IR 05000213/1990005
| ML20043G516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1990 |
| From: | Haverkamp D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043G515 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-90-05, 50-213-90-5, NUDOCS 9006200385 | |
| Download: ML20043G516 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-213/90-05 License No.
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Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06_141-0270
- Facility:
Haddam Neck Plant
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Location:
Haddam Neck, Connecticut Inspection Dates:
March 28 through May 8, 1990 Reporting Inspector:
John T. Shediosky, Senior Resident Inspector
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Inspectors:
Andra A. Asars Resident Inspector JohnT.Shedlop,SeniorResidentInspector Approved by:
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D 41 fg/A nald R. Haverkamp, Ch
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D6te Reactor Projects Sect n 4A Division of Reactop rojects Inspection Summary: Inspection on March PS - Mayy 8,1990 (Inspection Report No. 50-213/90-05)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine safety ins',ection by the resident inspectors. Areas reviewed included plant operations, radiological controls during thermal shield shipping and refueling cavity cleaning, primary system flushing, surveillance testing, an emergen:y preparedness training exercise, Plant Operations Review Committee activities, and written reports, i
Results:-See Executive Summary
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Plant Operations:
This was the sixth routine resident inspection during the 1989/1990 Refueling Outage.
Routine review conducted within this area identified no noteworthy findings.
Radiological Controls:
The licensee exhibited strong performance in worker radiation protection daring the cutting of the reactor vessel thermal shield segments, the installation of modifications to the reactor vessel lower internals and during the cleaning flushes of reactor coolant subsystems.
Thermal shield sections were shipped off site for disposal. A total of 220,045 Curies of material was shipped without incident.
Maintenance and Surveillance:
The final cutting of the thermal shield to allow for its disposal was completed.
The inspectors noted evidence of good preplanning during the decontamination and disassembly o,f,the special cutting equipment.
A series of extensive flushes was commenced to insure that reactor systems were free of debris.
Emergency Preparedness:
An emergency planning exercise was conducted by the licensee for training.
Security and Safeguards:
Modifications were in progress to allow for future cha+;es in the protected area boundary.
Engineering and Technical Support:
Visual' examinations made of'the pressurizer for cleanliness identified cracks in the interior surface stainless steel clad.
Safety Assessment and Quality Verification:
The-licensee on-site safety committee conducted comprehensive reviews of both
.the thermal. shield removal process and the. system cleanliness flush progra r s i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
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Summary of Facility Activities.......................................
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Plant Operations (71707, 71710, and 93702)*...........................
I 2.1 Operati onal Sa fety Veri fication.................................
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Radi ol ogi cal Control s ( 71707 )........................................
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Maintenance and Surveillance (61726, 62703, and 71707)...............
4.1 Ma'intenance Observation........................................
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4.1.1 Reactor Vessel Thermal Shield Disposal................
4.1.2 Reactor Vessel Lower Internals Modifications..........
1 4.2 Surveillance Observation........................................
4.2.1 Cleaning and Inspection of Reactor Coolant System Subsystems..........................................
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Emergency Preparedness (71707).......................................
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Security (71707).....................................................
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Engineering and Technical Support (37700, 37828, and 71707)..........
7.1 Indications of Defects in Pressurizer C1ad......................
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Safety Assessment and Quality Verification (40500, 71707, 90712, and
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92700)....................................................
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8.1 Plant Operations Review Committee...............................
\\x 8.2 R e v i ew o f W r i t t e n R e p o r t s.......................................
9.
Exi t I n t e rv i ews ( 30703 ).............................................
- The NRC Inspection Manual inspection procedure or temporary instruction that was used as inspection guidance is listed for each applicable report section.
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DETAILS 1.
Summary of Facility Activities The Fifteenth Refueling Outage continued during this inspection period.
Major work activities included shipping of the reactor vessel thermal shield sections and flushing of primary plant systems. All reactor fuel remained in the sppnt fuel pool.
2.
P_lant Operations 2.1 Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that the plant was operated safely and in accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements.
Regular inspections were conducted of the following plant areas:
control room security access point
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primary auxiliary building protected area fence
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radiological control point intake structure
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electrical switchgear rooms diesel generator rooms
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au,xiliary feedwater pump room turbine building
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Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for'conformance with technical specification (TS) requirements. Operability of engineered safety features, other safety related systems and on-site and off-site power sources were verified.
The inspectors observed various alarm condi-tions and confirmed that operator response was in accordance with plant operating procedures.
Routine operations surveillance testing was also observed.
Compliance with TS and implementation of appro-
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priate action statements for equipment out of service was inspected.
Plant radiation monitoring system indications and plant stack traces
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were reviewed for unexpected changes.
Logs and records were reviewed
4 to determine if entries were accurate and identified equipment status or deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover s,heets, system safety tags, and the jumper and lif ted lead book.
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Plant housekeeping controls were monitored, including control and t
storage of. flammable material and other potential safety hazards.
The inspectors also examined the condition of various fire protec-tion, meteorological, and seismic monitoring systems. Control room and shif t manning were compared to regulatory requirements and por-tions of shift turnovers were observed.
Control room access was pro-perly controlled and a profassional atmosphere maintained.
In addition to normal utility working hours, the review of plant operations was conducted for four hours o' backshifts (evening shifts). Operators were alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigue.
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Radiological Controls During routine inspections of the accessible plant areas, the inspectors observed the implementation of selected portions of the licensee's radio-logical controls progrcm. The utilization and compliance with radiation
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work permits (RWPs) were reviewed to ensure detailed descriptions of
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radiological conditions were provided and that personnel adhered to RWP requirements. The inspectors observed controls of access to various j
radiologically controlled areas and use of personnel monitors and frisking methods upon exit from these areas.
Posting and control of radiation
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l-areas, contaminated areas and hot spots, and labelling and control of con-
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tainers holding radioactive materials were verified to be in accordance with licensee procedures. During this inspection period, radiological controls for the following activities were observed.
reactor vessel thermal shield removal activities, and
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refueling cavity cleanup.
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These evolutions, which involved significant amounts of radioactive mate-rial, were performed without incident.
Report Section 4.1, below, deals
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with inspection findings from observations made of these evolutions.
Health physics technician control and monitoring of these activities was determined to be adequate.
4.
Maintenance and Surveillance 4.1 Maintenance Observation The inspectors observed various preventive and corrective maintenance activities for compliance with procedures, plant technical specifica-tions, and applicable codes and standards.
The inspectors also veri-fied the appropriate quality services department (QSD) involvement, safety tags, equipment alignment and use of jumpers, radiological and fire prevention controls, personnel qualifications, post-maintenance testing, and reportability.
Portions of activities that were re-viewed included:
4.1.1 Reactor Vessel Thermal Shield Disposal The reactor vessel thermal shield had been cut into three segments and removed from the core support barrel prior to this inspection period.
The first two segments were cut into pieces designed to be loaded into specific shipping cask liners. Ten shipments with these pieces were made prior to this report period.
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The remaining thermal shield segment was c', and shipped off site for disposal during this inspection period.
The final cut of the last segment was made on March 31; and, the last sections were shipped off site on April 25.
Three additional shipments of debris from the cutting operation
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are expected to be made later during this outage.
With the exception of one roller which had been used to support the thermal shield sections during the plasma are cutting evolution, all equipment was shipped as conven-tional low specific activity waste. A spot on the support roller became highly contaminated when hit by the plasma arc torch.
The roller, which had an underwater contact radiation level of 75 Rem, was unbolted and placed in a liner with the thermal shield debris.
The thermal shield sections and debris from the cutting
evolution were shipped off site for disposal using either the Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. Model 3-55 or Wastechem, Model TN-RAN shipping casks.
The shipments, which totaled approximately 220,040 Curies, were made without incident.
The plasma arc cutting equipment was removed from the reac-tor cavity, decontaminated, disassembled and packed for shipment off-site after its final use.
This evolution was completed without incident. Although complete decontamina-tion was not attempted, the licensee was successful in re-ducing contamination levels on the tools and the equipment by using an underwater high pressure jet.
The inspector noted that the plasma arc cutting equipment design incorporated features which facilitated its decon-tamination.
For example, it was designed to be operated within a large enclosure box in an effort to control debris generated by that process.
To aid in the decontamination and disassembly, the enclosure was made up of uniform size stainless steel panels. After decontamination and dis-assembly, each panel was packaged for shipment.
Effective packaging was accomplished with specially procured plastic bags sized for the panels.
This allowed for quick handling and lower personnel radiation exposure-than if each panel was individually wrapped with a plastic sheet.
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were then placed in a box for shipping.
The thermal shield support stand and the various lifting devices were coated to prevent corrosion and to facilitate decontamination.
There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
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I 4.1.2 Reactor Vessel Lower Internals Modifications The six reactor vesiel thermal shield lower support blocks
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were removed from the core support barrel between April 29 i
and May 6.
These blocks were disposed of along with debris from the thermal shield cutting process.
Upper support
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blocks, which were installed to provide temporary support I
for the thermal shield at the limiter key positions, were i
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then removed. All attaching bolts and pins and any bolt remnants were also subsequently removed.
Because the resulting holes from the displacement limiter key bolts and pins allowed for additional core bypass flow, flow blocking plates were installed. These were bolted in place and utilized a locking cup arrangement at the attach-ing bolt heads.
The second modification performed to the reactor lower in-ternals package during this inspection period consisted of the removal of a damaged vessel surveillance capsule holder chute.
The chute and some of the bolt remnant removal was performed using electron discharge machining (EDM).
The licensee had made an engineering consideration of the type
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of debris generated by EDM.
Damage to the reactor vessel-surveillance capsule chute occurred due to thermal shield movement during prior operating cycles.
There were no unacceptable conditions identified during these evolutions.
Several of the activities were supported by using divers working underwater within the reactor cavity.
The remaining activities associated with the overall modi-fication of thermal shield removal involve installing ex-
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ternal vessel neutron dosimetry and also installing flow blocking plugs within holes in the core support barrel
flange, where the material surveillance holders were re-moved.
4.2 Surveillance Observation The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use; technical specifi-cation frequency and action statement requirements were satisfied; necessary equipment tagging was performed; test instrumentation was in calibration and properly used; testing was performed by qualified personnel; and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
Portions of the following activities were reviewed:
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SUR 5.1-17A, Emergency Diesel Generator EG-2A Manual Starting
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and Loading Test, and ST 11.1-2, Reactor Coolant System Subsystem Cleanup.
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4.2.1 Cleaning and Inspection of Reactor Coolant System Subsystem An intensive effort was made to clean and inspect support systems of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). This was undertaken as part of an overall effort by the licensee to assure that these systems were clear of debris, Special test procedure ST 11,1-2, RCS Subsystem Cleanup, dated April 17, 1990 directed a sequence of high velocity water flushes from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) into the RCS through various subsystem flow paths.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR), High and Low Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI, LPSI), core deluge, charging header and pressurizer auxiliary spray piping was flushed with water driven by LPSI, RHR and primary water supply pumps.
During this inspection period procedure sections 6,1 through 6,6 were completed.
The test acceptance criteria required that the effluent particle size be less than 1/16"
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x 1/32" x 1/3?" following flushes with both specified mini-mum time duration and flow rates.
The borated water source, the RWST, had been extensively cleaned earlier.
The inspector reviewed the work in progress to the require-ments of ST 11.1-2 and its procedure changes No.90-259, 266, 269, 271, 275, 276, 277, 282, 287, 291, 292, 297, 298, 299 and 300. The procedure was found to be detailed and established a stepwise sequence of establishing the re-quired flow path, also requirements were stated for flow rates and time duration.
Pump and motor protection was addressed while operating equipment in off normal flow paths through limitations stated within the procedure.
Temporary flow paths established with spool pieces and hoses were controlled through the procedure and through the administrative jumper device controls - Plant personnel were observed to comply with the details stated within the procedure and instituted procedure changes where necessary.
There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
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Emergency Preparedness On May 3, the licensee conducted an Emergency Preparedness training exer-cise, The inspectors observed portions of the exercise from the control room and the Emergency Operations Facility. As part of the scenario, the
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licensee simulated an injured person requiring a search and rescue team dispatch.
NRC inspection of the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Plan
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i There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
6.
Security During routine inspection tours, the inspectors observed implementation of portions of the security plan. Areas observed included access point search equipment operation, condition of physical barriers, site access control, security force staffing, and response to system alarms and degraded condi-tions. These areas of program iniplementation were determined to be ade-
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quate.
The licensee has been preparing for future changes in the protected area boundary.
The work in progress was reviewed to insure that it did not compromise the present boundary. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
7.
Engineering and Technical Support 7.1 Indications in Pressurizer Cladding Following performance of ST 11.1-2, Reactor Coolant System Subsystem Cleanup, the licensee conducted visual inspections of the pressurizer
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to verify cleanliness.
On May 9, the visual inspections of the lower pressurizer head noted what appeared to be circumferential cracking around the strainer.
At the close of the inspection period, the licensee was conducting additional visual inspections of the pressurizer clad to characterize
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and determine the extent of the indications. These actions will be followed by the resident inspectors.
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. Safety Assessment and Quality Verification 8.1 Plant Operations Review Committee
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The inspectors attended several Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings.
Technical specification 6.5 requirements for re-quired member attendance were verified.
The meeting agendas included procedural changes, proposed changes to the Technical Specifications, Plant Design Change Records, and minutes from previous meetings.
PORC meetings were characterized by frank discussions and questioning of the proposed changes.
In particular, consideration was given to assure clarity and consistency among procedures.
Items for which adequate review time was not available were postponed to allow com-mittee members time for further review and comment.
Dissenting
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opin!ons were encouraged and resolved to the satisf action of the com-
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mittee prior to approval, lhe inspectors observed that PORC ade-
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quately monitors and evaluates plant performance and conducts a b
thorough self-assessment of plant activities and programs.
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8.2 Review of Written Reports
Periodic and Special Reports, and Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for clarity, validity, accuracy of the root cause and safety significance description, and adequacy of corrective action.
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inspectors determined whether further information was required.
The inspectors also verified that the reporting requirements of 10 CFR U
50.73, Station Administrative and Operating Procedures, and Technical
Specification 6.9 had been met.
The following reports were reviewed:
LER 90-03 Service Water Flow Rates Determined Inadequate During Special Test.
Haddam Neck Plant Monthly Operating Report 90-03, covering the period March 1,1990 through March 31, 1990.
Haddam Neck Plant Switchgear Building Bimonthly Progress Report No.
21, dated March 30, 1990.
Haddam Neck Plant Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report,
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covering the period January 1,1989 through December 31, 1989.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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Exit Interviews During this inspection, periodic me+e ings were neld with station manage-
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ment to discuss inspection observations and findings.
At the close of the inspection period, an exit meeting was held to summarize the conclusions of the inspection.
No written material was given to the licensee and no proprietary information related to this inspection was identified.
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In addition to the exit meeting for the routine resident inspection, the
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following meeting was held for an inspection conducted by a Region I based l
inspector.
Inspection Reporting Areas Report No.
Dates Inspector Inspected 213/90-07 April 16 -
C. Amato Emergency Preparedness April 20 4