IR 05000245/1979005
| ML19289E827 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Conte R, Cowgill C, Kister H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19289E824 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-245-79-05, 50-245-79-5, NUDOCS 7905290145 | |
| Download: ML19289E827 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I
.. gort No. 50-245/79-05 Docket No. 50-245 Category C
License No.
DPR-21 Priority
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Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Waterford, Connecticut Inspection conducted: February 27 - March 2, 1979 Inspectors:
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1A\\ 7 3 R. J. Conte, Reactor Inspector date' signed 2D S,,
3 f 4>)D C. J. Cowgjll, Reactor Inspector date signed da e si Jo bd//gned7[
Approved by:
H'. B. Kister, Dhief, Nuclear Support (date vigned Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 27 - March 2, 1979 (Report No. 50-245/79-05)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by two regional based inspectors of administrative controls for facility procedures; procedure format; technical content, approval; distribution; temporary changes to facility procedures and temporary procedures; procedure revisions resulting from Technical Specification Amendments; records of procedure changes; and liceisee action on previous inspection findings. The inspection involved 40 inspector-hours on site by two NRC regional based inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted D. Bergeron, Maintenance Engineer
- R. Herbert, Unit 1 Superintendent R. Johnson, Unit 1 Assistant Operations Supervisor R. Liskiewicz, Instrument and Control Foreman E. Mroczka, Superintendent, Station Services
- J. Opeka, Station Superintendent W. Romberg, Unit 1 Operations Supervisor Several other personnel associated with the operations, quality assurance, and administrative taffs were also interviewed.
- denotes those present at L.C. exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinos (Closed) Unresolved (245/76-23-03):
Fuel Pool System valve check-list and local control panel to be approprianaly labeled.
Revision 2, dated April 5,1978, to OP 310, Fuel Pool System, incorporates valve designators and descriptive titles to the valve lineup checklist.
Further, various controls on the local control panel (Panel No. 240) are appropriately labeled.
(Closed) Unresolved (245/78-15-01):
NRC:RI to review reportability of Transversing Incore Probe (TIP) Ball Valve failures.
The applicability of the TIP Ball Valve as a part of the Primary Containment Isolation System is discussed in a letter dated July 29, 1977, from D. Switzer to G. Lear, NRR. This letter also addresses the incorporation of these valves into proposed Technical Specifications with respect to Containment Leak Rate Testing. This area is being reviewed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and will be subsequently reviewed in conjunction with the Containment Leak Rate Testing Inspection Program.
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(Closed) Unresolved (245/78-17-02): Additional Provisions for Fill and Vent of Safety Related Systems. The licensee has reviewed this area and has detennined that procedural coverage for system venting is adequate. The inspector noted the use of temporary procedures (special procedures) for unique plant conditions requiring fill and vent lineups.
The inspector reviewed the system operating procedures for Core Spray and Reactor Shutdown Cooling.
Provisions exist for filling /
venting these systems. No items of noncompliance were identified.
(Closed) Infraction (245/78-19-01):
Failure to determine the Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR). The licensee has reviewed this area and has concluded that the cited event (one day's missed surveillance) was an isolated case. The cause of this event was operator error in utilizing the wrong computer code.
Revision 1, dated July 26, 1978, to SP 1031, Local and Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR and APLGHR) Surveillance, and Revision 23, dated January 31, 1979, to the Operation's Sur-veillance Log incorporates instructions for the operator to compare readings with previous day's readings of APLHGR to detect discrep-ancies. A review of completed data on a sampling basis did not indicate any further items of noncompliance in this area.
(Closed) Unresolved (245/78-28-01):
Audit finding to be reported by licensee in a Licensee Event Report (LER).
LER No. 78-17, dated August 21, 1978, reported the circumstances of Intermediate Range Monitor Rod Block Calibration that was not performed as required.
(Closed) Unresolved ;245/78-34-01):
Documentation of Daily Sur-veillance Log Reviews. Revision 23, dated January 31, 1979, to the Operation's Daily Surveillance Log, incorporates a review sign-off by the Shift Supervisor in this log.
Review of completed data, on a sampling basis, indicates Shift Supervisor reviews are being conducted.
(Closed) Unresolved (245/78-34-02):
Incorporation of Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Surveillance in conjunction with Reactor Relief Valve Operation.
Revision 4, dated February 10, 1979, to SP 626.2, Manual Operation of Relief Valves When Reactor is at Low Pressure, references SP 632.4, Suppression Chamber Drywell 2047 J96
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Vacuum Breaker Exercise, which is te be performed in conjunction with SP 626.2.
SP 632.4 satisfies the TS requirement to exercise the subject breakers on a release of energy to the Suppression Chamber, e.g., Relief Valve Operation.
(Closed) Infraction (245/78-34-04):
Failure to test the Standby I"asel Generator at Full Load.
Revision 3, dated August 2, 1978, to SP 668.1, Diesel Generator Operational Readiness Demonstration, and Revision 5, dated October 25, 1978, to OPS Form 668.1-1, data sheet for SP 668.1, incorporate a full load acceptance criteria for the Diesel Generator operability test.
A review of completed data for the revised surveillance test indicates no recurrent items of noncompliance.
Further, the licensee has reviewed similar surveillances to insure compliance with Technical Specifications.
No other discrepancies were identified.
The following additional areas of concern (identified during a previous inspection) were examined.
(245/78-34-05) Applicable surveillance tests did not clear'y
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require the documentation of Technical Specificatici (TS)
Surveillance Requirement (TS 4.3.B.1).
TS 4.3.B.1 requires in part the verification of control rod coupling inm p ity by nuclear instrumentation discernible response.
The licensee has cancelled SP 631.4, Control Rod Coupling Integrity and Nuclear Instrumentation Discernible Response Verification.
Revision 5, dated December 1,1978, to SP 690C, Function Subcritical Check, incorporates the requirements and documen-tation of TS 4.3.B.l. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(245/78-34-06) SP 625.4, Emergency Condensate Transfer Pump
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Oparational Readiness Test, Revision 0, August 26,1977, did not clearly specify pump discharge head acceptance criteria.
Revision 1, dated November 8,1978, to Form SF 625.4-1, which documents the data taken associated with SP 625.4, specifies pump discharge head acceptance criteria. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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3.
Administrative Controls for Facility Procedures Administrative controls were reviewed to determine the licensee's system for implementing requirements associated with the control of facility procedures as specified in Technical Specification, Section 6; Regulatory Guide 1.33-1972, Quality Assurance Program Requirements; and, ANSI N18.7-1972, Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants. Areas of emphasis were in the Established controls for format, content, review (including periodic review),
and approval of facility procedures.
The following documents were reviewed:
ACP-QA-1.04, Plant Operations Review Corrmittee, Revision 5,
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September 1,1978; ACP-QA-l.05, Site Operations Review Committee, Revision 2,
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September 13, 1978; ACP-QA-3.01, ACPS and Statior Forms, Revision 4, August 17, 1978,
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ACP-QA-3.02, Station Procedures and Forms, Revision 8, January
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5, 1979; ACP-QA-3.02A, Listing of Unit 1 Station Procedures, Revision 0,
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November 2,1978; and, ACP-QA-3.03, Document Control, Revision 8, December 1,1978.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Technical Content of Fa_cility Procedures a.
Facility procedures were reviewed tc verify that operational procedures are sufficiently detailed to accomplish plant evolutions within design characteristics and safety review considerations.
Included in this review was verification that appropriate Technical Specification Limits have been incorporated into these procedures, and that, where applicable, stepwise instructions are compatible with checklist information, and that provisions have been establisi.ed for review of completed checklists.
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Reference material for this review included applicable Piping and Instrument Diagrams, Final Safety Analyt:s Report Sections, and Technical Specification Sections.
Procedures reviewed with respect to this area are marked by asterisk (*) in the following paragraph (Procedure Approval, Format, and Distribu-tion).
b.
Dur Mg this review it was noted thJ emergency procedures, per se are not written to cover Loss of Shutdown Cooling or Loss of Service Water.
For the Loss of Shutdown Cooling, the licensee representative stated that the loss of this system is not significant based on the design of the plant, and that a large amount of time would be available to establish other techniques of decay heat removal; such as use of Isolation Condensers and Feed and Bleed.
Further, it was stated that use of these techniques are appropriately covered by system procedures.
The inspector reviewed these other system pro-cedures and applicable FSAR system descriptions and verified the licensee's statements.
During further review, the inspector determined that a loss of Serv!ce Water is a more significant event.
By design, only one header exists for this system; and if this header were lost, a plant shutdown would result either by operator action or indirect automatic actuation.
The licensee representative stated that a modification is planned to provide cross-connect capabilities for Service Water and Energency Service Water (which presently cools the Low Pressure Coolant Injection Heat Exchangers only).
Further, it was stated that upon completion of this modification (scheduled for the next refueling outage, Spring,1979), an emergency procedure would be written to cover actions upon Loss of Service Water.
This is unresolved pending completion of action as stated above and subsequent NRC:RI review (245/79-05-01).
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5.
Procedure Approval, Format, and Distribution a.
Selected procedures were reviewed to verify the following:
Procedures / procedure revisions were reviewed and approved
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in accordance with Technical Specifications; Overall procedure format is in conformance with the
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requirements of ANSI 18.7-1972, Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants; Documents, such as Vendor Manuals, used as Maintenance
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Procedures received the same level of review and approval as those maintenance procedures which reference them; and, Working file procedures including checklists and related
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forms are current with respect to revision and temporary change.
b.
The sampled procedures included:
Coerating Procedures
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OP 205, Planned Shutdown to Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown, Revision 3, August 2,1978;
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OP 206, Plant Cooldown to Cold Shutdown, Revision 2, July 26,1978; OP 302, Control Rod Drive System, Revision 8, April 20,
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1978;
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OP 334, Feedwater Coolant Injection System, Revision 3, May 6,1977; OP 309C, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System,
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Revision 4, February 3,1978;
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OP 316, Feedwater System, Revision 10, February 5,1979; 204/
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OP 333, Plant Air Systems, Revision 5, February 23, 1978;
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OP 338, Standby Diesel Generator, Revision 10, December 7,
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1978; IC 408A, Reactor Protective System, Revision 0, June 7, 1978;
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Emergency Procedures OP 503A, Loss of 345 KV Transmission, Revision 3, January
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10, 1978; OP 503B, Loss of All Station AC Powet, Revision 1, January
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10, 1978; OP 504, Recirculation System Failures, Revision 6, August
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16, 1978; Loss of Shutdown Cooling and Loss of Service Water (see
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findings in Paragraph 4.b);
Maintenance Procedures MP 703.5, Control Rod Drive Leak Test, Revision 1,
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August 2,1978; MP 716.3, Disassembly and Assembly of Feedwater Control
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Valves, Revision 1, August 2, 1978; MP 733.2, Diesel Start Air Compressors, Revision 1,
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August 2, 1978; MP 726.5, Shutdown Cooling Pump, Revision 1, August 2, 1978;
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MP 712.2, Disassembly and Reassembly of 973 Pressure Seal
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Tilting Disc Check Valve, Revision 1, August 2,1978; MP 722.1, Control Rod Drive Pump Repair, Revision 1,
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Administrative Procedures (Verification of Review and Approval Only)
ACP-QA-1.02, Organization and Responsibilities, Revision
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4, February 8,1979; and, ACP-QA-1.03, Assumption of Responsibility by Key Personnel,
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Revision 1, July 6,1978.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Temporary Changes and Temocrary Procedures a.
Selected temporary changes and temporary procedures were reviewed to verify the following:
Temporary changes did not involve a change of intent to
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the procedure;
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Temporary changes were reviewed and approved in accordance with Technical Specifications; Implementation of provisions to incoroorate temporary
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changes of a permanent nature into subsequent procedure-revisions; and, Temporary procedures were generated in accordance with
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ANSI 18.7-1972, Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants.
b.
The scope of this review included all temporary changes associated with procedures listed in the previous paragraph (Procedure Approval, Format, and Distribution) and selected temporary changes from other facility procedures.
The inspector noted that temporary procedures are termed
"special procedures" by the licensee. An index of these pro-cedures issued within the last year and selected procedures were reviewed.
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c.
During this examination it was determined that one temporary change had not been reviewed by the Unit 1 Plant Operations Review Comittee (PORC) and approved by the Unit 1 Superintendent.
This change added a precaution to OP 301, Nuclear Steam Supply System, Revision 16, September 6, 1978, concerning the operation of certain Limitorque Valves in response to an NRC Circular.
During a review of PORC Meeting Minutes it was determined that approximately 500 temporary changes had been processed within the last year. The subject change was reviewed by PORC and approved by the Unit 1 Superintendent on March 5,1979.
Based on the large number of temporary changes processed during the year, the inspector considered this an isolated case and not indicative of an administrative control problem.
The inspector stated that this area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
7.
Procedure Changes Resultino from License Amendments Technical Specification (TS)gh 58), which included Appendix A License Amendments (44 throu Changes, were reviewed to verify that applicable procedures were revised, as necessary, to reflect these changes.
Amendment 44, effective March 3,1978, incorporated FN Protection System Limiting Conditions of Operations / Surveillance Requirements and Administrative Controls into TS. The inspector verified that appropriate procedures had been approved and issued covering these surveillance requirements except for TS on fire protection barriers with an 18 month frequency.
The licensee representative stated that a procedure is being drafted and will be appioved and issued prior to the performance of the particular surveillance requirement.
The inspector considered this acceptable and stated that this area will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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8.
Records of Changes to Facility Procedures Records of procedure changes / revisions were reviewed to verify the following:
Procedure changes / revisions are being retained in accordance
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with Technical Specifications; and, Changes to procedures as described in the Final Safety Analysis
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Report (FSAR), if any, were made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(a)
and (b) requirements.
A basis for this review included the sampled procedures identified in the Approval, Format, and Distri-bution) previous paragraph (Procedure and applicable sections of the FSAR.
No procedures were identified as being described in the FSAR.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to determine acceptability or noncompliance. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is noted in paragraph 4.b.
10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph ~1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 2, 1978. The purpose, scope, and findings of the inspection were summarized.
Subsequent discussion of inspection findings occurred in a telephone conversation between Mr. R. Herbert, Unit 1 Superintendent, and Mr. R. Conte, NRC:RI, on March 5, 1979.
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