IR 05000244/1995019
| ML17264A326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1996 |
| From: | Keimig R, David Silk NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17264A325 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-95-19, NUDOCS 9602020093 | |
| Download: ML17264A326 (13) | |
Text
'
DOCKET/REPORT:
LICENSEE'ACILITY:
INSPECTION DATES'NSPECTORS:
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-244/95-19 Rochester Gas and Electric Company (RGKE)
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station Ontario, New York December 5-7, 1995 D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist F. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist J.
Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist N. McNamara, Emergency Preparedness Specialist L. Eckert, Radiation Specialist L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley R. Fernandes, Resident Inspector, J.
A. FitzPatrick
D. Silk, Sr.
Emergency Preparedness Spec.
Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety at APPROVED BY:
Richard
. Keimig, C
'
Emerg cy Preparedne s and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safet~
Date SCOPE:
Announced inspection of the biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise.
RESULTS:
Overall, the licensee's performance was very good.
There were good intra-and inter-emergency response facility (ERF) communications.
The licensee demonstrated good command and control at all of the ERFs.
The licensee correctly classified and declared the simulated events in a timely manner, using the new NUMARC emergency action levels.
Notifications to the off-site agencies were completed within 15 minutes.
Operations personnel in the simulator control room were accurate in their assessment of plant conditions and took appropriate mitigating actions to protect the health and safety of the public.
Control and coordination of the in-plant repair teams was done well at the operations support center.
At the emergency operations facility, personnel correctly performed dose assessment and projection calculations.
The protective action recommendations were timely and appropriate for the simulated conditions.
The emergency operation facility 9602020093 960i26 PDR ADOCK 05000244
staff kept off-site agency representatives well informed of plant status and radiological conditions during the exercise.
The licensee s post-exercise critique was appropriately self-critical in that it identified most of the items that the NRC inspection team noted, in addition to several others.
However, following the exercise in discussions between the inspectors and the NRC Emergency Response Team members, it was determined tha: discrepancies exist in documents and procedures concerning the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System reading that corresponds to the top of the fuel in the core.
Recent changes to emergency plan implementing procedures were reviewed in the Region I office prior to the on-site inspection and were found to be acceptabl DETAILS 1.0 PERSONS CONTACTED Ro"hester Gas and Electric
T. Alexander, Manager, Nuclear Assurance
R. Carroll, Manager, Operations and Technical Training
+*
F. Cordaro, Onsite Emergency Planner
G. Graus, Manager, Electrical Engineering
A. Harhay, Manager, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- J. Hotchkiss, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance
H. Lilley, Manager, guality Assurance
T. Marlow, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Services
R. Hecredy, Vice President Nuclear Operations
+*
F. Orienter, Radiation Safety Communication Coordinator
T. Plantz, Manager, Maintenance Systems
+*
P. Polfleit, Corporate Nuclear Emergency Planner
T. Powell, Risk Management
R. Smith, Senior Vice President, Customer Operations
- J.
Wayland, Manager, Systems Engineering
+
Denotes attendance at the December 5,
1995 Entrance Meeting.
- Denotes attendance at the December 7,
1995 Exit Heeting.
2.0 SCENARIO PULNNING The exercise objectives and scenario were submitted to the NRC in a timely manner and were reviewed by the NRC prior to the exercise.
The scenario was determined to test the major portions of the emergency plan (E-Plan)
and implementing procedures (EPIPs)
adequately.
On December 5,
1995, the NRC inspection team attended a licensee briefing concerning the scenario.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities, as necessary, to ensure that exercise objectives were met and to prevent adverse impact upon operation of the plant.
3.0 ACTIVITIES OBSERVED The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation of the emergency response facilities (ERFs)
and the actions of the emergency response organization (ERO) staff.
The following activities were observed:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
Selection and use of procedures.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
Direction and coordination of emergency response.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
Communications/information flow and record keeping.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses.
Issuance of protective action recommendations (PARs).
Provisions for in-plant radiation protectio I.
Provisions for communicating information to the public.
J.
Accident analysis and mitigation.
K.
Post-exercise critique by the 'licensee.
4.0 EXERCISE-FIISING ClASSIFICATIONS Inspection findings are classified, where appropriate, as follows:
Exercise Stre th:
a strong, positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the E-Plan.
Exercise Weakness:
less than effective E-Plan implementation that did not, alone, constitute an overall response inadequacy.
5.0 SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM (SCR)
The unusual event (UE) and alert classifications were correct and timely.
Event notifications to state/local officials and the NRC were also timely.
The shift supervisor announced to the SCR crew that he had assumed the position of emergency coordinator (EC) when he declared the UE.
He likewise announced to the crew when he had turned over EC responsibilities to the technical support center (TSC) director.
He demonstrated good command and control by directing mitigation efforts, coordinating communications with the TSC, and briefing the crew on plant status.
The SCR crew demonstrated good teamwork in their mitigation efforts.
Communications were formal and repeatbacks were used extensively.
The crew'
operations supervisor remained in telephone communication with the TSC via a headset, which provided for very timely and accurate exchanges of information with that facility.
The inspector also noted that the use of procedures was very good throughout the exercise.
Overall, the SCR crew's response was very good.
No particular exercise strengths or weaknesses were observed.
6.0 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)
Senior TSC managers, including the operations assessment manager, the TSC director, and the technical assessment manager were in place shortly after the unusual event declaration and assisted the SCR crew as needed.
The TSC was fully staffed and activated within 4D minutes of the alert declaration, well within the 60 minutes allowed.
The TSC director demonstrated good command and control throughout the exercise.
The transition of EC duties from the shift supervisor in the SCR to the TSC director, and later from the TSC director to the recovery manager, went smoothly.
The TSC director/EC made a prompt and correct declaration of the site area emergency (SAE).
The TSC director/EC held timely periodic meetings with the TSC assessment managers throughout the exercise.
At these
meetings plant conditions, trends, and mitigation strategies were effectively discussed.
Recovery actions and preparations for shift turnover were also di cussed.
However, the frequency and content of TSC director/EC briefings for the entire TSC staff declined mid-way through the exercise.
The performance of the TSC staff was good.
The inspectors observed frequent habitability checks of the TSC and the OSC during the exercise.
The TSC staff continually assessed plant conditions and kept the TSC director/EC well informed.
Notifications of the SAE were made promptly.
Performance by the Dose Assessment Manager (DAH) was noteworthy.
The DAH canceled a planned containment entry when the event classification escalated to an alert because changing conditions could have made the ALARA briefings invalid.
The DAM also quickly recognized that simulated dose rates from containment radiation monitors R-29 and 30 were increasing and gave the TSC director/EC timely notice that conditions were approaching the criteria for declaring the SAE.
There was good communication about plant conditions between the SCR and the TSC staffs.
Computer displays of plant conditions in the TSC were easy to use.
The ability to hold video conferences between the emergency operations facility (EOF)
and TSC staffs appeared to enhance communications between the two facilities.
Problems were experienced when several of the NRC's Federal Telephone System network telephones in the TSC were found to be out of service, but this condition was compensated for by using commercial telephone lines.
The performance in the TSC was very good overall.
No particular strengths or weaknesses were identified.
7.0 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)
The performance of OSC personnel was good.
The Plant Maintenance Assessment Manager (PMAH) was in place shortly after the alert declaration.
The PHAH frequently discussed priorities and repair strategies with the TSC staff.
Overall, emergency work teams were well controlled.
The briefings by the PHAM and TSC radiation protection staff were informative and pertinent.
The emergency work teams were dispatched in an expeditious manner and maintained good communications with personnel in the OSC.
The PHAH and TSC radiation protection staff remained cognizant of plant status and continually monitored the appropriateness of radiation protection requirements for each emergency work team.
One emergency work team was directed to wear air-supplied respiratory protection equipment.
The TSC radiation protection staff member who provided the health physics briefing questioned each emergency work team member as to whether their respirator qualifications were current.
One of the emergency work team members stated that his qualifications were not current and this particular individual was subsequently removed from the emergency work team.
The TSC radiation protection staff member providing the briefing noted that some emergency work team members had beards and directed that they should be clean shaven prior to donning their respiratory protection equipment.
The
g;fp P() j,'tpf},r,g'jf((l bing pb>lcI>>f ar>OJ g jp<<!ew ff<r fr< <<i% '+,g.~
igg 'tr{f"sjSO}rasIss"<v} bjjs tssrtss gwsvrgsgj}
.bs
>tq. }b v
7!. I~.'l. f'
')C<1: V<<r(}>et}ev" s r}~
'-.<Z<1S.IN
's<
w ro -'I (itic. {(IS}f().Af'
<:I} L1',s} ",Of;j;<<r1S1 >~is;!"
>Pl'
>(.A!J;: ',
P.
Fk>i{tf!+AT..<<.VZPP.
?BH j'ttl'c.'CT 96$'o 93Ablfrfo'rX!>" Hr<T
.~<,I (}Aa(,VVsi9'+r <l. C}ac J
{)is<a, I< f CI rat+'I Q Zaj( 'ai>il \\ \\I'(
~ kr<
rl A:rliQf(R s
~
- '
')i. '4r<(,'.I,.t';l,'Jpk Z(}Or'",j!1".,OA +f;}",fpbAZZ-- Zs ir'l tg>(f"'/(fop P%?I ((,Ob&ff{I',,9N RJ{7 offf ~Q ~~ffj WC h-'~ j0{SR;IC P C(I>ra > <{!.>03,.{lj4$1(o~off zs: {.'%3} "oprAsH +As(,.aao.aI} Aaro, . .'.'$?T"-gp,fdpc>p;!JZaGI~O ~i'l9VO 9AJ f(8(4V 'r"(PA& XA.'tfltnr {.'I'ri(13 ".BP, .rp+g fq+~~fe~qr'jyg(Ij OO .sVS II thr!{(O.I ZAO}r.efj>r(rt z st<i j'v(<f>>(t:I "a() <v'Oy f'sav}}'}I"f ss?og hcej'IS It>I<}<ra gp gj'tll!yrfeevt)r}r>>> ai C iq f ~ <!1 I'~/~'.44,z}lp~'i3,'! frf(ao>9'i:}Ar 999M Of'IAG ><<E 9 z~o j>AO"..J 1<<~.",jgj7:.'";,"",f,"pAjAsof(tqssf'Aalfjbt{o~ 's(I" e:tf{o{; ()pe fq 4vod." fioj,:fJ>aj fAUlfffo" bor f) z(l}rf O'{OrlT .Ir ol)i}i,'t(hi(L<'vreGIA 'ko Ng<< fp I'<<4 l<<i h'} tsy + rrrr!.'}}If!<:lifC". j{}.w (I i""I>:., (<3t> <<7->'>'.'r>, ' <e",!r.
a rj(IN I I<fr'
i~if}MI)0(tk. Yhjz(o j'If}{}!ss~"f{s'w.Ilcfl cl{}"f(I
. I!Cs f'f-(';?IGNI f<(v<'+4'p st.~g1j.pftl}+Ai 2: (folio&r I i )l'{Nl"',Jff ff>97?St ~
c>vf{odos'. f 9T if>J.P(q"'6" fgj'PA9{lMSJD ar}S'Oit(LA{}aajrf: j'JJd teorYf3P
"
.zoArt'b9j jr A bf 9'fOJJ zoazo<A<Asovl
~ <
Sjt fCNS>f tofcps>
r>>>ht>t ars<rCI>S)r. l+~
{}al 6 9'f9'e'I 'f3<c>os"{ff;f (<isis r r ar Cil, ~ <tire<(IN<
r}ae ~ I
<r>7
<IJ &}}Z
'{OI)RffO'res'fsgg
~ e.'If bAS RM O>rl5 AOOmfed ZAOj~:.jbAOO. <nGI'
1<O<} i,> ra
~ ~ < ~ <O y <ptsl i {maire w<<alj ( e ar}}sr'ra'<<ac
'r<S1 ~ ~ ~<re>><<$ <
ii({V (arW"N <IS, I(carr %ra
> rtic ~ <iver>r} Il 1rrrirlt<ca rr >>>".rit fla {QfIj<<$
C ){If/ ajrl+
t'O ' p>>. hite}}v>~ "1!1$'.a<,r }<<C'Iw!I!I }air}
o Ij,flpIj Or(
O t bf}I}<re'y r}<<icfm Z'I'tr lae.I<}(f~
Ble(>ZI(lsr'
~.r f {s f J'fhn}(1}{,.I f}AIfPfl 'f,g
<<r(
~.
I I I Sr< ~
fA&i!05"ij b'av'f s(zdo 2".(N!
of(OP
(l".'!IJB:, "I'az>4 g.
-"n -", l.
'onAS!O S
t)pI'OhASO IDIO orlT
~,1,'rfiqOl.h..rh 9?S}s>J&l} J"(9 f6 fcg S
brtstc I
>1,".I<>}J.'}'pi;fsjj, I g}$.
r I, a
aas
<I<a< ~
s(li
~ >e>> Bs>I>
2!3>I( ar>1 fN<
~ t<j}rs)sI
<r }f Q(l I(IS r>}rt>>
+N!S}tv<<rr '}Nr,j, I rWa>> lf'>>
If ilt(!(all JNI}>>O.EN<9'fr{} 't'.~r O(l I OVNO t'Asa
.30K -jtl.j Ij(fj{S[geS~ ~of f' {9t."c~:s!S~j'(fir'(.
/nhPO1 Cr>/TVJ5 'FPP(}g{P
'SLCQ<T T+{S;%<Jh NN ftf INNT
$ <<,~>>
~ ~ I',
hq,<<
<<<<6 Iarv r rr,>>i fc'q5r
~ t v err qv , N(v av lj'S i '
Irr>
'
l>1<t ~
I>v'll g<rr'
~ ~ J I,>I j<> rv'ag j} I ~ I
'i(iI
'graf(I'If{esp 4~p. pi>f'ff'}}'"'Of'2 O<r>>"{( >fr
? I f},'(St({N) 5&<pgf'.f}.'>t,
'r ar Is v<<s<g a'era<Sr
~ '< I f I>st r P I vr '
Sr
~ '2'< +! I >,<
<Z (>>Ilevltfi < l II
'
~ i jr I
~
(, f, }$>t f{'r,"f<'i~pQl! VJ
.S f~'t 21IS;I:j rl"{Ol}l'<,,aj}grl'f< <1'~
I I a>>(/SING
}9ecr9<iI(lOICI>%';->>OM f (ri~a AOi
>OZO"f(J f1{I(.frljbr(,I;.T ?}Af}
vp~f;~<6pgyi..inc> Zif bs> ~~FGP.fb 9"IOI".'.",<6&,i '.O'A'tf Sir}A4I'I'(Cs'>!'9
.<<.',I,,,J,,-,JiX $P; A:
f.'AAI'Izfo{1 r 9 js" zn{)t:iG>. ((!(v(i-" b(jo>'}
.. c {J {IS (cat<i(IZ>>J>a 'lo
.'f(tel.'}II 0f'r{IOi b&I{f G((J,J"j}
'e (I'>.'tit i(Of'.IS9${.-'tfl
~~9(
v(
I~~f j} f I{p+,Ic fr}"',tl ff;)(+,<<;br>",'g a at./Age - '{t:.I.{1j~<,',
a ~ 0<
~
I I I
I r
~
.fr<>"i&i JI'{08 i(thHrat Si > OII 2 fak, I
<,,11 !
I aire(a:I I'rc}id IsJ
.{Io'3"-M>139b "Is}JB ~nflj 'fofig 'y'
I r>i g r; ~ '~
I;,f')f ?O;-'!g g'I " Q.<' 'IIIf I
rfaa gf jy
<>>a e!pr"i
< rs}t
~t')rlI
~ rsjaf 1 aw <<f f<)'rpi e 'r! Iza I
, Zli, f I"sir{(P ts<(I csctf!
<s'l r { cQ Ir<'s4'c Or!&fr'IMA; I;.PI{1<<l}!:j}j X >f(IS>'a'}I r fltgi <<>> 1>>iia~i-
>'>.1 I>,
W~SC<
l til>'-
"f v" 1
"
crt~<
.'.sii a '"fll s'..Ja'l>:;f;3 li+) ll}fl fardlg
'9 l { III>ef('fi(O)
> if!'I'I r>(t
~ 0 fa 4!<vis 1 jr< dpty{O Ii
~{ jrftwgrfarrso rl rjD arsp'(
'Il i tf}gj<1
~i.{rp'w Iffle fi(i~;flf;,(Ggc!,cl;r bOP PO"f, b age (PS I} ~
A"ZO~~ "/.}(JOp"{O,f ~Ail
~(,<.-(ej <t.." tlgp<, hh;".hjj I
>IN> p>>f'S:lief 1!z<rr{w yg r.
~q I{K~~~> 'N1$~
.f? -.{c<'-tl: fjp 2 f~ f6{)d b9 l5 >?
z!<<"1>Ã9>
frii3}
I> f'z(y its}0",y, ~%"-'>'"+'if~;fo{J".5?'Afz ?J'M ffUbf'ii
"l'if'lU:>-t'fi".."'1"'<r(:r'i
~I '!".EJp~ic'pi
.f ".t~ f q'IrNTZS - ~
."; j:-I'II I
. b'boa(p
>II ff g>> }(l(<log p}G,gg lr>N,<
<>Oar}gf> ', I er JQ."n-I.",~~-.;.".'if:h", ".,'~>",'}A}SI{"OQOt
'f>Zf fg (>OU6'l=
>"=+I "I yg(ltS",v,"{<ate c jlsl, f,.(t}J;l as{ fq lsii( t}r"
~ }J<Z> -Xr "i
~ I>1W
}t I"}1. III '>r ~'t..
I:ti'~(~5
>0
'
'v. -.%~ ~ {
C c.">$
R4!5.fi 8"i I'IJ "I}t(:.'"I&l} J'{v(<3'IJcs f I' Jib}
ev<ts Ia>
'> Iad>r
'( J l rgb 1~}vK
"IH v vr!a+ ( - '<<Sr}'i~Oat}I'.I4 gl'a'a(~~.
C e%
f<S
~ rii
< +
~ r
+ 4'<
,'v:
Irv r. 1<
I rv<c><Q<Tf
>.<<is{vs ~ r l><
~,", f<".Zj."ti>ll'}g f(g I l 'I rji.'{It I}'ZO1>.<1';
e
'1
'8 laa inspectors verified that the qualification of each emergency work team member was current for the type of respiratory protection equipment that had been used.
The licensee noted during their critique that more easily retrievable respiratory protection qualification records should be evaluated.
The status of emergency work teams was readily apparent.
A status board was maintained in the TSC that indicated the team, the task assigned to each team, the individuals assigned, and the task completion status.
Overall, OSC personnel performance was assessed as good.
No particular strengths or weaknesses were noted.
8.0 ENERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
8.1 Command and Control Overall, the performance of the EOF staff was good.
The EOF was promptly staffed and activated.
EOF personnel maintained good communications with the TSC regarding plant status.
Prompt updates to status boards generally occurred except for one brief period.
The recovery manager conducted hourly briefings with the other managers and offsite agencies.
Although the EOF was congested at times, the general noise level was low and did-not distract personnel from their duties.
Protective action recommendations (PARs) were made in a timely manner.
Direct communications with the offsite agencies was done well.
Written documentation/information was disseminated throughout the EOF in a timely manner.
Some minor discrepancies
" re noted by the inspectors.
These included:
more frequent briefings (EOF announcements)
about plant conditions and planned actions could have been conducted to keep EOF personnel more aware of current situations; information on completion of accountability was somewhat slow in getting disseminated to the EOF staff; use of the results of the post accident sampling and monitoring for redefining reactor conditions and the emergency classification was not readily apparent; and the initial general emergency (GE) notification form (Part I) was determined by the licensee to be incorrect in that it stated a release was in progress when in fact there was not.
A correction to the initial Part I was subsequently sent out 26 minutes after the original declaration of the GE.
The discrepancies noted above did not detract from the ability of the EOF personnel to perform their function.
Overall, the EOF functioned well and was found to be well equipped and organized.
No particular strengths or weaknesses were identifi'ed.
8.2 Oose Assessment and Projection The dose assessment team arrived shortly after the declaration of the alert and began to go through their checklist and place the EOF dose assessment area in oper ation.
The DAN immediately directed one of the dose assessment personnel to obtain weather information and perform "what if" calculations to bound the possible scenarios for the plume and dose projections.
r a
a
gjp779a 9488. 7.9./AD~~'f6'
i/9',t",,pjv4gp~gi;g'8/0~
>8+<) i 0<~<jigigpvrigq, Q ftgQ /fpjg $ gp)fl 1
~d(Vp'i)h8r.
~i(Erg/".(<gag>
p<.!
mpter~~(..yap,c.XV~
I S'f Spg jC4gtj Ri~,~iqhpla!?
g,~ dg
~p 5
~ @~lpga'Jpp+ ftfl,'tg
,
.~i: >" f.t (~Q [E I.
p
~
w. +5)
<w atter:>'V> Ai nwpqren+rr r ~A(
ggtT
- >n'-4n.'-~A ggtT
~ j I>vt 4V %1' ~" t f>I\\ .un'"q.ijg~qq, )igggq fy'j~'.p i~>'p>e .r>r,'9." grip> I 'l
Field monitoring data was supplied by three teams - one licensee team that monitored the area within 5 miles of the plant, and 2 county teams (one from Mayre and one from Monroe) that monitored the area from five to ten miles from the plant.
The licensee's field team coordinator immediately contacted the Mayne and Monroe County dose assessment personnel to determine if the counties'ield monitoring teams were directed to their primary survey routes and to ensure there would be an exchange of field monitoring team information among the dose assessment teams for evaluation.
There were good exchanges of field monitoring data between the counties and the licensee.
The DAM continued to monitor plant parameters throughout the exercise and noted the changes in radiation levels in the containment as the simulated event progressed into a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
The DAN was quick to notice the loss of effluent radiation monitors when power was lost to electrical Bus 16.
He immediately informed the dose assessment personnel'that they would have to use field monitoring team data to perform dose projections.
The dose assessment personnel immediately performed calculations based on the field monitoring team data to determine source term and performed the necessary dose projections correctly.
The DAM was very proactive in keeping the NRC, State of New York, Mayne and Honroe County EOF representatives informed of the plant status, meteorological conditions, dose projections, and PARs.
The DAM worked closely with.the recovery manager to formulate the PARs for the general emergency declaration and as plant conditions worsened.
Overall, dose assessment activities were performed in an effective manner.
9.0 JOINT NEWS CENTER (JNC) The inspectors observed the layout, equipment, and activities in the JNC.
The facilities were conducive to conveying information to the public effectively.
Briefings by licensee personnel were generally good.
The licensee's technical liaison did a good job of explaining plant conditions and systems in a manner that was understandable to the public.
The licensee implemented a good initiative by having an individual provide brief messages in the Spanish language for the Hispanic population in the Rochester, New York area.
The inspector reviewed press releases by the licensee and assessed them as. timely, accurate, and understandable.
Overall, the licensee's performance in the JNC was good.
No particular strengths or weaknesses were identified.
10.0 LICENSEE CRITIQUE On December 7, 1995, the NRC inspection team attended the licensee's exercise critique.
The critique included most of the items observed by the NRC inspection team, as well as others.
An emergency response team from NRC Region I was dispatched to the plant and participated in the exercise.
The licensee identified a delay in granting access to NRC participants at the EOF as an area requiring further attention.
The licensee stated an intention to resolve this and other issues identified during the critique.
Overall, the team assessed the licensee's critique as goo.0 REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INDICATION SYSTEH (RVLIS) DISCREPANCIES During the exercise, emergency response personnel from NRC Region I participated along with their licensee counterparts.
After a simulated LOCA occurred, NRC team members asked the licensee personnel in the EOF about what percentage of RVLIS corresponded to the top of the fuel in the core.
This question was asked to determine if the fuel was still covered by coolant.
NRC personnel received conflicting answers.
The uncertainty about whether or not the fuel was covered caused NRC personnel to encourage the licensee to expand the PAR in case of further cladding and/or fuel damage if the fuel was uncovered.
Eventually, the.licensee expanded the PAR to include evacuation of areas further away from the plant.
Following the exercise inspection, the lead inspector was informed by NRC response team members who were in the EOF about the confusion regarding the RVLIS value that corresponded to the top of the fuel.
The lead inspector called two licensee personnel during the week of December 11, 1995, to obtain the correct value.
After several telephone calls, the inspector had obtained three different RVLIS values for the top of the fuel - 1) 42K was the value from the licensee's Emergency Response Data System (ERDS); 2) 68'as from the emergency operating procedures setpoint book (with adverse containment conditions); and 3) 55X was from an engineering drawing (without adverse containment conditions).
The inspector then asked what would be done about these discrepancies and whether the engineers in the TSC and EOF and the exercise scenario developers considered the impact of adverse containment conditions (and its implications for all instrumentation readings).
The licensee committed to correct the ERDS RVLIS value (the only actual erroneous value) and to review all ERDS parameters to ensure accuracy.
The licensee also agreed to ensure that the correct values and the impact of adverse containment conditions would be properly incorporated into all procedures.
(IFI 50-244/95-19-01) 12.0 REVIBl OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN IHPLEHENTING PROCEDURES An in-office review of revisions to EPIPs was completed by the lead inspector.
The list of the procedures and revisions that were reviewed are inc'uded below.
The inspector concluded that changes made were acceptable and did not decrease the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness program.
Procedure No.
Procedure Title Revision s EPIP 1-0 EPIP 1-5 EPIP 1-15 EPIP 2-4 EPIP 2-5 EPIP 2-6 EPIP 2-8 EPIP 2-11 EPIP 2-12 EPIP 3-4 EPIP 3-6 Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification Notifications Use of Health Physics Network (HPN) Emergency Dose Projections Hanual Hethod Emergency Dose Projection - Personal Computer Hethod Emergency Dose Projection - Hidas Program Voluntary Acceptance of Emergency Radiation Exposure Onsite Surveys Offsite Surveys Emergency Termination and Recovery Corporate Notifications
23,
4
3
4
9
20,
Procedure No.
Procedure Title Revision s EPIP 4-5 EPIP 5-1 EPIP 5-2 EPIP 5-3 EPIP 5-9 Public Affairs Notification Offsite Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment Periodic Inventory . Onsite Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment Periodic Inventory Checks and Testing Testing the Ability to Notify Primary NERP Responders Testing the Off Hours Call-in Procedure and quarterly Telephone Number Check 9,
10,11
13.0 CONCLUSIONS Overall, the NRC inspection team assessed the licensee's performance during the exercise as very good.
All exercise objectives were met and the licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to implement the E-Plan and EPIPs.
Additionally, the licensee's critique was appropriately self-critical.
The resolution of discrepancies pertaining to RVLIS, which came to light after the inspection team left the site, will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
14.0 EXIT MEETING The inspectors met with the licensee personnel listed in Detail 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and stated that they would be reviewed for appropriate corrective action. }}