IR 05000220/1982002
| ML20050A754 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1982 |
| From: | Doerflein L, Sharon Hudson, Kister H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050A750 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-82-02, 50-220-82-2, NUDOCS 8204020235 | |
| Download: ML20050A754 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Region I 82-02 Report No.
Docket No.
50-220
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DPR-63 C
License No.
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Category Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West
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Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted: February 8-28, 1982 Inspectors: Mb. ddm 3 /o/P2 S. D. Hudson, Resident Inspector dats signed b./re
.h 3 bo k3 m
_L. T. Doerflein, Resieent Inspector date' signed l
date signed i
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Approved by:
H. B. Kister', Chief, Reactor Projects
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Section 1C Inspection Summary:
Inspection on February 8-28, 1982 (Inspection Report No. 50-220/82-02)
Areas Inspected:_ Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the resident inspectors (91 hours0.00105 days <br />0.0253 hours <br />1.50463e-4 weeks <br />3.46255e-5 months <br />). Areas insracted included:
licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, physical security, plant tours, surveillance tests, safety system verification, licensee event reports, licensee action on Bulletins and Circulars, and periodic reports.
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Results:
No violations were identified in the areas inspected.
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Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8204020235 820315 PDR ADOCK 05000220 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted J. Aldrich, Supervisor, Operations W. Chambers, Security Investigator K. Dahlberg, Site Maintenance Superintendent W. Drews, Technical Superintendent J. Duell, Supervisor, Chemistry and Radiation Protection E. Leach, Superintendent of Chemistry and Radiation Management T. Perkins, General Superintendent, Nuclear Generation R. Raymond, Supervisor, Fire Protection
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T. Roman, Station Superintendent B. Taylor, Supervisor, Instrument and Control K. Zollitsch, Superintendent, Training The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including shift supervisors, administrative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and
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control and contractor personnel.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed)
INFRACTION (80-05-06): Access control to vital areas. The inspector verified that signs are posted at the entrance to vital areas to remind personnel of proper entrance procedures. This procedure is also stressed during both initial security indoctrination and annual general employee training.
(Closed) VIOLATION (81-01-02):
Failure to follow radiation protection procedures. The inspector verified the proper procedures for the use of Radiation Work Permits and contamination control was stressed with the
personnel involved. The inspector also observed that the snow plow is no longer parked inside the restricted area.
(Closed) VIOLATION (81-27-03):
Failure to properly maintain Control Room Log Book. The inspector verified that an entry has been made to the Control Room Log Book describing the sudden change in reactor recirculation flow.
Through discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector detennined that the need for maintaining complete and accurate logs was emphasized with the Control Room operators.
(Closed)
INFRACTION (78-11-01):
Failure to assess the scope of the QA Program through the triennial review of QA policy manuals. As stated in its response to the infraction, the licensee submitted FSAR Supplement 13, Quality Assurance Program, to NRR on July 30, 1979. This supplement deleted the requirement that management review and reissue QA policy manuals every i
three years. For the three manuals identified in the infraction, two of them, Quality Assurance Manual for Nuclear Reactors and Associated Electric Generating Facilities-Operating Phase, and Quality Assurance Manual for
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Nuclear Reactors and Asscciated Electric Generating Facilities-Design and Construction are not referenced in Supplement 13 and are no longer used at Nine Mile Point, Unit 1.
The third manual, Quality Control Manual for i
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Nine Mile Point Nuclear Site-Operating Phase, has been incorporated into the Quality Assurance Procedures.
3.
Operation Safety Verification a.
Control Room Observations
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Routinely throughout the inspection period, the inspector independently
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verified plant parameters and tquipment availability of engineered
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safeguard features against a plant specific checklist to ensure the following items were observed:
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Proper control room manning;
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Availability and proper valve line-up of safety systems; Availability and proper alignment of onsite and offsite
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emergency power sources;
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Reactor control panel indications and bypass switches;
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Core thennal limits;
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Primary containment temperature and pressure;
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Drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure;
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Stack monitor recorder traces; and I
Liquid poison tank level and concentration.
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Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and shift manning on both day and backshifts. Shift turnover checklists and log review by the oncoming and off-going shifts were also observed by the inspector.
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The inspector directly observed portions of routine power operations to ensure adherence to approved procedures.
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Review of Logs and Operating Records The inspector reviewed the following logs and instructions for the period February 8, 1982 through February 28, 1982:
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Control Room Log Book
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Station Shift Supervisor's Log Book
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Station Shift Supervisor's Instructions
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Licensee Event Report Log
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Reactor Operating Log The logs and instructions were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operation;
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Detect changes and trends in performance;
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Detect possible conflicts with technical specifications or
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regulatory requirements; Determine that records are being reviewed as required;
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Assess the effectiveness of the communications provided by the logs and instructions; and Determine that the reporting requirements of technical specifications
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are met.
No violations were identified.
4.
Observation of Physical Security The inspector made observations and verified during regular and off-shift hours that selected aspects of the plants physical security system were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plan and approved procedures.
The following observations. relating to physical security were made:
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The security force on both regular and off-shifts were properly manned and appeared capable of performing their assigned functions.
Protected area barriers were intact - gates and doors closed and locked
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if not attended.
Communication checks were conducted. Proper communication devices
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were available.
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Isolation zones were free of visual obstructions and objects that could
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aid an intruder in penetrating the protected area and during periods of darkness, the protected area had sufficient illuminatica.-
Persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area.
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Vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted or controlled
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within the protected area.
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Persons within the protected area displayed photo-identification
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badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring escort were properly escorted.
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Compensatory measures'were implemented during periods of equipment failure.
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No 'iolations were identified.
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Plant Tours During the inspection period, the inspector made multiple tours of plant areas to make a independent assessment of equipment conditions, radiological conditions, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements. The following areas were among those inspected:
Turbine Building
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Auxiliary Control Room Vital Switchgear Rooms
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Yard Areas
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Radwaste Area
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Diesel Generator Rooms
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Screen House Reactor Building
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The following items were observed or verified:
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Radiation Protection:
Personnel monitoring was properly conducted.
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Randomly selected radiation protection instruments were calibrated
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and operable.
Radiation Work Permit requirements were being followed.
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Area surveys were properly conducted and the Radiation Work Permits
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were appropriate for the as-found conditions. The inspector witnessed the performance of radiation survey #N62302 on the I
Reactor Building elevation 237 ft.
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b.
Fire Protection:
Randomly selectsd fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected
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on schedule.'
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i Fire d' cars were unobstructed and in their proper position.
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j Ignition scurces and cmbustible materials were controlled in
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accordance with the licensee's approved procedures.
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Equipment Controls:
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Jumpers and equipment tag outs did not conflict with Technical
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Specification requirements.
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Conditions requiring the use of jumpers received prompt licensee
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attention.
i The inspector independently verified that tag out #RMU 134002 on
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- 13 reactor recircuhtfor., pump had'been oroperly placed.
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Vital Instrumentation:
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Selected instruments ahpeared fu'nctional and demonstrated f
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a parameters within Technicti Specification Limiting Conditio.ns'
for Oper,ation.
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Radioactive Waste System Controls:
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Gaseous releases were monitored and recorded.
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j The radioactive waste system was operated in adcordance with
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approved procedures.
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The inspector witnessed the survey of radioactive waste shipment
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- 02820ll6A prior to departure from the site. The shipment consisted
of 117 Curies of dewatered resins and contaminated scrap material.
l The inspector also verified that the Radioactive Shipment Record Form was properly completed.
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Housekeeping:
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness'were in accordance with approved
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licensee programs.
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6.
Surveillanc[ Tests
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During the inspection period, the inspector v,itnessed the performance of
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various surveillance tests. Observations were made to verify that:
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Surveillance procedures conform to technical sp'ecification requirements
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and have been properly approved.
Test instrumentation is calibrated.
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Limiting conditions for operations for removing equipment from
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service are met.
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Testing is performed by qualified personnel.
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Surveillance schedule is met.
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Test results met technical specification requirements.
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Appropriate corrective action is initiated, if necessary.
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Equipment is properly restored to service following the test.
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The following tests were included in this review:
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IP-90.4, " Pressure Transmitter," Revision 0, dated February 21, 1980.
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l The inspector witnessed the calibration of the drywell wide range pressure indication, PT 201.3-484 perfomed on February 19, 1982.
PSP-1, " Reactor Water Sampling and Analysis," Revision 3, dated
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July 29, 1980, performed on February 24, 1982. The inspector noted
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P that the gamma well counter used for determining reactor water gross activity was due for its quarterly calibration on February 12, 1982.
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After this was brought to the licensee's attention, a calibration was
performed en February 26, 1982.
I IMP-NEU-2, " Intermediate Range Monitor Instrument Channel Calibration,"
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j Revision 3, dated January ll, 1982. The inspector witnessed the
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calibration of IRM channel #11, performed on February 26, 1982.
i No violations were identified.
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7.
Safety System Operability Verification
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On a sampling basis, the inspector directly examined selected safety system
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trains to verify that the systems were properly aligned in the standby mode.
This examination included:
Verification that each accessible valve in the flow path is in the l
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I correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote
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position indication.
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l Verification that power supply breakers are aligned for components
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j that must actuate upon receipt of an initiation signal.
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Visual inspection of the major components for leakage, proper
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lubrication, cooling water supply, and other general conditions that
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might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.
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Verification by observation that instrumentation essential to system
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actuation or perfomance was operational.
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During this inspection period, the following systems were examined:
Emergency Ventilation System
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Reactor Protection and Battery Charging Motor Generator Sets
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The inspector also conducted a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the Core Spray System #12.
In addition to the above items, the inspector verified that the containment isolation function of this system was in the
proper standby line-up. This includes:
Manual valves are shut, capped, and locked as appropriate.
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Motor operated or air operated valves are not mechanically blocked and
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power is available as appropriate.
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l There are no visual leakage paths between the containment and the
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isolation valves.
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During the walkdown of the Core Spray System #12, the inspector noted the j
following:
I A 3/4" instrument root valve (CRS-10ll) was missing the packing gland
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follower nuts and the follower was not in place. When notified by the inspector, the licensee promptly replaced the packing gland follower and missing nuts.
i A 3/4" line and manual valve located between the isolation valve and the
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first check valve in the core spray keep full system were not on the P&ID.
The licensee stated that this valve would be added to the P&ID. The inspector will verify that the P&ID has been corrected during a subsequent inspection.
(220/82-02-01)
The Core Spray Pump Strainers were not bolted to their ctacrete supports
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and were raised apprcximately 1/4" off the supports apparently due to the additional supports placed on the piping on both sides of the strainers.
A licensee representative stated that he would investigate the reason why the strainers were not resting on or bolted to the concretc supports. The
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inspector will review these findings during a subsequent inspection.
(220/82-02-02)
8.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
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LER's submitted to NRC:RI were reviewed to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LER's were reviewed:
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LER No.
Event Date Subject j
81-48 October 19, 1981 Repair #11 Liquid Poison Pump
The inspector witnessed this repair. Details in IR #81-27.
81-49 November 12, 1981 Repair Snubber #29-HS-6
The inspector witnessed this repair.
Details in IR #81-28, i
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81-50 July 15, 1981 Repair #11 R. B. Vent Monitor The inspector has reviewed the licensee actions concerning this repair.
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Details in IR #81-27.
81-51 November 9, 1981 Failure to meet radiation
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detection sensitivity limit for fish samples 81-52 August 12, 1981 Failure of relief valve thermocouple 81-53 November 20, 1981 Isolation of #11 & #12 Emergency Condensers 81-54 December 21, 1981 Exceeded average planar linear heat generation rate 82-01 Void LER 82-01 was written to report the replacing of packing in #13 feedwater Booster Pump (a component of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System). The Site Operations Review Committee reviewed this event and determined that it was not reportable as a LER.
Technical, Specifications 6.9.2.b.2 states that preventative maintenance items that require operation in a degraded mode permitted by.a limiting
condition for operation are not reportable. The licensee stated that the replacing of packing in safety related valves and pumps is considered to be preventative maintenance, and therefore, these items are not reportable as LER's. The inspector has verified that this is allowable
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in accordance with Technical Specifications.
The licensee also acknowledged his responsibility to ensure that all requirements of the limiting conditions for operating including testing of redundant components were met prior to beginning preventative maintenance on safety related systans.
LER No.
Event Date Subject
- 82-03 February 4, 1982 Overflow of cleanup sludge tank
- 82-04 February 7, 1982 Complete loss of 115 KV power 82-05 February 8, 1982 Repair of 115 KV breaker
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For the LER's selected for onsite review (denoted by asterisks above),
the inspector verified that appropriate corrective action was taken or
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responsibility assigned and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and did not
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constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.
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Report accuracy, compliance with current reporting requirements and
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i applicability to other site systems and components were also reviewed.
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LER 82-03, Overflow of Cleanup Sludge Tank.
On February 4, 1982, while backwashing a reactor water cleanup filter to the cleanup sludge tank, I
the sludge tank overflowed to the reactor building ventilation system.
This caused the reactor building ventilation to isolate and automatically initiated the Emergency Ventilation System.
The water and sludge in the ventilation duct leaked out on to the floor at four elevations of the
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Reactor Building causing airborne and surface contamination.
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The inspector reviewed stack monitor recorder traces and analysis of I
stack particulate and carbon filters to determine that no significant
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off-site release occurred. The licensee initially notified the NRC via the Emergency Notification System even though the event was not i
classified as an " Unusual Event" per the Emergency Procedures. The inspector monitored the decontamination efforts to ensure that proper radiological controls were used.
The cause of overflowing the tank was due to a level indicator that was not placed in service. The licensee has stated that the operating procedure will be revised to ensure that the level indicator is in service and the tank is pumped down prior to backwash operations. The inspector will review the licensee's action at a later inspection.
(220/82-02-03)
LER 82-04, Loss of 115 KV Reserve Power. On February 7, 1982. during
normal full power operations, the plant experienced a complete 115 KV reserve power. The loss was due to routine off-site breaker testing and a simultaneous fault causing the opening of a breaker supplying the other 115 KV line.
Both emergency diesel generators automatically started and energized the emergency busses.
All emergency systems functioned as designed during the event. The emergency busses remained powered from the diesel generators for about 30 minutes after which the busses were restored to the normal off-site 115 KV reserve power.
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One reactor recirculation puwp tripped as designed during the loss of power but now it will not restart. The inspector independently verified that the licensee meets the requirements of Technical Specifications for operation with one recirculation loop isolated.
The faulty ground directio..al relay that caused the loss of 115 KV power was repaired on February 8, 1982. Repair of the recirculation pump is not scheduled at this time.
No violations were identified.
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Licensee Action on IE Bulletins and Circulars a.
IE Bulletins The inspector reviewed licensee action on the following Bulletins to verify that:
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Written response was within the stated time period and contained l
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the required information.
i Written response includes adequate corrective action commitments.
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Licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to
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appropriate onsite management.
Information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate.
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Corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the j
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written response.
The following Bulletins are closed:
Bulletin 79-04, Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured i
by Velan Engineering Corporation In a letter dated May 1,1979, the licensee reported that there were no 3, 4 or 6 inch diameter Velan Swing Check Valves installed in seismic Category I piping systems at Nine Mile Point. The inspector had no additional questions in this area.
Bulletin 79-09, Failure of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems This Bulletin addressed failures of undervoltage (UV) trip devices in i
GE Type AK-2 breakers due to inadequate preventative maintenance programs.
In its response dated May 7, 1979, the licensee stated that no GE Type AK-2 breakers with undervoltage trip devices were used at Nine Mile Point.
The response also stated that GE Type AK-2 breakers with shunt trip devices were used in safety related systems and that a preventative maintenance program was already established for this type breaker. The inspector
reviewed N1-MPM-Cl2, "600 V (Type AK-2A-15/25) Breaker / Motor Inspection,"
including the data sheets for the last four years, to verify that a preventative maintenance schedule was established and adhered to for the GE Type AK-2 breakers and that the maintenance procedure referenced the GE power circuit breaker instruction manual. The inspector had no additional quest' ions in this area.
Bulletin 79-10, Requalification Training Program Statistics In a letter dated May 21, 1979, the licensee provided the training statistics requested by the Bulletin. The inspector had no additional questions in this area.
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Bulletin 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems In a letter dated July 9, 1979, the licensee reported that no
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Westinghouse Type DB-50 or 0B-75 circuit breakers were used in any safety system. The inspector had no additional questions
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Bulletin 79-23, Potential Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator Field
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Exciter Transfonner
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This Bulletin addressed potential excitation power transformer (EPT)
damage or failure if the neutral of the generator and the neutral of the primary vindings of the EPT are connected.
In its response dated l
October 26, 1979, the licensee stated that this condition existed on
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the Nine Mile Point Emergency Diesel Generators and further stated i
that the neutral connection of the EPT for each diesel generator would be reconnected to float the neutral and that each diesel would be run for a twenty-four hour full load test after the transfonner reconnection.
The inspector reviewed work requests no's. 11633 and 11634 and Quality Control Inspection Report No. 79-1457 to verify that the EPT primary neutral was floated on each diesel generator. To ccnfirm the full load test was performed in accordance with the requirements in the Bulletin, the inspector reviewed the data taken during the Dnergency Diesel Generator Manual Start and 24 Hour Operation Test performed on December 26-27, 1979 and January 5-6, 1980 for the No. 103 and 102 Diesel Generators respectively. The inspector had no further questions
in this area.
Bulletin 79-25, Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems In a letter dated November 26, 1979, the licensee reported that there
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are no Westinghouse BFD or NBFD relays installed in safety-related systems. The inspector had no additional questions in this area.
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Bulletin 80-21, Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcohm Foundry Company, Inc.
In a letter dated January 14, 1981, the licensee reported that there
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are no Malcohm Foundry Company parts in valves used at Nine Mile Point, Unit 1.
The inspector had no additional questions in this area.
b.
IE Circulars For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
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Circulars were received by licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that appropriate corrective actions were taken. The following IE Circulars are closed:
IEC 79-08,- Attempted Extortion-Low Enriched Uranium
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IEC 79-13, Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors
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IEC 79-18, Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety-Related Valves
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IEC 79-22, Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves
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10. Review of Periodic Reports The following reports were reviewed to determine that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications are being met and that plant operationr are accurately reported:
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Monthly Operating Reports for December 1981 and January 1982.
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No violations were identified, 11. Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
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