IR 05000336/1979011
| ML19225A119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1979 |
| From: | Caphton D, Foley T, Higgins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19225A115 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-336-79-11, NUDOCS 7907180445 | |
| Download: ML19225A119 (7) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR 'EGULATORY COSDIISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-336/79-11 Dockec No. 50-336 License '
DPR-65 Priority --
Category C
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Licensee:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O.
Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Millstone "'iclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Inspection at:
Waterford, Connecticut Inspection conducted:
April 10-13, 1979 Inspectors:
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'l J/ C. Hig
, Reactor Inspector date signed r fet$,$-
55/8 T. Foley, feactor Inspector date signed l
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c Approved by: /'jh/r O, b4[O')
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D. L. Cai5hWon, Chief, Nuclear Support dhte s'igned Section No.
1, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summarv:
Inspection on April 10-13, 1979 (Report No. 50-336/79-11)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors of previous inspection items, refueling operations, pipe supports and restraints, outage related maintenance and backshift operations. The inspection involved 49 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC regional based inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
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-2-DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory perscnnel were contacted.
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company J. Crockett, Engineer
- E.
Farrell, Unit 2 Superintendent L. Ferrell, SRO in Charge of Refueling D.
Flood, Engineer R. Guazza, SRO in Charge of Refueling H. Haynes, I & C Supervisor J. Heg, Operations Assistant J. Kelley, Operations Supervisor
- J. Opeka, Station Superintendent S. Scace, Engineering Supervisor R. Spurr, Supervising Control Operator R.
Stratman, Engineer W. Strong, Refueling Coodinator, Operations S. Sudigala, Acting Reactor Engineer NRC
- J. Shedlosky, Resident Reactor Inspector The inspector also talked with and interviewed severa) other licensee employees during the inspection.
They included reactor operators, health physics technicians, maintenance and quality control personnel.
- Denotes those who attended the exit interview.
2.
Previous Inspection Item Update (0 pen) Unresolved Item (336/77-08-04):
The licensee has completed an engineering analysis and determined tb-t the maximum thermal displacement rate for one length of Steam Generator (S/G) piping exceeds the existing snubber lockup rate.
This condition could have imposed an unevaluated stress on the S/G pipe.
The licensee is presently evaluating the most severe stress that could have been imposed on the piping.
The licensee's representative stated that this evaluation and any required actions will be completed fli)
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-3-prior to plant startt.p.
ine licensee is also resetting the snubber lockup rate to greater than the maximum rate of thermal growth of the S/G piping.
This item remains onen.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (336/77-31-04):
This item was also reviewed in inspection 336/79-05.
The licensee's representative stated that snubber piston settings will be verified in conjunction with Te.hni-cal Specification snubber visual incpections, but that an 18-r: nth frequency would be used vice the sliding scale dependent on t >e number of inoperable snubbers identified during the last inspection.
This item will receive further NRC review and remains open.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (336/77-31-05).
The licensee completed the seismic reanalysis of the new fuel elevator, determined that modifications were required and performed these modifications under Job Order 2-148-79 at the start of the current refueling outage.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (336/79-05-01):
The licensee issued Change 1 to Procedure No. 2209A, " Refueling Operations." This change adds the requirement to verify designated prerequisites and initial conditions any time that refueling operations are suspended and requirements for refueling are relaxed.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (336/79-05-02):
During fuel movement, with containment integrity required, entry and exit from containment is through the parsonnel airlock with only one door opened at any given time.
In the event of an evacuation of containment, the licensee's representative has determined that normal egress would be maintained and only one airlock door opened at a time.
The inspector had no further questions.
This item is closed.
3.
Refueling Operations a.
Pre-Fuel Handling Activities The inspector determined by direct observation and record review, that the follc.iing pre-fuel handling activities had been completed:
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(1)
Technical Specification requirements; (2)
Refueling equipment operation; (3)
Radiation monitor surveillance; (4) Source range surveillance; X)b
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(5)
Boron concentration; and, (6) Ventilation requirements.
b.
Fuel Handling Activities The inspector verified by direct observation and record review that fuel handling activicies were being conducted in accordtace with approved procedures and Technical Specification require-ments.
Items inspected included:
(1) Core monitoring during refueling was as required; (2)
Boron ccncentration was as specified (y_1720 ppm);
(3) Fuel insertion and removal was conducted in accordance wi procedures; (4) Fuel accountability was in accordance with licensee procedures; (3) Refueling area housekeeping was satisfactory; (6) Refueling crew and control room scaffing met licensee requirements; (7) A Senior Reactor Operator with no other concurrent duties directly supervised all fuel handling; (8) Vessel water level was proper; (9) Comnunications, as required, were maintained between refueling operators and the control room; (10) Containment integrity was established per Technical Specifications; (11) Shutdown cooling flow was maintained > 3000 gpm; and (12) Backshift refuel 4ng operaticas were satisfactory.
With the exception of the below items, the inspector had no further questions on the refueling.
c.
Source Range High Startup Rate Trips During 1978, the licensee completed a plant design change which removed the source range high startup rate (SUR)
347 026
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-5-trip alarmc, pre-trip alarms and control element assembly (CEA) withdrawal prohibits.
The annunciator module for the high SUR trip was not removed; nor was the high SUR trig %
bypass-relay, which actuated and was annunciated at 10 power decreasing and 15% power increasing.
The presence of the above annunciators could create uncertainty as to the actual status of the high SUR trip function.
The licensee's representative stated that he would initiate action to correct the inconsistencies 'a the annunciator panels by removing all reference to the previously deleted
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high SUR trips.
The item will receive further inspector review and for followup is designated as Item No. (336/79-11-01).
4.
Maintenance a.
Pressurizer Samole Valve The inspector reviewed the licensee's outage related maintenance work lists and selected Job order 2-252-79 for f urther review and wir.nessing.
This Job Order was to perform necessary repairs to the valve seat J plug <* the contain-ment isolation valve (2-RC-002) in t.
pressurizer liquid space sample line.
The inspector witnesced portions of the valve repair and noted that:
- Housekeeping and cleanliness were as specified;
- A Quality Control inspector was present;
- Maintenance was being performed by qualified persoanel;
- Radiological practices were in accordance with the Radiological Work Permit issued for the job;
- The system was tagged out prior to the work commencing; and
- Post maintenance inspection and testing were specified.
No items of noncompliance were identified in this review.
b.
Local Leak Rata Test (LLRT) Results The inspector revieued the results of the current LLRT program with licensee personnel. The inspector noted that several valves had sufficiently high leakage that results 347 027
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-6-were unable to be quantified with t'.e licensee's equipment.
These valves should be the subject of 30-day licensee event report since the maximum leakage limit of 0.60 La was appar-ently exceeded.
In o-der to facilitate accurate reporting and to meet the intent of Paragraph III.C.1 of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50, some detemination of each valve's pre-repair leak rate should be made.
Further, when one of two series valves fails, special attention should be given to measuring the leak rate of the second valve to determine whether containment integrity existed or not.
The licensee's representative acknowledged these comments and stated that procedures would be revised to insure accurate leakage measurement and reportir.g in the future.
This item wi'l receive further inspector review and is designated for followup as Item No. (336/79-11-02).
5.
Pipe Support and, Restraint Surveillance a.
Functional Testing of Snubbers The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's technical specification related functional testing of snubbers and witnessed the functional testing of several other snubbers after rebuilding and changing the seals to ethylene propylene (E/P).
The inspector noted that the snubber test machine had calibrated gauges, was properly adjusted for each snubber and that the functional test procedure was followed.
The inspector also noted that the lockup and bleed rates of the ten snubbers selected for functional testing fell within the acceptance criteria of the functional test procedure.
The licensee is involved in a program to replace all snubber seals with E/P seal material.
According to the existing schedule, all snubber seals inside of containment will be of the E/P type by the completion of the current outage.
The inspector had no further questions at this time.
b.
Observatior.
The inspector toured the auxiliary building, turbine building and containment building to inspect a random sample of snubbers, fixed pipe supports and component support structures at ambient temperature.
Visual examination verified that interference due to thermal expansion would not occur, that cold settings of selected snubbers and hangers conformed with design drawings or indicated reference set point identi-fied on the componc.nt.
The inspector noted some minor 0, m c.29 3 /i /_
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-7-deterioration of the rod wiper seal on a few snubbers, however, there was no evidence of fluid leakage.
Several snubbers' cold setroints had changed from the original recorded setpoint. All charges were in a conservative direction. One snubber on the LPSI system appeared to be installed improperly, however, further investigation revealed that this snubber had recently been rebuilt and the installation was still in progress.
The liceneee's repre-sentative acknowledged the above conditions.
The inspector had no further questions at this time.
6.
Control Room Manning 10 CFR 50.54(k) requires that an operator or senior operator be present at the controls at all times during the operation of the facility. The licensee's administrative procedure whicii implements this requirement (ACP 6.01) defines the controls as generally the front pan 31 area and included appropriate sketches.
The procedure also defines operation of the facility to be Modes 1 and 2.
For Modes 3 through 6 (the various shutdown modes), the operator is required to be in the control room but not necessarily at the controls.
This interpretation of operation of the facility will receive further NRC review and is designated as unresolved Iten No. (336/79-11-03).
7.
Unresolved Items Items about which more information is required to determine acceptaoility are considered unresolved.
Paragraph 6 of this report contains an unresolved item.
8.
Exit Interview At the inspection's end, the inspectors held a meeting (see Detail 1 for attendees) to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
The unresolved item was identified,
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