IR 05000219/1989017
| ML19325D560 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1989 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325D556 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-89-17, NUDOCS 8910250037 | |
| Download: ML19325D560 (12) | |
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IL U. S. REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION I
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P Report No.
50-219/89-17 t
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Docket No,'
50-219
, license No, CpR-16-Priority --
Category.C
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' Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation
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1 Upper Pond Road Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Facility Name:' Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection Conducted: July'30. 1989. - September 2. 1989
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Participating Inspectors:
M. Banerjee, Resident Inspector E. Collins, Senior Resident In;pector D.'Lew, Resident Inspector'
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' Approved By:
C. Copgil, Chief-Date Reactor Pro e6ts Section 48
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Inspection Summary: Inspection July 30 - September 2,1989 (Report No. 50-219/89-17)
Areas Inspected: -135 hours of onsite inspection was performed by resident inspectors.
The areas inspected included observation and review of plant
operational events (paragraphs 2.0, 4.0, and 10.0), efforts to reduce heat
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exchanger radiation levels (paragraph 8.0), observations of surveillance performance (paragraph 5.0), review of emergency service water system problems (paragraph 2.0), maintenance observations (paragraph 6.0) and review of
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previously opened inspection findings (paragraph 11.0).
.A safety system function team inspection of the containment spray / emergency service water system was conducted by NRC during this inspection period. The inspection findings are being addressed in a separate inspection report.
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8910250037 891010 T'-
PDR ADOCK 05000219 L
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Results: Overall, the plant was operated in a safe manner. The control room operators continued to perform in a professional and effective manner.
The response to a loss of all telephone communications was prompt and effective.
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- Operating personnel responded quickly to take the main transformer off line when transformer auxiliary equipment was lost.
The licensee replaced'the
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emergency service water (ESW) system pump 52B and the keep fill check valve, and cleaned an ESW system flow instrument.
Two previously open inspection items were closed, t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1.0 Personnel Contacted........-...............
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'2.0 ; Plant Operational Review...................
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2.1 Review of Operational Events................
iR 2.2 Control Room Observations.................
2. 3 Fa c i l i ty To u r s......................
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3.0 Emergency Service Water Pump Replacement...........3 g.,
y 4.0 Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specification......
5.0 Monthly Surveil'1ance Observation...............
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-6.0 ' Monthly Maintenance Observation..........,.....
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7.0 : Engineered Safeguards System Walkdown.............6 8.0 Radiological Control s
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8.1 Radiation Protection Observation.............
8.2 Radiation Reduction....................
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s 9.0 Security Observations.....................
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10.0 Loss of M1A Main Transformer Cooling.............7
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11.0 Previously Opened Inspection Findings.............
12.0' Inspection Hours Summary..
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13. 0 Ex i t Me e t i n g.........................
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DETAILS 1.0 Personnel Contacted Licensee Personnel (
- R. Brown, Radwaste Operations Manager T. Brownridge, Construction G. Busch, Licensing Manager E. Fitzpatrick, Vice President & Director T. Genna, MCF - I & C A. Hawley, Plant Operations Engineering M. Kapil, Plant Engineering
- D. Larsen, MCF Training Coordinator
- D. Ranft, Plant Engineering
- J. Rogers, Licensing
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- A. Rone, Plant Engineering Director R. Sullivan, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- I. Wazzan, Emergency Planner K. Wolf, Rad Engineering Mgr.
NRC Personnel
- M. Banerjee, Resident Inspector
- E. Collins, Senior Resident Inspector
- 0. Lew, Resident Inspector Denotes. attendance at exit meeting.
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2.0 Plant Operational Review (71707)
2.1 Review of Operational Events
The inspector reviewed details associated with key operational events which occurred during the report period. A summary of these inspection activities follows.
Increasing Carbon-Monoxide In the Main Transformer On August 4, increasing carbon-monoxide (CO) concentrations were detected in the main transformer.
The licensee responded by reducing generator load from the administrative limit of 425 MWe to 375 MWe, This power reduction was taken as a precautionary measure since C0 concentrations were increasing at a higher rate than expected. After load reduction, the results of subsequent oil sample analysis showed that C0 concentrations had stabilized.
Ti.e generator load limit was then increased to 400 MWe on 8/10/89.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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HFARelay(40500)
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I On 8/12/89 during surveillance testing, a high reactor pressure scram
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relay in the reactor protection system showed some anomalies.
I Although the HFA relay was deenergized and performed its required function, the technician observed that the relay fingers did not fully move to the de-energized position. The licensee replaced the relay, generated a deviation report, and sent the affected relay to
Plant Engineering for evaluation, j
i This relay had exhibited a similar response, although to a lesser
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degree, during a previous surveillance test.
The relay response was
attributed to improper adjustment of the spring compression screw.
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The licensee considers this anomaly an isolated event because it is
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the first to be observed at Oyster Creek.
The relay' manufacturer is
E being consulted in regard to this observation. The inspector had no l
other questions regarding the operability of the reactor protection
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Communication System Failure (93702)
On August 21at 11:15 a.m., Oyster Creek lost telephone communication
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. capability, including the dedicated Emergency Notification System i
(ENS) and Health Physics Network (HPN) lines.
Telephone lines in the-i vicinity of the plant remained functional.
The GPU system microwave i
channels were available, as were the radio channels with county, i
local police ~, and the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) including i
the link to New Jersey State from the EOF.
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The licensee opened 25 internal microwave channels to exterior lines f
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Instru:tions
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l were provided to the control room and personnel on the emergency plan
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call out list. The microwave system was used to complete the NRC
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L notification.
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It appears that loss of communication resulted from a construction l
accident which caused problems in the AT&T trunk line leading to the
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l Forked River central office. Communication capabilities were
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returned around 4:15 p.m. the same day.
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The resident inspector followed the licensee's response to the event found it timely and effective.
The licensee indicated that they would ask AT&T if capability existed to separate plant communication f
channels in more than one trunk cables.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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2.2 Control Room Observations Routine tours of the control room were conducted by the inspectors during which time the following documents were reviewed:
Control Room and Group Shift Supervisor's Logs;
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Technical Specification Log;
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Control Room and Shift Supervisor's Turnover Check Lists;
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Reactor Building and Turbine Building Tour Sheets;
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Equipment Control Logs;
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Standing Orders; and,
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Operational Memos and Directives.
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I No unacceptable conditions were identified.
2.3 Facility Tours Routine tours of the facility were conducted by the inspectors to make an assessment of the equipment conditions, personnel safety, and procedural adherence and regulatory requirements. -The following areas are among those inspected
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Turbine Building
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I Vital Switchgear Rooms
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Cable Spreading Room
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IL Diesel Generator Building
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Reactor Building
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Minor deficient conditions identified to the licensee were promptly l
corrected.
No other unacceptable conditions were identified.
l 3.0 Emergency Service Water Pump Replacement (93702)
On 8/17/89 the licensee declared Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump 52C j
inoperable when the pump did not develop adequate differential pressure j
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during a surveillance test.
It was concluded the ESW System II " keep L
full" check valve from the plant Service Water System was leaking.
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ESW System II was declared inoperable.
After determining that the check valve had worn seating surfaces, the licensee decided to replace the valve.
The keep fill line was isolated and ESW pump 52C was started and l,
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operated continuously to maintain the discharge line. full. With the pump operating continuously, the system was considered operable. After i
replacement of the check valve on' August 23, the keep full system was j
returned to service.-
j On 8/22/89 during surveillance testing, ESW pump 52B was declared inoperable when it did not develop adequate differential pressure.
In order to expedite corrective action, the licensee decided to replace pump 52B and remove the flow instrument (annubar) to check for plugging at the same time.
ESW pump 52B was replaced and the annubar flow element was
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'7 cleaned and reinstalled.
The licensee completed a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> run on pump
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52B, verified system operability and declared the ESW System I operable on 8/27/89.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's immediate corrective actions, the changes in pump and system performance after replacement of pump 528, and the cleaning of the flow instrument.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
4.0 Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications (93702, 61726)
On August 4, both the "B" and "C" channels for the Main Steam Line
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Radiation Monitors failed their quarterly calibration check (procedure 621.3.009).
The licensee declared the channels inoperable and initiated a plant shutdown in accordance with technical specifications.
Power was
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' initially lowered at a rate of 25 MW electric per hour; however, when it.
I was determined the.t the channels could be celibrated within a short time
frame, the rate of power decrease was reduced to 10 MW electric per hour, i
l The channels were calibrated approximately four hours after the plant l
shutdown was initiated.
The quarterly calibration check was performed l
satisfactorily and the plant shutdown was terminated.
l The inspector observed the calibration of the channels (procedure 621.3.031) and the quarterly surveillance. The inspector noted that caly
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' the high calibration check was performed after completing the calibration.
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After the acceptability of performing a portion of the calibration check was reviewed, the Group Shift Supervisor decided to perform the entire
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surveillance.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
The licensee consulted with General Electric and other utilities on the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitoring System.
Preliminary review indicates that General Electric's (GE) recommended tolerance of three percent may be too restrictive. The radiation monitoring instrumentation was installed recently dering the 12R outage.
The previous instrumentation had a tolerance of 30 percent.
During the calibration check, the
"B" and "C" channels' high calibration readings were 9.4 exponent 4 and 9.21 exponent
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4 counts per second (cps), respectively. The acceptance criteria is be-tween 9.7 exp 4 and 1.03 exp 5 cps.
Final resolution by GE is still pending, i
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The inspector reviewed the technical specification requirement for the actuation of protective function on main steam line high radiation, i
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Technical specifications require actuation to be set at less than or equal f
i to' ten times the normal background radiation at rated power. This i
setpoint conservatively corresponds to 850 cps. The licensee has'added i
additional conservatism by making the isolation setpoint at 600 cps.
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The inspector concluded that the licensee's response to the failure of the L
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Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor channels was' appropriate. The inspector also concluded from the magnitude by which the high calibration values were out of specification and the considerable conservatism in the set-i point that this event had minor safety significance. A timely resolution
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of the required tolerances for this system, however, is needed to prevent future technical specification required shutdowns. The inspector had no further questions.
5.0 Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector witnessed the performance of torus to drywell vacuum breaker l
monthly operability test. This operability test fulfills the plant l
technical specification r quirement of exercising the vacuum breakers L
monthly and verifying operation of position switches, indicators and l
l alarms. Only portions of the surveillance procedure 604.4.016 required to I
fulfill this technical specification requirement were performed.
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The inspector reviewed the test procedure and verified that proper administrative approvals were obtained prior to start of the surveillance.
The technicians performing the test were familiar with the requirements, adequate radiation control coverage was provided and the test data met
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the acceptance criteria. The inspector verified that the vacuum breakers
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were all closed after completion of the test, and the required fire watch i
was implemented when a fire barrier was opened to provide access to the
torus area in the reactor building where the vacuum breakers are located.
l No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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Monthly M_a ntenance Observation (62703)
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6.0 j
l The inspector observed partial completion of the following maintenance items on the emergency service water (ESW) system:
Removal of ESW System I annubar and checking for any plugging of
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instrument.
Replacement of ESW System II keep fill line check valve.
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ESW pump 528 replacement.
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s The inspector reviewed the work packages for appropriate work
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authorization and system safety tagging.
The inspector verified that appropriate QA/QC review was made and hold / witness points applied. QA
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surveillance was provided during ESW pump 528 replacement, which was done
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as an immediate maintenance.
Radiation control measures for the work
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crinditions involved were appropriate.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
7.0 Engineered Safeguards Feature System Walkdown (71710)
A system walkdown of the Emergency Service Water System was conducted on August 16 and 17.
No unacceptable conditions were identified. A de-tailed description of this walkdown is documented in Inspection Report
50-219/89-80, e
8.0 Radiation Protection (71707, 93702)
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8.1 Radiation Protection Observation During entry to and exit from the RCA, the inspectors verified that proper warning signs were posted, personnel entering were wearing proper dosimetry, personnel and materials leaving were properly
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monitored for radioactive contar.ination, and monitoring instruments were functional and in calibration.
Posted extended Radiation Work permits (RWPs) and survey status boards were reviewed to verify that they were current and accurate.
The inspector observed activities in the RCA to verify that personnel complied with the requirements of applicable RWPs and that workers were aware of the radiological conditions in the area.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
8.2 Radiation Reduction (71707, 93702)
During August, rising radiation levels were observed around the fuel pool heat exchangers. The licensee was concerned with these levels because maintenance on the "B" fuel pool heat exchanger was scheduled.
Additionally, the levels of radiation were approaching the point at which the area would become a locked high radiation area.
In response to this problem, the licensee took corrective action to l
reduce the radiation levels in the area.
The fuel pool heat exchangers have historically caused radiological concerns.
Contributing to this radiological problem are the con-figuration of the fuel pool cooling system with the filters down-stream of the heat exchangers and the tendency of the heat exchangers
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In 1986, the heat exchangers were
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Since 1986 the radiation levels at the heat exchangers had slowly increased to over 400 mrem /hr on contact.
Recent work in the spent fuel pool has caused silt to be stirred up.
Consequently, radiation levels have
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increased sharply to 750 mrem /hr.
Technical specifications require i
the area to be locked if levels reach 1000 mrem /hr.
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The licensee formulated plans to flush the heat exchangers to reduce
the radiation levels.
The normal fuel pool cooling configuration is
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one fuel pool pump and two heat exchangers in service. This configuration provides approximately 150 gpm flow through each heat exchanger. Technical Functions evaluated the operation with two
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pumps and one heat exchanger in service and concluded that there were no structural or operational problems.
The licensee decided to flush the heat exchanger with only one pump and one heat exchanger in service. This configuration provided approximately 300 gpm flow through each heat exchanger. After the flush, the radiation levels were reduced significantly from 750 mrem /hr. to 90 mrem /hr.
The licensee is monitoring levels on the heat exchangers and evaluating the implementation of either periodic flushing of the heat exchanger or operation with a one pump /one heat exchanger configuration. The inspector concluded that the licenbee's actions were positive in : educing radiatiot levels and consistent with the ALARA philosophy.
Continued effort in this area will improve the plant's radiological condition.
9.0 Observatio.' of physical Security (71707)-
During daily tours, the inspectors verified that access controls were in
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accordance with the Security Plan, security posts were properly manned, I
protected area gates were locked or guarded and that isolation zones were free of obstructions. The inspectors examined vital area access points to l-verify that they were properly locked or guarded and that access control l
was in accordance with the security plan. No unacceptable conditions were l
identified.
10.0 Loss of M1A Main Transformer Cooling l
On 8/11/89, after starting the "A" reactor feed pump, several M1A main transformer cooling pumps and fans tripped. As a result of the loss of
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these auxiliaries, transformer oil temperatures rose rapidly reaching a i
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maximum temperature of 108 degraes Celsius. The operators took prompt I
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action by reducing reactor power and taking the generator off line.
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reactor was placed in hot standby until repairs and other corrective
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L actions were effected. The generator was brought back on line on 8/12/89.
The licensee's review determined the loss of the cooling auxiliaries to
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the M1A main transformer was initiated by the starting of the "A" reactor i
feed pump.
The pump start caused a large voltage drop (greater than 800
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i volts) on the "A" 4160 volt bus.
The voltage drop in the 4160 volt bus was reflected in the 480/240 transformer which supplied power to the M1A i
main transformer auxiliaries. As a result of the lowered voltage, the
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cooling pumps and fans drew higher currents causing individual fuses to y
blow. Six of the eight fans and three of the four pumps tripped.
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f The Itcensee tock several immediate corrective actions. All the fan and
pump fuses were replaced. Oil samples from the transformer were taken to
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L determine potential Insulation damage. No damage was detect s.
Degraded I
ground and instrument wires on the phase tjucts which were d
.ged were re-i placed. Plant load upon initial operation was limited to 375 MW electric for several dayr until additional oil samp.es were taken to confirm no damage.
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Procedural changes were made requiring ths shifting of the power supply to l
auxiliaries to the emergency 480/240 transf ormer when starting the "A" reactor feed pump. Operators were briefed on the events e d procedure changes, The M1A main transformer and its auxiliary equipment were recently installed to replace the original M1A transformer which fal;ed in June.
The original transformer auxiliaries operated on 480 volt power.
The new transformer auxiliaries operate on 240 volt power.
Consequently, two
480/240 transformers were installed, one from the "A" 4160 volt bus tupplying normal power and one from the dB" 4160 volt bus supplying emergency power.
The licensee believes that the 480/240 transformer has high impedance. This high impedance compounded the effect of the voltage drop because the resulting increase in current csused voltage to drop
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further.
During the planned MIB main transformer installation in
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September, the licensee plans to replace the 480/240 transformer with a transformer with half the impedance.
This reduced impedance is expected to prevent future trips of the cooling auxiliaries.
l The action taken by the licensee in response to the transformer problem is
adequate. Operator actions were prompt and prevented potentially serious damage to the main transformer. The inspector had no further questions.
11.0 Previvusly Open Inspection Finriings (92700)
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(Closed) Unresolved ' tem 86-37-04.
This unresolved item addressed the need for formal adminHtrative control for tracking the electrical load growth.
In response the licensee committed to formalize the " Electrical Distribution Configuration Data Sheet" in an administrative procedure.
The incoector reviewed Procedure 5000-ADM-7311,03 (EMP-014), Revision 3-04, "iroject Res ew," and determined that responsibility and requirement d
to review proposed olent n.odification for changes to e1Ntrical loads had been inccrporated.
The procedure requires the use of a data sheet to identify the change in electrical loading and for final review and approval.
In addition, Procedure 124.2, Revision 0, " Control of Plant Engineering Dit acted Replacements and Modifications," requires review of
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the Procedure EMP-014 data sheet to determine if any engineering
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configuration concerns apply.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved item 85-38-04 This item was unresolved pending
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licensee's action to revise the station procedure for installation of l
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Raychem splites to ensure that QA is informed.
The revised Procedure
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A300-SME-3780.03, Revision 2, includes steps which require QA to be i
notified prior te any work involving Raychem splices.
It. also requires that Raychem splicing be verified by QC.
Station maintenance work
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controlled by short form are routed to QA prior to initiation of the work.
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The above procedure is included in the package if Raychem splicing is e
i involved. QA implements necessary hold points for immediate maintenance i.
where QA is verbally informed.
The implementation of Procedure
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A100-SME-3780.03 ensures QA notification and splicing verification.
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inspector interviewed an electrical job planner and a job coordinator and d!d not have any further question.
This item is closed.
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12.0 Inspection Hours Summary (71707)
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Inspection ennsisted of 135 direct inspection hours out of a total of 310
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inspector hours on site.
Forty of these direct insp*ction hours were
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performed during backshift hours, and nine during deep backshift hours.
l 13.0 Exit Meeting
A summary of th-esults of the inspection activities performed during
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this report per!c. were made at a meeting with senior licensee management
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at the end of this inspection.
The licensee stated that, of the subjects
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discussed at the exit meeting, no proprietary information was included, i
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