IR 05000237/1999010
| ML17191B372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17191B371 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-99-10, 50-249-99-10, 50-327-99-10, NUDOCS 9906110007 | |
| Download: ML17191B372 (11) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Report No:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
- Dates:
Inspectors:
- Approved by:
9906110007 990604 PDR ADOCK 05000237 G
PDR REGION Ill 50-237; 50-249 DPR-19; DPR-25 5*0:.23719901 O(DRS); 50-249/9901 O(DRS)
Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 6500 N. Dresden Road Morris, IL 60450-9766 May 25-28, 1999 J. Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst D. Funk, Emergency Preparednes~ Analyst
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Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Bra.nch
. Division of Reactor Safety
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units.2 and 3 NRC Inspection Report 50-237/99010(DRS); 50-249/99010(DRS)
This inspection consisted of evaluating the licensee's performance during an exercise of the Emergency Plan. It was conducted by three regional inspectors. No violations of NRC requirements were identifie Plant Support
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Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was very goo (SectionP4.1.c).
- Staff performance in the Simulator Main Control Room was effective. (Section P4:1.c)
The Technical Support Center st~ffs performance was excellent. (Section P4.1.c)
Overall performance of Operations Support Center management and staff was goo (Section P4.1.c)
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Staff performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was very good. (Section P4.1.c)
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Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were generally very good. Licensee
- critique findings were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's finding (Section P4.1.c)
- Report Details IV. Plant Support P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the 1999 exercise's objectives and scenario and determined that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensee's emergency plan. The scenario provided a challenging framework to support demonstration of the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a radiological release and several equipment failure P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P Evaluated Biennial EmergencyPreparedness Exercise Inspection Scope (82301)
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that p*ower reactor licensees conduct biennial exercises that involve participation by offsite authorities. On May 26, 1999, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving participation by State of Illinois, and Will, Kendall, and Grundy county responders. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response organizations and emergency response facilities were activated. The NRC Region Ill office and Headquar;ters staffs participated in this exercis '
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The i{lspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:*
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
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Technical Support Center (TSC)
- Operations Support Center (OSC)
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command-and-control, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise* critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of exercise performance.
- Emergency Response Facility Observations and Findings Control Room Simulator Exercise performance in the Control Room Simulator (CRS) was effective. Personnel were professional and appropriately timed briefings kept the crew aware of current conditions and response priorities. Good communications were displayed by the operating crew, both on telephones and over the plant paging syste Operators closely monitored plant conditions and responded properly to reports and alarms. Shift personnel appropriately assessed the Unit One spent fuel pool loss of level event and correctly declared an Unusual Event (UE), utilizing the appropriate
. Emergency Action Level. Classifications and notifications to State and the NRC were completed in a timely manner. The Illinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS)
notification was initiated within seven minutes and the NRC Emergency Notification System call was initiated within 35 minutes, well within the 15 and 60 minute requirement *
. Command and control by the Acting Station Director was appropriate. Briefings provided to the crew were timed so as not to impact the operator's actions and were concise. The Operations Director received a detailed, face-to-face turnover from the Acting Station Director prior to responding to the Technical Support Center (TSC). This provided him with current plant conditions and emergency response statu b:2 Technical Support Center Overall, the TSC staffs performance was excellent. Personnel were focused on their emergency response functions, and teamwork and communications were effective. The Operations and Technical Directors looked ahead to events which could lead to emergency classification change.
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The n~w TSC layout enhanced facility staff comniuni~tions and teamwork. The mor open layout. allowed for status boards to be seen easily from anywhere in the TS The Operations Director and Station Director arrived at the facility early (as is normal practice) to obtain emergency and plant information. Shortly after, the TSC and Operations Support Center (OSC) were manned to support control room response to the UE. The TSC activation was rapid and efficient. The last responder necessarito fill a minimum staff position arrived within 22 minutes of the activation announcemen Responders efficiently signed-in, proceeded to their work areas, utilized their activation procedures, and established communications and/or energized their equipmen The transfer of command and control of emergency response from the control room was timely and concise: The Station Director's command and control of TSC personnel was crisp and efficient. Briefings provided by the Station Director were periodic and concis Plant status and emergency activities were clearly understood by the staff. The technique of passing a microphone to TSC Directors and allowing them to briefly report on their groups' activities enhanced the briefings.
- The Technical and Operations Directors were proactive in tracking plant conditions and listing events which would cause emergency classification escalations. The Alert and *
Site Area Emergency conditions were verified and properly declared in a timely manne Notifications to State and NRC were complete and timel The inspectors observed good staff discussions related to emergency activities, current conditions, and possible mitigation activities. Issues were methodically addressed, ultimately resolved, and well communicated to the TSC's staff. No issues were lost in the process. Tasks and priorities were clearly identified for OSC response teams by the
- Directors and listed on the status boards.. Status boards were effectively maintained and continuously update *
Dose assessment efforts were good. The dose assessor used available data for calculations. When radiation monitor data and environmental field team measurements became available, the dose assessor rapidly provided calculations to the Radiation Protection Director. Meteorology was continuously monitored and changes were rapidly posted on a status board. Control of environmental field teams appeared to be goo Transmission of data and directions was clear and concise and no problems were observe b.3 * Operations Support Center and Emergency Response Teams The overall performance of the Operations Support Center (OSC) management and staff was good. The Acting Station Director proactively requested that the OSC be.
activated to a'id control room per~onne' in responding to escalating radiological
conditions. The OSC was fully staffed and operational very quickly following this request. The OSC Director conducted a good initial briefing, explaining the basis for the Unusual Event, plant conditions, and current priorities. Communications between th OSC, SCR and TSC were well-maintained through the use of dedicated communicators...
Demeanor of OSC personnel was professional throughout the exercise. All participants were attentive to briefings by ttie osc and TSC Directors. Being able to hearrsc*
briefings enhanced OSC effectiveness. Noise levels were generally maintained lo Radiation Protection (RP) support to the emergency response teams was very goo RP technicians assigned to teams 4 and 6 demonstrated proper use of instrumentation and As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable practices. Emergency response team members accumulated dose was constantly tracked and updated. In-plant radiation survey information was displayed in the facilit Status boards were well maintained and generally effective in tracking changing plant conditions and the status of the nineteen emergency teams dispatched during the exercise. All teams were given adequate pre and post dispatch briefings which emphasized radiological and plant condition Timeliness of dispatch of "Urgent" priority emergency response teams was of concer The OSC dispatched three teams assigned "Urgent" tasks. "Urgent" denotes a task of the highest priority; such a team is expected to be rapidly dispatched with a minimal briefing*. * The dispatch times of these teams were 13, 15, and 54 minutes.. Focus on Urgent team dispatch was not always observed, and was not consistent with Emergency
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Preparedness Implementing Procedure 0400-03, Revision 5, "Emergency Teams" and the licensees stated goal of 5 minutes for "Urgent" team dispatch. Status boards lacked postings of times the teams were requested, making tracking of the time from request to actual dispatch difficul Team "Urgent 19" required 54 minutes from request to dispatch; some of this time was reasonably spent reviewing drawings and pursuing dose extensions. However, the.
members of team "Urgent 19'.' did not don respirators and protective clothing, at the direction of the team controller. The donning of these items would have extended th team's dispatch time well beyond 54 minutes. The inability to consistently dispatch
"Urgent" priority teams in a timely manner was an Inspection Followup Item (IFI) (50-237/99010-01; 50-249/99010-01).
Radiation Protection personnel conducting team dispatch briefings did not.verify the
. status of respiratory qualifications of two personnel assigned to the "Urgent 19" team prior to dispatch. The respiratory qualifications list used in the OSC was dated May 13, 1999, aJild may not have been current.. The qualifications list indicated that one of the two individuals was not qualified and the other was not listed; he was determined to be qualified after the exercise. This was an Inspection Follow up Item (IFI) (50-237/99010-02; 50-249/99010-02). Emergency Operations Facility Overall performance of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff was very goo The NRC has given ComEd permission to utilize the former Corporate Emergency Operations Facility at Downers Grove, Illinois as the sole Emergency Operations facility
. for the licensee. The facility is 'staffed with personnel from the Downers Grove office.* A pager call.. out system fun~tioned wel '
The facility was rapidly and efficiently staffed with.responders from the assigned response team, without prestaging. A sign-in board delineated minimum require po*sitions for facility activation, and these positions were filled within thirty minutes ofthe Alert declaration. Responders effectively utilized activation procedures and checklists, rapidly establishing communications and data links. The transfer of command and*
- control from the TSC to the EOF Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) was orderly, well detailed, and forma Good command.and control was displayed by the MEO. Periodic briefings, well audible
. throughout the facility, kept the EOF staff well aware of reactor status, current priorities,
- and ongoing response activities. Station mitigation activity priorities were well*
understood, and displayed on status boards in several of the separate EOF room Briefings held in the TSC could also be heard in. the EOF, *but with some difficulty due to low volume levels. Posting of a significant events log, Nuclear Accident Reporting System forms,.press releases, and NRC notification forms assisted in keeping the EOF staff aware of current activitie The General Emergency was properly declared, using the correct Emergency Action Level, and within the timeframe that such a declaration was warranted. Notifications were timely. Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) were made per procedure and an associated flowchart. An emergency planning zone map was annotated to show the
.sectors and geopolitical subdivisions affected by the protective actions. Although information was available, it was initially difficult to determine if the state had implemented the utility PAR and the status of completion of the resulting protective
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Dose assessments were appropriately made utilizing plant and/or field team data for dose estimate calculations. Communications with environmental field teams were good; radio problems were not observed. When dose calculations indicated the potential for radiation doses to exceed acceptable levels outside of the emergency planning zone, the State of Illinois was contacted and informed. Communication between EOF personnel and personnel in other facilities appeared to be very goo Licensee personnel discussed whether radiation dose extensions should be authorized for an inplant team which was to be dispatched into a high radiation area. The EOF staff appropriately concluded that the benefits from the proposed task did not warrant the additional radiation exposures, and dose extensions were not granted. Approval was given for issuance *Of potassium iodide to the inplant team assigned to leak termination activitie *
An NRC Site Team of fourteen individuals arrived at the EOF, were adequately briefed and. provided with work locations near their licensee counterparts. Adequate space and equipment, including telephones, were availi:;1ble tor Site Team members to monitor licensee response activities.
. The recovery procedure was reviewed and the' criteria necessary for entry into the Recovery phase discussed. It was properly determined that conditions at the time of the discussion would not allow entry into the Recovery phase of operations, primarily due to the potential for additional radioactive release *
- Scenario and Exercise Control The inspectors assessed how challenging the scenario was to the licensee and evaluated the licensee's control of the exercise~ The scenario was challenging and *
- exercised the majority of the licensee's emergency response capabilitie~.
The inspectors observed several instances were controllers in the TSC provided incorrect information to exercise participants. Examples included controller indication that dose rates outside the TSC were two to four rem per hour; this was later corrected to 80 to 100 millirem per hour. Later in the exercise,,a Radiation Protection Technician was advised that dose rates in the TSC were 12 millirem per hour. After the technician
. reported the information to the Radiation Protection Director, the controller corrected the information to less than one millirem per hour. These examples of incorrect information were handled well, and had little impact outside the facility.*
b:6 Licensee Self-Critiques The inspectors attended the licensee's self-critiques in the CRS, TSC, OSC, and' EOF which occurred immediately after the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited verbal and written inputs from the participants in addition to providing the participants with the controllers' initial assessments of personnel performance. The inspectors concluded
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that these initial self-critiques were thorough and in* close agreement with the majority of the rnspectors' observation Summary of Conclusions Evaluation of the license's exercise performance was as follows:
Overall licensee performance during the 1999 exercise performance was* very goo *
Staff performance in the Control Room Simulator was.effectiv * *
The Technical Support Center staffs performance was excellen *
Overall performance of OSC management and staff was goo *
Staff performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was very goo *
Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough. The critiques included inputs from controllers and exercise participants. Licensee critique findings were consistent with the NR9 evaluation team's finding *
PS Miscellaneous EP Issues
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P8.1 * (Open) Inspection Followup Item No. 50-237/99001,,01; 50-249/99001-01:
Implementation of the semi-annual augmentation drill. The licensee had reviewed and revised the procedure which.directs conduct and evaluation of the semi-annual augmentation drills. Drills had been held to test the revi.sed procedure prior to
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procedure finalization, but augmentation drills have not been conducted under the approved procedure. This item will remain open. *
V. Management Meetings Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 28, 1999. The inspection team leader stated that, overall exercise performance was very good, two lnspection.Followup Items had been identified, and post-exercise critiques were generally very good. The licensee acknowledged the preliminary*
findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Abrell, Regulatory Assurance D. Ambler, Regulatory Assurance Manager S. Barrett, Shift Operations Manager P. Boyle, Chemistry Manager M. Burgess, Chemistry/Radwaste/Env. Manager T. Burns, BWR Scenario Development Supervisor P. Chabot, Site Engineering Manager
L. Coyle, Shift Operations Supervisor R. Fisher, Operations Manager M. Friedmann, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator R. Kelly, Regulatory Assurance NRC Coordinator W. Lipscomb, Site Vice President Assessor J. Lizalek, Nuclear Oversight Assessor.
L. Magers, Unit Chemist J,. Moser, A-Radiation Protection Manager P. Planning, Unit one decommissioning Manager M. Porter, QC Supervisor
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W. Rakes, Emergency Preparedness Trainer W. Stoffels, Maintenance Manager J. Stone, NO Manager P. Swafford, Station Manager M. Vonk, Corporate EP Manager B. Dickson, Resident Inspector D. Roth.. Resident Inspector
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301 IP 82302 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-2371249/99010-01 IFI Timely dispatch of urgent team /99010-02 IFI Handling of respiratory qualifications in OS *, e1osed Non Discussed 50-2371249/99001-01
- * IF Conduct of augmentation drill I
BWR CFR DPR DRP DRS EAL EOF EP EPZ FEMA IFI IP MEO NARS NRC NRR osc PA PAR
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c*Rs SRI TSC UE LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Boiling Water Reactor Code of Federal Regulations Demonstration Power Reactor Division of Reactor Projects Division of Reactor Safety Emergency Action Level Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Preparedness Emergency Planning Zone Federal Emergency Management Agency Inspection Follow up Item Inspection Procedure Manager of Emergency Operations Nuclear Accident Reporting System Nuclear Regulatory Commission *
Office of Nuclear Rei;ictor Regulation Operations Support Center Public Address Protective Action Recommendation NRC Public Document Room Public Reading Room Pressurized Water Reacto NRC Region Ill Radiation Protection Control Room Simulator
- Senior Resident Inspector Technical Support Center Unusual Event 11