IR 05000247/1982023
| ML20028C819 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1982 |
| From: | Foley T, Kister H, Koltay P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028C808 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-82-23, NUDOCS 8301140171 | |
| Download: ML20028C819 (17) | |
Text
j 50247-821005 50247-820923
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50247-821108 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY'COMfISSION
l Region I Report No. 82-23
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Docket No. 50-247
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License No. DPR-26 Priority Category ' C
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Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York Inc.
4 Irving Place
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New York, New York 10003 Facility Name:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Buchanan, New York Inspection conducted: November 1-30, 1982 Inspectors:
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T. Foley, Sen1Dr Riffdent Inspector date
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12l/5l83 P. Koltay, ResidenPInspector date
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Approved by:
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H. Kister, Chiif, Reactor Projects Section date IC, DPRP
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Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 1-30, 1982~(Inspection Report 50-247/82-23L Areas Inspected:
Routine onstta, r.egular and backshift inspection including licensee action on previously identified inspection findt.ngs; licensee. manage-ment changes; plant operations review; operational safety vertftcation; operability of engineamd safeguard features; refueling activities; surveillanca observations; facility maintenance; licensee event reports; physical security; review of monthly and periodic reports; steam generator wald. examination; and, refueling outage.
The inspection involved 170 inspector hours by the resident
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inspectors.
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Results: Two apparent violations were identified in two areas. (Failure to maintain a high radiation area locked, paragrapli 48, and failure to follow pro-cedures,, paragraph 141
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted D. Arity, Maintenance Engineer J. Basile, General Manager Nuclear Power Generation M. Blatt, Acting Director, Regulatory Affairs
A. Brescia, I&C Supervisor K. Burke, General Manager, Adninistrative Services J. Cullen, Rad Waste Manager J. Curry, Chief Operations Engineer W. Ferreira, Radiation Protection Adninistrator
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R. Gauny, General Manager, Environmental Health and Safety
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J. Higgins, Chemistry Manager C. Jackson, Vice President Nuclear Power J. Mooney, Electrical Engineer
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H. Morrison, Operations Superintendent A. Nespoli, Major Projects Manager
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J. Quirk Test and Performance Engineer M. Skotzko, Security Adninistrator M. Smith, Acting General Manager, Technical Support The inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees including members of the operations, health physics, technical support, main-
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tenance, construction, corporate engineering staff, and security personnel.
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2.
Licensee Management Changes The following management changes were announced by the licensee:
a) Ronald Gauny assumed the position of General Manager of Environmental Health and Safety, effective November 1,1982.
b) John Cullen was appointed Rad Waste Manager, effective November 1, 1982.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (247/81-15-06).
Review of Gross Leak Rate Test. The inspector reviewed the results of PTV-17 Containment Gross Leakage Test. The inspector verified that the test results met Technical Specification requirements.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (247/81-05-06). Testing of Fan Cooler Unit Water and Air Side Flows and Pressure Drops. The inspector witnessed various tests during startup operations, and reviewed P-MT-43-2. The tests were satisfactorily completed on May 21, 1981.
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InspectorFollowItem'(247/80-15-04). Shielding around AFW i
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pumps to prevent damage during postulated break.
Shielding was installed prior to plant startup, May 1981.-
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(Closed) Violation (50-247/82-03-01) Unprotected opening in fire barrier wall between the electrical cable tunnel and primary auxiliary building.
The inspector verified that the licensee repaired the fire barrier in accordance with cable tray penetration details identified on drawing No. A201208.
(0 pen) Violation (247/81-22-02) Drawing Control The subject report identified that drawing No. A209762-1, service water flow diagram, did not depict the constructed system. The inspector reviewed the desig-nated control room drawings list, and noted that drawing No. A-209762 has been verified to reflect as-built conditions as of May 1,1982.
While reviewing the designated set of control room drawings, the inspector identified several drawings including A-209762 as being partially illegible and tattered. Additional review of the drawings and discussions with licensee personnel, prompted the inspector to conduct a more detailed review of the licensee's drawing control pro-Refer to Section 4 of this report.
This item is considered open gram.
pending a review of the licensee's impending corrective actions to im -
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prove the onsita drawing controls.
(closed) Unresolved Item (50-247/78-26-01) Pressurizer relief valves were tested and reset at ambient temperatures using nitrogen.
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tures and differences in steam vapor / nitrogen to obtain true lift-off i
pressures. The inspector verified that Procedure PTR-5A, Test Procedure for Steam Set Pressure of Safety Valves, Revision B, has been updated by the licensee.
The procedure requires that pressurizer safeties be testedusingsaturgtedsteamthatwillmaintainthevalveinletneck temperature at 350 F.
4.
Plant Operations Review i
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Control Room Tour Daily, the resident inspectors reviewed, on a sampling basis,
the control room logs, records, annunciators, and instruments for significant changes or trends in plant parameters, to
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ascertain that requirements for the mode of operation at the time were being met, including equipment status, plant chemistry, communication ability, control room manning and i
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turnover, and general control room manner of operation and conduct of events.
Inspection Findings:
1) In general, no inadequacies were identified in the control room operation; however, some concerns were identified in the control room relating to refueling. These are discussed in a subsequent paragraph titled " Refueling Activities," in paragraph 7.
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-4 2) Drawing Control Program Audit
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During a routine tour of the central control room, the inspec-l tor performed an audit of the central control room (CCR)
drawing control program and reviewed a sample of the control
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room drawings. The inspector noted that the licensee main-I tains a selected group of about 25 drawings in a special stick
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file, identified as " central control room controlled verified
drawings." These drawings are marked verified as of May 1,
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1982, and include flow diagrams of safety related systems.
In addition, the licensee maintains a large quantity of draw-
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ings identified "for information only" in a filing cabinet i
located in the control room.
j The inspector noted that the licensee does not have a formal f
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program in place, that would assure that contml room drawings
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reflect the current as-built conditions.
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During a review of the verified drawings, the inspector identi-
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fled the following discrepancies:
l Flow diagrams include hand drawn corrections in the form l
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of additions and/or deletions of lines and valves. The changes are not dated, signed, or explained on the drawings.
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Several drawings are partially illegible due to poor
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reproductions.
Torn and tattered drawings have not been replaced.
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Several "for information only" drawings have been
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added to the controlled drawings stick file.
S The inspector reviewed the licensee's Quality Assurance l
Manual CI-240-1,Section II, which provides requirements
on the implementation of the drawing control program;
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and licensee's Procedure SA0122, Revision 1, Drawing i
Control, which implements such requirements. The inspec-
tor noted that SAO 122 does not, (a) specifically address I
a detailed CCR drawing control program, (b) provide a i
method for operations personnel to transmit field identified i
variations to field engineering for fomal revision of the i
drawings, or (c) for a method for tracking the planned,
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i ongoing, and completed modifications.
l The inspector discussed with the licensee, regarding the apparent inadequacy of the CCR drawing control program,
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and the reliability of the control room drawings used by
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-5-The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern regarding the CCR drawing control program. The licensee stated that the following will be accomplished prior to returning to power operations:
Procedure SAO 122 will be revised to include a de-
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tailed CCR drawing control program.
The program will identify special drawings, approximately
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70, to be maintained in the control room, a verification process for accuracy of the drawings, and a method for updating the drawings in a timely manner to reflect recent modifications to systems.
The preliminary details of the program have been presented by the licensee to the inspector during a meeting held on November 19, 1982. The inspector noted that the new program appears to be comprehensive, and its details will be reviewed by the NRC prior to plant startup.
B.
Plant Tours During the course of the inspection period, the inspectors made multiple tours of all accessible areas within the facility.
During these tours, the inspectors ascertained that adequate controls were being implemented for the following:
Radiation Protection Controls
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Plant Housekeeping
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Fire Protection
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Equipment Control
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Tagging Controls
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Pipe Support and Seismic Restraint
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Fluid Leaks
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Instrumentation Controls
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Inspection Findings:
1) Radiation controls in general are adequate. Radiation Work l
Permits (RWP's) are being established and implemented.
Pro-tective clothing, dosimetry, and respiratory equipment, as required, are routinely used in all controlled areas. The inspectors routinely check High Radiation Area door controls, and independently verify radiation levels and verify general good health physics practices.
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-6-l The following inadequacy was identified:
On November 9,1982, during a routine tour of the Primary Auxiliary Building, the inspector noted that on the 68'
level, near the containment spray pumps that a door to the hallway to the waste holdup tank area was unlocked and unguarded. The inspector reviewed the posted survey on the door.
The area survey, performed on September 17, 1982 indicated that the area was a High Radiation Area (HRA),-
with radiation intensity readings as high as 70,000 mr/hr on contact with the CVCS waste holdup tank, and. general area readings as high as 2,500 mr/hr. The inspector walked down the hallway to the entrance to the waste hold-up tank area, then returned to the unlocked door and left the area to obtain health physics assistance.
(Whenleaving the area, the inspector noted a person leaving the HRA several minutes after the inspector exited through the un-lockeddoor.) Upon returning with a health physics technician.
the door was found locked. The inspector entered the area,
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and, independently measured dose rates as high as 2,000 mr/hr approximately two feet from the tank at waist level.
I Discussions with the licensee's representatives indicated that a Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) previously entered the area, performed work in the area, leaving the door open and
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unguarded. The inspector found the door unlocked and un-guarded, and shortly thereafter, the NPO exited and locked t
the door to the High Radiation Area.
Technical Specification 6.12.1.6 requires that a locked door be provided to prevent unauthorized access to each HRA in which the intensity of radiation is greater than 1,000 mr/hr.
Leaving the door to the waste holdup tank hallway unlocked and unguarded is considered a violation.
(50-247/82-03-01).
The licensee provided the inspector with a Con Edison memorandum dated August 18, 1982 from S. Wisla to C. Jackson, which identi-fied problems currently being experienced with HRA doors and provided recommended solutions for upgrading the doors.
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The current licensee procedure on HRA doors is to provide a chain and lock to secure the door, and require two persons
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for access, one to guard the door, and one to enter the area and perfom the work. Certain authorized individuals (NPO's),
are allowed to open HRA doors and perfom work whila guarding the door. The proposed solutions recommend replacing the HRA doors with self-locking doors which do not prevent egress from the areas.
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The licensee has additionally reinstructed the NP0's in the correct procedure for entering HRA's, and is expediting the upgrading of the HRA door proposal.
2) Plant housekeeping improvements were noted in the Service Water Tunnel, Electrical Penetration Area, and in Administra-tion Building hallways.
Other areas of the plant remain the same or have degenerated, notably, since the conclusion of
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the last inspection period. These areas include the Primary Auxiliary Building, the valve gallery, and the Steam Generator Blowdown Tank area. There appears to be a lack of housekeeping.
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controls associated with the work on the Fan Cooler Units (FCU's)
as evidenced by numerous hoses, pieces of pipe, rope, rags, cans,
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and miscellaneous paraphernalia lying in the passage way by the FCU's. Additionally, it was observed that work on the FCU's results in copious amounts of water spilling from the breaking of flanges end draining of the FCU onto the floor and falling i
down several levels of containment passing over and wetting i
pipes, restraints, electrical cabling, etc.
This also provides the potential for the spread of contamination on the lower levels.
Discussion with Health Physics Technicians have indicated that they repeatedly requested that the FCU's be drained properly.
The area around the FCU's is confined, and much work is being done; however, additional housekeeping controls warrant licensee attention. Consideration should also be given to what effect the spillage of water and chemical solutions from the FCU's may have had on the electrical cabling. A chemical solution is used by the licensee to remove corrosive products from the fan cooler coils. This was discussed with the licensee, who stated that an evaluation was currently being perfomed and the results would be provided to the resident inspectors prior to startup.
No other inadequacies were identified in this area.
5.
Operatiortal Safety Verification Using a unit specific daily and biweekly checklist, the inspector routinely verified the following attributes:
Proper control room manning and access control;
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Operators adhering to approved procedures for ongoing activities;
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Adherence to limiting conditions for operations observable from
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the control room; No abnomalities on instrumentation and recorder traces;
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are operable; Control rod insertion limits are in conformance with technical
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specification requirements; Containment temperature and pressure indications were in con-
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fonnance with technical specification requirements; No abnonnalities indicated on radiation monitor recorder traces;
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and, Onsite and offsite emergency power sources available for auto-
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matic operation.
The inspector reviewed the control room log, shift supervisor's log, nefueling log, tagout log, operating orders, significant occurrence reports, shift turnover check sheet, and diesel operability log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activities, and to note any out-of-service safety systems.
During routine entry and egress from the protected (.PA), the inspectors
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verified:
Access contrf.ls are in confonnance with security plan requirements
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for personnel, packages and vehicles; The required number of guards are present and alert;
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Gates in the PA barriers are closed and locked if not attended;
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Isolation zones are free of visual obstructions and objects that
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could aid an intruder in penetrating the PA: and, Personnel radiation monitoring equipment is operable, and that
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equipment and materials are being monitored prior to release for unrestricted use.
Findings:
One inadequacy was identified and is discussed under " Security" in l
Paragraph 14 of this report.
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Operability of Engineered Safeguard Features
The inspector verified through direct observation, and procedural re-i view, the operability of the emergency diesel generators and the component cooling water system.
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The inspection criteria included:
i A walkdown of the accessible portions of selected system; I
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System lineups checked against plant drawings;
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Verified hangers and supports were operable;
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Cleanliness of breakers, instrumentation cabinets;
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Instrumentation is properly valved and calibrated; i
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Valves in proper position, power available, locked and i
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sealed, as required by checkoff lists; and,
Local and remote control positions correctly established.
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No violations were identified.
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7.
Refueling Activities During the reporting period the reactor plant was being refueled.
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the beginning of the period all fuel was stored in the spent fuel pool.
Fuel
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handling activities were observed in the control room, containment, and the
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spent fuel pool.
Inspectors verified that the licensee met technical specifi-cation requirements, Section 3.8.
The inspectors discussed several concerns
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with operators and/or operations department management which were subsequently
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resolved.
Quality Assurance Controls during refueling were particula,rly good.
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The licensee conducted visual inspections of 69 fuel assemblies for grid strap degradation previously reported in Inspection Report (50-247/81-03.)
No further grid strap degradation was noted on the initial inspection.
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Fuel pin degradation was noted on assembly F-44, which was reported in
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LER 82-045, and on assembly E-06 which will be added to the same LER.
The degradation consisted of one missing fuel pin end plug from each of
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the assemblies. The spring located below the end plug was found in place,
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indicating that all fuel pellets were contained. These fuel assemblies
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were not returned to the core.
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-10-Thirteen assemblies with minor grid strap degradation from previous re-fuelings remain in the core. Assemblies with fuel abnormalities were not returned to the core.
Oneassembly,however,(E-54)wasreturnedto the core with a foreign object less than 1 inch in length stuck between two fuel pins in the lower portion of the assembly below the active fuel zone. The inspector reviewed a Westinghouse discrepancy report accepting this assembly "as is," and mquested a safety analysis from the licensee conceming this assembly prior to startup. The licensee stated a safety analysis would be provided prior to startup.
Toward the end of the inspection period, the licensee refueled the reactor without incident. Two events, however, took place, not directly related to refueling, which have not been resolved.
One event took place when a leak occurred from the reactor vessel cavity to the reactor cavity sump. This occurred after the re: fuel shuffle was complete, and was caused by a leak in the boot seal. The leakage filled the reactor cavity sump to the alam setpoint which actuated the annuncia-tor. An (NPO) was dispatched to find out the cause of the alam. The reactor cavity sump pumps had failed to automatically operate. The licensee immediately pumped the reactor cavity fluid back to the refuelfrg water storage tank and initiated action to fix the pimps. The licensee is con-tinuing their investigation of this event. This item will be placed on the operations department, and the resident inspectors' list of items requiring resolution prior to startup.
The other event concerns an unexpected dilution-of the reactor coolant system. On November 23, 1982, at about midnight, the reactor operator noted the reactor vessel water level increased approximately one foot, equivalent to approximately 1,000 gallons. Simultaneously, the boron concentration decreased between 35-105 ppm. At approximately 0230 hours0.00266 days <br />0.0639 hours <br />3.80291e-4 weeks <br />8.7515e-5 months <br /> on November 24, 1982, the licensee terminated the hydrolazing of the reactor cavity walls and a hydrostatic test of the component ccoling sys-tem, in progress at the time, in -order to detemine what was causing the level increase in the reactor vessel, and to analyze the boron concentra-tion. The lowest boron analysis was 2010 ppm; 10 ppm above the licensee's minimum administrative limit. Subsequently, the licensee added boron to increase the concentration to 2080 ppm, and detemined that a portion of the hydrolazing water was entering the reactor coolant system through the gap between the head and the reactor vessel. The head was in place, but not bolted to the vessel flange, leaving about a 3/8" gap between the tw,
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-11-The licensee's imediate corrective action was adequate. The inspectors i
questioned the licensee concerning the precautions and prerequisites established prior to the hydrolazing activity. The Station Nuclear Safety l
Committee (SNSC) had not fomally reviewed the procedure because it was
not technically required, but discussions were held concerning the hydro-L lazing by the SNSC prior to the evolution.. Subsequently, the SNSC re-r'
viewed the event and the procedure for hydrolazing. This review resulted in additional precautions and prerequisites added to the revised procedure.
The licensee's technical action in regard to this matter appeam adequate; however, the licensee did not report this event pursuant to 10.CFR 50.72, item (3) which requires that the licensee make an immediate notification to the NRC of any event that results in a nuclear power plant not being in a controlled or expected condition while operating or shut down.
It is the inspectort position that the licensee was unknowingly diluting the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and adding reactivity without the benefit
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of an approved procedure. The licensee's representative stated that they believe the reactor remained in a controlled and expected condition at all times, since the water level was being continuously monitored, and that requirements of 50.72 (3) implied a requirement for notification of more significant events than the one which took place. The licensee stated that if the concentration had decreased below the adninistrative limit, then they would have reported pursuant to 50.72 (3).
The licensee also notes that the event was reported imediately to the NRC resident inspec-tors. This matter remains unresolved pending determination by the NRC of its reportability aspects. (50-247/82-23-03)
No violations were identified.
8.
Surveillance A.
The licensee's surveillance equipment and program provides assurance that required pumps, fans, valves, and other instrumentation will perform their required functions.
The inspector's verification of the licensee's surveillance program includes:
Review of surveillance procedure for confonnance to tech-
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nical specification requirements, and verify proper licensee review / approval; Verification of test instrumentation calibration;
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Observations of portions of system removal from service.
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Confirmation that LC0's are met when operational mode re-quirements are specified; Observation of portions of the conducted surveillance test;
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service; I
Review test data for accuracy and completeness.
Independent-
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ly calculated selected test results to verify accuracy;
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Confirmation that surveillance test documentation is reviewed
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and test discrepancies are rectified;
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Verification that test results meet technical specification
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requirements; Verification that testing was done by qualified personnel;
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and, Verification that surveillance schedule for this test was met.
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The following surveillance test was witnessed:
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P PTR-5A Test Procedure for Steam Set Pressure and Leakage l
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Testing of Spring Operated Safety Valves, Revision 0, i
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September 22, 1982.
The pressurizer safety valves were tested and resat by Wyle
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Laboratories at their facilities. The inspector reviewed the
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Certification of Test Reports and verified that the refurbished
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valves opened within the limits identified in the procedure.
l The valve settings were tested hot, using saturated steam.
l Valve No. RV 464 was found to be leaking at 2236 psig.
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licensee stated that the valve will be repaired on site.
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B.
Additional Surveillance Test Verification j
t Portions of the following surveillancc tests were witnessed, by the
inspector.
The tests were:
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Scheduled in accordance with the TS, where applicable;
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Procedures were being followed,
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Testing was performed by qualified personnel;
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LCO's were met, when applicable; and, Restoration of systems was correctly accomplished.
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The tests witnessed were:
PT-RIO, Fan Cooler Unit Filtration Test, Revision 2;
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Post Accident Containment Air Vent System Filtration Test; and.
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Snubber Testing Program - The licensee completed testing of 199
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out of 252 snubbers to be tested. There were 86 failures to date,
mostly due to lockup outside Technical Specification limits. The
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licensee is replacing all failed and most snubbers which passed with new and rebuilt snubbers.
No violations were identified.
9.
Review of Monthly and Periodic Reports
During this period, the inspectors reviewed the Monthly Operating Report relating to Indian Point Unit No. 2 for the month of September, and the semi-annual effluent and waste disposal report submitted August,1982. These reports were reviewed pursuant to Technical Specifications, and verified to
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detennine that the statistics had been accurately reported, and that the narrative sumaries of the operating experiences were contained therein.
No violations were identified.
10.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to detennine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
LER 82-043/03L-0 CVCS Holdup Tank 21, damaged due to vacuum
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created through valve lineup error. The condition of the tank has r.ot been corrected; however, the procedure which led to the valve j
lineup error has been revised to prevent recurrence.
LER 82-042/03L-0 RWST level transmitter outside TS limits
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(onechannel)
LER 82-045/01T-0 Degradation of Fuel Assembly F-44
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No violations were identified.
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-14-11. Notification of Unusual Event On November 23, 1982, the licensee's security office received a threatening'
telephone call from an anonymous caller. The threat of unidentified nature was directed at Indian Point, and was to be initiated at 6:00 p.m. on the same date. The licensee declared an in-plant security alert, and an un-usual event in accordance with the site emergency plan.
The inspectors verified that appropriate contingency plans were initiated by the licensee.
The licensee terminated both the security alert and the unusual event at 7:00 p.m.
No unusual activities relating to the telephone call were observed.
12. Facility Maintenance The inspector reviewed portions of safety-related corrective and pre-ventive maintenance, and determined through observations and reviews of records that:
The maintenance activity did not violate limiting conditions for
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operation; Redundant components are operable, if required;
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I Required administrative approvals, and tagouts were obtai:.eu
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prior to initiating the work, if required; Approved procedures were being used,.where required;
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The procedures used were adequate to control the activity;
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The activities were being accomplished by qualified personnel;
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Replacement parts and materials being used are properly certified;
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Preventive Maintenance Program is functioning in accordance with
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approved procedures; Radiological controls are pr6per, and that they are being
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properly implemented; Ignition / fire prevention controls were appropriate, and were
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implemented, where required; QC hold points were observed, and provided independent verifi-
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cation of specific points, if required; and, j
Equipment was properly tested prior to return to service.
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-15-Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
Electrical Penetration Replacement - In order to provide additional pig-tails for present and future jobs, the licensee replaced 10 existing electrical penetrations with new high density penetrations. The new pene-trations were manufactured to applicable standards of IEEE 317 and 344.
Of the 10 penetrations, 6 were welded outside containment, and 4 were welded inside containment. The affected penetrations were identified as: H20. H23, H25. H27, H28, H32 H35. H40, and H46. The inspector re-
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viewed the electrical penetration replacement safety evaluation NS-2-
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82-107, Modification Package 82-15870, and a sample of associated drawings.
The inspector witnessed penetration seal leak tests.
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The inspectors conducted sample reviews of maintenance and construction packages, including steplists, maintenance procedures and drawings, and witnessed, in part, maintenance activities conducted by the licensee in the following areas:
Replacement of component cooling water pump motors for CCW pupps
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Nos. 22 and 23; Replacement of component cooling water heat exchangers;
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Replacement of containment spray pump and motor;
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Fan cooler units, installation of flow diffuser.s; and,
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Replacement of residual heat removal pump.
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No violations were identified.
13. Steam Generator Weld Examination The licensee completed an inspection program of the steam generator girth welds. The program consisted of Non-Destructive Examination (NDE)
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utilizing Ultrasonic (UT) techniques, radiography, and video tapings.
A preliminary UT examination covered 3600 of steam generator No. 23 weld and 3 feet of steam generator No. 22 weld.
Detailed UT examination covered three feet of the weld on steam generators No. 22 and 23.
Subsequent radiography of the same weld areas supported previously mapped UT indications.
Based on tie findings, the licensee concluded that all indications are reflected from the inside weld circumference, and are the result of the original as-welded fabrication process characterized by rough inside weld surfaces.
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l The NRC conducted its own NDE examination covering a sampling of the same
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l weld area coverage as the licensee. The NRC analysis of the NDE data sub-stantiated the licensee's conclusions. Details are provided in NRC Inspection Report 50-247/82-26.
No violations were identified.
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Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
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