IR 05000155/1980019
| ML19341D345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1981 |
| From: | Boyd D, Parker M, Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341D343 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-80-19, NUDOCS 8103050403 | |
| Download: ML19341D345 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/80-19 Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI Inspection Conducted: December 8, 1980 to January 9, 1981
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Inspector:
G. C.
'right j
f f k M. E. Parker s - 2 'I -B f Approved By:
D. C. Boyd, Chief f - E 7 WI Projects Section 4 Inspection Summary Inspection on December 8, 1980 to January 9, 1981 (Report No. 50-155/80-19)
Areas Inspected: Routine Resident Inspector inspection of maintenance, IE Bulletin followup, IE Circular followup, Licensee Event Report followup, TMI-2 Task Action Plan verification and review of procedures pertaining to ATWS events.
The inspection involved a total of 126 inspector-hou.s onsite, by two NRC inspector.
Results: No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
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' t DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- C, J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent
- C. R. Abel, Operations & Maintenance Superintendent
- D.
E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
- R.
E. Schrader, Technical Superintendent
- A. C. Sevener, Operations Supervisor
- J. J. Popa, Maintenance Engineer
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R. Fisher, Q.A. Analysist J. A. Johnson, Instrument & Control Supervisor D. D. Herboldsheimer, Outage Coordinator H. E. Black, Maintenance Supervisor F. J. Valade, Shift Supervisor The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including operations and maintenance personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Maintenance Activity The inspector reviewed and observed the maintenance activities pertaining to the preparation, removal and insertion of a control rod drive. The inspector verified administrative controls in force, testing provisions and provisions for return to service.
No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review
of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that report-
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ability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accom-plished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
(a) LER 80-09 (closed): Six month leakage tests for the equipment and
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the personnel locks to the containment building not performed in a timely fashion.
(b)
LER 80-28 (closed): RDS Sensor Channel D Out of Service.
(Refer to LER 80-31)
(c) LER 80-29 (closed):
RDS Channel D Battery Cell 12 low specific gravity.
(Refer to IE Report 80-13 paragraph
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4 for further information on Battery Low specific gravity.)
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(d) LER 80-31 (closed):
RDS Sensor Channel D Out of Service.
After further investigation it was determined that the differential pressure capsule was defective. 'The capsule was replaced.
(e) LER 80-32 (closed):
RDS Sensor Channel D Out of Service.
(Refer to LER 80-31, note that event date for LER 80-32 is before that of LER 80-31).
(f) LER'80-34 (closed): MSIV Closure Time Out of Spec.
Investigation by licensee revealed that hardened packing material on the stem was causing the slow closing time. The licensee is going to use a combination of ribbon and braided graphite packing. The licensee feels that by using braided and ribbon packing that a high degree of leak tightness will be acheived due to the ribbon packing and the stem will be maintained clean by the " cleaning" action of the braided packing.
No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
IE Bulletin Followup IR-80-19 -- 12/8 - 1/7/81 For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described
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in the written respon.
(a)
IEB 79-26 Revl. (closed):
" Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades" The licensee's response to Rev. 1 indicated that all information requested and time frame were included in and satisfied by the January 4, 1980 response to the original bulletin.
(b)
IEB 80-13 (closed):
" Cracking in Core Spray Spargers" The licensee replaced the original core spray sparger during 1979 with one manufactured from materials less susceptable to IGSCC.
The licensee examined the old sparger and did not find any indications of cracking. The licensee further proposed inspecting the new sparger on a 40-month schedule rather than every refueling outage as specified
by the bulletin. Discussions with IE Headquarters indicated that due to the new materials used in the replacement sparger that the reply
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is acceptable.
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e (c)
IEB 8G-16 (closed):
" Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc.
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Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with either ' A' or 'D' Output Codes" The licensee identified one instrument which fell into the category in question. Evaluation of the instrument determined that the instrument upper limit of 3000 psig versus the maximum accident pressure of 1380 +/-5 psig (reactor trip) negates the potential problem discussed in the bulletin.
(d)
IEB 80-21 (closed):
" Valve Yokes supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc."
(e)
IEB 80-23 (closed):
" Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation" No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
IE Circular Followup
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For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verfied that the Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was l
performed, and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appro-
priate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
f (a)
IEC 80-11 (closed):
" Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures" The licensee addressed their review toward both the emergency diesel generator and the diesel driven fire water pump. Review indicated that only permanent type glycol anti-freeze is used with no additional additives. As such no further action required.
(b)
IEC 80-18 (closed):
"10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Chan8es to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems" (c)
IEC 80-21 (closed):
" Regulation of Refueling Crews" Refueling activities at Big Rock Point requires fuel elements to be moved one at a time within a cask from the reactor vessel to the fuel pool. The use of the cask requires operation of the main crane which is performed by an auxilary operator (the individual may or may not have a license). The activities involving the auxilary operators are limited to positioning of the cask to accept or discharge a fuel element. The actual grappeling of the fuel element or positioning of the fuel element is performed by licensed opera tors.
It is also to be noted that all the activities of the auxilary operators are directed by licensed personnel.
(d)
IEC 80-22 (closed):
" Confirmation of Employee Qualifications" l
No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Survey to Determine Existance of Adequate Emergency Procedures for Coping with ATWS Events at Operating Power Reactors.
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The inspector reviewed selected licensee procedures to verify that the following events situation are adequately covered.
(a) - Failure to scram when required.
(b) - Failure to complete scram when initiated automatically or manually.
(c) - Inability to move or drive control rods.
(d) - Failure to automatically scram when a parameter exceeds its trip valve.
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(c) - Criteria for use of the liquid poison system.
(f) - Reactor trip or scram.
(g) - Anticipated transient without scram.
(h) - Authority and responsibility of the control operators governing the use of the Liquid Poison System.
The procedures reviewed are as follows:
(a) - SOP 1 Rev. 16
" Reactor Operation"
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(b) - S0P 4 Rev. 2
" Liquid Poison System"
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(c) - GOP 4 Rev. 7
" Reactor Trip Recevery"
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(d) - ONP 2.8 Rev.
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" Single Rod Insert Failure" (e) - ONP 2.9 Rev.
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" Multiple Rod Insert Failure (Two or More)"
(f) - ONP 2.31 Rev. 5-
" Reactor Scrams" (g) - ALP 1.2 Rev. 9 -
"NSSS Annunciator Tabulation No. 1" (h) - EMP 3.5A Rev. 1-
" Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)"
The review concluded that the procedures appear to be adequate to handle the situations described.
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It should be noted that due to the design of Big Rock Point that two (listed
below) of the items listed in Section 4 of IE Bulletin 80-17 have been modified.
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(a) Big Rock Point does not move the mode switch to a "... position other than RUN" following a scram. The mode switch at BRP does not have a "Startup/ Hot Standby" position, as such all activities involving j
startup, heat up and power operation are conducted with the mode switch in "RUN."
Mode switch position is altered in the following conditions:
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(1) The mode switch is placed in " shutdown" if multiple rods fail to insert, to insert another scram signal into the reactor protection system.
(2) The mode switch is placed in " Bypass Dump Tank" to allow reseting l
of the reactor protection system if a high scram dump tank level
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scram is present.
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-s (d) Due to the small number of control rods, the criteria for entering the procedures governing multiple rod failures is two or more. The criteria for entering the ATWS procedure, which includes manually tripping the reactor recriculation pumps, is two or more rods failing to fully insert
and reactor power is greater than 4%.
No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
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Review of Completion Status, THI-2 Action Plan Items at Big Rock Point The inspectors reveised the THI-2 Action Plan Items listed below to ascertain the status of each per request of Mr. J. H. Sniezek, Director, Division of Resident and Regional Reactor Inspection. The review was telecopied to Region III on January 9, 1981.
(a) TAP # I.A.I.1:
Verified that STA training program was in place, that all STA's were trained and that all STA's were degreed engineers.
(b) TAP # I.A.1.3:
Verified that the licensee was conforming to the overtime limitations even though no formal commitment to do so has been made by the licensee.
(c) TAP # I.A.2.1.(4):
Verified that the licensee has instituted the revised R0/SRO training and requalification pro-gram outlined in their letter of August 6,1980.
It is to be noted that the licensee is waiting on formal approval of the revised training program.
(d) TAP # I.C.5:
Verified that a program for " Feedback of Operations Experience" was in place.
Reviewed Big Rock Point procedure 16.18 section 5.4.2. revision dated October 13, 1980.
(e) TAP # I.C.6:
For verifying " Performance of Operating Activities"
the licensee utilizes independent verification of tagging orders when system is removed from service for maintenance. Return-to-service is accomplished by one auxilary operator clearing tags with the Control Room Operator verifying that all tags have been returned and a Shift Supervisor review of the tagging order. Post-maintenance functional testing of the system is used to verify operability.
(f) TAP # II.E.4.2.(Sa): Verified that the licensee had submitted a revised containment high pressure set point.
Implementation of the change is scheduled for July 1, 1981.
(g) TAP # II.E.4.2.(6):
Verified that the licensee met the staff's interim position for containment purge and vent. Valve
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operation of October 23, 1979.
By meeting the above position the present requirement to close and the
valves is not applicabic.
(h) TAP # II.K.3.9:
Not applicable to Big Rock Point.
(i) TAP # II.K.3.22a:
Not applicable to Big Rock Point.
(j) TAP # III.D.3.3:
Verified that the licensee's commitment to have
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an upgraded iodine monitoring capability had been completed. A multi-channel analyzer (200 channel)
has been placed such that accurate analysis of silver zeolite air sample cartridges may be per-formed.
No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Review of Licensee Response to IE Bulletin 80-24 Prevention of Damage Due
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to Water Leakage Inside Containment
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i The inspector activities described in Section III parts 1 and 3 were performed by NSSI Inspectors and forwarded to IE Headquarters on January 9,1981. The inspection activities for Section III part 2 are as follows.
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The inspector verified that licensee's response accurately describes the mechanical and electrical equipment installed at the facility.
A review of calibration records and maintenance orders revealed that the
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containment level switches had been inspected in June of 1980.
No calibration /
inspection records exist for the Reactor Enclosure clean and dirty sump high
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level indicators (Note that no specific requirement now exists for these l
calibrations). The inspector verified that the licensee has now included the
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sump high level switches on their periodic calibration schedule. The inspector
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determined that existing surveillance procedures appear to be adequate to detect uncontrolled leakage.
It is to be noted that the bihourly tours referenced in the response are not controlled by procedure and are not specifically in-tended to detect leakage / sump overflow. The licensee has committted to re-
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vise the bulletin response to indicate the tours are normal operating practives and not' surveillance procedures.
(50-155/80-19-01)
The inspector verified that the operators have sufficient information available to detect leakage in a reasonable time period. Once leakage has been detected an entry into containment would, in all probability, be required to determint.
the location and isolate the leak.
The licensee has not proposed any interim surveillance measures as it is felt that existing activities, i.e., bihourly rounds and the daily leaks rate surveillance procedure, are sufficient.
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The inspector verified that a revision to the plant administrative procedures has been made pertaining to the reportability of service water leakage in containment.
No apparent items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee personnel (denoted in paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection and. summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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