IR 05000237/2008006
| ML080870543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/2008 |
| From: | Julio Lara Engineering Branch 3 |
| To: | Pardee C Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR-08-006 | |
| Download: ML080870543 (25) | |
Text
rch 26, 2008
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 FIRE PROTECTION TRIENNIAL BASELINE INSPECTION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000237/2008006(DRS);
Dear Mr. Pardee:
On February 15, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 15, 2008, with Mr. Dave Wozniak and other members of your staff.
The fire protection triennial baseline inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), dated April 21, 2006. The fire protection inspection team examined activities conducted under your license related to safety and to compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and the conditions of your license related to fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown. The inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and records, observations of activities and installed plant systems, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance was identified, which involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because the violation was of very low safety significance, and because the finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as an Non-Cited Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station facility. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA by A.M. Stone Acting For/
Julio F. Lara, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000237/2008006(DRS); 05000249/2008006(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Dresden Nuclear Power Station Plant Manager - Dresden Nuclear Power Station Regulatory Assurance Manager - Dresden Nuclear Power Station Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice President Senior Vice President - Midwest Operations Senior Vice President - Operations Support Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Director - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Manager Licensing - Clinton, Dresden, and Quad Cities Associate General Counsel Document Control Desk - Licensing Assistant Attorney General Illinois Emergency Management Agency State Liaison Officer Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commissionn
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000237/2008006(DRS); 05000249/2008006(DRS); 01/28/2008 - 02/15/2008; Dresden
Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3; Fire Protection Triennial Baseline Inspection.
This report covers an announced fire protection triennial baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors in accordance with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), dated April 21, 2006. Based on the results of this inspection, one finding of very low safety significant was identified, with an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC describes its program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.
Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and periodically perform the necessary testing on safety-related thermal overload relays/heaters (TOLs), installed in 1993, in the alternate power feed to isolation condenser reactor inlet valves 2-1301-4 (Unit 2) and 3-1301-4 (Unit 3). Periodic testing of the TOLs is required to ensure the valves can perform their Appendix R safe shutdown functions, when required. Upon discovery, the licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program, initiated predefine parameters (PMID) and created surveillance work orders to test the TOLs at the next opportunity. There was not a cross-cutting aspect to this violation.
This issue was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Disposition Screening," because the finding was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
The finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent an actual loss of functionality of the isolation condenser system containment isolation valves. (Section1R05.7)
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection scope
The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensees fire protection programs defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The licensees fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:
- preventing fires from starting;
- rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur; and
- providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant.
The inspectors evaluation focused on the design, operational status and material condition of the reactor plants fire protection program and post-fire safe shutdown systems. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that:
- (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant;
- (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability;
- (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition;
- (4) puts adequate compensatory measures in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features;
- (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured;
- (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and
- (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensees problem identification and resolution program.
In addition, the inspectors review and assessment focused on the licensees post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspection was performed in accordance with U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), dated April 21, 2006. The NRC regulatory oversight process IP used a riskinformed approach for selecting the fire areas and/or fire zones and attributes to be inspected. The inspectors with assistance from a senior reactor analyst used the licensees Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) to choose several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. The fire areas and/or fire zones chosen for review during this inspection are listed below and constitute four inspection samples:
Fire Zone Description Safe Shutdown Methodology Second floor of the 1.1.1.3 III.G.3 - Alternate Shutdown Capability Unit 3 Reactor Building Aux Electric Equipment 6.2 III.G.3 - Alternate Shutdown Capability Room Mezz level of the Unit 2 8.2.6.A Turbine Building (Iron III.G.3 - Alternate Shutdown Capability Horse Area)
III.G.2.c - 1-hour rated fire barriers with 11.3 2/3 Cribhouse suppression and detection
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.1 Shutdown From Outside Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected fire areas and for alternative shutdown in the case of control room evacuation. The inspectors reviewed the plant systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for each fire area selected for review.
Specifically, the review was performed to determine the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant inventory makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. The review also included the fire safe shutdown analysis to ensure that all required components in the selected systems were included in the licensees safe shutdown analysis.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis, normal and abnormal operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, their updated final safety analysis report, and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that rely on shutdown from outside the control room. This review included verification that shutdown from outside the control room could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power.
The inspectors also examined the operators ability to perform the necessary manual actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing post-fire shutdown procedures, the accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, and the available time for performing the actions. The inspectors also observed the operators perform simulated post-fire manual actions in the plant using selected portions of DSSP during selected fire scenarios.
The inspectors reviewed the updated final safety analysis report and the licensees engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license amendments, technical specifications, safety evaluation reports, exemptions, and deviations) to determine the licensing basis.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables.
The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors compared the as-installed configurations to the approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association codes to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.
The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association codes to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding.
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions, such as, the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.
The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.
The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee had identified both required and associated circuits that may impact safe shutdown.
On a sample basis, the inspectors verified that cables of equipment required to achieve and maintain hot-shutdown conditions in the event of fire in selected fire zones had been properly identified. In addition, the inspectors verified that these cables had either been adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage, mitigated with approved manual operator actions, or analyzed to show that fire-induced faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. In order to accomplish this, the inspectors reviewed electrical schematics and cable routing data for power and control cables associated with each of the selected components and related modifications.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, having very low safety significance (Green) for the licensees failure to perform the periodic trip tests on thermal overload relays/heaters (TOLs) installed in the alternate feed to isolation condenser (IC) reactor inlet valves 2-1301-4 (Unit 2) and 3-1301-4 (Unit 3). Specifically, 1993 modifications installed new larger TOLs in the alternate feed to these valves to ensure the valves could perform the Appendix R safe shutdown functions, in the event of a Main Control Room fire-related evacuation. However, the licensee failed to establish the required predefined parameters (PMID) for periodic surveillances (trip testing)to test the TOLs to demonstrate functional performance. Consequently, the TOLs have not been tested since installation in 1993.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed the Dresden Safe Shutdown Report (SSR), Dresden Safe Shutdown Procedures (DSSP), design drawings, cable routings, and related modifications to assess Dresdens post-fire safe shutdown capability using the Isolation Condenser Method for post-fire shutdown which would be operated locally by use of manual actions. Schematic diagram 12E-3507B, Schematic Diagram Isolation Condenser Inlet Valves 3-1301-1 and 3-1301-4 Control, Revision M, depicted the control logic for these IC valves. The inspectors reviewed the drawing and related modifications to determine if postulated fire-induced faults could prevent safe shutdown.
Unit 2 Modifications M12-2-92-001-C, dated July 1992, and Unit 3 M12-3-92-001-C, dated April 1993, added alternate power feeds and controls to inboard isolation condenser valves 2(3)-1301-1 and 2(3)-1301-4 to address potential post fire spurious closure of these valves and GL 89-10 requirements.
Dresden Fire Protection SSR, Amendment 14, Sections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.4 described the purpose and basis for IC MOV modifications. The SSR stated, in part, alternate electrical power and control feeds have been installed on each of the two inboard, i.e., inside primary containment, isolation condenser valves MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4. These valves are normally open and are required to remain open for isolation condenser operation. The possible spurious closure of these valves due to fire damage to their control circuits would defeat isolation condenser operation. Since the valves are located inside the inerted drywell, manual operation to rectify the spurious operation is not feasible. The new alternate feeds were installed to upgrade the reliability of the isolation condenser system and provide means to override the effects of spurious signals on these valves. The SSR further stated, the alternate feeds for the Unit 2 valves are powered from Unit 3 480-V MCC 38-1, located in Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. A transfer switch has been installed in Fire Zone 1.3.2 (part of Fire Area RB2-I) where the cables to the inboard valves enter the drywell. This switch allows the valves to be opened if they spuriously close since it will select that power feed, normal or alternate, which is energized. Assuming that Unit 2 electrical equipment has been damaged by the fire, the feed which would be energized would be the alternate feed from MCC 38-1.
An isolation switch is also installed in Fire Zone 1.3.2 to manually select the power feed to the inboard valves.
The inspectors requested that the licensee provide the sizing calculations for the TOLs installed in the alternate feed to IC reactor inlet MOVs 3-1301-1 and 3-1301-4 and the last TOLs testing performed for valve 3-1301-4. In response to the inspectors request, licensees review identified that predefined parameters (PMID) for periodic surveillance (trip testing) of the TOLs have not been established after installation of the TOLs for valves (2)3-1301-4 in local panels 2202-75(U2) and 2203-75(U3). Consequently, no work orders (WOs) were initiated and the TOLs have not been periodically tested since installation. The licensee stated that PMs to demonstrate functionality of valves (2)3-1301-4 under normal plant conditions, using the alternate feeds, were being performed every 18 months by cycling the valves. However, the inspectors determined that although cycling the valves provides reasonable assurance for operability under normal conditions, it does not ensure valve motor overload protection without nuisance tripping. Furthermore, the licensees TOLs testing program requires that preset acceptance criteria be met. For example:
- (1) test current must be 300 percent of heater rating;
- (2) trip time must be recorded and verified if within acceptable ranges against specified trip time ranges to ensure valve does not trip prematurely;
- (3) for certain TOLs all three phases must be connected in series so that all heaters are tested at the same time to obtain accurate results; and
- (4) temperature current compensation chart must be used.
The inspectors noted that Dresdens predefine PMIDs and PM procedures required that TOL trip testing is performed every six years (+25 percent) on safety-related valves. Dresden procedure DES 7300-05, Maintenance and Surveillance of E.Q. and Safety-related 480V MCC, Revision 21, delineated the TOLs testing requirements. Step I.13, of the procedure stated, The primary purpose of testing the overload relay is to verify it protects the motor against overload conditions without nuisance tripping. A relay that trips early (nuisance) during testing can jeopardize the reliability of the motor operated valve.
The relay should trip as described in this step to provide proper motor protection.
The licensee also informed the inspectors that the thermal overloads sizing calculations for valves 2-1301-4 and 3-1301-4 were not available for review. The applicable TOLs heater sizing calculation No. 004-E-032, issued in August 1992, had not been revised to incorporate TOLs heater sizing changes implemented under the IC MOV Modifications.
Consequently, the inspectors requested that sizing evaluation be performed by the licensee and the results were reviewed by the inspectors to ensure that the TOLs installed in the alternate feed were sized properly for their application. The results provided reasonable assurance of functionality until the installed TOLs are trip tested in the near future.
The inspectors noted that industry standards and National Electric Code required thermal overloads to be sized to allow for operating within the expected motor service factor as well as operation under degraded voltage conditions. These two conditions required that the thermal overload be sized approximately 25 percent higher than the temperature corrected motor FLA rating. Other design considerations are incorporated when sizing TOLs to ensure the components are protected and trip within set limits. Also, the inspectors noted that the TOLs installed on safety-related valves at Dresden are not designed to be bypassed during a design basis event and could drift and open prematurely if not tested periodically and appropriately sized for the application.
Upon discovery, the licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program, initiated predefine parameters (PMID) and WOs to test the TOLs at the next opportunity.
Analysis:
The inspectors determined that failure to periodically test safety-related thermal overloads installed in isolation condenser reactor inlet valves 2-1301-4 and 3-1301-4 alternate feed and used in Appendix R applications was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening because the finding was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the licensee did not ensure the operability and functional performance of the thermal overloads installed in the alternate feed to isolation condenser reactor inlet valves 2-1301-4 and 3-1301-4. The periodic testing is required to ensure installed overload sizing sufficiently accounted for operation under design bases conditions, including operation within the motor service factor, operation at degraded voltage conditions and operation at a design temperature and radiation in the location the TOLs were installed. (Unit 2 at SDC room local panel 2202-75 and Unit 3 at TIP room local panel 2203-75).
The inspectors determined that the issue was within the licensees ability to foresee and address when performing PM activities on the valves in the last 15 years. Also, the performance deficiency did not have actual safety consequences, that it did not impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and that there were no willful aspects to the violation.
The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Phase 1 screening. The finding screened as Green because the inspectors answered no to all five questions in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Column.
Specifically, the finding did not represent an actual loss of the indications and control functions of the isolation condenser reactor inlet valves.
The inspectors determined there was no cross-cutting aspect to this finding.
Enforcement:
Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XI, Test Control, requires that a program be established to ensure that all testing necessary to demonstrate that structures, systems and components will perform satisfactorily in-service be identified and conducted.
Contrary to the above, from July 1993, to January 30, 2008, the licensees test program failed to ensure that periodic testing necessary to demonstrate that the safety-related components installed via modifications would perform satisfactorily in-service be identified and performed. Specifically, the licensee failed to periodically test thermal overload heaters installed in the alternate feed to isolation condenser reactor inlet valves 2-1301-4 (Unit 2)and 3-1301-4 (Unit 3) to ensure the operability and functional performance of the components and the related valves.
The licensee captured this issue in their corrective action program as IRs 728694, 729575, and 729867. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section V1.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000237/2008006-01; 05000249/2008006-01)
.8 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, on a sample bases, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The Inspectors reviewed the redundancy of communication systems and procedural guidance for safe shutdown procedures communications to verify that important information could be transmitted following a fire.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations.
The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available on-site. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.11 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review on the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, work orders, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
.1 Exit Meeting
On February 15, 2008, at the conclusion of the inspection, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dave Wozniak and other members of licensee management. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
No interim exits were conducted.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
- D. Wozniak, Site Vice President
- B. Carol, Operations Director
- G. Dean, Senior Manager Design Engineering
- T. Hanley, Plant Manager
- L. Mallavarapu, Electrical/I&C Design Manager
- B. Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- A. Lintakas, Programs Engineering Manager
- F. Pournia, Senior Manager Plant Engineering
- J. Mauro, Fire Marshall
- J. Strasser, Design Engineer
- M. Kerchenfaut, Appendix R Engineer
- P. Bembnister, Fire Protection Engineer
- J. Lizalek, Lead Assessor, Nuclear Oversight
- D. Wolverton, Assessor, Nuclear Oversight
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- C. Philips, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Melendez, Resident Inspector
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000237/249/2008006-01 NCV Failure to Perform Periodic Trip Tests on Thermal Overload Heaters,
Discussed
None Attachment