IR 05000220/1990024

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Emergency Preparedness Insp Repts 50-220/90-24 & 50-410/90-22.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Insp & Observation of partial- Participation Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise
ML17056B093
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/29/1990
From: Lancaster W, Lazarus W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17056B092 List:
References
50-220-90-24, 50-410-90-22, NUDOCS 9011090047
Download: ML17056B093 (16)


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NUCI EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

50-220/90-24 Report Nos.

50-410/90-22 50-220 Docket Nos.

50-410 DPR-53 License Nos.

DPR-69 Licensee:

Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 301 Plainfield Road S racuse New Yor k 13212 Facility Name:

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 5 2 Inspection At:

Scriba New Yor k Inspection Conducted:

October 1-3 1990 NRC Team Members:

W.

K. Lancaster, Regional Team Leader date W. Lazarus, Region I E. Hasselberg, NRR R.

Temps, RI B. Cook, SRI Approved by:

W.

.

Laza s,. Chief, Emer ncy Preparedness Section date Ins ection Summar

Ins ection on October 1-3 1990 Re ort Nos. 50-220/90-24 and 50-410/90-22 R

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observation of the licensee's partial-participation annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on October 2, 1990.

The inspection was performed by a team of five NRC Region I and headquarter's personnel.

Results:

No violations were identified.

The licensee's response actions for

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this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

9011090047 9019>

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on October 3, 1990:

L. Burkhardt, Executive Vice President N. Radermancher, Assistant to Executive Vice President R. Sylvia, Senior Vice President S. Wilczek, Nuclear Support Vice President J. Firlit, Nuclear Generation Vice President B. Burtch, Director, Communications and Public Affairs R. Abbott, Unit 2 Plant Manager J.

Conway, Unit 2 Technical Support Manager A. Salemi, Manager, Emergency Preparedness B. Thomson, Manager, Radiation Protection R. Smith, Manager, Training D. Howes, Emergency Preparedness L. Laque, Manager, Maintenance J. Andrews, Emergency Preparedness D. LeCuyer, Emergency Preparedness P. Hartnett, Emergency Preparedness J. Kaminski, Training E. Leach, Senior Generation Specialist During the conduct of the inspection, other.licensee emergency response personnel were inter viewed and observed.

2.0 Emer enc Exercise The Nine Mile Point partial-participation exercise was conducted on October 2, 1990, from 6:00 a.m.

until 2:45 p.m.

2.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives, submitted to the NRC Region I on July 3, 1990 were reviewed and, following revision, were determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.

On July 31, 1990 the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.

Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on September 17, 1990, to discuss the scope and content of the scenario.

As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the licensee.

It was determined that the revised scenario would provide for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Pla,3 NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on October 1, 1990 and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the scenario.

The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and indicated in the scenario that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant

'perations.

The exercise scenario included the following events:

-- Unidentified primary coolant leakage greater than 5 gallons per minute;

-- Fire in the vital DC switchgear;

-- Extended loss of vital DC power; Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA);

-- Activation of Emergency Resp'onse Facilities;

-- Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment; Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency classifications; and

-- Management of recovery operations.

The above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency response facilities.

2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities.

The following activities were observed:

2.

3.

4, 5.

6.

Detection, classification, and assessment of the scenario events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response; Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies; Communications/information flow, and record keeping; Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; Provisions for in-plant radiation protection;

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7.

8.

9.

3.0 Exercise Observations Performance of offsit'e and in-plant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control; Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 10.

Provisions for communicating information to the public; and ll.

Management of recovery operations.

The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activations of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures.

3.1 Exercise Stren ths The team also noted the following actions that provided strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:

-The Technical Support Center (TSC) Director exercised good command and control in the TSC;

-The TSC Director conducted good staff briefings and maintained frequent communications with other emergency response facilities;

-The TSC staff developed a number of innovative solutions to a multitude of equipment problems;

-The TSC staff was able to trend and to project plant accident conditions through the exceptional use of their status and trending boards;

-The Radiological Assessment Manager, located in the TSC, demonstrated an exceptional knowledge of plant operations and emergency procedures.

This knowledge allowed him to anticipate problems and recommend offsste protective actions based upon his projection of degrading conditions;

-The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Director exercised good command and control in the EOF;

-The EOF staff had good communications and interactions with each other (especially between Technical Assessment, Radiological Assessment and the Recovery Manager);

and-The EOF Director conducted good staff briefings and notifications of his staff.

3.2 Exercise Weaknesses The team identified the following weaknesses that could have precluded the effective implementation of the Emergency Plan (as observed in the EOF) in the event of an actual emergency:

-Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) were made by the EOF to the state and county at a Site Area Emergency declaration,

even though the definition of a Site Area Emergency indicates that the licensee believes there is no risk to the population beyond the site boundary.

Contributing to this weakness, the General Emergency declaration was not declared as early as it could have been, based upon degrading plant conditions (core melt sequence)

with little hope of reversing the situation.

This item is an Exercise Weakness (50-220/90-24-01 and 50-410/90-22-01);

and-The EOF should have been more conservative in making PARs for Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) located on either side of the projected plume pathway.

Too much confidence was placed in the ability to precisely predict plume pathway.

As a result of an undetected wind shift, the plume went through an ERPA for which no PAR had initially been made.

This item is an Exercise Weakness (50-220/90-24-02 and 50-410/90-22-02).

The existence of these weaknesses does not preclude an overall finding that the health and safety of the public could be protected.

These exer cise weaknesses will be specifically re-evaluated in a subsequent drill or exercise.

3.3 Areas For Im rovement The NRC team identified the following areas which did not have a

significant negative impact on overall performance during the exercise, but should be evaluated for corrective action.

The licensee conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise which also identified these areas:

-The TSC staff did not appear to have any procedure for estimating/assessing core damage other then one based on the post accident sample.

No procedure or computational aids were used in the TSC to estimate a fraction of core damage based upon any correlation with the percent and duration of fuel uncovery, drywell H, concentrations, drywell radiation levels, off-site unfiltered release's with known flow rates, etc.;

and-The Operational Support Center (OSC) experienced undue delay in getting teams into radiological controlled areas because of a cumbersome Radiological Work Permit (RWP) process.

4.0 Exit Meetin and NRC Criti ue Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report.

Team observations made during the exercise were summarize C

The licensee was informed that no violations were observed.

Although there were exercise weaknesses identified, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of the public.

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