IR 05000089/1987003

Insp Rept 50-089/87-03 on 871217.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Bypassing of Reactor Safety Interlock & Insp Procedures 40750,90712 & 92700 Addressed

ML20195J166
Person / Time
Site:	General Atomics
Issue date:	01/07/1988
From:	Russell J, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195J164	List: IR 05000089/1987003 ML20195J161
References
50-089-87-03, 50-89-87-3, NUDOCS 8801260223
Download: ML20195J166 (5)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No.:

50-89/87-03 Docket No.:

50-89 License No.:

R-38 License:

GA Technologies, Inc.

P. O. Box 81608 San Diego, California 92138 Facility Name:

TRIGA Mark I Inspection at:

GA Technologies.Torrey Pines Site Inspection Conducted:

December 17, 1987 Inspector:

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/6-VI J g dssell, Radiation Specialist Date Signed Approved by:

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G. P. (t11Hf Radiological Protection Section uhhs, Chief Date Signed

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Facili Summary:

Inspection on December 17, 1987 (Report No. 50-89/87-03)

Areas Inspected:

This was a special, unannounced inspection to evaluate the bypassing of a reactor safety interlock.

Inspection Procedures 40750, 90712

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and 92700 were addressed.

Results:

In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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8801260223 880108 PDR ADOCK 05000089

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted

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• K Asmussen, Manager, Licensing and Nuclear Compliance

• W.Whittemore, Physicist-in-Charge (PIC)

W. Stout, Deputy Physicist-in-Charge (DPIC)

L. Miller, Senior Reactor Operator (SR0)

• Denotes those individuals present at the exit interview on December 17, 1987.

2.

Initial Licensee Report

.0n November 2, 1987, the licensee notified the Region V office of an event on October 30, 1987, in which the DPIC rendered a Technical Specification (TS) Table II interlock ciriuit inoperable during trouble-shocting of a rod operation problem.

Follow-up notification was provided by a letter dated November 6, 1987, and received by the Region V office on November 9, 1987..The licensee report stated that, during startup of the reactor on October 30, 1987, the SR0 discovered that air pressure-could not be maintained on the transient control rod piston and, therefore, the central transient rod (CTR) could not be withdrawn. The DPIC investigated the problem, traced it to the operation of two micro switches on the CTR and effected a repair by bypassing one of the interlock micro switches.

Subsequently, during that shift, six steady state and one pursed runs were made. During the next shift, at approximately 10:00 p.m., October 30, another SR0 performing a routine weekly chect :ut, dixovered that air could be applied to the CTR regardless of the position of the cylinder, contrary to TS 5.2.2.

3.

NRC Onsite Follow-up A regionally based Radiation Specialist reported to the site on December 17, 1987, to review the event.

Based on a review of licensee records and procedures and discussions with personnel, the following was revealed.

The inspector reviewed the operations log and noted the log entry for 0820, 10-30, stated:

"CTR would not stay fired. Traced problem to air supply microswitch. Taped SW closed, tested and test sat.

Do not lower cylinder CTR is to be left up or down" There were seven subsequent runs of the reactor, six in steady state and one pulsed. Tht steady state power level was less than 250 kw and the maximum pulsed power level was 900 Mw. The rod worth of the CTR was noted as $2.69. During the steady state operations, the normal control rods; SAFE, SHIM and REG; are either full out with REG partially in or all three were partially in.

During steady state CTR was full out.

During the pulsed run SAFE and SHIM were full out, REG was partially in

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($0.41) and CTR was full in and the reactor was operating at less than 1 kw. To pulse the reactor CTR was fired to the full up position; power peaked at 900Mw in less than 30 ms; the reactor automatically returned to the steady state power level in less than 60 ms due to its negative fuel temperature coefficient; and average fuel. temperature peaked at approximately 480*C, It was_noted that control-circuitry, which was not effected by the disabling of the microswitch, prevents pulsing at steady

. state power-levels greater than 1 kw.

The inspector reviewed Operating Procedure XIII, Reactor Maintenance /

Repair, and noted the requirement that:

...In all cases involving repair or maintenance of a safety system,

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a SR0 shall be responsible for compliance with requirements of the Reactor License and Tech Specs. No repairs nor maintenance shall be allowed unless the SRO is aware of the operation and concurs with its performance. The operation will be performed under the direct supervision of an SR0 after the APIC or above has been notified."

...The cognizant SR0 shall be responsible for checking that the

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operation of the repaired or maintained system is verified as satisfactory and that all scram functions of safety operations affected by this operation are verified...."

The inspector reviewed the Operation and Protection System Logic Diagram and noted the two microswitches, "cylinder down" and "air supply," and their parallel function for control of the CTR. The diagram indicated no labels or component designations for the microswitches.

The inspector interviewed the DPIC and SR0 on duty at the time of the event. Their statements reflected the information provided in the written report, dated November 6, with the additions that the two microswitches provide a parallel enable function to the CTR enable circuit and that the microswitches are not labeled to distinguish one from the other. The DPIC stated that he confused the functions of the two switches although ne tested both during his check of the malfunctioning system. He stated that his confusion was due to the lack of labelling and the complementary function provided by the switches.

Operation of the cylinder, the CTR and the microswitches were observed and the system operated properly at the time of inspection.

Bypassing the cylinder down microswitch allowed application of air to the CTR in any position of its cylinder. However, during steady state operation both CTR and its cylinder are full-up and during pulsed operation the CTR is fired to the full-out position. As a worst case scenario, if the reactor had been operated in an off-normal condition with SAFE, SHIM and REG full-out and CTR full-in with its cylinder in the full-up position; additionally, if the ikw pulse interlock had also failed and then the CTR was inadvertently activated; the response of the reactor would not have been significantly different from a normal pulsed run, That is, core power would have peaked at approximately 900Mw, the core average temperature would increase to approximately 480*C and the reactor would have automatically returned to the pre-pulse power leve _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _.

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The inspector verified that the corrective actions specified in the licensee's letter dated November 6, 1987, had been implemented and appeared to be adequate to prevent recurrence.

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TS 5.2.2 reads:

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"During reactor operation, the applicable interlocks shown in Table 11 shall be operable."

Table II, Minimum Interlocks, reads:

"Action Prevented Mode in Which Effective

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Pulse

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Withdrawal of more than one X

standard rod

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Withdrawal of any staiMard rod X

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Application of air to transient X

rod unless its movable cylinder is fully down"

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The operation of the reactor in steady state with the cylinder down microswitch bypassed, allowing application of air to the transient rod with its cylinder in any position, is an apparent violation of TS 5.2.2.

TS 9.3, Written Procedures, reads in part:

"Written instructions shall be in effect for the following items.

The instructions shall be adequate to assure the safety of operation of the reactor but shall not preclude the use of independent judgement and action should the. situation require such.

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"f.

Routine maintenance of the control rod drives and recctor safety and interlock systems or other routine maintenance that could have an effect on reactor safety...."

The failure to perform tests, to assure that air could not be applied to the CTR in any position other than when its cylinder was fully down, subsequent to the bypass of the cylinder down microswitch as required by

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Operating Procedure XIII is an apparent violation of TS 9.3.

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Paragraph V, Enforcement Actions, provides that the NRC will not generally issue a notice of violation for a violation if (1) it was identified by the licensee; (2) it fits in Severity Level IV or V; (3) it was reported, if required; (4) it was or will be corrected, including measures to prevent recurrence, within a reasonable time; and (5) it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation.

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This event was identified by the licensee; it would normally be considered of Severity Level IV.as defined in Supplement I of _10 CFR 2, Appendix C; it was rnported by the licensee; the event was evaluated and corrective action was instituted which, it appears, will be effective to prevent recurrence; and it could not_ reasonably have been expected that the event could have been prevented by licensee corrective action for previous violations.

Therefore, ~no notice of violation will be issued for this event.

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Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in paragraph 1, at the conclusion of the inspection on December 17, 1987.

The scope and findings of the_ inspection were' summarized.

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