IR 05000213/1981012
| ML20038B806 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1981 |
| From: | Elasser T, Tanya Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20038B793 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.E.4.1, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-TM 50-213-81-12, NUDOCS 8112090117 | |
| Download: ML20038B806 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-213/81-12 Docket No.
50-213 License No. DPR-61 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Haddam Neck Plant Inspection at:
Haddam, Connecticut
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Inspection conducted e tember 14 - October 30, 1981 Inspectors:
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l.H. smitn", Senior Resident Inspector date signed date signed date signed
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Approved by:
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T.C. Elsashmf Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 1B, Division of Resident and Project Inspection Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 14 - October 30, 1981 (Report No. 50-213/81-12)
Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspector of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of licensee events; operating events; review of periodic and special reports; surveillance observation and review of TMI Action Plan items. The inspection involved 81 inspector-hours by the resident NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12'
(Rev. April 77)
9112090117 811123 PDR ADOCK 05000213 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
G.H. Bouchard, Maintenance Supervisor R.E. Brown, Operations Supervisor r
T.W. Campbell, Instrument and Control Supervisor
H.E. Clow, Health Physics Supervisor
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J.H. Ferguson, Unit Superintendent R.L. Gracie, Operations Assistant R.H. Graves, Station Superintendent G.R. Hallberg, Security Supervisor R.Z. Test, Station Services Superintendent Other licensee staff and operating personnel were also interviewed during the course of the inspection.
2.
Review of Plant Operation - Plant Inspections a.
During the course of the inspection, the inspector conducted multiple
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tours of the following plant areas:
-- Control Room
-- Primary Auxiliary Building
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-- Vital Switchgear Room
-- Diesel Generator Rooms
-- Turbine Building
-- Intake Building
-- Control Point
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-- Security Building
-- Yard Areas
-- Containment Building
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b.
The following observations / determinations were made:
-- Radiation protection controls. The inspector reviewed or observed
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the following: Radiation Work Pemits (RWP) in use, personnel compliance with RWP's, routine radiation area surveys, posting of radiation and high radiation areas and use of protective clothing and personal monitoring devices.
No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
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-- Monitoring instrumentation.
Control room instruments were observed for proper operation, correlation between channels and that the displayed parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
i No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
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-- Equipment lineups. The inspector verified that selected valves and breakers were in a position or condition required by the technical specifications.
-- Control room annunciators. Lighted annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were under-stood and corrective action, if required, was being taken. On average, only one or two annunciators were lighted on each control room visit.
-- Plant housekeeping controls. Plant housekeeping controls were observed including control and storage of flamable material, control of potential safety hazards and licensee action to control the spread of surface and airborne contamination. No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
-- Fluid leaks, piping vibrations. All areas toured were examined for evidence of fluid leaks and piping vibrations. None were found.
-- Fire protection / prevention. The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment.
Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas. Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact.
Cable trays were clear of debris.
-- Control room manning. The inspector verified that control room manning requirements of the Technical Specifications were being met.
-- Security.
During the inspection, observations were made of plant security including adequacy of physical t'arriers, access control, vehicle control, and searches.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
-- Maintenance, testing and surveillance. During routine tours after plant shutdown for refueling, the inspector observed routine main-tenance, testing and surveillance activities in progress throughout the plant.
No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
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-- Refueling Limiting Conditions for Operation. The inspector verified that refueling Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation were being satisfied.
-- Refueling activities. The inspector verified that refueling prerequisite plant conditions, tests, and inspections were satisfied during the course of refueling operations. Refueling activities in the control room were witnessed and compliance with Technical Specifi-cations and applicable precedures were verified.
Fuel status boards were inspected for accuracy and the manning in the control room and on the refueling floor were confirmed to be in accordance with applic-able requirements.
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3.
Shift Logs and Operating Records a.
The inspector reviewed selected operating logs and records against the requirements of the following procedures:
-- ADM 1.1-5, Control Room Operating Log;
-- QA 1.2-14.1, Bypass and Jumper Control;
-- ADM 1.1-43, Control Room Area Limits for Control Operators;
-- N0P 2.2-2, Steady State Operation and Surveillance;
-- ADM 1.1-44, Shift Relief and Turnover;
-- QA 1.2-2.4, Housekeeping Requirements;
-- QA 1.2-16.1, Plant Information Reports; and
-- QA 1.2-14.2, Equipment Control.
b.
Shift Logs and Operating Records were reviewed to verify that:
-- Control Room log sheet entries are filled out and initialed;
-- Auxiliary log sheets are filled out and initialed;
-- Control Room Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration;
-- Operating Orders do not conflict with Technical Specifications;
-- Plant Information Reports confirm there are no violations of Technical Specification requirements; and
-- Logs and recoras are maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications and the procedures noted above.
c.
The following operating logs and records were reviewed:
-- N0P 2.2-2, Lag sheets which consist of Control Room, Part 1 and 2, Primary Side Surveillance Form, Secondary Side Surveillance Form, and Radiation Monitoring System Daily Log;
-- Shift Turnover Sheets;
-- Jumper Log;
-- Tag Log; and
-- Control Room Operating Lo.
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4.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 were reviewed by the inspector. This review included the following considerations:
the report includes the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; planned corrective action is adequate for resolution of identified problems; determination whether any information in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence; and the validity of reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:
-- Monthly Operating Report 81-9 for the month of September 1981.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The following LER's were reviewed to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of the cause and the adequacy of the corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required, and whether there were generic implications. The inspector also verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and Station Administrative and Operating Procedures had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken and that the continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits.
81-14 Diesel generator cooling system leak. The diesel closed cooling system cooler experienced tube leaks after a test run. The leaking tubes were plugged.
81-15 Crack in exhaust duct to main stack. A split seam in the exhaust duct to the main stack was discovered by the licensee. The split allowed approximately one percent of the exhaust flow to bypass the stack. The split was repaired.
81-16 Residual heat removal (RHR) system leak rate in excess of technical specification limits. The leakage was reduced to within technical specification limits within the four hours allowed.
6.
TMI Action Plan Items a.
Item II.E.4.2.7 Radiation Signal on Purge Valves 1.
Requirement Containment purge and vent isolation valves must close on high radiation signa _
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2.
Inspection Findings In a letter from Counsil to Eisenhut dated May 20, 1981, the licensee has taken exception to the requirement that a containment high radiation signal be provided to close containment purge and vent isolation valves. The licensee provided the following justification.
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The 42-inch purge valves and the 8-inch bypass valves are manually operated valves which are not opened during any operating mode.
b.
Technical specifications require the valves to be closed to establish containment integrity.
c.
The valves are locked closed during operation.
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The three-quarter inch containment vent valve is used infrequently and is automatically closed on a contain-ment high-pressure signal.
The licensee's position on this item will receive further considera-tion by the NRC.
b.
Item II.E.4.2.5.b. Containment Isolation Pressure Setpoint 1.
Requirement The containment setpoint pressure that initiates containment isolation for nonessential penetrations must be reduced to the minimum compatible with normal operating conditions.
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2.
Inspection Findings l
In a letter from Counsil to Crutchfield dated July 17,1981, the
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licensee provided analysis and justification for the present I
containment isolation setpoint of 5 PSIG. To account for the repeatability of the pressure switches and to ensure a trip occurs
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at 5 PSIG or less, the licensee has reduced the trip setpoint to 4.7 PSIG.
Licensee action on this item is acceptable, i
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Item II.E.4.1.2 Dedicated Hydrogen P_enetrations 1.
Requirement Plants using external recombiners or purge systems for postaccident combustible gas control'of the containment atmosphere should provide containment penetration systems for external recombiner'or purge systems that are dedicated to that service only, that meet the redundancy and single-failure requirements of General Design Criteria 54 and 56 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, and that are sized to satisfy the flow requirements of the recombiner or purge system.
2.
Inspection Findings The following documents were reviewed by the inspector.
-- Counsil to Denton letter dated December 31,1980.
-- Crutchfield to Counsil letter dated September 3,1981.
In a letter, Counsil to Denton dated December 31, 1981, the licensee described the two presently _ installed systems which would be used-to reduce combustible gas concentrations within the containment. The primary system is the containment air particulate monitoring system and the backup is the containment purging system.
In both instances the hydrogen is purged with outside air and vented through charcoal and HEPA filters before it is released through the plant stack. The licensee also reemphasized the fact that fuel cladding at the Haddam Neck Plant is stainless steel, not zirconium.
The licensee's system to control postaccident combustible gases was found to be-acceptable by NRR. Documentation of those findings is contained in a Crutchfield to Counsil letter dated September 3, 1981.
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Item II.B.4.2.B Training for Mitigating Core Damage 1.
Requirements Licensees are required to develop a training program to teach the use of installed equipment and systems to control or mitigate accidents in which the core is severely damaged. They must then implement the training progra...-
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Inspection Findings The licensee and a contractor of the licensee have developed a satisfactory training program entitled " Operation with a Damaged Core". This program has been implemented, but due to an earlier than expected refueling outage all required personnel have not attended the training. Training will be provided to those persons by December 18, 1981. All licensed on-shift operations personnel who are involved with control board manipulations on a daily basis, including STAS, have completed the program.
Licensee action on this item is satisfactory. The inspector will review the program when all training has been completed.
7.
Operating Events On October 23,1981, the 125-ton containment polar crane was apparently overstressed and failed. At the time of the incident, the crane was attached to the reactor vessel head lifting rig which in turn was attached to the The h~ ad was installed with the studs and nuts in place but vessel head.
e not tensioned. Removal of the head lifting rig from the head was the next operation to be performed. The crane was used to take the weight of the lifting rig off the three connecting bolts to allow their removal. The crane apparently continued to lift after it was " bumped" up to lift the weight of the rig. The crane gear mechanism failed allowing the cable to unreel and the hook to fall over. There was no damage to reactor system components and no personnel injuries.
Conservative calculations made by the licensee indir. ate a maximum crane load of 450 tons.
At the time of the incident all 52 reactor vessel studs were installed with the nuts hand tight. Calculations indicated that the crane load distributed over only three or four of the studs would have been less than the load applied during normal stud tensioning. The lifting lugs on the reactor head and the lifting rig were inspected by the licensee.
No deformation was noted.
The licensee is considering what, if any, additional inspection and examination must be performed on the head lifting lugs and lifting rig prior to their next use.
Refueling activities were continued with a duplicate crane mechanism.
8.
Surveillance Activities a.
Requirements
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Technical Specification 4.3.A requires that a test be performed each refueling to demonstrate proper automatic operation of the core cooling systems. Requirements of the test are summarized below.
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The two independent core cooling systems will be tested separately.
A test signal will be applied to initiate a loss of normal AC power to each of the emergency power systems while a coincident signal is applied which initiates the operation of the emergency core cooling equipmen.
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2. Verification shall be made that the diesel generator and its associated pumps have started in the proper sequence and that the high pressure safety injection, low pressure safety injection and charging pumps attain the proper discharge heads.
3. The test is satisfactory if all components have operated and sequenced properly.
b.
Docunents Reviewed 1. SUR 5.1-18-C, " Test of Emergency Diesel Generator EG-2A with Partial Loss of AC Coincident with Core Cooling Actuation".
2. SUR 5.1-19-C," Test of Emergency Diesel Generator EG-28 with Partial Loss of AC Coincident with Core Cooling Actuation".
c.
Inspection Findings The inspector reviewed the preparations made by the licensee and witnessed the performance of the above surveillance tests. The inspector verified that test instrumentation was properly calibrated, that approved procedures were used, that work was performed by quali-fied personnel and that the acceptance criteria were met.
No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
9.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior licensee management personnel to discuss inspection scope and findings.
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