IR 05000213/1981017
| ML20041E575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1982 |
| From: | Elsasser T, Tanya Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041E564 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-81-17, NUDOCS 8203110103 | |
| Download: ML20041E575 (7) | |
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DCS Nos. 50213-811222 50213-820108 50213-811119 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I Report No.
50-213/81-17 Docket No.
50-213 License No. DPR-61 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Haddam Neck Plant Inspection at:
Haddam, Connecticut Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
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L40 2/J!84 T.H. SMITii, Senior Resident Inspector date signed date signed date signed Approved by:
gudo c// f8k T.C. ELSMSER, Chief, Reactor Projects
/dat6 signed Section 1B, Division of Resident and Project Inspection Inspection Summary:
Inspection on December 7,1981 - January 17, 1982 (Report No. 50-213/81-17)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspector of plant-operations including tours of the facility; log and record review; licensee
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action on previous inspection findings; operating events; Licensee Event Reports; review of periodic and special reports and review of plant design changes. The inspection involved 64 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector.
Results_: No violations were identified.
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Region I Form 12
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(Rev. April 77)
82O3110103 820219 PDR ADOCK 05000213
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
G.H. Bouchard, Maintenance Supervisor R.E. Brown, Operations Supervisor T.W. Campbell, Instrument and Control Supervisor H.E. Clow, Health Physics Supervisor J.H. Ferguson, Unit Supervisor R.L. Gracie, Operations Assistant R.H. Graves, Station Superintendent G.R. Hallberg, Security Supervisor D.J. Ray, Engineering Supervisor R.Z. Test, Station Services Superintendent Other licensee staff and operating personnel were also interviewed during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action On Previous Inspection-Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (213/80-26-01):
Failure to properly search personnel entering the protected area. The licensee has instituted a search program to ensure regular plant employees are properly searched when both the portal and hand-held explosives and metal detectors are not functioning.
Licensee action on this item is acceptable.
(Closed) Noncompliance (213/80-22-03):
Failure to follow plant chemistry procedures. The inspector checked the in-use chloride indicator solution and verified that it was labeled correctly. The inspector-also reviewed procedures PM 9.4-3.3, " Radioactive Determination of Liquid, Gaseous, and Particulate Samples: and CHDP 2.15, " Radiochemical Analyses Performed by Vendor Laboratories" to verify that the licensee had completed the action -
specified in the CYAPC0 letter of March 6, 1981. Licensee action on this item is acceptable.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (213/80-10-02): Follow-up on IAL dated October 17, 1980. This item was reviewed and foud to be satisfactory in NRC inspection report 50-213/81-0.
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3.
Review of Plant Operation - Plant Inspections a.
During the course of the inspection, the inspector conducted multiple tours of the following plant areas:
-- Control Room
-- Primary Auxiliary Building
-- Vital Switchgear Room
-- Diesel Generator Rooms
-- Turbine Building
-- Intake Building
-- Control Point
-- Security Building
-- Yard Areas b.
The following observations / determinations were made:
-- Radiation protection controls. The inspector reviewed or observed the following:
Radiation Work Perm *ts (RWP) in use, personnel compliance with RWP's, routine rad'atior area surveys, posting of radiation and high radiation areas and use of protective clothing and personal r,nitoring devices. No unsatisfactory conditions were identis ed.
-- Monitoring instrumentation.
Control room instruments were observed for proper operation, correlation between channels and that the displayed parameters were within technical specification limits.
No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
-- Equipment lineups. The inspector verified thit selected valves and breakers were in a position or condition required by the technical specifications.
In this area, an in-depth review was conducted of the operation and system alignment of the Component Cooling Water System and the Service Water System. No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
-- Control room annunciators. Lighted annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken. On average, only one or two annunciators were lighted on each control room visi.
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-- Plant housekeeping controls.
Plant housekeeping controls were observed including control and storage of flamable material, control of potential safety hazards and licensee action to control the spread of surface and airborne contamination. No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
-- Fluid leaks, piping vibrations.
All areas toured were examined for evidence of fluid leaks and piping vibrations.
None were found.
-- Fire protection / prevention. The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas.
Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact.
Cable trays were clear of debris.
-- Control room manning. The inspector verified that control room manning requirements of the technical specifications were being met.
-- Security. During the inspection, observations were made of plant security including adequacy of physical barriers, access control, vehicle control, and searches. No unacceptable conditions were identified. On January 7, 1982, the contractor guard force was changed from Interstate Security Services to Burns International Security Services.
No problems were encountered during the changeover period.
4.
Shift Logs and Operating Records a.
The inspector reviewed selected operating logs and records against the requirements of the following procedures:
-- ADM 1.1-5, Control Room 0 prating Log;
-- QA 1.2-14.1, Bypass and Jumper Control;
-- ADM 1.1-43, Control Room Area Limits for Control Operators;
-- NOP 2.2-2, Steady State Operation and Surveillance;
-- ADM 1.1-44, Shift Relief and Turnover;
-- QA 1.2-2.4, Housekeeping Requirements;
-- QA 1.2-16.1, Plant Information Reports; and
-- QA 1.2-14.2, Equipment Control.
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b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
-- Control Room log sheet entries are filled out and initialed;
-- Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialed;
-- Control Room Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration;
-- Operating Orders do not conflict with Technical Specifications;
-- Plant Information Reports confirm there are no violations of Technical Specification requirements; and
-- Logs and records are maintained in accorance with Technical Specifications and the procedures noted above.
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The following operating logs and records were reviewed:
-- N0P 2.2-2, tog sheets which consist of Control Room, Part 1 and 2, Primary Side Surveillance Form, Secondary Side Surveillance Form, and Radiation Monitoring System Daily Log;
-- Shift Turnover Sheets;
-- Jumper Log;
-- Tag Log; and
-- Control Room Operating Log.
5.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report includes the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; planned corrective action is adequate for resolution of identified problems; determination whether any information in the report should be classified
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as an abnormal occurrence; and the validity of reporte0 information.
i Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:
Monthly Operating Report 81-11 for the month of November 1981.
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Monthly Operating Report 81-12 for the month of December 1981.
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No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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Operating Events
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At 3:03 a.m., December 22, 1981, the reactor tripped from full power caused by reactor coolant system high pressure. The sequence of events, which caused the high pressure condition, was initiated by the failure of the control air line fitting to the high level dump valve on the feedwater system Heater Drain Tank (HDT). The sequence was:
Loss of control air caused the HDT high level dump valve to fail open.
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Heater drain pumps cycled due to low level in the HDT.
Main Feed Pump "A" tripped on low suction pressure.
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Reactor trip from high pressure at 2300 PSIG.
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When the main feed pump tripped, the operator manually reduced electrical load to attempt to bring power down to within the capability of one main feed pump. However, the primary system power reduction rate was less than that of the secondary system and the resulting power mismatch caused the high pressure trip.
Primary system average temperature reached a maximum
of 565 F.
Both pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves opened momentarily at 2270 PSIG and closed properly when pressure was reduced after the reactor trip. Temperature and pressure returned to normal immediately after the plant tripped. All systens functioned normally during the event. The control air line to the HDT high level dump valve was repaired and the reactor was taken critical. Power operation resumed later in the day.
A body to bonnet leak on boric acid system valve BA-V-388, in the common discharge line from the two boric acid pumps, necessitated isolating both pump discharge lines leaving only one operable boric acid flow path.
During power operation, the technical specifications require that.two of the three possible paths for boric acid injection to the primary plant be operable. Accordingly, at 6:45 a.m., on January 8,1982, a plant shut down was initiated. While the shut down was in progress, the licensee contacted the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and requested temporary.elief from the technical specifications for a period of time sufficient to repair the leaking valve with the system in its isolated configuration.
At about 10:45 a.m., the relief request was granted. The licensec terminated the shut down and returned the plant to full power. At 1:15 p.m., repairs were completed and the boric acid system was tested and. returned to a normal configuration.
No unacceptable conditions were identified during the review of these plant events, i
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7.
Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The following LER's were reviewed to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of the cause and i.ne adequacy of the corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required, and whether there were generic implications. The inspector also verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Station Administrative and Operating Procedures had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken and that the continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits.
81-19 Charging Pump bearing vibration above ISI action level.
During routine inservice inspection, the
"B" charging pump bearing vibration exceeded the ISI program action level. Worn bearing parts were replaced and a satisfactory retest was performed.
8.
P1 ant Design Changes The inspector reviewed several changes made to portions of the plant which changed the facility as described in the Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report. The changes were p<rformed through several mechanisms: equipment jumpers, tagouts, and the formal Plant Design Change Request system. The inspector verified that the changes were reviewed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and that safety evaluations had been written documenting that the changes did not involve unreviewed safety questions.
In several instances, the inspector concurred with the licensee assessment that 10 CFR 50.59 reviews were not required.
In meetings with licensee management, the inspector stressed the fact that use of equipment jumpers or tagouts may constitute a facility design change and that appropriate reviews must be performed. The inspector will review this area during subsequent routine inspections.
9.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior licensee management personnel to discuss inspection scope and findings.