IR 05000250/1982002

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IE Insp Repts 50-250/82-02 & 50-251/82-02 on 820104-08.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Previous Findings,Event Followup & Licensee Identified Items
ML20041C855
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/03/1982
From: Dance H, Landis K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20041C849 List:
References
50-250-82-02, 50-250-82-2, 50-251-82-02, 50-251-82-2, NUDOCS 8203020612
Download: ML20041C855 (4)


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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

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REGION 11

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$" $'oo ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-250/82-02 and50-251/82-02 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1207 Homestead, Florida 33030 Facility Name: Turkey Point 3 and 4 Docket Hos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Hos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point site ne Homestead, Florida (A44/h MJ/$L Inspector:

Kerry '. La is D4te' Signed

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L3 8L Approved by: ha u

H. C. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Uate' Signed Resident and Reactor Project Inspection SUftl1ARY Inspection of January 4-8, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 48 inspector-hours on site in the areas of follow-up of previous findings, event follow-up, licensee identified items, surveillance, circulars and plant operations.

Results Of the 6 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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l 8203020612 820203 PDR ADOCK 05000250

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted y

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Licensee Employees

  • H. Yeager, Site Manager J. Hayes, Plant lianager, Nuclear D. Haase, Operations Superintendent W. llilliams,' Assistant Superintendent, Electrical
  • V. Wager, Operations Supervisor J. Labarraque, Technical Department Supervisor D. Jones, Quality Control Supervisor J. Balaguero, Licensing Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on January 8,1982 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The site manager acknowledged the need for a closed loop follow-up system for IE circulars.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.

(Closed) Violation 250/81-31-02,251/81-31-02:

Deficient Overpressure liitigating System (0 tis) functional, test procedure. The inspector reviewed the change to Operating Procedure-0202.1, Reactor Startup-Cold Condition to Hot Shutdown, which ilow requires measurement of the OfiS summator output and comparing saae to an acceptable value, b.

(0 pen) Violation 250/81-31-01, 251/81-31-01:

' Failure to include.in procedures the alignment of instrumentation root valves.

The licensee is establishing a valve lineup hold point in the startup procedure to assure proper O!!S system valve lineup prior to starting the reactor coolant. pumps for heatup. This procedural change will be reviewed for adequacy during a subsequent inspection.

c.

(0 pen) Violation 251/81-33-02: Bit Flow Path Blockage.

The inspector revieaed the inter-office correspondence dated November 24, 1981 from B. A. Abrishami to J. A. Labarraque concerning Unit 4 high head safety

- injection (HHSI) flow path obstruction. The correspondence lists eight

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actions to be taken which appear to adequately address necessary corrective action. The inspector reviewed the change to OP-4104.1,

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f High Head Safety Injection' System - Periodic Test.

The change

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incorporates using a contact pyrometer to measure the temperature of

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HHSI piping'at various locations to insure the system temperature is

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above 145 F.

OP-2504.1, Heat Training System-Periodic Test, was also reviewed and appeared to provide adequate assurance of heat tracing system operability.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

IE Circulars The following IE Circulars were reviewed to determi'le whether they had been received by station management, reviewed for apolicability and appropriate action had been either taken or planned.

Consequently, the listed IE circulars can be closed for Units 3 and 4:

IEC 79-05 Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors IEC 79-19 Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll - Rand Pump Impellers IEC-80-01 Service Advice for General Electric Induction Disc Relays.

IEC-80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours IEC 80-03 Protection from Toxic Gas Hazards The licensee could not produce files addressing review and necessary action taken on any IE Circulars prior to 1979 while numerous files for 1979 and 1980 were incomplete. There is no formal tracking system to assure that IE circulars have been reviewed by all of the necessary personnel and that actions identified to be necessary were initiated and completed.

The lack of a closed loop tracking system was acknowledged by the licensee with plans to initiate such a procedure.

Circular tracking system improvement will be reviewed by the inspector during a subsequent inspection (IFI-250, 251/82-02-01).

6.

Surveillance Observation The inspector conducted an in-depth inspection of OP-12104.02, Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Periodic Channel Functional Tast, including:

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review for conformance to technical specification (TS) requirements, (2)

observation of surveillance performance, (3) review of test data for accuracy and completeness, (4) licensee review, (5) test results met TS requirements (6) surveillance completion by qualified personnel and (7)

deficiency identification and resolution by approriate plant personnel.

One channel of source range instrumentation (N32) was noted to be out of service (005). The inspector observed proper annotation of the periodic test (PT),

listing in the 00S log, and that a Plant Work Order (PWO-81-43) had been initiated to repair the channel.

The inspector had no further questions.

No violations or deviations were identified in this are r-

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7.

Review of Plant Operations a.

The inspector observed routine control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report period. The inspector verified the operability of selected _ emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accoidan a with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.

.These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications,10 CFR and facility procedures.

b.

LER 251/82-01 (Closed): On January 5,1982, the D llotor Control Center (!!CC) tripped as a result of a momentary phase to phase fault associated with the itCC bus. The fault was produced by the inadvertent introduction of a metal fish tape through an unused conduit encountered during ongoing plant modification work.

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' equipment caused operational problems or placed the unit outside limiting conditions for operation due to individual component or equipment unavailability. However, the liCC being deenergized resulted in a deviation from the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.1.c.

l The licensee initiated Unit 4 shutdown, " hot line" communications with IE Headquarters,' and a prompt report. The inspector participated in l

observation of the llCC buswork with no apparent damage indicated. The licensee plugged the open conduit and will initial a PWO to check the

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remaining flCC's to plug all unused conduit. The D 11CC was reenergized with satisfactory operation within approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and return to 100% power operation was commenced. The inspector had no further questions.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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