IR 05000213/1990011
| ML20055F555 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1990 |
| From: | Dragoun T, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055F554 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-90-11, IEB-80-10, NUDOCS 9007180023 | |
| Download: ML20055F555 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-REGION I l
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Report No. 90-11
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Docket'No. 50-213
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License No. DPR-61
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Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee' Atomic Power Company
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P. O. Box 270
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Hartford, Connecticut 06141
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Facility Name. Haddam Neck Power Station l
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- Inspection At-Haddam Neck'. Connecticut x
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p Inspection Conducted: June 4-8, 1990-
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Inspect'or:
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p T..Gragoun, Senior Radiation Specialist date j
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- W. Pasciak, Chief, Fa-1 Fities Radiation
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Inspection Summary:-_ Inspection-on June 4-8,1990 (Inspection' Report No. 30-213/89-22)
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JAreas Inspected:
Routine inspection of the radiological controls program i
including control of outage work,-. ALARA, worker training,' corporate HP
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< support, tritium exposures, and followup to Bulletin 80-10.=
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Licensee action relative to Bulletin-
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D 80-10 was requested.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Licensee Personnel
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- E. DeBarba, Station Director M. Brown / Technical Training Manager L. Chatfield, Training Manager
- H. Clow, Health Physics Manager T._ Mcdonald, Technical Training Supervisor R. McGrath, Senior Engineer
- W. Nevelos, Rad. Protection Supervisor - Operat4 's M. Quinn, Chemistry Supervisor
- H. Siegrist, Supervisor - Rad. Protection (Cor arat?
- M. Sweeney, Rad. Protection Supervisor - Servis
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1.2 NRC personnel
- A. Asars, Resident inspector
- Attended the Exit Interview on June 8, 1990 2.0 Purpose The purpose of this routine radiation safety inspection was to review the following program elements:
-Control of Work
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-ALARA-Worker Training-Corporate Support-Tritium Exposures-Bulletin 80-10 Followup 3.0 Control of Work The licensee's programs to control the radiological hazards to workers during the extended outage were reviewed with respect to the criteria
. contained in 10 CFR 19 " Notices, Instructions, and Reports to Workers" and 10 CFR 20 " Standards for Protection Against Radiation".
Performance was determined from:
-Observation of work in.the Spent Fuel Building, radwaste processing, and work on the Charging Floor in the Reactor Containment Building.
-Interviews with Health Physics (HP) Supervisors, HP technicians and workers.
-Review of selected Radiation Work Permits (RWP)
-Observation of worker briefings.
Within the scope of this review, no violations were observed. Strengths and weaknesses were noted as follows:
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The RWP is effectively used to assess the radiological hazards and specify protective measures. The licensee has added an attachment to the RWP called the "1A" sheet that lists various precautions beyond the normal radiological concerns.
This additional information is useful for workers and HP technicians.
Most work is trovided with constant HP technician coverage. These technicians are all contractors but appeared to be very knowledgeable of the status of work in their assigned area. The plant equipment area is divided into large " zones" with a permanent house technician placed in charge of each zone.
Similarly, each zone has its own control point where the RWP for the zones are maintained and the workers and supervisors are briefed.
Surface contamination levels on the accessible areas of the plant'are quite low.
Protective clothing requirements are minimal except for jobs requiring contact with certain equipment. No hot particles were detected on components removed from the spent fuel pool or the refueling cavity.
However, the inspector noted that there was no operable frisking station at the access to the Spent Fuel Building or the Radwaste Building.
Workers must traverse the plant yard areas to use the friskers at the main control point.
Licensee management stated that in-field frisking had received reduced attention by workers and technicians due to the absence of problems.
However, steps would be taken to re-emphasize in-field frisking.
This matter will be reviewed in future inspections.
Cooperation and communications between HP personnel and workers appeared to be good.
Pre-job briefings for workers provided a thorough review of radiological conditions at the job as well as the controls required by the RWP. The inspector had no further questions.
4.0 ALARA The licensee's efforts to maintain personnel exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable ( ALARA) during the outage was determined from a review of selected RWP-ALARA forms and interviews with selected personnel.
Within the scope of this review, the inspector determined that the ALARA efforts are adequate and there are various efforts underway to improve performance.
These efforts include the use of a digitalized camera that saves pictures of machinery on a disc.
The pre-job survey dose rates and contamination.
levels are superimposed and the picture printed using a computer. The.
picture is then used to brief workers prior to the start of work instead of using a two dimensional survey map.
This presentation of survey data is very effectiv. - ---.
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'Some high radiation area doors are now equipped with a " talking sign" and
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strobe light. When the area is unlocked, a switch triggers a recorded warning about high radiation area entries.
This is broadcast from a
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speaker adjacent to the door. Meanwhile, the strobe light flashes as long as the door is kept open.
These measures supplement the normal controls
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required by the Technical Specifications.
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All engineering projects (plant modifications) are reviewed on site by a committee of HP personnel.
Projects that are judged to result in excessive radiation exposure relative to the improved plant safety are rejected. The inspector noted that the review was thorough and represents i
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an excellent effort.
The total st: tion exposure is 317 manrem to date, p imarily due to the l
extended outage to remove the thermal shield. Tne licensee projects a
year end total of 392.manrem.
This is above the PWR average.
In March 1990 the Station Director instituted an exposure reduction initiative program and assigned specific tasks to site departments
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y including Engineering, Maintenance and Plant Operations. Although this represents a good initiative at the station, it does not demonstrate the same level of broad effort,CYAPC0 management devoted to reducing
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industrial accidents.
There appears to be a lack of sensitivity to ALARA.
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For example, a -radwaste worker was observed' carrying a bag with a 5 mrem /hr contact dose rate, Accumulations of radwaste en the charging floor reading
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40 to 50 mrem /hr at the boundary raised the general area dose rates.
The Health Physics Manager stated that this matter would be reviewed.
5.0 Worker-Training i
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The general employee training program was reviewed with respect to the
requirements in 10 CFR 19.12 " Instructions to workers".
The inspector
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observed training classes'in' session, interviewed selected personnel and.
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reviewed selected records, In addition, the. inspector toured the main training facility which is located at the Millstone site and interviewed the training managers. Within the scope of,this review no violations.
were observed.
The onsite training classrooms are well equipped and comfortable.
Training aids are effectively used and the required material was adequately presented.
Training is conducted in two parts:- the first part'
encompasses industrial safety, security, emergency response and fitness
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.for duty; the second part covers radiation protection at level 1 for
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. inexperienced workers or level 2 for experienced workers who were trained
at another site within the previous year.
t The Millstone site training center was generally well equipped,
.particularly the Chemistry Laboratory.
The center continues to accumulate equipment to duplicate in plant hardware for student hands-on practice.
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The staff appeared to be highly motivated and enthusiastic.
Much effort is devoted to training contractor personnel who support the outage.
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Contracted HP ttchnicians are vigorously screened using an entrance exam i
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.-and then provided.on-the-job training tailored to their particular
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R-responsibilities. A similar program was initiated for mechanic tradesmen 3'
hired for the refueling outage. The training program to qualify in-house
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HP technicians was last used in 1987 since no new candidates have been.
hired as.aLresult of a stable staff.
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A new, procedure for continuing training of onsite HP supervisors became:
effective in May 1990 (RPM 1.2-4, " Exempt Personnel Training").
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approach is unique &nd innovative in that it mandates attendance at certain meetings to develop management skills along with annual.
requirements for formal train.ng.
The--licensee was' commenced for this-
initiative.
6.0= Corporate Support
A concern expressed by the NRC in recent inspection reports and in the Systematic Appraisal.of Licensee Performance (SALP) report.is that the-support to the site by the corporate HP branch was decreasing, particularly inlthe area of audits.
During this inspection, the inspector discussed the services provided by the Radiological Assessment Branch {RAB)
(corporate):with the _ Supervisor, Radiological Protection (corporate).
In late-1988 the mission of the RAB was realigned resulting i_n the transfer of two ALARA engineers to the site.
RAB involvement is now.
. limited to providing general guidanca in the ALARA practices manual.
lne long term goal for auditing is to complete a review of all subjects.
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in NUREG-0855 " Health Physics Appraisal" on a three year cycle.
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will reouire an average of two audits per year. An audit of the ALARA
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. program was in progress during this inspection.
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The inspector tated that the role-of the RAB is.now clear and there are
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no.further questions.
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7;0- Tritium'
-During inspection 89-22 the inspector noted many cases of apparent
tritium exposure.
This matter was reviewed further through a review of
records, interviews with selected personnel, and observation of tritium
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sampling in the work zones and found not to be of concern.
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- The licensee controls tritium exposure by conducting routine analysis of spent fuel pool water. An engineering study determined an action level-for. pool water such that the exposure at the water surface would reach
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This action level has never been reached.
In addition, a-bicassay (urinalysis) is completed on any. worker suspected of receiving
10-MPC-hour ~or more based cn air sampling. Ali bioassay results have
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Ebeen negative.
The licensee stated that the forms used to documant i.he bioassay results will be rewricten for clarificatici.
The inspector had m further questions.
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f 8.0 Polletin 80-10 Followup
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Bulletin 80-10, issued by the NRC on-May 6, 1980, required.all licensees
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are considered as nonradioactive but could possibly become radioactive, through interfaces with radioactive. systems. The licensee responded in a letter dated June 23,.1980.
NRC Inspection No. 81-11 found the licensee evaluation incomplete in that gas. systems such as -instrument air wre not considered.
The SALP report issued on October 20, 1982 indicates a
. licensee commitment to submit the additional information by November 30, 1982. This matter was never closed.
W In February 1989 a routine HP survey of the outside yard areas found that
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a " clean" drain had been used to dispose of contaminated water, This N
drain was identified in the 1980 study as a pathwat ' hat required plugging.
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In the latest. Annual: Radioactive Effluents Dose Report submitted by the
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licensee on March 28, 1990, positive levels of I-131 were detected in tb vegetation samples close to the site boundary. These anomalies may be
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associated with an unmonitered release path.
As a result of'these matters, the licensee was requested to take.the following. actions:
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Complete the evaluation of non-iiquid pathways to allow closure of.
Bullet'ni80-10.
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Verify that remedial action for unmonitored pathways in the original-and.' subsequent evaluatfons is completed.
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- Review the adequacy of'
- the origir.al encineering evaluation of unmonitored pathways conducted in 1980 (EN-M0-153) in view of the recent environmental sampling results.
These matters remain unresolved and will be reviewed in a future-inspection.
(50-215,'0-11-01)
9.0 Exit-Interview
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The inspectcr met with the licensee personnel denoted in Section 1.1 at the conclusion of,this inspection on June 8, 1990. The scope and
.. findings relative to Se'ctions 3.0 through 7.0 were discussed at that time. Additional discussion relative to the findings in Section 8.0 twere discussed by the resident inspectors during the week of-June.11, 1990.
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