IR 05000089/1983001
ML20023C567 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | General Atomics |
Issue date: | 04/22/1983 |
From: | Johnson P, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20023C556 | List: |
References | |
50-089-83-01, 50-163-83-01, 50-163-83-1, 50-89-83-1, NUDOCS 8305170437 | |
Download: ML20023C567 (5) | |
Text
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T U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-89/83-01
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50-163/83-01 Docket Nos. 50-89 and 50-163 License Nos. R-38 and R-67 Licensee:
G. A. Technologies Inc.
P. O. Box 85608 San Diego, California 92138 Facility Name: TRIGA Mark I and Mark F Inspection at: Torrey Pines Mesa Inspection conducted: April 4-8, 1983 Inspectors:
n/n1 2[g3 P.11. Joh son, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved by:
1' E6 23 N D".'T."'Kiisth, Chie f Ddte Signed Reactor Projects Section 3 Summary:
Inspection on April 4-8, 1983 (Report Nos. 50-89/83-01 and 50-163/83-01)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of organization, logs and records, review and audit, procedures, surveillance, experiments, and the operator requalification program. The inspection involved 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br /> onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: One Severity Level V violation was identified (failure to conspicuously post a high radiation area - paragraph 10.c).
No deviations were identified.
8305170437 830425 PDR ADOCK 05000089 O
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. W. Parker, Director, Quality Assurance and Compliance Division R. A. Wolf, Secretary, Executive Committee
- D. C. Pound, Chairman, Criticality Safeguards Committee
- H. N. Wellhouser, Manager, Compliance Administration Department
- W. R. Mowry, Licensing Administrator
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- J. R. Shoptaugh, Associate Physicist-in-Charge
- W. A. Stout, Deputy Physicist-in-Charge
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K. G. Thompson, Health Physics Technician
- Indicates those attending the exit interview on April 8, 1983.
2.
Organization G. A. Technologies Inc. became owner and licensee of the TRIGA Reactor
. Facility in 1982, as discussed in a June 23, 1982 request for changes in the facility licenses. No changes in the organizational structure or staff associated with the facility had occurred since the previous
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inspection. The Physicist-in-Charge (PIC) of the TRIGA Facility reports through the Director, Materials and Chemistry, to the Vi'e President of Fusion and Advanced Technology, which is consistent with the Technical Specifications (TS) for both reactors.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Logs and Records
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Selective examination of the following operating logs and records for both facilities covering the period from January 1, 1982 through April 6, 1983 verified that they were being maintained consistent with license requirements.
Operating Logs Maintenance Logs Reactor Startup Checklists Reactor Shutdown Checklists Weekly, Monthly, Semi-annual, and Annual Checklists Irradiation Request Forms No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Review and Audit l
Discussions with licensee personnel and examination of the Criticality Safeguards Committee (CSC) Charter, membership, and meeting minutes for the previous two years established that review and audit functions were being conducted consistent with the requirements of the TS.
The licensee's 1981 and 1982 annual reports for the Mark I and Mark F reactors stated that no facility changes, tests, or experiments were performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 during these year.-
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The Technical Specifications'(TS) for both reactors state that the CSC members shall be selected by the Vice President or his designated alternate. The minutes of an Executive Committee meeting on March 7, 1983 assigned the Vice President, Power Reactor Programs, as the individual to whom the CSC reports. To ensure that the Vice President of Fusion and Advanced Technology (to whom the PIC reports) is also kept informed of CSC activities, the licensee stated that the distribution of CSC minutes would include both of the Vice Presidents.
(83-01-01)
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Operator Requalification Program The Operator Requalification Program is common to both the Mark I and Mark F facilities except for control manipulations. The operators are licensed for both. The inspector verified by discussions with operators and examination of records that the requalification program was t-ing performed consistent with the approved program. Only the three Senior Reactor Operators assigned to the facility staff were actively participating in the requalification program.
Licenses were also held by three other individuals who were not participating in the requalification program, and the licensee was aware that these operators would have to be recertified before performing licensed duties again. Records of operator review of abnormal and emergency procedures, examinations, reactivity manipulations, and supervisor evaluations for two individuals were verified to meet program requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Procedures The inspector reviewed the Administrative Procedures and Written Operating Procedures for both Triga facilities for technical adequacy and conformance to the technical specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Experiments The experimental program on both reactors consisted principally of activation analysis, neutron radiography, King furnace high-temperature studies of reactor fuel, various irradiations, and training exercises.
Through examinations of numerous Irradiation Request forms and discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector verified that the experiments had been appropriately reviewed and approved, potential hazards had been identified, reactivity effects on the reactor had been predicted beforehand and confirmed by measurement, and reactivity limits had not been exceeded.
No violations or deviations were identifie,
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8.
Surveillance Examination of operating logs, selected surveillance records, and procedures and discussions with licensee personnel indicated that surveillance requirements were being accomplished in a timely manner.
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Additionally, the records of several limiting conditions for operation, which do not have specific surveillance requirements, were examined to verify that they had not been exceeded. These included steady state power levels, maximum available excess reactivity, maximum reactivity insertion during transient operations, maximum reactivity worth of transient control rods, pool water conductivity and bulk water temperature.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Fuel Handling
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The inspector observed unloading of a portion of the Mark F reactor core in preparation for an experiment involving 1.5 MW operation with a small core (approximately 60 elements, including control rod followers). Fuel handling was done by a licensed SR0 with a second SR0 present at the console. Fuel moves were indicated on the loading diagram and in the Mark F Operating Log as required by the licensee's procedures.
Core excess reactivity was determined periodically during the unloading sequence and after recalibration of the control rods.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Independent Inspection The inspector observed completion of a startup checklist on the Mark F reactor and startup and operation (at various power levels) of both reactors, and conducted a tour of the facility.
Portions of an experiment (involving Mark F reactor operation at 1.5 MW with reduced core size) were also observed. Findings were as follows:
a.
The rod position indicator (electronic digital type) for Shim Rod No. I did not indicate all the time on the " hundreds" digit. The indica *.or's range was approximately 100 to 800 scale units, but it indicated only tens and units except in the 300-499 portion of the scale.
The operator was able to maintain an awareness of rod position oy watching the " tens" digit turn over. The inspector also observed that the power supply which provides power to the three l
nuclear instrument channels for the Mark F oscillated on one occasion after the console power was turned off and back on.
The operator stated that this condition had been observed previously, but that an instrument technician called to investigate could not
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determine the cause. The oscillation was apparent on the nuclear instruments' indication (particularly on the source range) but did
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not preclude normal use of the instruments. Neither of these
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conditions (rod' position indicator problem and power supply oscillation) was contrary to TS requirements, but both represented i
equipment problems which should be corrected. The licensee stated l
during a subsequent telephone conversation that the conditions would be corrected by July 1, 1983.
(83-01-02)
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b.
The licensee had been observing peeling of the epoxy coati.ig applied to the interior of the Mark F reactor pool. An SRO stated that this was being kept under control by periodic underwater vacuuming of the pool walls. Some blisters and small flakes were visible, indicating an apparent need for re-vacuuming. The inspector also observed that facility housekeeping needed to be improved. While no adverse impact on nuclear safety of the facility was identified, the conditions observed would make cleanup of an unforeseen contamination problem more difficult.
c.
The. inspector measured radiation dose rates at selected locations in the Mark F reactor room while an experiment involving 1.5 MW operation was in progress. A licensee-owned instrument with current calibration was used. This instrument indicated greater than 5 rem /hr gamma (the instrument's maximum reading) at the exit from the neutron radiography beam port. The radiation dose rate was greater than 500 mrem /hr gamma within approximately one foot of the beam port opening. A higher-range instrument used by a licensee health physicist indicated approximately 4.5 rem /hr gamma on the 50 rem /hr scale. A Snoopy being used by the health physicist also indicated greater than 2 rem /hr (the instrument's maximum reading) neutron dose rate at the beam port exit. Eight to ten people were in the Mark F reactor room at various times during the conduct of the experiment. Those present were observed to be wearing dosimetry devices. They were advised by the health physicist and an SRO to stay away from the vicinity of the beam port, and no one other than the health physicist was observed there. However, the inspector observed no "High Radiation Area" posting as required by 10 CFR 20.203(c)(1). An SR0 poi'nted out a "High Radiation Area" sign on a portable stand (approximately three feet high), but it was on the far side of the pool from the reactor room entrance.
It was also facing away from the entrance such that it would not have been seen by someone entering the reactor room.
The lack of proper posting of the high radiation area was determined to be a violation of 10 CFR 20.203(c)(1).
(83-01-03)
One violation was identified, as discussed in subparagraph 10.c above.
No deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on April 8, 1983. The inspector summarize the scope and findings of the inspection, as discussed in paragraphs 2 through 10.
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