IR 05000244/1997007
| ML17264A918 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17264A917 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-97-07, 50-244-97-7, NUDOCS 9706170004 | |
| Download: ML17264A918 (42) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I
. Docket No:
License No:
50-244 DPR-18 Report No:
50-244/97-07 Licensee:
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RGRE)
Facility:
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Location:
1503 Lake Road Ontario, New York 14519 Dates:
April 14 - May 1, 1997 Inspector:
J. M. D'Antonio, Operations Engineer Approved by:
G. Meyer, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety 970hi70004 9706'i0 PDR ADQCK 05000244
Executive Summar One inspector conducted a two week inspection of the conversion from the current Technical Specifications (CTS) to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS).
This inspection was performed using NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/130, Improved Standard Technical Specification Implementation Audits.
The purpose of the inspection was to verify that requirements moved from technical specifications were in fact relocated to, appropriately controlled documents, that new programs and procedures were generated as required, and that the applicable controls were used for subsequent changes to relocated requirements.
~oeratione The facility did a generally good job of accomplishing the technical specification (TS)
conversion.
Although some requirements were relocated to locations other than those identified in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report, all requirements were accounted for.
New, programs and procedures had been developed as necessary, and changes were appropriately controlled.
QA audits of the conversion process were thorough and effective.
Some discrepancies were noted, resulting in the following open items:
The CTS for emergency plan radiation monitors did not specify which channels were covered.
All channels appeared to be addressed by other specifications.
Ginna should determine which channels this specification applied to and verify ITS surveillance frequencies are appropriate. (97-07-01)
The requirement for an operable boration flowpath was deleted in Revision 1 to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The inspector questioned the conclusion in the facility safety evaluation that the consequences of a dilution accident were not increased.
The facility position was that inability to borate would not increase the consequences of dilution and the FSAR states that operators would have sufficient time to halt a dilution prior to criticality; the inspector's position was that inability to borate resulted in inability to correct the dilution. The NRC willfurther evaluate this issue.
(97-07-02)
The inspector noted instances where new procedures or procedure changes had been generated without corrections to other procedures affected by these changes.
In addition, the inspector reviewed one safety evaluation for a TRM change (concerning refueling interlocks) which did not appear to address all relevant reasons for these interlocks in the FSAR. This open item is to ensure all appropriate technical consideration factors and procedures are addressed when making document changes or developing new procedures.
(97-07-03)
Re ort Details
Operations Procedures and Documentation 03.1 Verification of Relocated Re uirements
~Sco e
Attachment 1 is a facility generated list of CTS requirements relocated to other supporting documents.
The inspector reviewed the line items identified in the "NRC verified" column of Attachment 1, and verified the item had been relocated.
For the majority of these items, the inspector also verified that all components of the original specification were accounted for between the ITS and/or other documents to which requirements were relocated.
An example of this is ECCS (emergency core cooling system) pu'mp requirements, where the requirement for pump operability is retained in the ITS, but the surveillance frequency is relocated to the inservice testing (IST) program and the test acceptance criteria are relocated to the individual surveillance procedures.
b.
Observations and Findin s The majority of the relocated items were in the locations identified in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
In a few instances, the facility had placed requirements in "original relocation" controlled locations other than the specific document indicated in the SER.
Requirements from the CTS were appropriately carried over to the new ITS or supporting documents.
Discrepancies noted are as follows:
- CTS 3.1.2.3 - "Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Rates" were accounted for in operations procedures 01.1 and 02.2 rather than the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) as assumed in the SER.
This relocation was acceptable, however, these procedures state administrative limits only, and refer to ITS 4.3.3 for engineering limits. ITS 4.3.3 only addressed reactor coolant system (RCS)
heatup and cooldown rates.
The inspector noted that these engineering limits are stated in facility precaution, limitation and setpoint (PLS) documents; the facility determined during this inspection that the PLS document would be the final location for the former CTS "hard" numbers of 100 deg/hr heatup and 200 deg/hr cooldown, The inspector considered this acceptable.
- CTS 4.1-1 Functional Unit 28 - "Emergency Plan Radiation Instruments" was indicated as being relocated to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).
However, the facility was unable to identify specifically which instruments this referred to, and all radiation accident and effluent monitoring instrument channels are addressed in other CTS specifications which have been relocated to the ODCM, The specific discrepancy that needed resolution was that the CTS for these unspecified emergency plan instruments required monthly channel and functional
checks; some of the channels which may have been addressed by this CTS have quarterly checks in accordance with the individual channel CTS transferred to the ODCM. (IFI 97-07-01)
- CTS 4.11.2.2 - RHR pump testing in Mode 6 - this requirement was replaced by a new simpler requirement SR 3.9.5.2.
This was reflected in plant procedure 0-6.11 but not in the IST program as indicated in the conversion submittal.
C.
Conclusions The CTS to ITS conversion was accomplished as approved by the SER except for the indicated discrepancies.
Permissible changes from the SER approved location of some requirements had been made.
03,2 Review of New Pro rams ao
~Sco e
The inspector reviewed the following new programs for adequacy and compliance with the content specified in Section 5.0 of the Improved Technical Specifications:
ITS 5.5.3 ITS 5.5.5 ITS 5.5.13 ITS 5.5.14 Post Accident Sampling Program Component Cyclic or Transient Limit Program Technical Specidications Bases Control Program Safety Function Detemination Program b.
Observations and Findin s b.1 ITS 5.5.3 - Post Accident Sam lin Pro ram This specification requires a program to ensure the capability to obtain required samples under accident conditions.
Required program elements are training of
'personnel, procedures for sampling and analysis, and provisions for maintenance of equipment.
The program is implemented through CHA-PASP, Post Accident Sampling Program and CHA-PASS, Overall Guidelines for the Post Accident Sampling System.
The inspector reviewed these procedures and verified the procedures addressed the required areas.
The inspector also verified that the sampling procedures referenced by these administrative procedures existed; however, a discrepancy was noted in that these governing procedures had not been updated to reflect the actual titles of the in-use sampling and analysis procedures.
The inspector also reviewed documentation of on-the-job training for post accident sampling and noted that only 2 of 8 technicians had completed all training; however, the remainder were scheduled to complete this training one sample at a time as they cycled through their shift b.2 ITS 5.5.5 - Com onent C clic or Transient Limit Pro ram This specification requires a program to track RCS cyclic and transient occurrences specified in the FSAR.
The facility implemented this program through new procedure RE-50.1, Transient Monitoring Program.
Historical data for transients prior to this program had been compiled from log reviews with a 10% reduction in cyclic limits as a conservative means of accounting for any missed historical transients.
The inspector verified that the procedure tracks the transients identified in the FSAR as required by the ITS.- Other cyclic events are tracked as well.
b.3 ITS 5.5.13 - Technical S ecifications Bases Control Pro ram This specification requires a program providing appropriate controls for changes to the ITS bases.
The facility program was implemented through P-LPC-2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and Associated Documents Control.
This procedure also addressed the TRM and Core Operating LimitsReport (COLR).
This procedure specified a safety review to evaluate proposed changes for determining if a full safety evaluation is needed, and meets the criteria of the technical specification.
The inspector reviewed several examples including the changes associated with Revision 1 to the TRM, and found them in compliance with this procedure.
The inspector also verified that the 10CFR50.71 annual submittal of changes to technical specification bases had been submitted.
The inspector noted a potential problem in that the originator of the change to a document is responsible for determining what procedures, if any, are affected and for the preparation of any associated 50.59 review.
The preparer is not necessarily knowledgeable of the full range of 'procedures and requirements, and may not consider all applicable, procedures or requirements.
Discrepancies noted:
- The TRM was changed to delete the requirement for an operable Mode 5 and 6 boron injection flowpath.
The basis for this change was that this would not
'increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of a dilution event since the FSAR states that adequate time exists for the operators to recognize and terminate an inadvertent dilution prior to criticality. However, the inspector was concerned that the 50.59 evaluation was incorrect in that such a change removed the ability to mitigate the consequences of the dilution. '(Ol-97-07-02)
- Although mode 5/6 boron injection flowpath surveillance requirements were deleted from the TRM, they were still required in 06.13, Daily Surveillance Log.
- The TRM was changed to eliminate a requirement for operable refueling interlocks, replacing it with administrative controls should an interlock become inoperable.
This change was ultimately acceptable because there was no original commitment in the conversion submittal to adopt this limiting condition for operation (LCO),
which did not exist in the CTS.
However, the safety evaluation for this change referred to the acceptability of administrative controls for safe movement of heavy loads, but did not evaluate FSAR and the CTS bases crediting these interlocks for
safety of refueling activities.
These interlocks are for the prevention of damage to the fuel assembly being moved, not safety of personnel or equipment beneath the load, and fuel movement without these interlocks would be considered operation outside the conditions assumed in the FSAR.
In response to these comments, the facility stated they would develop further guidance concerning these interlocks.
- Credit was taken for the location of pressurizer heatup and cooldown limits in operations procedures, but the procedures referenced did not addre'ss the "hard" limits in the CTS, only administrative limits. The licensing reviewer had apparently accepted the operations department statement that these procedures contained the CTS limits but was not aware of the PLS document, which did have the engineering limits limits.
The issue of ensuring all affected procedures are addressed and all potential technical factors considered when developing new procedures or procedure changes is an open item (97-07-03).
The inspector concluded that the facility process for review of new procedures and changes should include additional reviews if the change addresses areas beyond the change proposer's expertise.
The facility acknowledged the inspector's concern.
b.4 ITS 5.5.14 - Safet Function Determination Pro ram This specification requires a program to evaluate whether or not a safety function assumed in the accident analyses is lost due to the inoperability of systems supporting operability of safety systems.
The facility program is implemented through the following three procedures:
A-52.3 A-52.4 A-52.12 Safety Function Determination Program Control of Limiting Conditions for Operating Equipment Inoperability of Equipment Important to Safety These three procedures together attempt to go beyond the requirements of ITS 5.5.14 and 3.06, because they require the evaluation of the impact of non TS support systems on TS equipment; ITS 5.5.14 only refers to support equipment which itself has a TS LCO. Although it is good that the facility has considered this possibility, none of these procedures addressed just how a shift operator is to evaluate the operability of TS equipment with non-operable non-TS support equipment.
The facilty stated that shift personnel have been trained to generate an adverse condition report for engineering evaluation in such circumstances, but no such guidance was provided in these procedures.
One requirement these procedures did not meet was ITS 5.5.14 pp1.c, "Provisions to ensure that an inoperable support system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities" ~
In response to this comment, the facility generated an Action Report 97-0603 to address this ommission in procedure A-52.3. The rewrite was commenced during this inspectio C.
Conclusions The facility had done a generally good job in developing new programs which met the requirements of the ITS sections requiring them.
03.3 Review of Chan es to Relocated Re uirements a e
~Sco e
During the verification of relocated requirements, the inspector noted that location and content of some of these items had been changed subsequent to the original conversion and relocation.
The inspector reviewed these changes and the adequacy of controls used.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspector reviewed 15 changes and found the changes to have been acceptably performed with the following minor discrepancies:
- Surveillance acceptance criteria for Sl (safety injection) pumps were changed from the minimum 1356 psig discharge pressure specified in the original TS to a minimum of 1336 psid differential pressure for the required action range in the IST surveillance.
This change was appropriately evaluated by a 50.59 review which calculated that minimum flows required by the COLR would be met or exceeded for all conditions.
The inspector noted that although the data sheet had been changed, the procedure still stated the original values in the test requirements section.
The facility agreed to correct this error.
- Surveillance acceptance criteria for RHR pumps was changed from the minimum 140 psig discharge pressure specified in the original TS to a minimum of 134 psid for the required action range of the IST surveillance.
This change was appropriately evaluated by a 50.59 review. The inspector noted that although the data sheet had
'been changed, the procedure still stated the original values in the test requirements section.
The facility agreed to correct this error.
c.
Conclusions Changes to relocated requirements were appropriately accomplished in accordance with the applicable controls.
03.4 Verification of New or Modified Surveillances
~Sco e
The inspector reviewed the SER, selected 2-3 new or modified surveillance criteria in each ITS section, and verified that survellances had either been generated or modified to address these criteri b.
Observations and Findin s Based on the following reviews, the inspector found no errors or overlooked requirements.
-SR 3.1.4.4:
The minimum acceptable T-ave for rod drop testing has been changed to 540 deg F; RSSP-7.0 Control Rod Drop Test has been appropriately modified.
-SR 3.1.6:
Requirements for verifying rod bank positions within limits were changed; appropriate modifications were made to 01.2, Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load and 06.13, Daily. Surveillance Log.
-ITS 3.1,2,3; 3.1.8 Changed requirements for moderator temperature coefficient measurement and T-ave verification for physics test exceptions; appropriate changes had been made to PT-34, Startup Physics Test Program and PT-34.2, Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement.
-SR 3 4.9.2:
Pressurizer Heater Capacity,'was checked in 06.11, Surveillance Requirement/Routine Operations Check Sheet.
-SR 3.4.11.2:
Cycle PORVs was performed in PT-2.6.5, RCS Overpressure Protection System PORV Operability Verification.
-SR 3.5.1:
ECCS valve position verifications were in 06.13 Daily Surveillance Log.
-SR 3.5.2:
ECCS valve position verifications were in S30.1 Sl Valves and Breaker Position Verification and S30.2 RHR Valves and Breaker Position Verification.
-SR 3.6.2.1,2:
New requirements for containment personnel airlock and equipment hatch interlocks, seals, and leakrate testing are addressed in PT22.1,2,3,4
1 1.2
'-SR 3.6.2,3:
Containment isolation valves inside 5 outside containment requirements were in PTT-23A Containment Isolation Valve Test Connection Boundary Control.
-SR 3.6.3.6:
Containment isolation valves response to an ESF signal is verified in RSSP-2.1 Sl Functional Test.
-SR 3.6.7:
H2 Recombiners functonal test - new test requirement was originally met with two changes to the operating procedure; final test procedure had not been written at the time of this inspection.
-SR 3.7.8.2,3:
Additional SW verifications were performed in S-30.8, Service Water System Valve Position Verification.
-SR 3.7.7.1:
Additional CCW verifications were performed in S.30.7, Component Cooling Water Flow Path Verificatio SR 3.9.4.1,5.1:
Verification of RHR in service with refueling cavity level above or below 23'ere performed in 015.1, Administrative Requirements for Reactor Head Lift, Core Component Movement, and Periodic Status Checks.
-3.9.5.2:
Breaker alignments were performed in 06.11,.Surveillance Requirement/Routine Operations Check Sheet.
C.
Conclusions The facility had done a god job of ensuring that surveilances have been generated or modified as necessary to accommodate new or changed requirements.
The inspector found no overlooked requirements.
Quality Assurance in Operations a 0
~Sco e
The inspector reviewed a facility audit of ITS implementation completed in March 1996 and reviewed preliminary findings from a second audit completed the week prior to this inspection.
b.
Observations and Findin s The facility audits were performed using the guidance of NRC Tl 2515/130 and appeared quite thorough.
Discrepancies from these audits were being addressed, including findings from the most recent audit, although the report had not yet been issued.
C.
Conclusions The facility had performed thorough QA audits of the ITS conversion, which were effective in identifying discrepancies and allowed the inspector to reduce the
'amount of time spent looking at selected areas.
X1 Exit IVleetlng An exit meeting was held on May 1, 1997.
The inspector discussed the inspection findings and stated that the facility had done a generally good job of accomplishing the ITS conversion.
The following new open items were discussed:
IFI 97-07-01: The CTS for emergency plan radiation monitors did not specify which channels were covered.
All channels appeared to be addressed by other specifications.
Ginna should determine which channels this specification applied to and verify ITS surveillance frequencies are appropriat IFI 97-07-02: The requirement for an operable boration flowpath was deleted in revision one of the Technical equirements Manual (TRM). The inspector questioned the conclusion in the facility safety evaluation that the consequences of a dilution accident were not increased.
The facility position was that inability to borate would not increase the degree of dilution and the FSAR states that operators would have sufficient time to halt a dilution; the inspector's position was that inability to borate resulted in inability to correct the dilution. The NRC willfurther evaluate this issue.
IFI 97-07-03: During the inspection, the inspector noted instances where new procedures or procedure changes had been generated without corrections to other procedures affected by these changes.
In addition, the inspector reviewed one safety evaluation for a TRM change (concerning refueling interlocks)
which did not appear to address all relevant reasons for these interlocks in the FSAR. This open item is to ensure all appropriate technical considerations factors and procedures are addressed when making document changes or developing new procedures.
The facility concurred with the findings.
Facility personnel present at exit:
Terry White Richard Marchionda George Wrobel
.Joseph Widay Gregg Joss John Traynor Peter Bramford Don Filion Tom Harding Mark Flaherty Manager Operations Superintendent Production Manager Nuclear Safety 5 Licensing Plant Manager IST/ISI Coordinator Senior QA Analyst Reactor Engineer Radiochemist Licensing Engineer Licensing Engineer
Attachment I - Relocation Table
TABLE 1 ITEMS RELOCATED TO CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)
(Changes controlled by ITS 5.6.5 and 10 CFR 50.59'"
ITEM
¹"'0.iii 20.v 20.xxiii 20.xxxv 20.xxxiii CTS ¹ 3.10.1.1, Figure 3.10-2 3.10.1.3, Figure 3-10.1 3.10.2.2 3.10.2.10a 3.10.2.8 DESCRIPTION Shutdown Margin Limits Control Bank Limits F,(Z) and F" Limits AFD Target Band AFD Target Band ACTUALLOCATION COLR Figure
COLR Figure 2 COLR Sections 2.5 and 2.6 and Figure 3 COLR Section 2.7 and Figure 4 COLR Section 2.7 NRC VERIFIED April, 1997
TABLE2 ITEMS RELOCATED TO UFSAR"'Changes controlled by:
(a) 10 CFR 50.54 or (b) 10 CFR 50.59)
CTS ¹ Table 3.5-1 Table 3.5-2 Table 3.5-4, Notes Table 3.5-4, Notes Table 3.5-3 5.1 5.2.1 & 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.3.1.a & 5.3.1.c DESCRIPTION Various Instrumentation Operational Details Various Instrumentation Operational Details ESFAS Instrumentation Design ESFAS Instrumentation Design Various Instrumentation Operational Details Site
.Reactor Containment Penetrations Containment Design Features Miscellaneous Reactor Core Design Features CHANGE CONTROL (a)
(a)
(b)
(b)
(a)
(b)
(b)
(b)
(b)
ACTUALLOCATION UFSAR Table 7.2-1 UFSAR Table 7.2-1 UFSAR Sections 6.2.4.4.9, 7.3.2.2.2, and 10.5.3.1.3 UFSAR Sections 6.2.4.4.9, 7.3.2.2.2, and 10.5.3.1.3 UFSAR Table 7.5-1 UFSAR Section 2.1.2 Figure '2.1-2 UFSAR Section 3.8.1 and 6.2 UFSAR Section 3.8.1 and 6.2 Multiple UFSAR Sections'"
NRC VERIFIED April, 1997
5.3.2 5.4.3 5.5 CTS ¹ DESCRIPTION RCS Design Features SFP Region I Decay Time Limit Waste Treatment Systems CHANGE CONTROL (b)
(b)
(b)
ACTUALLOCATION UFSAR Section 5.2.1,
'Table 3.2-1 Table 9.3-10 Table 9.3-11 UFSAR Section 9.1.2.7 UFSAR Chapter
NRC VERIFIED 6.1.1 5 6.2.1 6.4 6.9.1.1 Management Titles Training Startup Report (a)(b)
(a)(b)
(b)
UFSAR Chapter 13, QA Program UFSAR Section 13.2, QA Program UFSAR Section 4.1.4 April, 1997
TABLE3 ITEMS RELOCATED TO IST PROGRAM (Changes controlled by Specification 5.5.8 and 10 CFR 50.55a(f))
CTS ¹ Table 4.1-2, ¹7 DESCRIPTION Pressurizer Safety Valve Testing Frequency ACTUALLOCATION'"
IST Program, Attach B, page 37 NRC VERIFIED Table 4.1-2, ¹12 Fire Protection Pump Information TRM 4.2 ISI/IST Program Information IST Program Sections 1 and 4 4.5.2.1 4.5.2.2.c CS, Sl & RHR Pump Head Limits IST Program, Attach A Accumulator Check Valve Testing IST Program, Attach B, page 51 4.8.1 & 4.8.2 4.8.3 4.8.4 4.8.5 4.8.6 4.1 1.2.2 AFW Pump Tests AFW Valve Tests SAFW Pump Tests SAFW Valve Tests AFW & SAFW Tests RHR Pump Testing in MODE 6 IST Program, Attach A IST Program, Attach B, page 6 IST Program, Attach A IST Program, Attach B, pages 12, 13, and 15 IST Program Sections 5 and 6 IST Program, Attach A April, 1997
TABLE4 ITEMS RELOCATED TO ISI PROGRAM (Changes controlled by 10 CFR 50.55atg))
CTS ¹ 3.13 4.2.1 4.14 DESCRIPTION Snubbers ISI/IST Program Information Snubber Surveillance Program ACTUALLOCATION ISI Program, Section 9 ISI Program, Section
ISI Program, Section 9 NRC VERIFIED April, 1997
TABLE 5 ITEMS RELOCATED TO ODCM (Changes Controlled by Specification 5.5.1)
CTS ¹ 3.5.4 8c Table 3.5-6 3.5.5 5 Table 3.5-5 3.9.1
~ 1 3.9.1.2 5. 3.9.2 4 3.9.1.3 3.9.2.1 DESCRIPTION Radiation Accident Monitoring Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Liquid Effluents Concentration Liquid Effluents Dose Liquid Waste Treatment Gaseous Wastes Dose Rate ACTUALLOCATION, ODCM ODCM, CHA-EGSTRM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM NRC VERIFIED 3.9.2.3 Gaseous Waste Treatment 3.9.2.2.a, 3.9.2.2.c, 3.9.2.4 Gaseous Wastes Dose 3.9.2.2.b, 3.9.2.2.c, 3.9.2A Gaseous Waste Dose ODCM ODCM ODCM 3.9.2:7 3.16.1 5 Table 3.16-1 3.16.2 3.16.3 Table 4.1-1, ¹18, 28, 29 Solid Radioactive Waste Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Land Use Census Interlaboratory Comparison Program Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM April, 1997
CTS ¹ 4.1.4 &. Table 4.1-5 4.10.1 5. Table 4.10-1 4.10.2 4.10.3 4.12.1.1 5. Table 4.12-1 4.12.1.2 4.12.2.1 5 Table 4.12-2 4.12.2.2 4.12.3 4.13 6.9.1.3, 6.9.1 4, Table 6.9-1 5 Table 6.9-2 DESCRIPTION Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Surveillance Requirements Radiological Environmental Monitoring Land Use Census Interlaboratory Comparison Program Liquid Effluents Concentration Liquid Effluents Dose Gaseous Wastes Release Rate Gaseous Wastes Dose Waste Decay Tanks Radioactive Material Source Leakage Tests Administrative Control Reports ACTUALLOCATION ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM ODCM NRC VERIFIED Y
April, 1997
TABLE 6 ITEMS RELOCATED TO PLANT PROCEDURES (Changes controlled by 10 CFR 50.59"')
ITEM
¹"'8.ii 18.v 18.vii 3.8.1.b 3.8.1.f 3.8.1.c CTS ¹ DESCRIPTION Radiation Levels in Containment Control Room and Manipulator Crane Communications Containment Audible Flux Monitor ACTUALLOCATION 0-15.1, Step 5.4.3 0-15.1, Step 5.9.3 0-15.1, Step 5.3.4 NRC VERIFIED 28.ii.n 28.v.b 31.I 31.II 32.U 33.v 33.x Table 4.1-2, ¹18 Table 4.1-5, Note 5 4.4.4 4.4.3 4.5.2.3 4.6.1.e.1 4.6.2.c Secondary Coolant Samples CHANNEL CALIBRATIONand National Bureau of Standards Containment Tendon Surveillance Recirculation Heat Removal Systems Air Filtration Systems Diesel Inspections Battery Test Trending CHA-SAMP-SG-LEAKAGE, Step 5.3.2 CHA-RETS-ODCM, Table 111-3, Note 4 PT-27.2 PT-39, PT-4, PT-4.1 A-1040 A-1105 PT-11, Electrical PM Analyst Review 38.i, 38.ii 4.11.1.1 Spent Fuel Pool Charcoal Adsorber System A-1040 46.i 5.3.1.a Reporting Requirements for Rod Filler Material UFSAR 4.2.4.3 April, 1997
57.iii 65,i 6.17 CTS ¹ DESCRIPTION Monthly Operating Report Content Major Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems ACTUALLOCATION A-25. 6 Reg. Guide 1.16 CHA-RETS-ODCM,Section IV.A.4 NRC VERIFIED April, 1997
TABLE 7 ITEMS RELOCATED TO PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR)
(Changes Controlled by ITS 6.6.6)
ITEM
¹"'.v 3.1.1.1.k CTS ¹ DESCRIPTION LTOP Enable Temperature ACTUALLOCATION PTLR Section 2.2 NRC VERIFIED 7.I 7.v 25.ii 3.1.2.1.a, Figure 3.1.1 5 Figure 3.1-2 3.1.2.3 3.15.1 RCS Heatup and Cooldown Curves Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Rates LTOP Setpoints PTLR Section 2.1, Figures 1 and
Procedure 0.1.1, Step 4.2 and Attachment 2 PTLR Section 2.3 April, 1997
TABLE 8 ITEMS RELOCATED TO TECHNICALREQUIREMENTS MANUAL(TRM)
(Changes Controlled by 10 CFR 50.59'")
CTS ¹ 3.1.1.4 5 3.1.1.6 3.1.6 and Table 4.1-2, ¹1
'and ¹2 3.2.1
&. 3.2.1.1 3.2.2 5 3.2.4 3.2.3 5 Table 3.2-1 Table 3.5-1, ¹17 Table 3.5-2 3.5.6.1 3.7.2.1.b.2, 3.7.2.2.a 5 3.7.2.2.b 3.10.4.3.2.b.iii 5 Table 3.10-1 3.11.2 3.1 1.3, 3.1 1.5 DESCRIPTION Reactor Vessel Head Vents RCS Chemistry CVCS In MODES 5 and 6 CVCS above MODE 5 CVCS Boron Concentration Circulating Water Flood Protection SAFW Pumps Control Room Toxic Gas Monitors Second Offsite Power Source Misaligned Rod Accident Analysis Evaluation Fuel Movement Requirements in Aux Bldg Fuel Movement Requirements in Aux Bldg ACTUALLOCATION TR 3.4.1
~
TR 3.4.2 TR 3.1.2 TR 3.1.1 TR 3.1
~ 1 TR 3.3.2 LCO Table 3.3.2-1, Function ¹6.a TR 3.3.1 TR 3.8.1 TR 3.1.3 TR 3.9.2 TR 3.9.2 NRC VERIFIED April, 1997
3.11.4 CTS ¹ DESCRIPTION Fuel Movement Requirements. in Aux Bldg ACTUALLOCATION TR 3.9.2 NRC VERIFIED 3.12.1 Table 4.1-1, ¹34 5 35 Moveable Incore Instrumentation Control Room Toxic Gas Monitors TR 3.3.3 TR 3.3.1 Table 4.1-1, ¹14, 16 &. 19 CVCS Surveillances TR 3.1.1. and TR 3.1.2 Table 4.1-2, ¹10 Table 4.1-2, ¹19 Table 4.1-2, ¹4 4.3.5.6 4.6.1.e.3(b)
5.4.3 6.7.1.b 6.7.1.c 6.7.1.d 6.8.1.e 6.16 Fuel Movement Requirements in Aux Bldg Circulating Water Flood Protection CVCS Surveillances Reactor Vessel Head Vent DG Sequence Time Limits SFP Tornado Related Requirements Safety LimitViolation Response Safety Limit Violation Response Safety Limit Violation Response Process Control Program Process Control Program TR 3.9.2 TR 3.3.2 TR 3.1.1 and TR 3:1.2 TR 3.4.1 TR 3.8.2 TR 3.9.1 TR 2.0 TR 2.0 TR 2.0 CHA-RETS-ODCM,Section IV.A.5 CHA-RETS-ODCM,Section IV.A.5 April, 1997
TABLE 9 ITEMS RELOCATED TO TECHNICALSPECIFICATION BASES (Changes controlled by ITS 5.5.13)
ITEM
¹"'.iv 13.XII 16.v None 32.VIII N/A CTS ¹ 2.3.3.1, 2.3.3.2, and Figure 2.3-1 3.3.1.1.h 5 4.3.3.3 3.3.1.7 3.3.1.8 3.6.5 3.11.1 4.6.2.f 4.6.3.a.3 DESCRIPTION LSSS Voltage Settings PIV Listing Sl Pump Listing Sl Pump Listing Mini-purge valves opening restrictions Aux Building Ventilation Component Listing Battery degradation definition Tie Breaker Listing ACTUALLOCATION SR 3.3 4.2 LCO 3.4.14, Applicable Safety Analyses Bases Bases for SR 3 4.12.1, 3.4.12.2, and 3.4.12.3 Bases for SR 3.4.12.1, 3 4.12.2, and 3.4.1 2.3 Bases for SR 3.6.3.1 LCO 3.7.10, LCO Bases Bases for SR 3.8.4.3 LCO 3.8.9, LCO Bases NRC VERIFIED April, 1997
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