IR 05000237/1988004
| ML17199U750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1988 |
| From: | Patterson J, Ploski T, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-237-88-04, 50-237-88-4, 50-249-88-04, 50-249-88-4, NUDOCS 8803290343 | |
| Download: ML17199U750 (16) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I II Reports No. 50-237/88004(DRSS); No. 50-249/88004(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249 Licenses No. DPR-19; No. DPR-25 Licensee:
Commdn~ealth Edison Company P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, Illinois Corporate Command Center, Chicago, Illinois Inspection Conduct~~ ~ebruary 29 through March 2, 1988 A,~!"
Inspectors:
T. ~f~ki.. *
Q.~~Mf\\
Jt Patterson m.cJ~-
M. Smith
..j/;1/rs'
Date
?1¢~
D e
Inspection Summary Inspection on February 29 through March 2, 1988 (Reports N ~237/88004(DRSS);
No. 50-249/88004(DRSS))
.
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced irispection of the Dresden Station's annual emergency preparedness exercise, involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercis Results:
No.violations of NRC requirements were identified.
- 380318 8:30329031~ 05000237 PDR ADOLK OCD
- DETAILS Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams J. Jamison, Control Room, TSC, OSC M. Smith, TSC J. Patterson, Corporate Command.Center (CCC)
Commonwealth Edison E. Eenigenburg, Station Manager J. Wujciga, Production Superintendent E. Netzel, Quality Assurance Superintendent T. Gilman, Supervising Emergency Planner M. DiPonzio, Emergency Planning Supervisor R. Goodin, Shift Engineer R. Sitts, Shift Engineer, Instructor T. Ziakis, Rad Chem Foreman T. Lechton, Principal Emergency Planner T. Markwa 1 ter, Emergency Planner*
P. Vitalis, Emergency Planner J. Bowman, Emergency Planner T. Britt, GSEP Training Instructor W. Carter, Training Instructor J. Harrington, Quality Assurance. Instructor R. Haijal, Emergency Planner J. Nash, GE Resident Engineer The above personnel attended the March 2, 1988 exit intervie.
Licensee Action on Previously - Identified Items (Closed) Items No. 237/87027-01 and 249/87026-01:
During the 1987 exercise, contamination control provisions for the Operational Support Center (OSC) were inadequate such that, had scenario events been real, the facility would likely have become contaminate As indicated in Section Sb of this report, contamination control provisions established and main.tained at the OSC were adequat This item is close General An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations*
Emergency Plan {GSEP) was conducted ~t the Dresden Station on March 1, 1988. This utility-only exercise tested the licensee's capability to respond to a hypothetical accident scenari The attachments to this report contain the licensee's scope of participation, exercise objectives, and scenario narrative summary.*
- 4.
General Observations Procedures The exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements using the GSEP, Dresden Annex to the GSEP, and the Station and Corporate organization 1 s Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). Licensee Response The licensee 1 s overall response was coordinated, orderly, and timel Had scenario events been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to allow State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safet Observers Licensee observers and four NRC observers monitored and critiqued
- the exercis * Exercise Critiques The licensee held critiques following the exercise on March 1, 198 The NRC exit interview was conducted o~ March 2, 198.
Specific Observations a. * Control Room The Shift Engineer (SE), Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE},
and Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) exhibited good teamwork in recognizing and responding to changing plant conditions indicated by scenario dat Technical Speci.fications and relevant abnormal operating procedures and emergency plan implementing procedures (EPIPs) were effectively utilize At 8:50 a.m., the SE quickly and correctly classified an Alert, with the SCRE providing good assistance in determining the appropriate Emergency Action Level (EAL).
The SCRE completed the initial notification of State agencies within ten minute Activation of the onsite emergency organization was automatically initiated at the Al~rt declaratio By 9:15 a.m., two supplemental communicators had arrived in the Control Room and had established dedicated communications links to the Technical *Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC).
Adequate communications were maintained with the*facilities during the exercis The Operations Duty Supervisor and future Station Director (SD) arrived in the Control Room shortly after the Alert declaratio Both did a good job of interfacing with onshift personnel without disrupting the crew*s responses to changing plant condition Both managers had received a thorough understanding of past and current scenario events prior to the TSC becoming fully operationa *
Initial notification of the NRC was accompl_ished about twenty-five minutes after the State notificatio The licensee has recently made copies of the Event Notification Worksheet available in the Control Room to facilitate and better document conversations with NRC duty officer While this initial notification was within one hour of the emergency declaration, its timeliness was adversely affected by changing plant conditions requiring attention and by some apparent unfamiliarity with the worksheet, which took over ten minutes to complet However, one participant had earlier made a technically incorrect remark to the effect that one full hour could elapse after a*declaration before NRC notification was require Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Onshift personnel should be instructed on the regulatory requirement's emphasis on initially notifying the NRC immediately after State and local agency notification The sooner the NRC is notified, the better its response can coincide with any activations of licensee, State, and local emergency response organization *
The licensee should provide additional familiarization trainin~ to onshift personnel on the Event Notification Workshee The licensee's caller should advise the NRC duty officer whenever a completed worksheet is being used to help communicate a messag Operational Support Center (OSt). and Inplant Teams The OSC became fully operational with adequate staff soon after the Alert declaratio A contamination control point was established and staffed at the lunchroom entrance to the OSC, where returning inplant*
teams checked themselves for contamination before entering the facilit Prohibited access to other OSC entrances was well enforce OSC habitability was also ensured by the continuous operation of a survey instrument in the dosimetry issue room of the OS Sup~rvisory personnel used a status board to track inplant team assignments and result A sequence of events status board, supplemented by messages broadcast from the TSC over an intercom system, kept OSC staff sufficiently aware of scenario events and major decision Inplant teams were adequately briefed on assigned tasks and any relevant radiation hazard Given the limited extent of simulated onsite radiological hazards in this scenario, maintenance teams had
. adequate dosimetry and were accompanied, when appropriate, by Radiation Chemical Technicians (RCTs) equipped with survey instruments. *Teams observed while on assignment demonstrated adequate understandings of their tasks and took proper precautions for any associated industrial safety or actual radiation.hazard *
This utility-only exercise included the response to a worker who had supposedly received a minor cut on the knee while exiting a contaminated are Upon receiving the injury report, onshift personnel notified the appropriate TSC director who then contacted the OS An adequately staffed and equipped first aid team was quickly dispatche At the accident scene, the team exhibited some uncertainty about the extent of the injury, given the large amount of red liquid on the victim's clothing.. The team radioed that an ambulance was needed to transport the victim to *a local hospital for treatment of a severe leg injur This request was correctly blocked by exercise controller The first aid team should have made better efforts to question the victim and her co-workers on their understandings of the extent of injur The team demonstrated greater concern for the injured person as opposed to such radiation
. hazards as the potential for spreading contamination on themselves or along the route used to transport the victim by stretcher to the Decori Roo An RCT made preliminary surveys of the accident scene before and after the victim was transporte The route to the Decon Room was surveyed soon after the victim was move Survey results were radioed to OSC staff, who had the Decon Room readied to receive the victi The portion of the corridor between the Reactor Building and the Decon Room was roped off for contamination control purpose Had events been real, this was a necessary practic However, it caused some confusion to passersby not i nvo 1 ved in the dri 1 In the Decon Room, smear ~amples of the wound area were taken before and after simulated decontaminatio The final samples were not bagged and labele The same piece of gauze used to wipe the area around the decontaminated wound was then used to wipe the victim's*
gloved hand Although the person taking the smear samples wore gloves, the RCT who received the samples for further processing.did not use gloves or indicate that he was simulating wearing glove Ba~ed on th~ above findings, this portion of ~he licensee's ~rogram was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
To minimize confusion to nonparticipants, onsite ~reas identified as being contaminated only for drill purposes should be posted accordingl *
Additional training shouldbe provided on the prope*r techniques for collecting, handling, and storing samples taken when treating minor injuries where contamination was present or suspecte Technical Support Center (TSC)
The internal layout of the TSC has been significantly improved since the last exercis Workstations for the principal Station Group directors were now located in one large room, rather than in three adjacent room Most of the directors were positioned at* a U-shaped
series of desks from which wall-mounted and portable status boards were readily visibl This layout also.facilitated interfacing among the various director A dose assessment computer room was located adjacent to the large* room, while an NRC office area was located on the opposite side of the computer roo All three rooms were separated by movable partition The Station Director (SD) assumed command of onsite emergency response activities within one hour of the Alert declaratio While the SD was being briefed in the Control Room before assuming his lead responsibilities, his communicator effectively managed TSC activation, including compensating for an Operations Director whose arrival was intentionally delayed by exercise controller The TSC staff demonstrated their capability to activate the facility in an efficient manner, pending the orderly transfer of command and control to the S As the scenario progressed, the SD and Corporate Command Center (CCC) Director elected not to exercise their option of transferring command and control to the latte The CCC remained in a support mode to the onsite emergency organizatio This hadno significant adverse impact on the licensee's overall response effort The entire TSC staff adequately demonstrated their capability to manage onsite response activities in a coordinated and orderly manne Station EALs were monitored for the need to change the emergency classificatio Adequately detailed logs were generated to enhance later ~econstruction of the dire~tors' action Status boards were kept current ~ith accurate informatio Communicators were effettively utilized to maintain communications with a 11 response ce 11" of exercise contra 11 ers 1 ocated offs ite, who posed*
the types of questions anticipated from NRC and State emergency response group However, the SD could have assigned lower priorities to responding to the CCC's requests to prepare the Unit 3 post-accident sampling system for use and also forming several offsite survey teams.* Current plant conditions, the low potential for degradation. plus limitations on the available numbers of RCTs posed by the scenario, made prompt compliance with these CCC requests unnecessar The use of real-time, onsite meteorological data presented a realistic challenge to the Rad Chem Director, Environs Director, and their staff Good use was made of an RCT to obtain real-time meteorological data from the Control Room during a temporary loss of capability to acquire these data via compute The computer problem was promptly repaire The scenario did not lead participants to formulate offsite protective action recommendations or.to seriously consider a evacuation of nonessential onsite personne During the exercise, actual wind direction fluctuations resulted in there being five potentially affected downwind sectors. While TSC staff demonstrated the capability to track changing wind conditions, they exhibited difficulty in evaluating these changes, and then informing State officials of the fact that there were five potentially affected
- downwind sectors rather than thre The Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) form was used to transmit information on changes to affected downwind sector The current NARS form is formatted to address downwind sectors in sets of three adjacent sector This limitation of the form may have contributed to the difficulty in recognizing the importance of having to consider five instead of only three sectors in any future protective action decisionmakin Participants were challenged late in the exercise with having to decide whether or not the emergency response actions warranted a change in classification from 11Alert 11 to 11 Recovery, 11 per criteria in the emergency plan and EPIP The SD led his TSC staff in an adequate verbal discussion of the situation per the EPIPs, and arrived at an acceptable conclusio This verbal discussion of classification change and short-term recovery activities was then conveyed by the SD to the CCC staff in a conference cal At that point, TSC participants exhibited uncertainty about what else was to*
be done before exercise terminatio A controlJer directed them to write dqwn a summary of their verbal discussion While the written summary was satisfactory, it lacked detail regarding time and cost estimates for specified maintenance tasks and did not specify emergency organization staffing need Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Additional training should be provided to dose assessment staff on the evaluation of ch~nging meteorological conditions*
and th~ impact of these fluctuations on protective action decisionmakin *
The licensee should interface with appropriate State officials to revise the NARS form to allow greater flexibility in ~pecifying affected downwind sector informatio *
Procedural guidance on recovery planning should be revised to better address the needs to:
document the planning effort; assign task priorities; estimate task completion schedules and costs; and specify short-term staffing need Corporate Command Center (CCC)
The CCC Director, who was also the corporate Nuclear Duty Officer, put CCC staff on standby status following the Alert declaratio He also informed the Senior Vice President of the declaratio At 9:55 a.m., the TSC's SD briefed the CCC Director on scenario event It was agreed that command and control would remain onsite with the SD, while the CCC Director and his staff would function in a support mode as long as deemed necessar After being briefed,.
CCC staff were also required to review relevant procedures prior to contacting their TSC counterpart **
The CCC staff proposed several innovative solutions to cope with scenario condition The nearsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at Mazon, Illinois, was made unusable for this exercise due to simulated impassible road conditions and degraded communications equipmen Should plant conditions later warrant an EOF activation, the Environs Director recommended that the nearsite EOF for the licensee's Quad Cities Station be activated and staffed by personnel from that similarly designed Boiling Water Reactor statio If the Mazon EOF later became acce~sible, a communications engineer formulated a plan to improve its communications capabilities utilizing a temporary antenna and a number of telephone-equipped company vehicles pending restoration of the EOF's permanent communications equipmen The Engineering Director suggested that the condensate demineralizer be used as a source of cooling water to Unit 2, a measure which TSC staff later implemente The CCC staff exhibited a coordinated, determined effort to support the Dresden Station's onsite emergency organizatio However, relevant Unit 2 parameters were not posted in a readily visible locatio CCC staff did not wear available position identification badges, nor were their workstations adequately labele While the CCC Director was aware of the three news releases issued by corporate staff, there was insufficient documentation that.he or a designee had approved all releases prior to issuanc Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:
CCC staff should be readily identifiable by position for the benefit of liaisons from other emergency response organization *
Relevant plant parameters should be posted in a readily visible locatio '*
A 11 press re 1 eases should be documented as approved by the CCC Director or his designe.
Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions Exercise objectives and scenario packages were submitted in accordance with established schedule The licensee was responsive to the few questiofts that the NRC had on scenario dat The scenario was challenging to participants in several respects. *It involved both units, although neither was in the Run Mode for purposes of the exercis Real-time, onsite meteorological data were utilize However, since the simulated emergency warranted only an Alert declaration with little potential for escalation, offsite protective action decisionmaking and evacuation of nonessential onsite personnel were not major concerns to participant A 11 response cell 11 of controllers located offsite was effectively utilized to challenge TSC participants by telephoning the types of questions anticipated from a NRC Base Team or the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety. A high degree of freeplay was allowed, regarding suc activities as prioritizing inplant team activities and dealing with the unavailability of the nearsite EO At 1:10 p.m., a message was issued that instructed participants to decide whether conditions had reached the point where the emergency could be reclassified as being in 11 Recovery 11 per established criteri Several TSC and CCC participants had begun to address this question prior to the message being issue Participants were now forced to answer this reclassification question, rather than being informed by a 11 break message 11 that an artificial time jump of several days had just occurred which placed them in 11 Recovery 11 prior to.their demonstrating recovery plannin *
Based on th~ above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:
The licensee should utilize real-time meteorological data in future utility-only exercises, including scenarios where participants have to demonstrate onsite and offsite protective action decisionmakin.
Exit Interview On March 2, 1988, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Section 1 to present their preliminary inspection finding The licensee agreed t~ consider the items discussed and indicated that none were proprietary in natur Attachments: Scope of Participation Ex~rcise Obj~ctives Narrative Summary
- *.
.;
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATIO~
GSEP EXERCISE March 1, 1988 SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION The March 1, 1988 Dresden GSEP Exercise is a daytime event to test the capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company GSE The Exercise will include mobilization of CECo personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergenc The Exercise is a CECo only event, thus there will be no involvement required by local or State agencie Commonwealth Edison will participate in the Dresden Station Exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization and the. Corporate Command Center as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe, efficient operation of the Dresden Station and other CECo nuclear generating station The EOF and JPIC will not be activated for this Exercise. The only offsite emergency response facility that will be activated will be the Corporate Command Center, which will respond.and activate on a real-time basis in the Exercise scenario event Personnel for the TSC and other on-site par_ticipants will be on-site at Dresden by 0800, the start of the Exercis The Exercise shift will receive the initial scenario information and respond accordingl The "Exercise... Nuclear Duty Person will be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time basi Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose* assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not. actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercis Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent;_
specifically prearranged for the Exercis Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assistance only to* the.extent that the resources. are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Compan A/l/wjm
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION 1988 GSEP EXERCISE March 01, 1988 OBJECTIVES
,,~vr~rott X December 18, 1987 PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:
Demonstrate the capability to implement the Commonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan to protect the public in the event of a major accident at the Dresden Nuclear Power Statio Demonstrate this capability during the hours to qualify as a daytime Exercise in accordance with NRC guidanc SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:
1)
Incident Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL)
has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSEP *
. - (CR, TSC)
2)
Notification and Communication 3731A/wjm Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of declaring an accident classificatio (CR, TSC) Demonstrate the capability to notify the NRC within one (1)
hour of the initial inciden (CR) Demonstrate the capability to contact pertintmt organizations that would normally assist in an emergency, but are not participating in this Exercise *(e.g., INPO, Murray & Trettel, General E~ectric, etc.)
- (TSC, CCC) Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information so that reports may be made to the Emergency News Center for Press release (TSC, CCC)
Demonstrate the information/updates ongoing manne (TSC, CCC)
ability to provide follow-up to the State and NRC in a timely and
- - (Groups that are primarily concerned).
Page 1 of 3
198~ DNPS GSEP EXERCISE OBJECTIVES (cont'd)
_.,..........
December 18, 1987 3)
Radiological Assessment; Demonstrate the capability to protection activites relative Scenario situation (OSC)
conduct to the in-plant radiation specific. Exercise Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper contamination control provision (OSC) Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to implement proper Health Physics practices and dosimetry*
issuance for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OS (OSC) Demonstrate the capability of the Operations Support Center to track and document personnel exposures for OSC personnel and Maintenance Teams dispatched from the OS (OSC) Demonstrate the capability to provide first aid and follow proper decontamination procedures for a
contaminated, injured person not requiring immediate transportation to an offsite medical facility via an ambulanc (OSC) Emergency Facilities; 3731A/wjm Demonstrate the capability to activate the emergency organization and staff the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures during the daytim (CR, OSC, TSC and CCC)
b. *
Demonstrate the capability to record and track major plant status information relative to changing plant exercise events using plant status boards *
. - (CR, OSC, TSC and CCC) Demonstrate the capability to track and document, on status boards and logs, dispatched Operations and Maintenance Team activities and in-plant job statuse Demonstrate the capability to manage the TSC under minimum manning conditions with* the missing Director's normal activities delegated and assigne (TSC)
Page 2 of 3
19&8 DNPS GSEP EXERCISE OBJECTIVES (cont'd)
u
December 18, 1987 S)
Emergency Direction and Control Demonstrate the ability. of the GSEP organization to manage and direct a simulated emergency Exercis (CR, TSC, OSC, CCC) Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to manage their emergency response facilities in the implementation of GSE (CR, OSC, TSC, CCC) Demonstrate the ability Maintenance and Operating emergency plant operatio (CR, OSC, TSC)
to coordinate and prioritize activities during. abnormal and Demonstrate/simulate the ability to requisition, aquire and transport emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant condition (CR, TSC, CCC) Demonstrate the ability to properly document. any special procedures or changes to any procedures, necessitated by the events occuring during the Exercis (CR, TSC, CCC)
6)
Short Range Planning and Recovery:
3731A/wjm Demonstrate the capability to identify priori ties,.
procedures, requirements, program& and policies which would
- be required to stabilize the plant until permanent repairs can be implemented and return the plant to a normal operating statu (TSC and CCC)
- final -
Page 3 of 3
DRESDEN 1~88 GSEP EXERCISE March 1, 1988 NARRATIVE SUMMARY INITIAL COftDITIONS; Time is 0800, Tuesday, March 1st, 198 Temperatures during the night were well below freezing, with a heavy snowfal Roads are icy and drifted shu The day shift and Management are arriving late for wor Both Units are in COLD SHUTDOW Unit 3 is in day 14 of scheduled 12-week refueling and maintenance outag Unit 2 has been off system for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in preparation for a 10 day dual unit outage necessitated by 2/3 Diesel stub shaft modifications and Unit
battery discharge test UNIT 3 CONDITIONS:
The Unit has been de-fueled, with all fuel transported to the Fuel Pool and the Fuel Pool gates and shield blocks in plac The reactor vessel is open with water level maintained at about 12 inches below the flang An inch or two of water has to be added to the vessel once per shift via a clean demin. hose, in order to maintain the desired water leve The reactor cavity has been deconned after drain down; however, problems have been experienced with high dose l~vels coming from the Drywell/Reactor Building bellows seal cavity because of inability to maintain water shielding without almost continuous additio Since Torus and the Torus Basement work -are outage critical path, Work Planning has requested operations to accelerate efforts to locate the source of leakages because there i still minor water intrusion into. the Torus and the Torus Basement is
.
.
wet, highly smearable and airborn Shift crews have been and are extremely busy setting up for the Unit 125 VDC battery discharge test*
(scheduled for day shift-today), taking the 2/3 Diesel OOS (just completed), looking for the water leakage in Unit 3 and the Shutdown sequence on Unit The Drywell and Tqrus are open with the Drywell equipment hatch remove There are no maintenance or contractor personnel in the Drywell; however, a - cleaning crew, under Project and Construction Services supervision, has entered the Toru The use of supplied air and double anti-C, with rain gear is. require *Discharge canal level is being held at 503' for Unit 3 condenser water side inspectio UNIT 2 COftDITIOBS:
- The Unit came off line at 080 Monday (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> previously).
The Unit is at step 59 of DGP 2-Reactor water level is at the bottom of the steam lines, MSIVs are open and moderator temperature is at 205F cooling slowly to 190F in preparation for "Slow Flood".
Reactor flange temperature is at 420F and cooling at 15°F/H RWCU (on Auxiliary Pump),
CRD and Head Spray, and Shutdown Cooling are in service in accordance with the procedure~
The intent is *to continue cooling slowly to 190F while awaiting pre-requisite conditions between moderator and flange
.temperature delta
"T" to permit continuation of vessel forced cool-dow Page 1 of 3 3814A/l/wjm
UNIT 2 CONDITIONS: (cont'd)
The Drywell is de-inerted with initial entry complete The entry disclosed a severe packing leak on the 2301-4 valve, the repair of which required forced cooldown of the vessel and head flange zones currently in progres Both personnel air lock doors are open to allow equipment setup for CRD C-9 replacemen The Reactor Mode Switch is in SHUTDOW The Turbine/Generator is on turning gear with the HP Shell temperature at 350 Severe EHC fluid leakage from #4 CIV has necessitated removing the EHC
- System from service for system maintenance~ The TBCCW head tank fill line is isolated for a 4-hour leak rate test being performed by direction of the Operating Enginee EXERCISE SCENARIO (ALERT)
0800 - 1310 Although plant conditions prior to 0900 do not specifically fall into an established Unusual Event classification, it is likely that an Unusual Event will be declared on the Shift Engineer's discretion due to the deteriorating plant condition At 0800, the temporary hatch cover on the U-3 Isolation Condenser Vent Line has blown of Between 0800 and 0815 Control Room personnel attempt to restar_t Reactor Building. Ventilation Fans which have tripped due to the large Reactor Building dp chang At 0815, A contractor calls the Control Room to report a cold air draft up on the 4th floor of Unit Subsequent* operator investigation reveals that the hatch is gone, and that secondary containment is now los The time estimate to restore secondary containment will be 0915 at the absolute earlies During this time frame, starting at 0835, the Control Room is receiving alarms concerning* a Loss of Service Water in the 2/3 Crib Hous An old 10 inch capped hypochlorite *injection flange has broken off from the Main Service Water Head,er in the 2/3 Crib Hous The break is large enough to result in the total loss of all service water to both unit Back-up equipment malfunctions in the U-1 Crib House further prohibits any partial mitigation of the Service Water loss on Units 2 and Operator and Maintenance responses center on investigating and repairing the damaged Service Water Supply System. Coincidently, with these immediate activities in progress will be the realization of how this service water loss will impact current plant operation Of major concern, * will be U-2 coolant exceeding 212F without secondary containment in effec Additionally, the attempt to quickly establish Primary Containment by closing the U-2 Drywell Interlock Door will be delaye During *this delay, at 0859, u..:..2 Reactor Coolant will exceed 212 Plant conditions, at this time (O~OO), qualify as an _Alert per EAL #3(a).
The me'thods and actions to contro'i U-2 Coolant Temperature will be a major exercise priority **
The loss of Service Water on Units 2 and 3 results in many other plant problem Equipment serviced by RBCCW and TBCCW Systems (which are cooled by service water) now begin to overheat and/or tri As time passes, the U-3 spent fuel pool temperature increase becomes another important.*concern due to a*
potential iodine releas Page 2 of 3 3814A/2/wjm
EXERCISE SCENARIO (ALERT) (cont'd)
0800 - 1310 By 1000, the High Cooling Water Temperature. on the U-2 Service Air Compressor causes it to tri Restoration of the U-2 Service Air System is delayed long enough to require the contractors (on supplied air in the U-3 Torus) to evacuate the work are While leaving the area, a contractor sustains an injury and a call for help is made *to the Control Room's emergency extensio A rescue team is dispatched and the victim is transported to the Oecon area for treatmen Concurrent with the Alert declaration, or upon the OSC's realization that the OSC area may become contaminated, contamination control provisions for the OSC are expected to be establishe From 0900, to the end of this Scenario at 1310, the station will have the latitude to "free-play" the exercis This implies that their actions after 0900 to prioritize, mitigate and control the station situations will be largely their *own and not Scenario directe Therefore, several potential and probable courses of Scenario action have been anticipate The station options from doing nothing to various emergency cool down methods which violate Technical Specification limits have been plotted and charted to supply participants with plant response dat *
It is not anticipated that any particular station course of action will totally sta~ilize and control scenario events by 1310 hours0.0152 days <br />0.364 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.98455e-4 months <br />. It is expected that the station will be acting within one of the perceived "game plans" by 1310 *hrs. when the scenario action stop At this time, 1310, the "Recovery Phase" of the exercise continue The Control Room and OSC activities cease, while the TSC and CCC continue to deal with the station events on a short and long term planning basi RECOVERY PBASE (1310 - 1430)
In the strictest sense of what "Recover" is by definition, * the exercise events by 1310 do not qualify as being in "Recovery".
The nomenclature "Recovery Phase" is used to describe when the actual.
physical plant activities have stoppe It is at this point in the exercise, where the TSC and CCC are required to evaluate the situation as it now exists, and to plan for the continued plant activities necessary to actually 'enter a true "Recovery" *.. Their planning and management of the station emergency will dictate and define how and when a "Recovery" may be entere The submission of their* plan, and schedule of future activities will be
- the participant's last. exercise involvemen The exercise will. be terminated at 143 A/3/wjm Page 3 of 3 (final)