A.
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The inspector noted that the Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) briefed the control room personnel as to the initial simulated conditions of the plant, and, at the beginning of and during the emergency exercise, exhibited positive control and authority over the shif t organization. The NPS assumed the duties of the Emergency Coordinator (EC) and implemented the Emergency Plan in accordance with approved Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP). During the Unusual Event stages of the exercise the EC did not have a designated on-shift individual to help handle the numerous phone calls which came in to the control room. The merits of designating and training pesonnel as emergency communicators was discussed with a licensee repre-sentative.
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-250,251/82-13-01). The position of EC was transferred from the NPS to
Plant Superintendent-Nuclear upon activiation of the Technical Support Center (TSC). Designated plant personnel assembled at the TSC and proceeded to augment the on-shift organization in the areas of emergency direction and control, notification, communication, radiological assessment, operational accident assessment, plant system engineering, repair and corrective actions and onsite protective actions. While the licensee did not demonstrate long term augmentation of the onsite organization (because of the nature of the scenario), it was pointed out to the NRC on day two of the exercise that arrangements would have been made to relieve a portion of the TSC staff and set up a shift schedule for continuous long-term support at the TSC.
7.
Onsite Emergency Organization This area was reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.0, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.B.
The initial on-shift emergency organization was well defined and it appeared that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization. Augmentation of the initial response organiza-tion was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel and corporate assistance. Due to the scenario progression and a suspension of activities overnight on March 15, 1982, the timeliness of the augmented response was not observed.
The NPS assumed the duties of the EC upon initiation of the simulated fire emergency and maintained this position through the medical emergency. Upon escalation of the Unusual Event to an Alert category the responsibilities of the EC were transferred promptly to the Plant Superintendent-Nuclear, thus, the NPS did not demonstrate the capability of the on-shift organization to perform dose assessment and to make protective action recommendations to offsite authorities. Although most accident scenarios would allow time for activiation of the TSC, certain fast-breaking accidents would require the NPS (EC) to make an immediate assessment and, if necessary, promptly notify and make protective action recommendations to the offsite authorities. This matter is also discussed-in paragraph 5 abov.
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The on-site fire team and the first aid / decontamination team, and the offsite fire team and medical support team were activated during the
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simulated emergency. All activities in these two areas (fire, medical)
l appeared to follow approved procedures, and except for some communication problems which are covered below in paragraph 11, all response teams and groups demonstrated their capability to handle fire and medical emergencies
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at the Turkey Point Plant. Although the TSC staff appeared to cover all the
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key functional areas recommended in NUREG-0654, it was difficult to determine the chain of command at the TSC for those individuals other than the Emergency Coordinator and TSC Supervisor.
The inspector discussed providing a manning board at the TSC which indicates chain of command and the f nctional area to which each staff member is assigned. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-250, 251/82-13-02).
8.
Emergency Response Support and Resources j
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to a
accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency I
Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),10 CFR 50, appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in
Offsite assistance resources utilized during this exercise included REEF at
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Mt. Sinai Hospital, Homestead Air Force Base, and Metropolitan Dade County
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Fire Deprtrtment.
The inspectors observed that assistance resources were called upon and responded to the assistance request as stated in the agreements between FP&L and these offsite organizations.
During the fire drill it was noted that some licensee fire team members
experienced some difficulties in rigging hose and installing diverters. It a
appears that these members could benefit from additional training in the use
and installation of fire fighting equipment.
This area will be reviewed
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during a subsequent inspection (50-250, 251/81-13-03).
It was also noted
that during the fire drill there was no communication with the control room i
.concerning any possible personnel injuries. Although the scenario did not involve a simulated injury associated with the fire drill a negative report
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from the fire team leader to the emergency coordinator would have been helpful. The merits of such reporting was discussed with licensee repre-
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sentatives.
9.
Emergency Classification System-This area was reviewed in accordance with the requirements of.10CFR-
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50.47(b)(4),.10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.D.
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The emergency classification system used by the EC was in accordance with the classification scheme specified in NUREG-0654. During the course of the i
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exercise each of the four classes of emergency unusual event through
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general emergency, were simulated.
The inspectors noted that licensee personnel properly classified the emergencies based on the simulated emergency initiating conditions.
10.
Notification Methods and Procedures This area was reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
The EC used approved procedures in the notifications to onsite and offsite FP&L personnel and State, Federal and local response organizations. The EC in the Control Room used check-lists effectively in performing the notifi-cations in a prioritized manner.
Upon activiation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at the General Office in Miami, Florida, all notifications to Federal, State and local agencies were made from that location. Since the E0F was activated shortly af ter activation of the TSC the licensee did not demonstrate the capability of the TSC staff to communicate with the agencies during a simulated Site Area or General emergency.
The merits of providing the TSC staff the opportunity to demonstrate their ability to communicate with and recommend protective measures to the offsite authorities was discussed with licensee representa-tives.
The TSC contained the communication equipment described in the Emergency Plan and communication links between the TSC and the Control Room and EOF were adequately maintained.
The system of notifications used at the EOF appeared to be adequate.
Notifications from the EOF to offsite agencies were made in a timely manner and were in accordance with licensee procedures.
11.
Emergency Communications This area was reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed emergency communications methods and practices among
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onsite and offsite agencies and groups.
Observations were made at the control room, TSC, and EOF. At the control room and TSC it was observed that the normal method for transmitting information (except for the use of completed data sheets) was verbal either over communication lines or face to face.
There was no evidence of any written messages. At one point in the medical drill these was confusion as to the arrival of the medivac helicopter.
The use of written messages, which could have precluded such confusion, should be considered. (50-250, 251/82-13-04).
At both the E0F and NPS office in the control room ringing phones tended to distrupt briefings and coordination activities.
Also in the NPS office there were several phones on one desk, and at times it was difficult for the
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Shif t Technical advisor to determine which phone was ringing. The use of phone lights, modifying and controlling ring tone and volume for EOF and NPS office phones was discussed with licensee representative. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-250, 251/82-13-05).
Communications activities among offsite and on-site radiological survey teams was also observed.
On the first day of the exercise the observer noted communications difficulties between the in plant survey teams and the health physics office while walkie-talkies were being used.
It was difficult for the observer to assess whether the problems were due to equipment capabilities or due to lack of operator familiarity with communication equipment and communication protocol. On the second day of the exercise communication problems were observed between the field monitoring teams and the OSC.
It was noted that two walkie-talkie units were not useful to the team because of dead batteries.
The merits of providing training in the use of radio communications equipment and providing backup communications equipment to field and in plant survey teams was discussed with licensee representatives. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-250, 251/82-13-06).
12.
Public Information and Education This area was reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(B)(7),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.0, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.G.
This inspector noted that an Emergency News Center (ENC) was initially established at the site but as the simulated emergency was escalated the ENC function was transferred to the EOF in Miami. Within the ENC and EOF, the coordination of information between the licensee, the State of Florida representatives, and the NRC representatives appeared to be adequate.
The flow of information to media representatives appeared to be timely and accurate. Coordination of the rumor control function with federal, state, and local agencies was adequate but was not heavily exercised. It appears that clarification of the licensee spokesman function is needed.
Designation of the licensee spokesman was not clear to the observer during the morning media briefing sessions. This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-250, 251/82-13-07).
13.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment This area was reviewed in accordance with requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Program IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654 Section II. H.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing and operations of the emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment availability and use in these facilities. Observations were made of activities in the control room, TSC, OSC, and E0F.
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The NPS office in the control room served as a focal point for emergency response during the Unusual Event category.
Adequate communications equipment was present in the control room for notification of federal, i
state, and local emergency response orgarizations.
Backup communications were available in the event the primary communications link was lost.
The observer noted that the meterological recorder in the control room was out of service. A license representative informed the observer that backup
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weather information was available from Homestead Air Force Base.
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observer verified that the EPIP contained the phone number for obtaining back-up weather data, o
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The physical layout and emergency equipment were observed at the TSC and E0F.
The TSC which is an interim facility, had space for more than 25 persons and contained sufficient supplies and equipment. Space and layout of the EOF appeared adequate. The noise level in the EOF was sometimes high. Moveable partitions to separate work areas in the EOF was discussed with licensee representatives.
In the TSC the status board for on-site i
radiological data was too small and not well organized. Also at the TSC,
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two large maps of the 10-mile EPZ which were detailed by sector were
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available but were not used during the exercise. At the EOF situation
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reporting and briefing could have been facilitated by using event related status boards in addition to plant parameter type status boards.
These aforementioned areas will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection
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(50-250, 251/82-13-08).
The primary site-of the OSC (South assembly room of administration building)
appeared adequate from a space and layout standpoint. The alternate site of the OSC (I&C building, first floor) appeared to be small for the number of people (approximately 35) at that location. The office cubicles being used made it difficult to find specific individuals. This matter was also noted by licensee representatives.
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The observer also noted that during the relocation of the OSC from the
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primary to alternate location, delays occurred in delivery of vital supplies and equipment. As an example, delays in delivery of protective clothing to the alternate OSC resulted in a chemistry technician being delayed about 30 minutes in taking a simulated post accident sample while waiting for the needed protective clothing.
Licensee observers also noted this problem.
Licensee representatives agreed to take followup action on this matter.
14. Accident Assessment
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This area was observed-in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR
50.47(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in
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The observers noted that. accident. assessment roles were assigned to the TSC and the EOF. The technical support group within the TSC functioned to analyze the plant equipment status and to make recommendations to the Emergency Coordinator.
.The radiological assessment groups provided
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continuous updates on in plant' radiation hazards. The E0F directed the off-
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site monitoring groups, while coordinating with the TSC, and was the central point for receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data. All personnel working in the TSC and EOF appeared to be knowledgeable in their functional
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area and response support of all groups appeared adequate.
It was noted that dose assessment was performed at both the TSC and E0F. It was pointed out to the observer that the TSC had primary responsibility for the dose assessment during the exercise. The plant chemistry group had the responsibility for carrying out the dose assessment.
They performed the task efficiently af ter assigning a chemistry technician to the control room to insure that needed data was received to support the computer analysis.
The posting of the data on the TSC status board was timely and accurate.
The status board has a section for protective action status which was correctly maintained in accordance with the projected dose assessment information. The observer noted that the computer software used to make dose projections did not lend itself to timely correcti.ns.
Licensee representatives also noted this problem.
This area will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection (50-250, 251/82-13-09).
The inspector also observed post-accident sampling and analysis provisions.
The inspector observed that HP technicians followed procedures properly when obtaining air particulate samples. Swipe sample and dose rate surveys were obtained correctly and quickly. Personnel were familiar with operation of all equipment used and checked the operability of the equipment before conducting surveys. Calibration of the equipment in the OSC was peformed at the beginning of the second day of the exercise.
Chemistry personnel were familiar with the appropriate post-accident sampling and analysis procedures which were required by the exercise.
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Proper sampling and analysis equipment was employed. The inspector noted what appeared to be a weakness in the post-accident sampling and analysis j
documentation and reporting program.
The inspector observed that one chemistry technician did not know the proper reporting channel for post-accident sample results.
It was also ncted that one chemistry technician did not label post-accident samples until the controller prompted him to do so. These areas will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection
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(50-250, 251/82-13-10).
The licensees offsite monitoring teams were also observed. Two offsite monitoring teams were dispatched during the exercise. Membership on the offsite teams included health physics technicians from the plant. The team members who were observed demonstrated competence in the use of monitoring
equipment and sampling equipment.
It was noted that the instrument used by
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the team members were within the licensees specified calibration frequency.
Team members were equipped with personnel monitoring devices (TLD's and
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pocket dosimeters) and demonstrated a knowledge of usage.of the devices and i
i proper reporting of personnel dosimetry information. No problems were noted
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from a ' communication standpoint.
The observer did note that the teams l
experienced some delay in deployment from the substation Assembly Area due I
to the unavailibility of a a key to the substation control room locker I
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where offsite monitoring equipment is stored.
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-250, 251/82-13-11).
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Protective Responses This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in
place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR
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- 50.74(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
The inspector observed several indications of the licensees protective response program for both on-site and offsite personnel. Areas evaluated
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included evacuation, accountability, decontamination, and protective action recommendations.
When the emergency alarm was sounded and Owner Controlled Area Evacuation was announced over the PA system,17 licensee personnel evacuated though the North and South Gate without undue delay. Evacuees departed to the Assembly
Area via privalely owned vehicles.
At the Assembly Area (Florida City substation) 7h miles west of the plant, personnel were monitored and
personnel accountability was completed. Their vehicles were also monitored.
The offsite monitoring teams used this site as a staging area while awaiting specific assignments.
A decontamination area was established in case evacuees arrived contaminated.
However, upon reviewing the decontamination equipment present at the station, no soap or water hose was available. The inventory sheet for the Radiological Emergency Equipment at the substation did not indicate the need for soap or water hose.
The only way contaminated liquid waste. is controlled is by placing a sheet of plastic material (vinyl) on the grass but no provisions are made to control water run off from the sheet (50-250, 251/82-13-12). There appears to be no approved procedure for the management of the Assembly Area (This item was identified in report number 50-250, 251/81-24.). The Assembly Area supervisor was using what appeared to be a draft copy of an assembly area management procedure. The Assembly Area does not provide enough space for the plant evacuee's, offsite monitoring teams and the state of Florida Mobile Monitoring Van.
There appears to be no consideration of suitable alternatives for inclement weather, high traffic density, specific radiological conditions, and the number of persons expected to arrive at the Assembly Area.
This item was noted by the licensee also. This item was identified in report number 50-250, 251/81-24.
The inspector observed the accountability of the plant personnel during this
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- exercise.
It was noted that c complete site accountability (Units 1, 2, 3
. and 4) was not conducted during the exercise. 'Only 17 persons evacuated for
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the site and accountability drill.
This was done in 16 minutes.
The inspector pointed out.to licensee management that accounting for only 17 people did not appear to constitute an adequate accountability test.
This matter was discussed with licensee management representatives.
Licensee managerrent representatives-demonstrated to the inspector that thorough y
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According to
licensee management representatives emergency accountability testing had r
been conducted in October and December 1978, September 1979, September 1980,
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and September 1981. The inspector had no further comments on this matter.
The inspector noted that provisions were made for the use of respiratory j
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. protection and protective clothing for onsite monitoring teams, repair j
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facilities were established in the radiation controlled area.
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Protective action decision making and subsequent licensee actions were
evaluated.
It was noted that the licensee management personnel made appropriate recommendations to offsite agencies concerning protective
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actions based on available radiological information and projections.
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16.
Radiological Exposure Control
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. specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II. K.
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Exposure control measures were evaluated in the TSC, OSC, and at various work areas within the plant.
It was noted that exposure guidelines were i
used for all teams entering high radiation areas of the plant. A log book j
was kept in the OSC in which estimated exposure levels for all personnel involved in accident assessment and damage control and repair activities were maintained. A 24 hr/ day capability to determine doses of emergency
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personnel was noted.
Personnel were observed reading their pocket dosimeters at frequent intervals when they were in simulated high-radiation areas. Before teams were sent into high radiation zones, they were briefed
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by OSC personnel on the radiological conditions in the plant. Walkie-talkies were provided as a means to maintain communications between the teams.
On-site contamination controls were established which included access control of high-radiation areas, use of protective clothing and frisking of personnel and equipment leaving radition areas.
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One problem area relating to radiological exposure control.. was noted.
During a survey, the HP technician having possession of a survey instrument,
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allowed two workers accompanying him to-get ahead of him and out of his sight. Thi:; occurred in an area where the simulated radiation levels were I
subject to change.
In an actual situation this could have contributed to
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unnecessary radiation exposure of the accompanying individuals.
This area
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will be reviewed during a future inspection (50-250, 251/82-13-13).
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17. Medical and Public Health Support i
This area was observed to determine that arrangements are made for medical services for' contaminated injured individuals as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12),10 CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.L.
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A simulated medical emergency was initiated during the exercise which included a contaminated person with a compound fracture of the right arm and a concusion to the head. This initiated a request for offsite assistence.
-Homestead Air Force Base (HAFB) and the REEF emergency facility at Mt. Sinai
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Hospital participated.
The inspectors observed the medical drill both onsite and offsite.
From an onsite standpoints direction and control of the medical drill by the EC appeared satisfactory. One problem area concerning the estimated arrival time of the medivac helicopter is discussed in paragraph 11 above. Another area which should be _ improved is maintenance of communication with the hospital regarding the status of injured victims. It was pointed out by the licensee during the critiques that the hospital attempted to call the plant for additional information; however, the scenario called for a suspension of activities prior to the call.
The inspector discussed advantages of providing for coordinated, follow-up messages to and from the medical facility regarding the medical and radiological status of injured persons.
The offsite observer _ noted that the victim was transported to Mt. Sinai Hospital via-a helicopter from HAFB at approximately 1819 hours0.0211 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.921295e-4 months <br />. It arrived at Mt. Sinai at 1837. Immediately after removal from the helicopter, the victim's vital signs were checked.
He was monitored with a PRM-4 with probe, another PRM-4 with an alpha detector and a 740-F Ion Chamber.
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victim was then moved to the Nuclear Medicine Entrance of REEF.
There were no barrier ropes and signs, step off pads nor' blotter paper put down on the floor from the Nuclear Medicine Entrance to Room C (Viable l
Contaminated Casualties).
The contaminated sources were simulated and the controller provided the appropriate readings when necessary. The attending
l medical and HP personnel appeared to appropriately decontaminate the victim
_to the point that he could be treated as a regular medical patient. During-the dress-down and clean-up phase of this drill at Mt. Sinai, the inspector observed that hospital personnel did not appear to be familiar with the proper methods of removing contaminated clothing.
The monitoring of the helicopter and crew was simulated.
The attending physicians and other personnel were monitored before leaving Room C.
It did not appear that anyone monitored or simulated monitoring the floor between
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Room C and the Nuclear Medicine entrance.
The inspectors.~ identified a need for additional training for hospital.
personnel in appropriate procedures in dress-down and protective measures to prevent the spreading of radiological contamination, (50-250, 251/82-13-14).
This area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
18.
Recovery /Re-entry Planning This area was reviewed against the requirements _in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), 10
- CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph H, and specif.ic criteria in ' NUREG 0654,Section II.M.
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l The Emergency Plan describes a general plan for recovery /re-entry.
The recovery effort would be directed by the Recovery Director from the EOF or TSC.
Although the scenario did not provide for a demonstration of the recovery effort, the Emergency Coordinator at the TSC described the establishment of shifts for continued support by the TSC staff.
Recovery planning activities were not reviewed for E0F operations.
19. Exercises Critique The licensees critique of the energency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise were formally presented to licensee management for corrective action as required by 10 CFR50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II. N.
A formal FP&L critique of the exercise was held on March 17, 1982 with exercise controllers, key participants, licensee management and NRC personnel in attendance. Weaknesses identified as a result of the exercise were discussed and follow-up actions were planned.
Review of the licensees action on these matters will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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