IR 05000213/1990009
| ML20043G863 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1990 |
| From: | Amato C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043G859 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-90-09, 50-213-90-9, NUDOCS 9006210206 | |
| Download: ML20043G863 (9) | |
Text
a r..
.
'
.
.
-
,
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
,
Region I Report No.
50-213/90-09 Docket No.
50 213 License No.
DPR-61 Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Comnany P. O. Box 270 Hartford. Connecticut 06101 0270 Facility Name:
Haddam Neck Plant
.
Inspection Conducted: May 18-20.1990 i
Inspection At:
Berlin and Haddam. Connecticut i
Inspectors:
O M- <breM NL * n /?9#
C. G. Amato,' Emergency Preparedness
' date Specialist, Region I A. Asars, RI, Haddam Neck Plant i
W. Raymond, SRI, Millstone Point l
F. Hasselberg, NRR/PEPB
Approved by:
b
/
My lo W. J. Lafarus, Chief, Emerd$ncy Preparedness
~
date Section, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Inspection Summary: Insnection on May 18-20.1990 (Inspection Report No. 50-213/90-09)
.
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced, emergency preparedness inspection and l
l-
- observation of the licensee's full participation emergency preparedness exercise conducted on May 19, 1990. There was extensive participation by personnel of the
,
L State of Connecticut and 17 local Towns. The inspection was performed by a team of l
three Region I personnel and one NRC headquarters specialist.
Results:
One unresolved item and three exercise weaknesses were identified. The i
licensee response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
p$p2ggggggj8 l
i-
___
--
,,.
_ -,.,,...
-
.
.,
.
.
.
,
,
e
>-
DETAILS
.
1.0 Persons Contacted The following Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company and Northeast Utility Service Company staff members attended the exit meeting.
W. Buch, Senior Site Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Millstone E. DeBarba, Station Director, Haddam Neck Plant g
'
P. Luckey, Senior Nuclear Trainer, Training Department E. Molloy, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Section c
W. McCance, Senior Site Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Haddam Neck Plant E. Mroczka, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations L Osiecki, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator R. Rodgers, Manager, Radiological Assessment Branch W. Romberg, Vice President, Nuclear Operations The inspectors also interviewed and observed the actions of other licensee personnel.
2.0 Emergency Exercise The Haddam Neck announced, full-participation exercise was conducted on May 19,1990, from 6:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. The State of Connecticut and 17 local
_
Towns participated.
2.1 Pre exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to NRC Region I on February 7,1990, were reviewed and, following revision, determined to be adequate to test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On March 14,1990, the licensee submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluation.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario which allowed adequate testing of the major portions of the Haddam Neck Plant Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures and also provided the
,.
~
opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action. NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on May 18, 1990. Suggested NRC changes to the scenario made by the licensee were discussed during the briefing. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disruption to normal plant activities.
...._ _ _ _
'
I.
'
.
t
.
.
e
'
2.2 -
Exercise Scenario
<
The exercise scenario included the'following events:
1.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture resulting in a 1,000 gallon per minute primary to secondary system leak rate; 2.
Declaration of a Site Area Emergency (leak rate exceeds make up
,
capacity);
3.
Isolation of the affected steam generator; 4.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system placed in service; 5.
Interfacing System Loss of Coolant Accident (Event 9) (RHR line
,
break within the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB));
!
6.
Failure of the safety injection and charging systems; 7.
Declaration of a General Emergency-Bravo (loss of two fission product barriers with the potential loss of the third);
8.
Fuel over heat, clad damage and release of the gap fraction; l
9.
Release of radioactive material to the environment via the PAB
-
ventilation system; i
10.
Calculation of projected dose and dose commitment, and i
deployment of field teams; i-
IL Declaration of a General Emergency Alpha (site boundary dose in
'
excess of Protective Action Guide dose limits);
12.
Development of Protective Action Recommendations; i
13.
Charging system returned to service and RHR system isolated from
the Reactor Cooling System; and, l
L 14, Release of radioactive material to the environment teiminated.
l l
2.3 Activities Observed
!
During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made
,
.-
s
--
.
.
.
'
..
.
-
.
,
detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities and tlic Emergency Response Organization staff, and actions of the Emergency Response Organization staff during operation of the Emergency Response Facilities. The following activities were observed:
1.
Use of the correct control room procedures; 2.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events;
!
3.
Direction and coordination of emergency response; 4.
Notification of licensee and State of Connecticut and Town personnel and communication of pertinent plant status information
,
to State personnel;
,
5.
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; 6.
Assessment and projection of off site radiological dose and
.-
consideration of protective actions; 7.
Severe accident analysis; and, i
l 8.
Accident mitigation.
l 3.0 Classification of Exercise Findings L
Emergency preparedness exercise findings are classified as follows.
<
l l-3.1 Exercise Strengths L
Exercise strengths are areas of the licensee's staff response that provide strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant
!
conditions and implement the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
3.2 Exercise Weaknesses Exercise weaknesses are areas of the licensee's response in which the performance was such that it could have precluded effective implementation of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in the event of an actual emergency in the area being observed. Existence of an
.
-
-
-
-
-
-.
- - - - -
Ih,
,. -
r
,
e-
.
-
.
exercise weakness does not of itself indicate that overall response was inadequate to protect public health and safety.
3.3
' Areas for Improvement An area for improvement is an area which did not have a significant negative impact on the licensee's ability to implement the Emergency P:an Implementing Procedures and response was adequate. However, it should be evaluated by the licensee to determine if corrective action could improve performance.
.
,
4.0 -
Exercise Observations
!
The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation of the Emergency Response Organization, Emergency Response Facilities, and use of these facilities were j
generally consistent with their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan
.
Implementing Procedures. The following strengths, exercise weaknesses and
!
r
.
areas for improvement were identified, i
!
4.1 Control Room i
The following exercise strengths were identified, i
,
l
!
l-
l 1.
Reactor operators tracked plant conditions closely at all times, kept ahead of the scenario and made excellent use of Emergency Operating Procedures to isolate the malfunctioning steam
,
L generator.-
!
l
!
l No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
p 4.2 Technical Sunnort Center i
!-
l The following exercise strengths were identified.
1.
The staff made very good use of various information sources.
2.
The staff developed innovative suggestions and problem solutions.
3.
The staff challenged plant conditions and identified vulnerabilities, including the loss of coolant accident.
L
!
.
-
- - - - -.
I.
.
.,
.
,
.
!
4.
The staff developed contingency plans to cope with potential RHR '
l problems when this system was placed in service.
No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified, i
4.3 Emergency Operation Center
!
1.
Excellent Manager of Security and Security staff actions were j
noted.
'
,
No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
4.4 Corporate Emergency Operation Center
-
1.
There was excellent severe accident analysis by the Technical f
Support Group staff.
2.
This staff challenged plant conditions and identified vulnerabilities including the loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
3.
The staff correctly identified the LOCA as an Event V.
,
4.
Staff developed a list of what could go wrong with the plant and
possible corrective actions.
5.
There was very good support of the Northeast Utility Team at the Connecticut State Emergency Operations Center.
6.
The selection of the release model based on plant conditions, and l
l use of the Imminent Core Damage Dose Projection procedures by
!
the Manager, Radiological Consequence Assessment as the preferred procedure was very realistic.
i
7.
There were-very good briefings by the radio net controller of the I
l Environmental Monitoring Teams as to plant conditions and
classification.
l I
l No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified.
<
\\
.
.
..;
.
-
.
1.
The Protective Action Recommendation was not posted, and there was no feedback to staft or other Emergen,cy Response Facilities as to any protective actions implemented by the State.
2.
The Technical Support Group did not continue to develop corrective actions and assumed the actions of Emergency Repair Teams 2 and 4 would be successful.
.
4.5 Operation Suoport Center (OSC)
No exercise strengths were identified.
i The following exercise weaknesses were identified.
1.
The OSC Manager and Assistant OSC Manager were not able to
"
effectively operate and manage the activities of the OSC. Specific l
examples include the following.
The managers did not follow and/or deviated from the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. This was noted during the 1989 exercise (see Section 5.0). OSC staff did not remain in the OSC at all times, and this forced the managers to leave the OSC to locate needed staff. The OSC staff was not
,
L briefed on plant conditions and accident classification. Additionally, Emergency Response Team (ERT) members were not briefed, or not adequately briefed, prior to dispatch into the field. Status boards were often not maintained, and when maintained, information was confusing or not complete (see Section 5.0). This is an exercise weakness (50-213/90-09 01).
2.
The OSC managers and staff did not properly plan repair activities.
This resulted in the teams either being unprepared for plant conditions, or unprepared to conduct the maintenance activities assigned. Specific examples include the following.
i To terminate the release, repairs had to be made by containment entry and manual valve operation or restoration of electrical power
'
after a cable vault entry. An ERT was assembled, briefed and dispatched to the containment hatch. Containment entry was
!
not made. This team was then diverted to the cable vault without being recalled for a briefing or being given a radio / telephone briefing. Repair actions were therefore delayed and subsequently 1'
..
.
.
,
.
.
.
l not made. The release to the environment continued throughout J
this period. ERT Health Physics briefings did not establish turn-back dose thresholds. Health Physics personnel accompanying the ERTs during periods of changing plant conditions did not take air samplers or high range, non saturable survey instruments. ERTs were not instructed to return or leave an assigned area if unforeseen conditions develeped. During one occasion, there was no discussion about tools needed for electrical work. One ERT did not have Health Physics support or a radio to maintain communication while in plant. This is an exercise weakness (50-
-1 213/90-09-02).
4.6 Exercise Control No exercise strengths were identified.
No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified.
,
1.
On one occasion a controller handed players the Controllers Evaluation Manual opened to Section 7, Players Rules. This i
document contained the scenario.
2.
Closed copies of the Controllers Evaluation Guide were left unattended by controllers in at least two Emergency Response Facilities.
3.
The controller assigned to ERT No. 4 did not contact the OSC controller for instructions when this team was diverted to the cable vault and did not advise the OSC controller as to the delayed entry
of the ERT into the vault. This resulted in the release being
!
terminated by controller action, rather than by re. pair team action.
5.0 1.icensee Actions on Previously identified Items Areas for improvement were identified in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/89-04 regarding the OSC. Specifically, the OSC functions were not conducted in accordance with the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and status boards were not maintained current or adequately.
These areas were not corrected. In fact, these areas were repeated and
-
.
-
. -
-
-
.
eL e.
,,
.
..
-
.
.
i performance deteriorated such that exercise weaknesses were identified regarding the operation of the OSC (see section 4.5) The licensee's corrective actions for j
the areas identified in the 1989 exercise consisted of replacing the individual responsible for the identified areas. No other corrective acions were apparently taken, and this action was not sufficient to correct the identified concerns. This is unresolved (UNR 50-213/90-09-03).
6.0 Licensee Critioue The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on May 19,1990 during which the licensee's lead controllers and observers discussed observations of the
exercise. The licensee's critique was constructive and thorough except for the
,
Operations Support Center (OSC). The licensee did not identify any of the problems associated with the OSC, nor did they recognize that they were repeat concerns from the 1989 exercise. The licensee's objective 11, which states in part that they must demonstrate the ability to self-critique their performance, was not adequately met. This is an exercise weakness (50-213/90-09-04).
7.0 Exit Meeting l
Following the licensee's self critique, the NRC team met with the licensee's i
representatives listed in Section 1 on May 20,1990 to discuss findings as detailed in this report. The licensee agreed tnat the findings discussed would be
,;
L
' evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken.
L l
The NRC team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
'
The licensee was advised one unretolved item and three exercise weaknesses were identified. The NRC team also determined that within the scope and l
limitation of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated they could
'
implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
'
.
(
a
.
m
-
--
-