IR 05000237/1992008

Safety Insp Repts 50-237/92-08 & 50-249/92-08 on 920526-28. No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Exercise Re Review of Exercise Scenario

ML17177A470
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	06/08/1992
From:	Mccormickbarge, Ploski T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17177A469	List: IR 05000237/1992008 ML17177A468
References
50-237-92-08, 50-237-92-8, 50-249-92-08, 50-249-92-8, NUDOCS 9206160070
Download: ML17177A470 (25)

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-237/92008(DRSS); 50-249/92008(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 License Nos. DPR-19; DPR-25 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:

Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:

Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois Inspection Conducted:

May 26-28, 1992 Inspectors:

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H. Simons T. Plosk1 Accompanying Personnel:

Approved By:

Inspection summary M. Peck G. Smith D. Schultz Date Date Inspection on Mav 26-28, 1992 (Report Nos. 50-237/92008CDRSS);

50-249/92008CDRSS))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced inspection of the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station's emergency preparedness exercise involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302),

observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301).

Results:

No violations or deviations were identifie The licensee demonstrated a good overall response to a hypothetical scenario which included the following challenging aspects:

use of the control room simulator; activation of the security plan; activation of the fire brigade and offsite monitoring teams; and the use of roleplayers ~imulating NRC duty oLficers,and onscene -

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One concern was identified regarding the untimely briefing and dispatch of offsite monitoring team Interfaces between the security force and other members of the licensee's emergency response organization were goo All emergency,declarations were correct and timel Corrective actions were successfully demonstrated for all three concerns identified during the 1991 exercise.

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DETAILS NRC Observers and Areas Observed H. Simons, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

J. McCormick-Barger, CRS, TSC T. Ploski, Operational Support Center (OSC), inplant teams M. Peck,* CRS G. Smith, CRS, TSC, EOF D. Schultz, TSC Persons Contacted L. Gerner, Technical Superintendent J. Kotowski, Production Superintendent R. Radtke, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor T. Josefik, Security Administrator L. Oshier, Lead Health Physicist D. Sharper, Emergency Planning Coordinator R. Holman, Emergency Planning Coordinator R. Carson, Corporate Emergency Planning Supervisor R. Groves, Corporate Emergency Planner The above and 10 other licensee representatives attended the NRC exit interview on May 28, 199 The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspectio.

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items CIP 82301)

(Closed) Open Item No. 237/91023-01:

During the 1991 annual exercise, the Shift Engineer (SE) failed to declare an Unusual Event due to a postulated security threat situatio The licensee revised several of the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in order to clarify the criteria for declaring an emergency due to various types of security threat As indicated in Section 6.a of this inspection report, during the 1992 exercise the SE correctly classified several situations warranting emergency declarations due to ongoing security threat This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 237/91023-02:

During the 1991 exercise, supervisors in the Operational Support Center (OSC) did not maintain adequately detailed logs and records of briefings given to inplant team As indicated in Section 6.c of this inspection report, the o~c Dir~ctor, osc _Supervisor and.a technical briefer

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maintained adequately detailed records of their activities and decisions on logs, briefing forms and message form This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 237/91023-03:

During the 1991 exercise, the osc supervisor demonstrated inadequate concern for the respiratory protection needs of several inplant team During the 1992 exercise, one team's assignment involved the use of respiratory protection equipment as a precaution due to changing plant condition The team was dispatched to prepare the post accident sampling system for use in collecting a reactor coolant sampl The OSC Supervisor and the Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) assigned to this team demonstrated good concern for the team's respiratory protection need Both persons assured that all team members were currently qualified to wear full face respirator The RPT assured that each team member was issued the proper size respirator from the osc*s supplie This item is close.

General An announced, off-hours exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) was conducted at the Dresden Station site on the night of May 26-27, 199 The exercise tested the licensee's emergency response organization's capabilities to respond to an accident scenario resulting in a simulated release of radioactive effluen Attachment 1 describes the scope and objectives of the exercis Attachment 2 summarizes the exercise scenari.

General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements, using the licensee's GSEP and related implementing procedure Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timel If scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safet \\

4 Observers The licensee's controllers and observers monitored and critiqued this exercise, as was indep~ndently done by six NRC observer Exercise Critique The licensee held critiques in each facility with the part1cipants immediately following the exercis Lead controllers held a joint critique the day following the exercise to discuss observed strengths and weaknesses for each facility and the overall exercis The NRC discussed observed strengths and weaknesses, developed independently by the NRC evaluation team, during the exit interview with the licensee held on May 28, 199.

Specific Observations CIP 82301) Control Room Simulator CCRS)

At 0015 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS)

received a report of abnormal aircraft activity over the plant sit The Shift Engineer (SE) in charge of CRS activities was promptly notifie The SE correctly declared an Unusual Even State officials and the SSS were notified of this declaration in a timely manne After receiving another report that unauthorized persons had apparently entered the Protected Area, the SSS instructed the guard force to respond accordingl The SSS then informed the SE of this information and a new report that a suspicious device was found within the Protected Are The SE correctly declared an Alert at 01oo*hours, based on the timely and accurate information provided by the SS State officials and the SSS were notified of this emergency declaration in a timely manne A response cell of controllers simulated NRC and other offsite organizations' representative CRS personnel initially notified simulated NRC officials of the Unusual Event and Alert declarations within the regulatory time limi Simulated Feqeral Aviation Administration (FAA) officials were notified after the Unusual Event declaratio The SE kept CRS personnel

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adequately informed of these declarations and his other decisions in response to scenario event The SE should have recognized that NRC officials needed to be further informed of the FAA notification, per 10 CFR 50.}2 (a) (2)(vi), as we~.l as the unauthorized entry

• of personnel and contraband into the Protected Area, per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix However, had scenario events been real, NRC officials would have recognized that the licens~e's event descriptions associated with both emergency declarations repre~ented reportable safeguards events and would have reacted accordingl Following the Unusual Event declaration, a Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) Advisor reported to the plant site and functioned in the CRS, Technical Support center (TSC) and the Operational Support Center (OSC)

as the exercise progresse In response to the inspectors' concern that this staff level position was not yet proceduralized, the licensee provided a draft procedure for the GSEP Advisor position and indicated that the exercise was seen as an opportunity to refine the position's role in one or more response facilitie The GSEP Advisor's overall performance was a positive contribution to the onsite emergency organization's performanc However, on one occasion, the advisor provided direction to an operator, which briefly diminished the SE's command authority over CRS staf The GSEP Advisor should provide his advice through the S An operations engineer provided excellent support to the SE during the exercise without adversely impacting the SE's command authorit The SE accepted the GSEP Advisor's good advice to order the assembly of all onsite personnel following the Alert declaration as a security precautio It was unclear if the SE adequately coordinated this action with the SSS prior to the sounding of the station's assembly sire Following the loss of circulating water and the Anticipated Transient Without SCRAM (ATWS), the Shift Control Room Engineer briefly assumed command and control of the reactor operators, rather than performing his Shift Technical Advisor (STA) functio After about five minutes, the SE relieved the engineer so that STA duties could be fulfille No violations or deviations were identifie Technical Support Center CTSC)

The TSC was activated following *the Alert declaratio TSC staff were pre-selected in order to fulfill their periodic exercise participation requirement They responded to the sit~ fro~ ya~~ous _offsite location Had events been real, a calltree, which was a prioritized listing of persons assigned to each response position by their estimated commuting times to the site, would have been implemente An adequate number of TSC staff arrived about 65 minutes after the Alert declaratio The TSC's Station Director (SD)

relieved the SE of command and control of the onsite response organization approximateiy 98 minutes after the Alert declaratio The timliness of TSC activation and transfer of command and control are considered adequate, in view of the use of pre-selected personnel rather than the implementation of the prioritized calltree described abov During the final phase of TSC activation, an explosion in the cribhouse, which was related to the onging security threat, and a related ATWS occure The SE declared a Site Area Emergency in a correct and timely manne State and NRC officials were initially notified in a timely manner, although there was brief confusion on whether CRS or TSC staff should perform these required notification Several minor problems were noted regarding the initial notification message to the State, which was prepared and transmitted by TSC staf Although an abnormal release to the atmosphere would likely have been through the standby gas treatment system, the current wind speed and direction data provided to state officials were more appropriate for a ground level release, rather than an elevated release to the environmen Secondly, the message form developed by state officials, which is*utilized*to--formulate initial notification messages for any emergency declaration, does not require event description information to be included in the messag Instead, such information may be provided in the "additional information" section of the message form or may be provided to the state officials, upon their request, during the message verification callback proces In order to expedite information flow regarding the bases of any emergency declaration, the licensee and state officials should consider revising the message form to include mandatory provisions for an event descriptio Overall, the TSC staff effectively interacted in correctly assessing plant conditions and adjusting corrective action priorities in response to changing scenario event Several means were used to assure that all TSC staff remained ~ware of _plant conditions,

• major decisions and other response action Status boards were maintained in an accurate and timely manne The SD conducted periodic briefings during which each of his directors were expeqted to update all TSC staff on the status of their current activities, new information and any concern Noise levels within the TSC were somewhat improved from those noted during the 1991 exercis However, TSC staff should have made better efforts to minimize communications while the SD was-conducting the very informative briefing Per procedures, two offsite radiological monitoring teams were to be formed and made ready to leave the site following the Alert declaratio The teams were formed within about one hour after the Alert declaratio However, the teams' leaders did not complete initial briefings in the TSC until after 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />, or more than two hours after that declaratio The teams then obtained and checked their supplies, survey instruments, communications equipment and vehicle These tasks took an estimated 45 minutes to complete, which was adequat However, the offsite monitoring teams were not ready to perform their duties until almost three and one half hours after the Alert declaration, which was inadequat The untimely briefing and dispatch of the offsite monitoring teams is an Inspection Follow-up Item (50-237/92008-01 and 50-249/92008-01).

The first documented offsite dose projection performed by TSC staff was not done until 0321 hours0.00372 days <br />0.0892 hours <br />5.30754e-4 weeks <br />1.221405e-4 months <br />, roughly one hour after drywell radiation levels had begun to increas By the exit interview, the inspectors were satisfied that the TSC's dose assessor had performed several -0ffsite*dose projections prior to the £irst one for which a computer printout was generate The dose assessor apparently elected not to have the computerized calculations printed until drywell radiation levels were on the order of 500 to 1000 Roentgens per hour (R/hr).

All offsite dose calculations should be documented for subsequent evaluations of the licensee's response by NRC and licensee incident investigation team The director-level members of the TSC staff maintained individual logs of the activities and decisions that varied in qualit Several of the TSC's status boards were electronic copy boards, which enabled clerical support staff to readily generate historical records of information on these board Clerical staff also manually copied information posted on all other TSC status boards as another supplement to the directors'

personal logs for response reconstruction purpose Several licensee staff arrived in the TSC during the latter stages of the exercise in orde~ to simulate being members of an NRC Site Tea The simulated Site Team should have been briefed by a senior TSC manager having an overall knowledge of abnormal onsite conditions and ongoing response activities, rather than only being briefed by the Security and Technical Director No violations or deviations were identified; however, one Inspection Follow-up Item was identifie Operational Support Center (OSC)

Onshift personnel began reporting to the osc following the Alert declaratio As a precautionary measure due to the ongoing security threat, all onsite personnel were ordered to assemble and to be accounted for shortly after the Alert declaratio The osc Director identified himself and several key aides to the available technician He ordered no one to leave the facility without his permissio osc staff were accounted for by signing a roster or by registering with a guard at the entrance to the facilit Although onsite personnel were accounted for within about 30 minutes, the osc Director should have indicated when he considered all persons under his authority to be present and accounted fo A supervisors' office and the adjacent lunchroom were reconfigured into the osc workspac All but one walkway *into the*lunchroom*were *blocked as an access and a contamination control measur A contamination control point was established along the only usable hallway leading to and from the os Inplant teams surveyed themselves at this location before entering the os Habitability surveys were periodically performed within the os While osc activation and onsite assembly were in progress, a Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) was assigned to survey the onsite assembly areas. *Due to the ongoing security threat, the RPT was not dispatched until a security guard was available to accompany hi Both were adequately briefed on the survey task and the security threa The RPT kept OSC supervision informed of his survey results as he completed surveying each assembly area.

The OSC Director declared the facility to be fully operational within 60 minutes of the Alert declaratio By that time, all supervisory personnel and several dozen technicians were available to p~rform their dutie overall information flow between the osc, CRS and TSC was very good, with several minor exception Although an OSC communicator maintained open line communications with a CRS counterpart, the first report of the ATWS was received from the GSEP Advisor, who had arrived from the CRS to assist in activating the os The CRS's communicator confirmed this report when aske During periodic briefings of key TSC staff that were broadcast in the osc, TSC staff on several occasions stated their beliefs that certain inplant teams had been dispatched from the osc on high priority task On both occasions, these teams were in the midst of the briefing process when these announcements were mad Since status boards in the TSC and the OSC listed the dispatch times of all inplant teams, there should have been no misunderstandings about the status bf any tea During the exercise, any of four supervisory personnel in the osc gave concise, accurate status update briefings to the available technician A flip chart was used to post updated information on scenario events,.major decisions and higher priority task Broadcasts of TSC staff briefings supplemented these sources of informatio The OSC Director and his aides effectively managed technicians assigned to the facilit A two-sided copy board was used to list the names of technicians from each department who were available for assignment, as well as those who were currently assigned to an inplant tea No teams were delayed due to a real or perceived shortage of technicians, dosimetry, or protective clothin Several teams were delayed up to about 15 minutes until a security guard became available to accompany the Twelve inplant teams were dispatched from the osc during the exercis Teams were given concise and detailed briefings by a technical briefer or the osc Superviso These individuals also debriefed returning team Briefings and debriefings were adequately documented on form In addition to the tasks to be performed, briefings addressed: the status of the security threat; anticipated radiological conditions; exposure limits; protective clothing needs; and reporting instructions.

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Each team member's exposure history was verified prior to a team's dispatc Teams were issued proper dosimetry and protective clothin An RPT, equipped with a survey instrument, accompanied.inplant teams whenever appropriat A guard accompanied each team until the onsite security threat no longer existe Team members' simulated radiation exposures were adequately tracke *

Two inplant teams were accompanied by an inspecto Both were adequately briefed, issued proper dosimetry and received adequate support from the accompanying RPT to avoid unnecessary radiation exposure A team of instrument and electrical maintenance tecnnicians was dispatched to determine the cause of a loss of power to the control room's indications of control rods' position The technicians obtained the tools and system drawings needed to troubleshoot the proble The technicians efficiently diagnosed the equipment failure, which was simulated on a realistic equipment mocku An operator was later dispatched to simulate connecting two instrument air system The operator obtained the relevent procedure and proceeded to the work sites, where he adequately described how he would perform the assigned task in accordance with the procedure~

Inplant teams reported the results of their activities to osc supervision prior to returning to the os These results were then promptly reported to the TS No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Operations Facility CEOFl EOF activation began after the Site Area Emergency declaratio Incoming EOF staff, who were prestaged in a local motel, efficiently prepared to perform their dutie Communications with TSC counterparts were quickly establishe Although EOF staff became fully capable of performing their duties in a timely manner, turnover of command and control from the TSC's SD to the EOF's Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO) was slo The EOF was fully operational about 30 minutes before the SD was ready to relinquish command and control of the licensee's response efforts to his EOF counterpar This delay did not adversely affect the licensee's response to scenario event *

The EOF's Safeguards Specialist was particularly effective in performing his duties before and after the MEO assumed comman As the security threat evolved, he showed good concern for the safety.of onsite personnel, non~essential evacuees from the site and EOF staf The Safeguards Specialist and the EOF's Access Control Coordinator demonstrated good initiative by using a status board to post detailed information regarding the changing security threat situation for the benefit of EOF decisionmakers and their support staff Protective measures staff in the EOF performed very effectively in several respect When they were notified that an explosive device had been placed in a location which could lead to a radioactive release to the environment, they quickly performed offsite dose projections to estimate the worst case offsite impac EOF decisionmakers were informed of this assessmen When one offsite survey team was simulated to have had a vehicle accident, the Environs Director soon recognized that the loss of communications with this team might be related to more than an equipment malfunctio He ordered the other survey team to search for their missing counterpart Once he discovered that the personnel involved in the vehicle accident were unharmed, the director began making arrangements to replace this team with another from the licensee's LaSalle County Statio The EOF's reactor safety group performed well with respect to gathering and assessing plant status informatio One minor flaw was noted in their performanc The group utilized the table of Emergency

"Action Levels (EALs) found in the emergency plan rather than the EAL table located in an implementing procedur The plan's EAL table was out-of-date despite NRC's recent approval of a plan revision containing several EAL refinement These refinements had been incorporated in the implementing procedur The inconsistencies between the plan's and the procedure's EAL tables had no adverse affect on the exercise participant Approved changes to the emergency plan should be distributed and filed in controlled copies of this document in a more timely manne In general, briefings within the EOF should have been more frequent and thoroug The MEO initially briefed available personnel while the facility was being staffe The next briefing did not occur for about 50 minute During ~ubsequ~n~ _brief!_:r:igs,_ not _all EOF

• staff were briefed that the explosive device, which could have created a release path, had been deactivated or that one offsite survey team had been involved in an acciden Such information appeared ~o be known only by key staff and persons in the affected functional groups in the EO All EOF staff, including any liaisons from State agencies, sho.uld be briefed on all significant event No violations or deviations were identifie.

Exercise Objectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)

The exercise scope and objectives and the exercise scenario were submitted to NRC within the proper timeframe The licensee adequately responded to the lead inspector's questions pertaining to the scenari The scenario was challenging and included the use of: the control room simulator; the security plan; a response cell of controllers to simulate NRC duty officers and other offsite officials; licensee staff simulating members of an NRC Site Team; and several equipment mockup No violations or deviations were identifie.

Exercise Control Exercise control was goo There were adequate controllers to control the exercis No noteworthy instances of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which they might not otherwise have taken, were observe No violations or deviations were identifie.

Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on May 28, 1992, with the licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection finding The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in natur The licensee was informed that the exercise's challenging aspects included: activation of the security_ plan; use of the control room s.imulator; activation of the fire brigade and offsite monitoring teams; the use of several equipment mockups; and the use of roleplayers to simulate NRC duty officers and onscene incident responder *

.One concern was identified regarding the untimely briefing and dispatch of offsite survey team In response to a concern about the unproceduralized GSEP Advisor position, the licensee provided a draft implementing,procedure and indicated that the position would soon by formally added to the onsite emergency organizatio Interfaces between the security force and the licensee's other emergency responders were goo All emergency classification decisions were correct and timel Corrective actions were successfully demonstrated on all three concerns identified during the 1991 exercis Attachments: Exercise Scope and Objectives Exercise Scenario summary

DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERCISE MAY 27, 1992 SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION DATE:

May 27, 1992 TYPE CECO Only, offhours OFFSITE AGENCY PARTICIPATION:

None PURPOSE:

Test the capability of the basic elements within the Conunonwealth Edison Company GSE The Exercise will include mobilization of CECo personnel and resources adequate to verify their ability to respond to a simulated emergenc CECO FACILITIES ACTIVATED:

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Control Room (Simulator>

TSC

.. osc EOF CECo FACILITIES NOT ACTIVATED:

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CEOF JPIC

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Other Participants:

None The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Officer.will be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time basis. The uExercise" Nuclear Duty Officer and the balance of the Corporate Emergency Response Organization will be prepositioned close to the EOF to permit use of personnel from distant location Conunoriwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but w.ill not actually incur the expense of using contractor services except as *prearranged specifically for the Exercis Commonwealth Edison will.arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise. Conunonwealth Edison.will provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Compan ZDRESDEN/87/l

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DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERICSE MAY 27 I 1992 1. Assessment and Classification Objectives Demonstrate the ability to assess, within fifteen (15) minutes, conditions which warrant initiating a GSEP classi~ication. CCR, TSC EOF) Demonstrate the ability to determine applicable Emergency Action Levels CEALs) within fifteen (15)

minutes of initiating classificatio CCR, TSC, EOF)

2. Notification and Communication Objectives

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. Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out a NARS for CCR, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to notify appropriate State and local organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of an Emergency classification or significant change in NARS informatio CCR, TSC, EOF) e. ZDRESDEN/63//l Demonstrate the abi 1 i.ty to correctly fi 11 out NRC Event Horksheet CCR, TSC, EOF)

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Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC inunediately following State notification and within one Cl) hour after.making an.Emergency.classificatio CCR, TSC, EOF)

Demonstrate the ability to provide hourly information updates to the States* and within thirty C30) minutes of changes in latest reported conditions on the State Agency Update Checklis CCR, TSC, EOF)

Demonstrate the ability to contact appropriate support organizations that would be available to assist in an actual emergency within one Cl) hour of conditions warranting their assistance. C M+T, Teledyne)

CCR, TSC, EOF)

Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on ENS upon reques CCR I TSC, EOF)

Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of C011!111UQh:.atJon with.the -NRC on -HPN~ upon'-request ~ -*

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DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERICSE MAY 27, 1992 Demonstrate the ability to provide hourly information updates to the NRC and within thirty (30) *minutes of changes in reportable conditions when an open-line of communication is not maintaine CENS and HPN) CCR, TSC, EOF>

Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate informational announcements (e.g. assembly instructions, changes in plant conditions> over the plant public address syste CCR)

3. Radiological Assessment and Protective Actions Objectives Demonstrate the ability to collect and document radiological surveys taken for conditions presented in the scenari CTSC, EOF, OSC) *Demonstrate the ability to trend radiological information for conditions presented in the scenari CTSC, EOF, OSC) Demonstrate the ability.to take appropriate protective actions for onsite personnel in accordance with Station procedures. (e.g. respiratory protection, protective clothing, Kl).COSC, TSC>

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. Demonstrate the ability to adequately prepare and brief personnel for entry into High Radiation Areas in accordance with Station procedures and policie COSC, TSC)

. Demonstrate the ability to issue and administratively control dosimetry issued to teams dispatched from the OSC in accordance with Station procedure COSC> Demonstrate the ability to establish radiological control in accordance with Health Physics procedure CTSC, OSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document radiation exposure for inplant operations and maintenance teams in accordance with plant procedure CTSC, OSC>

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DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERICSE Emergency Facilities Objectives MAY 27, 1992 Demonstrate the ability to establish minimum staffing in the TSC and OSC within thirty C30) minutes of an Alert or higher Classification during a~ offhours event in accordance with procedure CTSC, OSC> Demonstrate the ability to augment the Control Room staff within thirty C30) minutes of an appropriate Emergency Classification in accordance with the procedure CCR> Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the Control Room to

.the TS CTSC, CR) Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the TSC to the EO CTSC, EOF> Demonstrate the ability to establish minimum staffing in the Emergency Operations Facility within approximately one Cl) hour of the Site Emergency classification in accordance with EOF procedures. C EOF.>

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Using information supplied by the Exercise scenario, demonstrate the ability to record, track, and update information on the Status Boards at least every thirty C30) minute CCR, TSC, OSC, EOF)

. Demonstrate the ability-to document Operations and Maintenance Team.activities in logs and on appropriate Status Boards~ COSC> Demonstrate the ability to track in-plant job status in logs and on.appropriate Status Boards *

. CCR, TSC, OSC, EOF> *

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DRESDEN NUCLEAR POHER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERICSE MAY 27, 1992 Demonstrate the ability to exchange counterpart activity information between the ERFs at least every sixty C60) minute CCR, TSC, EOF, OSC) Demonstrate the ability to update and disseminate information from the Electronic Status Boar CTSC,, EOF> Emergency Direction and Control Objectives Demonstrate the ability of the Directors and Managers to exert command and control in their respective areas of responsibility as specified in procedure CCR, OSC, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and.expedite Operations and Maintenance activities during aQnormal and emergency situation CTSC, OSC, EOF> Demonstrate the ability to prioritize resources for Operations and Maintenance activities during abnormal and emergency situatio CTSC, EOF, OSC> Demonstrate the ability to acquire and transport emergency equipment and supplies necessary to.... *

mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant

.condition CCR, TSC, EOF, OSC) Demonstrate the ability of the Shi ft Engineer, *

. Sta ti on. Di rector,.OSC Di rector and MEO.to. provide briefings and updates concerning plant status, event classification, and activities in progress at least every sixty C60) minute CCR, TSC, OSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to provide access for the Mock NRC Site Team in accordance with Access Control procedure CTSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to interface the Mock NRC Site Tea CTSC, EOF)

. Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-ess.ential personnel within thirty (30) minutes after deciding to evacuate the site. CTSC, CR>

. Demonstrate the ability of individuals in the Emergency Response Organization to perform their assigned duties and respqnsi_bUities as specified in Generic GSE CCR, TSC~ -*osc. EOF)

ZDRESDEN/63//5

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8. Miscellaneous Objectives DRESDEN NUCLEAR POHER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERICSE MAY 27, 1992 Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude of the source term of a releas CTSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability to establish the relationship between effluent monitor readings and onsite and offsite exposures/contamination for various meteorological condition CTSC, EOF, Field Teams) Demonstrate the ability to calculate release rate/projected doses if the primary instrumentation

. used for assessment is offscale, or inoperable, or if the

• rel ease is unmonitore CTSC, EOF> Demonstrate the ability to assemble and account for On-site personnel within 30 minutes of a Site Emergency declaratio CCR, TSC) Demonstrate the abilrty to explain the evacuation route, brief personnel and arrange for traffic control within one Cl) hour of starting site evacuatio CTSC, EOF>

• Demonstrate the ability to collect and count field samples in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures *. CF1eld Teams, TSC, EOF) Demonstrate the abi 11 ty to perform dose rate measurements in the environment for conditions presented in the scenario. (field Teams) Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Environs Teams within forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field sample CTSC, OSC> Demonstrate the abi 11 ty to control/coordinate Environs Teams activities in accordance with CEPIP CTSC, EOF, Field Teams)

. Demonstrate the. abi 1 i ty to transfer.

control/coordination of Environs Teams activities

• from the TSC to the EOF in accordance with Station and EOF procedure CTSC, EOF) Demonstrate the ability of the Security force to respond to an emergency situation in accordance with procedure (Security) Demonstrate t.he ability.of.the Seaurity* force to

• coordinate actions and interact with the Emergency Response Organization. (Security)

ZDRESDEN/63//6

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w 9. Public Information Objectives Non. Re_covery Objectives DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERICSE MAY 27, 1992 Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to enter a Recovery classification in accordance with procedure CTSC. EOF) Demonstrate the ability to generate a Recovery Plan which wi 11 return the plant to normal operations in accordance with CECo policies and procedure CTSC. EOF) Demonstrate the ability to coordinate recovery actions with the State and NR CTSC. EOF> Demonstrate the ability to determine long-term recovery'staffing requirement CTSC. EOF)

ZDRESDEN/63//7

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DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1992 GSEP EXERCISE MAY 27, 1992 NARRATIVE SUMMARY (Initial Conditions)

General Chemical cleaning of the Unit One Spent Fuel Storage Racks has been scheduled for midnights 5/27/92. The NUKE-KLEAR Corp. has 10 people presently onsite making preparations for the scheduled cleaning. The Federal Bureau of Investigation CFBI) has notified Corporate Security of the increased terrorist threats received in their federal offices located in Chicago during.the past wee Braidwood, Byron, Zion, LaSalle, Quad, and Dresden have been placed in a heightened awareness phase as a result of the information received from the FB Unit Two:

Unit Two had been operating at lOO'L Power for the previous 80 days until today, when the Load Dispatcher gave the station the 'go ahead' to decrease power below 501 for the purpose of performing DOS 0250-02 Full Closure and Timing and Exercising of Main Steam Isolation Valve The Reactor is presently operating at 401 powe The 2A Control Rod Drive CCRD) pump is scheduled to be returned to service by 5/28/92 after being Out of Service COOS) due to mechanical seal replacemen At 2300, the IMs are in progress repairing a problem identified with the 213 Chimney SPIN The General Electric backup radioaCtive release monitoring system for the 2/3 c~imney is in service. Chemistry department has been notified to take a grab sample once per shift.* IMs are in progress with the final calibration of the 'A' SBGT flow control dampe Once the IMs are completed with the work request, operations will be notified. Operations will wait for completed work request to perform 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> operational ru Unit Three:

Unit Three is presently in Day 30 of a*Scheduled 70 day refuel outag All fuel moves have successfully been accomplished and routine maintenance is presently underway on the 'backshift' to complete the servicing on equipment and. components that have been targeted for overhau ZDRESDEN/90/1

UNUSUAL EVENT C0015)

. While on routine mobile patrol, a security officer hears what he analyzes to be a helicopter hovering over the protected area. The security officer searches in the dark sky above for five (5) minutes but cannot visually identify the exact location of the helicopte Three individuals are able to safely parachute into the Protected Are Upon storing their parachutes and other equipment near a storage tank. they accost three contractors from the Nuke-Klear corporation, remove their security badges and bound and gage them in the Nuke-Klear supply trailor.

. EXPECTED ACTION The security officer should notify the Security Shift Supervisor or Response Team Leader that he has heard what appears to be an aircraft (helicopter> hovering over the Protected Area for the past five minute The Security Shift Supervisor should immediately notify the Shift Engineer of the incident. The Shift Engineer should classify an Unusual Event per EAL Bf or EAL 9b (Unusual Aircraft activity over the Protected Area).

A!.fil COlOO - 0215)

A security officer conducting mobile patrol within the Protected Area discovers suspicious materialCs> by a storage-tank near the North/West corner of the Unit 3 Turbine Building. The items include three (3) detached parachutes and a military style gun c.lip, electrical tape, splicing wires and detonating caps neatly packed behind one of the storage tank EXPECTED ACTION

.

The Shift Engineer should declare an Alert per EAL Bk (Armed or forced protected area intrusion). The Shift Engineer may request the assistance from

.the local bomb squad due to the nature of the discovery <electrical tape and detonating caps). The security officer immediately notifies the Security Shi ft Supervisor, who in. turn notifies -the Shi ft Engineer of the discover SITE EMERGENCV (0215/0217 -

END>

An explosion rocks the '2/3' cribhouse, spewing glass and dust onto the roadwa The blast damages several pieces of vital equipment contained within the cribhouse*including the Circ Hater Pumps, fire pump, electrical panels and Service Hater Syste The loss of the CH pumps causes a decrease and

.

subsequent loss of Condenser Vacuum requiring. the Shift Engineer to order a manual scram of the reactor. The RPS system will generate an automatic scram signal when.condenser vacuum decreases to 23 inches of mercur Hhen the operator initiates the manual scram, the RPS system does not de-energize, therefore no rod movement occurs. The crew enters DEOP 400-5 *.

Failure to scram. Subsequently the crew initiates alternate Rod Insertion per DEOP 500-5, and after pulling RPS solenoid fuses, one half of the Control Rods insert. The remainder will be hydraulically locke The crew must resort to other alternate scrams to ~et them 1s:aserte ZDRESDEN/90/2

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As part of DEOP 400-5 actions, the crew initiates the Isolation Condense At approximately 0217, the I so-Condenser. will isolate due to a high flow trip switch failur The IMs may be dispatched to repair a failed microsw1tch contained inside this flow switc At 0217, the Service Hater System fails due to damages incurred by the explosion in the Cribhous The loss of service water will cause the failure to the instrument air compressor due to the loss of cooling wate After the Assembly has sounded, the Nuke-Klear Corporation supervisor will phone the Shift Engineer to report that three of his workers are missin He requests the Shift Engineer to check with Security to see if the individuals are in any of the Assembly Are Between 0230 and 0300 (after the assembly), one of the contractors manages to free his hands and phones the Shift Engineer's office to inform him of the encounter with three masked individual At 0345 the State Police will notify the FBI that they have three indlviduals involved in a fatal head on collision with a tractor trailer on interstate 5 The individuals had in their possession, explosive devices with detailed maps and plans for a terroist attack upon a local Nuclear Power Pl an The State Po 11 ce will fax photos of the i ndi vi dua 1 s and the maps to the FBI in Chicago for further investigation. The FBI, being aware of the

• event at Dresden, contact~ the Safeguard Specialist at the EOF and sends the maps and photos via fax to the facilit *

.

At 0430 while performing surveys at some Environmental Monitoring Point, the.Field Team van will be disabled due to an accident caused by a herd of Deer. All communication will be lost due to damage incurred in the cras T~ere are no injuries with the exception of the slain deer.*

A security guard will hear an alarm in-the facility and will investigate it source upon approaching the TLD room he will see smoke coming from underneath the door. A small type a fire has started within the room and has spread to the nearby sourc *

EXPECTED ACTION After the explosion in the cribhouse is recognized as being caused by an explosive device, the Shift Engineer will upgrade the current ALERT to a SITE EMERGENCY per EAL Sm (Security event that results in the loss of control of any vital area).

An assembly will be conducted at this time if it wasn't conducted at the ALERT phase to account for all personnel on sit The ATHS will prompt the Shift Engineer to declare a SITE EMERGENCY per EAL 3k (Failure of the Reactor Protection System instrumentation to initiate and complete an automatic reactor SCRAM once limiting Safety System Setting have been exceeded and manual scram was not successful) if he has not already done so. Efforts will be made to insert the control rods, but every effort aside from manually venting the piston will be successful in getting all the rods to inser ZDRESDEN/90/3

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The Shift Engineer will inform the TSC of the problem with the missing contractors and request that they perform an accountability to find the three individuals. The Security force should discover that the three individuals have apparently left the premise The Shift Engineer should discuss the report of the contractor to the TS The combination of the "nearly" simultaneous Site Emergency Events may be enough to convince the Station Director to upgrade the Site Emergency to a General Emergenc The EOF Safeguard Specialist should pass the information received from the FBl*on to the EO The EOF should be able to identify the maps as being the Dresden's Common Cribhouse and the OffGas Absorber Vaul The EOF should then make the determination that there is an unexploded bomb in the vicinity of the Absorber Vault set to detonate at 0500 (according to the plans). A PAR should be made at this time due to the potential for a release to the environment if the bomb explode At 0430, during the insertion of the. sixth rod, a failure occurs on the 5 and 6 voltage supply to the RPIS system, causing light indication to be lost for the bottom half of the cor *

The EOF will challenged with determining that the Field Team have encountered difficulties and need assistanc The Security guard should use a fire extinguisher to extinguish the blaze. The EOF may make the determination that a habitability survey is required due to the potential damage to.the calibration sourc ZDRESDEN/90/4