IR 05000244/1995016
| ML17264A198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1995 |
| From: | Dantonio J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17264A197 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-95-16, NUDOCS 9510230216 | |
| Download: ML17264A198 (9) | |
Text
Qe U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
DOCKET/REPORT NO:
LICENSEE:
FACILITY:
DATES:
INSPECTORS:
50-244/95-16 Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Rochester, N. Y. 14649-0001 Ginna Nuclear Generating Station September 18-22, 1995 J. O'Antonio, Operations Engineer K. Kolaczyk, Operations Engineer LEAD INSPECTOR:
J.
'Antonio, Operations Engineer Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety
'C> -/3-4~ ~
Date APPROVED BY:
nn W. Meyer, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Date 9510230216 951016
'PDR ADOCK 05000244
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Two inspectors evaluated the licensed operator requalification program in accordance with IP 71001.
Included in this evaluation were observations of the operating examinations administered to one staff crew and one operating crew.
~0erations Exam material quality was generally good and met or exceeded Examiners'tandard criteria.
Two crews were observed.
All members of both crews passed all aspects of the examinations.
The crews were observed in a total of six simulator scenarios.
The crews made several errors in board operation, interpretation, and EOP usage.
The board operation errors were corrected by other crew members.
In one scenario, failure to ensure a ruptured steam generator (SG) remained isolated following SI reset contributed to lifting a relief on that SG.
This oversight was corrected.
The EOP usage errors did not prevent the crew from taking appropriate action to mitigate scenario'vents.
Overall crew performance was acceptable.
Facility evaluation of crew performance was acceptable.
The inspectors concurred with facility overall results, but attached more significance to the EOP usage error than did the facility evaluators.
The administration of the requalification program was good.
Recordkeeping and tracking of various training inputs and feedback sources were excellent.
Ginna uses one unique approach to obtaining training feedback and assessing-training needs by the use of a training post-event evaluation process.
After
.an actual plant event, Training prepares a questionnaire and interviews the operators involved to evaluate the event for any training implications.
This is done in addition to any other station post-event review process.
The inspectors considered this to demonstrate a good, proactive approach on the part of the Training Department to provide meaningful and effective training.
DETAILS 1.0 INSPECTION SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES An announced inspection of the Ginna licensed operator requalification program was conducted from September 18-22 1995, using NRC Inspection Procedure 71001.
Inspection activities included evaluation of the annual operating and written examination administered to one operating and one staff crew, review of program documents and records, and interviews with operators and instructors.
The inspection objectives were to ensure that the licensed operator requalification program adequately trains and evaluates the operators to.
ensure safe plant operation."
2.0 REVIEW OF EXAM MATERIAL 2. 1, Exam Development The examination was developed based on a sampling plan indicating the lessons taught grouped by major area.
A percentage of the examination devoted to an area is then based on total lesson time in the given area.
The sample plan does not list KA or lesson objectives for the listed questions; this information is available in the facility's question bank database'.
The inspectors spot checked to verify linkage between the questions and the lessons.
2.2 Written Examination The written examination consisted of 45 multiple-choice questions; no static simulator section was used.
The overall technical level of the examination was good, with questions at the appropriate comprehension level.
The exam tested a wide range of plant knowledge including the operators'amiliarities with recent plant modifications such as the digital feedwater system.
The inspectors concluded the written exam was an appropriate evaluation tool.
2.3 Simulator Scenarios The inspectors verified that the examination scenarios and sets met or exceeded the Examiners'tandard criteria.
The overall technical difficulty of the scenario sets was good.
A total of three simulator scenarios were planned for the examination, "with all three run on the operating crew and two for the staff crew.
One scenario seemed of minimal difficulty in that the post-EOP entry failures were simple failures of automatic actions; however, this was made a set with more involved scenarios.
One scenario planned for both crews involved a seismic. event that ruptured and partially drained the refueling water storage tank (RWST).
This scenario did not run properly in that the RWST failure went below the intended level.
As a result, this scenario was not run for the staff crew.
The substitute scenario the facility then used was the third scenario for the first crew, which been run for validation by an instructor on the staff crew two months previously.
The inspectors questioned.the validity of using this scenario for his examination.
The facility then selected a sixth scenario,
thus running a total of three scenarios on the staff crew.
The instructor had also validated this scenario; however, this had been 10 months ago and the scenario had been modified.
This was acceptable to the inspectors.
2.4 Job Performance Measures Six job performance measures (JPH)s were used in the examinations.
The tasks selected were appropriate.
The JPHs contained clear performance standards and were relevant to the job tasks of the operators, The JPH exam bank is large and consists of over 200 JPH exam items.
Overall, the inspectors concluded the JPHS were an acceptable evaluation tool to measure the proficiency of the operators.
3.0 CREW PERFORMANCE/FACILITY EVALUATION Overall operator performance was acceptable.
Both crews passed all sections
'f their examinations.
During simulator scenarios, individuals on both crews made board operation errors.
Although these errors were noted and corrected by other crew members, the total number of errors was more than is routinely seen during scenarios.
The crews were also very quiet in their communications.
The facility had as a self-identified weakness the need to improve crew briefings.
It has been the inspector's'bservations that more vocal personnel are a great aid in keeping other crew members informed of status by virtue of the fact that all personnel can keep track of what is happening in real time, rather than having to wait for briefings; this need for improving briefings is common at plants where crews don't speak up.
During one scenario, the intended event was a seismic event resulting in rupture of the RWST.
Due to a simulator problem, the level in the RWST went below 15X, the 1'evel at which the operators are required to secure all pumps taking suction from the RWST.
The originally-intended procedure flowpath was E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," to E-l, "LOCA," to ES-1.3,
"Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation," to ECA-1.2,
"LOCA Outside Containment," to ECA-l. 1
"Loss of Recirculation."
This was still the correct flowpath despite the simulator problem.
However, in this case, the SRO looked at ES-1.3, stated,
" I see no reason to enter this procedure,"
and returned to E-1.
In addition, actions outside the EOP were taken in an attempt to provide a suction source for the ECCS pumps.
The crew was ultimately sent to the endpoint procedure ECA-l. 1 by a transition in E-1.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures and considered the facility decision to pass this crew to be correct based on the fact that all necessary actions were taken to get water in the core.
In fact, the simulator problem placed this scenario outside the EOP bases.
The EOPs are written assuming that if the RWST is empty the water is either in the containment or spilled by a LOCA outside containment with the
'RWST intact.
Required actions are to'attempt to isolate the leak and makeup to the RWST.
The RWST being ruptured at a level below the minimum for ECCS pump suction is not a situation that can be remedied by RWST makeup, and the fact that the crew took action in addition to that in the EOP, specifically to makeup to the boric acid storage tanks as a suction source, was commendabl However, the inspectors considered the crew's decision not to follow the EOP transitions as specified in the applicable procedures to indicate a lack of knowledge that these transitions as indicated would have gotten the crew to the ECA-l. I procedure.
The inspectors observed JPMs performed by two licensed operators.
The JPMs were properly administered by the Ginna training staff and were properly performed by both operators.
The operators demonstrated particularly good exam performance during the JPMs, requesting necessary clarifications and procedures, clearly identifying components to be operated, and clearly simulating the actions taken with these components.
'I Facility ev'aluation of the crews was acceptable, but the inspectors have the following comments:
The facility appeared somewhat reluctant to explicitly criticize the crews.
In post-scenario critiques, facility evaluators preferred to present errors as
"good teamwork" because they were caught, rather than as mistakes by the people who made them.
However, no errors were overlooked.
In the ruptured RWST scenario, the critical task was to execute the specified procedure flowpath.
This was not done.
Nonetheless, all evaluators marked off this critical task as accomplished.
The fact that the SRO decided to disregard two EOPs was only mentioned in passing by one evaluator as a minor concern to be mentioned to the SROs.
In discussion with the inspectors the facility stated that the actual intent of this critical task was to get water to the core, and the fact that the scenario did not run as intended altered the details of that task.
The inspectors agreed, but expressed the concern that the original critical task should have been identified as missed, followed by an evaluation of whether the originally identified task was still critical in the scenario as run.
This explicit evaluation was not done, and the facility did not appear to consider the decision to disregard the EOP flowpath as'he same degree of error the inspectors did:
4.0 PROGRAM CONTENT/FEEDBACK 4.1 Pt ogram Development The requalification program consists of a core with additional material as approved by a Training Program Curriculum Committee, which meets at least quarterly.
The inspectors verified that plant and industry events that were received from NRC or third-party correspondence were reviewed and incorporated into the Ginna training program.
During this inspection, lessons were being prepared incorporating an NRC information notice concerning inappropriate bypassing of safeguards and a fire at the Fermi station.
The training program introduced operators to upcoming revisions in the emergency action level event classification tables and the planned implementation of improved technical specifications.
The inspector attended a training class that was held after
the examination.
This training class provided an overview of the revised technical specifications.
The instructor was knowledgeable of the subject matter, and the course was appropriate in form and content.
Operators stated that they enjoyed the flexibilitythat was built into the weekly training program, which allowed a shift crew to review items of. which concerned them.
In conclusion, operators were generally pleased with the quality of the classroom training they received.
Feedback from students was actively solicited by the Training Department staff to improve the training program.
Student feedback forks were tracked by the Training Department, and replies were given to student comments when possible.
The Ginna training staff utilized two unique methods to improve the training program.
One method was a formal "training work request" program.
Any identified training needs or modifications are tracked through this system.
The other method was a Training Department-initiated event evaluation.
If an actual event occurred at the plant, members of the Training Department would interview operators and perform an independent review of the transient to determine if the operator's level of training had a positive or negative affect on the outcome of the event.
This assessment is performed in addition to any other event assessment the facility may perform.
The inspectors reviewed post-event training assessments concerning a loss of instrument air on June 7;
1995, and a loss of an off-site power circuit on June 30, 1995, and determined the reports provided a valuable assessment of the effectiveness of the training program.
4.2 Use of Individual Plant Examination Results The inspectors reviewed the Ginna individual plant examination (IPE) to ascertain how the results of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) that was performed as part of the IPE was factored into the operator license training program.
Licensed operators and training instructors were also interviewed by the inspectors to determine their knowledge of the IPE results.
The Ginna IPE listed a loss of instrument air or and a steam generator tube rupture as the dominant initiating events that resulted in core damage.
The inspectors verified that the Ginna Training Department had operator training scenarios that covered the IPE risk-significant initiating events and subsequent accident scenarios.
JPHs had been developed to train operators on contingency plans that were outlined in the IPE as being important from a risk-reduction perspective.
However, the IPE results were not used as a bases to increase or decrease the amount of training that operators received on a
particular system or event sequence during the requalification cycle.
Additionally, operators and training instructors were not familiar with the results of the IPE and did not appear to recognize'ow the PRA results could be used to improve reactor plant operation and safety.
The Ginna Training Manager indicated that the results of the Ginna IPE were not disseminated to operators during this training period or potentially used to modify the training material since it is being revised.
Once the results are finalized, the Training Manager indicated that the results of the IPE may be factored into future training cycle. 0 REHEDIATION The inspectors reviewed facility remediation practices for failed quizzes or examinations and consi'dered them appropriate.
In the event of a failed weekly quiz, remediation (usually self-study)
has been on the grade received, after which the following week's quiz is the makeup.
Failure of an annual exam is evaluated by a license review board.
The inspectors reviewed a 1994 simulator failure in which the crew failed due to misinterpr'etation of SI termination criteria in ECA-3.3.
Completion of license review board requirements was documented, and an appropriate retest scenario administered.
6.0 MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT Management was effectively involved in training development and evaluation.
The Operations Manager or a representative observes all evaluated scenarios run on operations crews and participates as an evaluator.
If pass/fail questions arise concerning crew performance, the final decision belongs to the Operations Manager.
He is also a member of the Training Program Curriculum Committee, which approves program content.
7.0 EXIT MEETING An exit meeting was conducted on September 22, 1995.
The inspectors reviewed the inspection results, which were acknowledged by facility management in attendance.
Personnel present are noted below.
Richard Harchi onda Gary Meier Robert Carroll Jane Neis Frank Haciuska Terry White Superintendent of Production Manager of Nuclear Training Department Manager Operations
& Technical Training Supervisor of Technical Training Supervisor of Operations Training Operations Manager